MA-2018-987

  • Post author:
  • Post category:MA

In OCCA case No. MA-2018-987, Cox appealed his conviction for a criminal case that led to an accelerated sentence. In a published decision, the court decided that the District Court must prepare the appeal record and transcripts at public expense. The court noted that Cox was deemed indigent for the purpose of having an attorney appointed, but the District Court initially ruled that he had enough assets to pay for his transcripts. This created a problem because it delayed his appeal process. The court ultimately granted Cox's request for a writ of mandamus, which allowed him to move forward with his appeal without having to pay upfront for the transcripts. The decision was not unanimous, with some judges disagreeing.

Continue ReadingMA-2018-987

MA 2018-0296

  • Post author:
  • Post category:MA

In OCCA case No. MA 2018-0296, J.M.F. appealed his conviction for Lewd Acts with a Child. In a published decision, the court decided to grant his application for a writ of mandamus and remand the matter to the District Court. The court found that J.M.F. was personally indigent and entitled to receive transcripts at public expense for his appeal, despite the trial court's earlier ruling about his parents' ability to pay. One judge dissented.

Continue ReadingMA 2018-0296

S-2015-672

  • Post author:
  • Post category:S

In OCCA Case No. S-2015-672, the appellant appealed his conviction for Attempted First Degree Burglary. In a published decision, the court decided to dismiss the State's appeal and deny the petition for writ of prohibition/mandamus. The dissenting opinion was noted by one member of the court. This case involves Jeremy Scott Niederbuhl, who was charged on December 13, 2013, for trying to break into a home. After attending a barbeque at the homeowner's house, Niederbuhl returned hours later and attempted to enter the home through a door and a window. The homeowner, Mr. Scott, fired shots, hitting Niederbuhl, who then went to the hospital and remained there for two weeks. The legal process began in 2013 when the charges were filed. However, Niederbuhl only found out about the charges in late 2014 when he turned himself in for a different issue. His lawyer argued that there were important text messages between Niederbuhl and the homeowner that could help his case, but the State did not provide this evidence, leading to a significant delay in the trial. On July 17, 2015, the trial court dismissed the case, agreeing that Niederbuhl's rights to a speedy trial and due process were violated due to the State’s lack of action and bad faith. The court believed the State did not follow its obligation to turn over evidence, which was a significant factor in its decision to dismiss the case. The State disagreed with the trial court's dismissal and filed a motion to reconsider the ruling. However, the trial court decided it couldn’t consider this motion because the State already filed an appeal. The State then appealed the dismissal, claiming the trial court made errors in its ruling and that the dismissal did not follow legal procedures. However, the court decided that the State’s appeal was not valid since it did not follow specific laws regarding when the State can appeal a dismissal. In addition to the appeal, the State also filed a petition requesting an order based on their belief that the trial court made mistakes in its rulings. However, the appellate court concluded that the State did not meet the requirements to get an extraordinary writ, which is a special type of order. In summary, the appellate court dismissed the State's appeal and told the case to go back to the District Court for further actions. The petition for the extraordinary writ was also denied, indicating that the appellate court found no legal basis for the State’s claims.

Continue ReadingS-2015-672

C-2006-649

  • Post author:
  • Post category:C

In OCCA case No. C-2006-649, Robert Earl Richardson appealed his conviction for Shooting with Intent to Kill. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant Richardson's request to withdraw his guilty plea, which means he will get another chance for a trial. One judge disagreed with this decision. Richardson had originally pleaded guilty to a crime and was sentenced to twenty years in prison. After his sentencing, he wanted to change his mind about the guilty plea and asked to withdraw it. However, there were delays in hearing his request. Nearly four years after he first asked, a different judge finally listened to his case but did not allow him to withdraw his plea. Richardson argued that he didn’t fully understand what he was agreeing to when he pleaded guilty. Specifically, he claimed he was not informed that he would need to serve 85% of his sentence before being eligible for parole, which is known as the 85% Rule. This is important because it means a person might spend a long time in prison before they could have a chance to be released early. During the hearing about his request, Richardson’s lawyer said he usually informs clients about this rule but could not remember if he did so with Richardson. Since there was no clear proof that Richardson was informed about it, the court ruled that he could withdraw his guilty plea. The decision was to reverse the lower court's ruling, allowing Richardson to try again and have a fair trial where he can present his side of the story.

Continue ReadingC-2006-649

PR-2006-120

  • Post author:
  • Post category:PR

In OCCA case No. PR-2006-120, a petitioner appealed her conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug (methamphetamine) and driving without seatbelts. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petitioner's request for relief in part and deny it in part. One judge dissented. The case began when the petitioner was charged with possessing methamphetamine and driving without a seatbelt. She initially agreed to a plea deal with the state, which involved accepting guilt for the drug charge and a fine for the seatbelt violation. However, when the petitioner refused to follow through with the state’s conditions for the plea, she attempted to enter a non-negotiated or blind guilty plea. The judge refused to accept her blind plea and insisted she proceed to trial, stating she did not have an absolute right to plead guilty. The petitioner believed she should be allowed to enter her guilty plea without the state’s conditions. This disagreement led her to file a petition with the court seeking orders to either allow her to plead guilty or to prevent the judge from forcing her to go to trial. After reviewing the facts of the case, the court found that the petitioner had a clear legal right to have her guilty plea accepted if it met the necessary legal requirements. The court noted that it was a mistake for the judge to reject her plea without evaluating whether it was voluntary and if there was a factual basis for it. The court granted part of the petitioner’s request by directing the district court judge to conduct a hearing on her blind plea and accept it if it correctly fulfilled the legal standards. However, the court denied her request to have her plea regarding the seatbelt violation accepted, as that plea required the judge’s approval. The dissenting judge expressed concerns about whether the petitioner had truly shown that she was being harmed by the trial court's refusal to accept her plea, suggesting that any challenges to a guilty plea rejection should typically be taken up in direct appeals rather than with this type of petition. The dissenting judge also supported the trial judge's discretion, arguing that the right to a jury trial must be upheld. In summary, the court ruled that the petitioner should be given a chance to enter her guilty plea under the law, but that her plea regarding the seatbelt violation did not have to be accepted.

Continue ReadingPR-2006-120

MA-2001-117

  • Post author:
  • Post category:MA

In OCCA case No. MA-2001-117, the Petitioner appealed his conviction for two counts of Murder in the First Degree and two counts of Robbery With a Dangerous Weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petition for an extraordinary writ, which means the court decided to stop the prosecution from seeking the death penalty in the retrial. The dissenting opinion noted concerns regarding the outcome of the case based on previous legal interpretations and precedents. The case began with the Petitioner charged in two separate cases, related to tragic events that resulted in the loss of life and armed robbery. Initially, the jury found him guilty of all charges and recommended life sentences without parole for the murders and life imprisonment for the robbery offenses. However, this verdict was reversed, and the case was sent back for separate trials, which created a new legal situation. The Petitioner argued that he should not face the death penalty again because the first jury had already decided on a life sentence, indicating that they did not believe the death penalty should apply. This idea connects to the legal protection known as the Double Jeopardy Clause, which prevents someone from being tried multiple times for the same offense. The court looked closely at the issue of double jeopardy, discussing how it applies not just to being tried for the same crime, but also regarding the severity of punishment. They acknowledged that once a jury has had a chance to decide on a punishment like the death penalty, the state should not get a second opportunity to change that if the first jury chose not to impose it. As a result, the court found that the Petitioner should not have to go through the additional stress and public scrutiny of another capital sentencing trial when they had already made a clear decision against it previously. Thus, the petition to prohibit the state from seeking the death penalty was granted.

Continue ReadingMA-2001-117