Writ of Prohibition Archives

S-2015-672

Post author:Staff
Post published:June 15, 2016
Post category:S

In OCCA Case No. S-2015-672, the appellant appealed his conviction for Attempted First Degree Burglary. In a published decision, the court decided to dismiss the State's appeal and deny the petition for writ of prohibition/mandamus. The dissenting opinion was noted by one member of the court. This case involves Jeremy Scott Niederbuhl, who was charged on December 13, 2013, for trying to break into a home. After attending a barbeque at the homeowner's house, Niederbuhl returned hours later and attempted to enter the home through a door and a window. The homeowner, Mr. Scott, fired shots, hitting Niederbuhl, who then went to the hospital and remained there for two weeks. The legal process began in 2013 when the charges were filed. However, Niederbuhl only found out about the charges in late 2014 when he turned himself in for a different issue. His lawyer argued that there were important text messages between Niederbuhl and the homeowner that could help his case, but the State did not provide this evidence, leading to a significant delay in the trial. On July 17, 2015, the trial court dismissed the case, agreeing that Niederbuhl's rights to a speedy trial and due process were violated due to the State’s lack of action and bad faith. The court believed the State did not follow its obligation to turn over evidence, which was a significant factor in its decision to dismiss the case. The State disagreed with the trial court's dismissal and filed a motion to reconsider the ruling. However, the trial court decided it couldn’t consider this motion because the State already filed an appeal. The State then appealed the dismissal, claiming the trial court made errors in its ruling and that the dismissal did not follow legal procedures. However, the court decided that the State’s appeal was not valid since it did not follow specific laws regarding when the State can appeal a dismissal. In addition to the appeal, the State also filed a petition requesting an order based on their belief that the trial court made mistakes in its rulings. However, the appellate court concluded that the State did not meet the requirements to get an extraordinary writ, which is a special type of order. In summary, the appellate court dismissed the State's appeal and told the case to go back to the District Court for further actions. The petition for the extraordinary writ was also denied, indicating that the appellate court found no legal basis for the State’s claims.

S-2013-510

Post author:Staff
Post published:June 9, 2015
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-509 and S-2013-510, two individuals appealed their convictions for first-degree murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the dismissal of the charges against them based on their claim of immunity under the Stand Your Ground law. The court found that the appeal by the State of Oklahoma was not authorized to challenge the dismissal order. One judge dissented.

S-2013-509

Post author:Staff
Post published:June 9, 2015
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-509, Julio Juarez Ramos and Isidro Juarez Ramos appealed their convictions for first-degree murder. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling granting the Appellees immunity from prosecution under Oklahoma's Stand Your Ground law. #1 dissented.

PR-2006-120

Post author:Staff
Post published:April 18, 2006
Post category:PR

In OCCA case No. PR-2006-120, a petitioner appealed her conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug (methamphetamine) and driving without seatbelts. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petitioner's request for relief in part and deny it in part. One judge dissented. The case began when the petitioner was charged with possessing methamphetamine and driving without a seatbelt. She initially agreed to a plea deal with the state, which involved accepting guilt for the drug charge and a fine for the seatbelt violation. However, when the petitioner refused to follow through with the state’s conditions for the plea, she attempted to enter a non-negotiated or blind guilty plea. The judge refused to accept her blind plea and insisted she proceed to trial, stating she did not have an absolute right to plead guilty. The petitioner believed she should be allowed to enter her guilty plea without the state’s conditions. This disagreement led her to file a petition with the court seeking orders to either allow her to plead guilty or to prevent the judge from forcing her to go to trial. After reviewing the facts of the case, the court found that the petitioner had a clear legal right to have her guilty plea accepted if it met the necessary legal requirements. The court noted that it was a mistake for the judge to reject her plea without evaluating whether it was voluntary and if there was a factual basis for it. The court granted part of the petitioner’s request by directing the district court judge to conduct a hearing on her blind plea and accept it if it correctly fulfilled the legal standards. However, the court denied her request to have her plea regarding the seatbelt violation accepted, as that plea required the judge’s approval. The dissenting judge expressed concerns about whether the petitioner had truly shown that she was being harmed by the trial court's refusal to accept her plea, suggesting that any challenges to a guilty plea rejection should typically be taken up in direct appeals rather than with this type of petition. The dissenting judge also supported the trial judge's discretion, arguing that the right to a jury trial must be upheld. In summary, the court ruled that the petitioner should be given a chance to enter her guilty plea under the law, but that her plea regarding the seatbelt violation did not have to be accepted.

F-2000-948

Post author:Staff
Post published:January 14, 2000
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. PR-99-1326, the Petitioners appealed their conviction for murder and shooting with intent to kill. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that the mistrial declared by the judge was not justified and therefore double jeopardy bars the State from retrying the Petitioners. One judge dissented. The case began when the Petitioners were charged with serious offenses. The first trial ended in a mistrial, which the judge declared after issues arose during a witness's cross-examination. The attorneys raised concerns about whether the prosecution had failed to provide evidence that could help the defense. This evidence related to the witness's background and credibility. The judge felt that the defense attorney’s questions may have harmed the trial, which led him to call for a mistrial. However, after reviewing the trial's events, the court found that there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial. In other words, the situation did not require such an extreme remedy. The court felt that a warning could have been sufficient to address any perceived problems before resorting to declaring a mistrial. Ultimately, the review concluded that the judge made errors in declaring the mistrial and, as a result, the defendants could not be tried again for these charges. The opinion emphasized that once a jury is discharged without sufficient reason, it can lead to violating the defendants' rights under the double jeopardy clause, which prevents someone from being tried for the same crime twice.