Victim Compensation

C-2018-1174

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### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA **Case No. C-2018-1174** **OCT 31, 2019** **STEVEN JOSEPH BEATY, Petitioner, v. THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondent.** **SUMMARY OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Petitioner Steven Joseph Beaty entered guilty pleas to the following charges in the District Court of Grady County, Case No. CF-2018-115: **Count I** - Felony Domestic Assault and Battery, After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies (21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 644 (C)); **Count II** - Misdemeanor Violation of Protective Order (22 O.S.Supp.2012, § 60.6); **Count III** - Obstructing An Officer (21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 540). The Honorable Kory Kirkland accepted the pleas on October 16, 2018. The sentences imposed included the following: **Count I** - ten (10) years imprisonment with the last seven (7) years suspended and a $500.00 fine; **Count II** - one year imprisonment and a $200.00 fine; **Count III** - one year imprisonment and a $100.00 fine, with all sentences served concurrently and additional requirements such as costs, victim compensation assessments, and referral to the Batterer's Intervention Program. On October 25, 2018, Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. After a hearing on November 13, 2018, Judge Kirkland denied the motion. Petitioner now appeals this denial and raises the following propositions of error: 1. The lack of a factual basis for the plea renders it involuntary due to not being served with the Protective Order. 2. The trial judge failed to consider Petitioner’s ability to pay the victim compensation fee. 3. Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel during both the plea hearing and at the plea withdrawal hearing. **Analysis:** After thorough review of the petitions, records, and transcripts, the court finds no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. A plea is evaluated based on whether it was voluntary and intelligent, requiring the Petitioner to show it was entered inadvertently or without consideration. In his first two propositions, Petitioner alleges he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea due to inadequate factual basis and failure to inquire about ability to pay the compensation fee. However, these claims were not raised in the motion to withdraw nor in the certiorari petition, waiving their consideration on appeal. In Proposition III, relating to ineffective assistance of counsel at the withdrawal hearing, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability that such deficiencies would have altered the outcome. The court affirms that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and not coerced. The claim about the court’s failure to record considerations for the victim compensation assessment is acknowledged; thus, that part of the assessment is vacated, and the case is remanded for a hearing to address this requirement properly. **Conclusion:** The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is **DENIED**. The Judgment of the District Court is **AFFIRMED**. The current victim compensation assessments are **VACATED**, and the case is **REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT** to consider all necessary factors for assessment under 22 O.S.2011, § 142.18(A). **OPINION BY**: LUMPKIN, J. **CONCUR**: LEWIS, P.J.; KUEHN, V.P.J.; HUDSON, J.; ROWLAND, J. **COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE AT THE PLEA HEARING**: Bill Smith, P.O. Box 926, Norman, OK 73070 **COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER ON APPEAL**: Danny Joseph, Oklahoma City, OK **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE**: Jason M. Hicks, District Attorney, Kara Bacon, Assistant District Attorney, Chickasha, OK. [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2018-1174_1734227971.pdf)

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RE-2009-239

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In OCCA case No. RE-2009-239, the appellant appealed his conviction for uttering a forged instrument. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the order of revocation to allow for concurrent sentences instead of consecutive sentences. One judge dissented regarding the finding of excessiveness in the revocation order. In the case, the appellant, who was originally given the benefit of a deferred sentence and then suspended sentences, was accused of violating his probation by not reporting to his probation officer. The sentencing judge ultimately revoked his suspended sentences and imposed a total of eight years in prison, which he argued was excessive. The court reviewed the record and statements made by the judge during the revocation hearing. They determined that although the judge had the power to revoke less than the full suspension, the circumstances of the case warranted a modification to allow the sentences to be served concurrently, rather than consecutively as originally ordered. Additionally, the appellant contended that a second assessment for victim compensation was unlawful, as it exceeded the statutory limit. However, the court noted that the compensation assessments were appropriate and not void, concluding that this issue did not affect the validity of the revocation order itself. The final decision directed the district court to change the revocation order to reflect concurrent serving of sentences while affirming the other aspects of the revocation.

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J-2001-57

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In OCCA case No. J-2001-57, J.L.H. appealed her conviction for Public Drunk. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the adjudication of delinquency and disposition of the District Court while modifying the victim compensation assessment. One judge dissented. J.L.H. was found delinquent because she did something that, if she were an adult, would be considered being publicly drunk. This happened in the District Court of Grady County. After the court made its decision, J.L.H. was placed under the care of the Office of Juvenile Affairs and was to live with her grandmother. J.L.H. had three main reasons for her appeal. First, she believed that the court's decision did not match the evidence presented and the court's own conclusions. Second, she thought it was wrong that her treatment plan was not filed on time, as the rule says it should be done in thirty days. Third, she argued that the court should not have made her pay a victim compensation fee because it did not apply to her case. After looking closely at the records, the court found that there was enough proof during the hearing to support the decision made about J.L.H. They decided that the way she was placed with her grandmother was in her best interest and fit with the law's requirements. The court also determined that not filing the treatment plan on time did not harm J.L.H. However, the court agreed with J.L.H. on the issue of the victim compensation fee. They said that the court could not charge her this fee because there was no evidence to support it in her case. So, they decided to cancel the $25 fee. Overall, the court upheld the main decision about J.L.H.'s delinquency and how she would be treated, but they removed the charge for the victim compensation fee.

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