F-2018-690

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **DANIEL ROSS DAGE,** **Appellant,** **vs.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. F-2018-690** **SUMMARY OPINION** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Daniel Ross Dage was convicted of Possession of Juvenile Pornography in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1021.2, in the District Court of Comanche County, under the Honorable Gerald Neuwirth. He was sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment, with eight (8) years suspended, and a fine of $5,000.00. Additionally, he is subject to sex offender registration and two years of post-imprisonment supervision during his suspended sentence. Dage appeals his conviction and sentence, raising three propositions of error. I. The record does not sufficiently demonstrate that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. II. The State's evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dage knowingly possessed videos of juvenile pornography. III. A sentence of 20 years is excessive under the circumstances, violating the United States and Oklahoma constitutions. After thorough review of the record, including transcripts and briefs, we find that the case must be reversed and remanded for a jury trial. Proposition I is granted. The State concedes this issue. While defendants can waive their constitutional right to a jury trial, such a waiver must be competent, knowing, intelligent, and on the record, as established in *Hinsley v. State*, 2012 OK CR 11; *Valega v. City of Oklahoma City*, 1988 OK CR 101. Record evidence must show that both the State and the court consented to the waiver. The requirements for a valid waiver include an advisement of rights and a court minute reflecting the waiver, with signatures from the defendant and counsel. The record does not provide evidence of a waiver or party consent; there are no advisements regarding jury trial rights, nor discussions recorded in the trial transcript concerning the waiver. Thus, we conclude that the record fails to show Appellant validly waived his right to a jury trial. Proposition II, concerning the sufficiency of evidence, is briefly addressed. The State needed to demonstrate Dage knowingly possessed child pornography according to 21 O.S.2011, § 1021.2. Although Dage argues against the sufficiency of evidence, we find that the evidence reasonably infers Dage was aware of the prohibited nature of the material, and no other individual had reasonable access to the USB drives. Therefore, this proposition is denied. Given our decision regarding Proposition I, Proposition III concerning sentencing is rendered moot. **DECISION** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Comanche County is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for a jury trial. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COMANCHE COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE GERALD NEUWIRTH, DISTRICT JUDGE** **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** LARRY CORRALES P.O. BOX 2095 LAWTON, OK 73502 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** NANCY WALKER-JOHNSON P.O. BOX 926 NORMAN, OK 73070 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** CHRISTINE GALBRAITH ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY COMANCHE CO. COURTHOUSE 315 SW 5TH ST., RM 502 LAWTON, OK 73501-4360 **MIKE HUNTER** ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLA. DIANE L. SLAYTON ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL 313 NE 21 ST STREET OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR HUDSON, J.: CONCUR ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-690_1735220870.pdf)

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F-2011-693

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In OCCA case No. F-2011-693, Michael Wayne Dorsey appealed his conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree and Shooting with Intent to Kill. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm Dorsey's conviction and his sentences but vacated the $5,000 victim compensation assessment set by the trial court. One member of the court dissented. Dorsey was found guilty by a jury of manslaughter and shooting with intent to kill. The jury decided on a punishment of thirty years for manslaughter and five years for the shooting charge, which would be served one after the other. Dorsey argued that he should have been allowed to use self-defense as a reason for both charges, but the court found that the instructions given to the jury were correct. Dorsey also claimed that the trial judge made an error with jury instructions regarding self-defense and intoxication, but the court disagreed. He further asserted that his lawyer was not effective because there was no objection raised to those jury instructions, but the court ruled that there was nothing wrong with the instructions in the first place. Lastly, Dorsey objected to the judge imposing the victim compensation amount without considering several important factors. The court agreed that the judge did not properly assess the situation and sent the case back to the trial court for a new decision on the compensation amount. Thus, the main outcome was that while Dorsey's conviction was upheld, the court required a reconsideration of the victim compensation assessment based on certain statutory factors outlined in the law.

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F 2012-294

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In OCCA case No. F 2012-294, Doris Jean Whitaker appealed her conviction for an unspecified crime. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse her conviction and remand the case for a new trial due to a lack of adequate record on appeal. The State agreed with the decision, acknowledging that the failure to provide a trial transcript denied Whitaker her right to a meaningful review of her case. A dissenting opinion was not noted.

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F-2000-1156

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In OCCA case No. F-2000-1156, Randy Scott Bucsok appealed his conviction for lewd molestation and rape by instrumentation. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the lower court's judgment and remand the case for a new trial. One judge dissented. Bucsok was found guilty of multiple charges, including lewd molestation and rape by instrumentation. The jury sentenced him to a total of 60 years in prison, with some sentences running consecutively while others were partially suspended. Following his conviction, Bucsok raised several arguments in his appeal regarding mistakes made during the trial. First, he argued that the trial court made a mistake by not allowing two witnesses, Shell and Kemble, to testify. The court found this was a serious error because their testimony could have been important to Bucsok's defense. The judges believed that excluding this evidence hurt Bucsok's chance for a fair trial. Bucsok also claimed that the trial court wrongly allowed hearsay testimony from other witnesses. However, the court decided that this part of the trial was handled correctly and that the testimony was admissible. Additionally, Bucsok expressed concern about unfair evidence being presented to the jury regarding uncharged crimes, but the court determined that there was no plain error in how this evidence was managed. Finally, he disagreed with the trial court’s decision to bar testimony about the victim's behavior that could explain injuries. In conclusion, the court found that the trial court had made critical mistakes, particularly in not allowing key witnesses to testify, which warranted a new trial for Bucsok.

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F-2000-948

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In OCCA case No. PR-99-1326, the Petitioners appealed their conviction for murder and shooting with intent to kill. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that the mistrial declared by the judge was not justified and therefore double jeopardy bars the State from retrying the Petitioners. One judge dissented. The case began when the Petitioners were charged with serious offenses. The first trial ended in a mistrial, which the judge declared after issues arose during a witness's cross-examination. The attorneys raised concerns about whether the prosecution had failed to provide evidence that could help the defense. This evidence related to the witness's background and credibility. The judge felt that the defense attorney’s questions may have harmed the trial, which led him to call for a mistrial. However, after reviewing the trial's events, the court found that there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial. In other words, the situation did not require such an extreme remedy. The court felt that a warning could have been sufficient to address any perceived problems before resorting to declaring a mistrial. Ultimately, the review concluded that the judge made errors in declaring the mistrial and, as a result, the defendants could not be tried again for these charges. The opinion emphasized that once a jury is discharged without sufficient reason, it can lead to violating the defendants' rights under the double jeopardy clause, which prevents someone from being tried for the same crime twice.

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