Substantial Evidence

F-2018-1046

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**Summary of the Case:** In the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma, Adam Russell Hemphill, Sr. was convicted by a jury of Child Neglect. He was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. Hemphill raised two issues on appeal: (1) allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments and (2) the trial court's admission of evidence regarding his prior drug use. **Issues Presented:** 1. **Prosecutorial Misconduct:** - Hemphill argued that prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument prejudiced his right to a fair trial, primarily due to the prosecutor's references to his past marijuana use and comments regarding uncharged crimes. - The Court found that although some remarks made by the prosecutor were questionable, they did not rise to the level of affecting Hemphill's substantial rights or rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. The absence of objection to most comments and the strength of the evidence against Hemphill contributed to this conclusion. 2. **Admission of Evidence:** - Hemphill contested the introduction of evidence regarding his past marijuana use, asserting it was irrelevant and inadmissible as evidence of bad acts. - Although the Court agreed that the evidence was not relevant to the case and constituted an error in its admission, it ultimately concluded that the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Hemphill's guilt. **Decision:** The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment and sentence, determining that Hemphill was not entitled to relief on either of his claims. **Concurrences:** Judge Hudson concurred in the results but disagreed with the majority regarding the prosecutor's cross-examination about marijuana use. He believed the admission of this testimony did not constitute an abuse of discretion and was relevant to Hemphill's claims about his financial situation. --- For full details and legal citations, refer to the complete decision linked above.

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C-2018-685

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **ORIE DANIEL HILL,** **Petitioner,** **V.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Respondent.** **Case No. C-2018-685** **SUMMARY OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI** LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE: **Background:** Orie Daniel Hill, Petitioner, entered a blind plea of nolo contendere to multiple charges including: first-degree rape (victim under age fourteen), rape by instrumentation, lewd or indecent acts to a child under sixteen, and child sexual abuse. The trial court sentenced him to thirty years imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently and mandated three years of post-imprisonment supervision. Hill later filed a motion to withdraw his plea, claiming it was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. **Issues Raised:** 1. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Hill's motion to withdraw his plea; 2. Hill was denied effective assistance of counsel. **Facts:** The case involved allegations against Hill related to inappropriate sexual behavior towards an 8-year-old girl, A.H. The investigation included statements from the victim and forensic evidence, including DNA linking Hill to the offenses. **Analysis:** The court's review is limited to whether the plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently, whether the sentence was excessive, and whether counsel was effective. The burden is on Hill to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective or that he did not fully understand the plea agreement. 1. **Proposition One:** The court concluded that Hill knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his plea. He was informed of his rights and the potential consequences. Despite Hill's claim of feeling pressure and receiving poor legal advice, the court found no evidence supporting these assertions. 2. **Proposition Two:** Hill’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not meet the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, which requires showing both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The court ruled that counsel’s advice was sound and appropriately reflected the realities of the situation, including the potential for harsher sentences if the case went to trial. **Conclusion:** The petition for a writ of certiorari is DENIED, and the judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED. **MANDATE:** Ordered issued upon delivery and filing of this decision. --- **APPEARANCES:** - **For Appellant:** David R. Slane; Nicollette Brandt - **For the State:** Chris Anderson, Assistant District Attorney **OPINION BY:** Lewis, P.J. **Concur:** Kuehn, V.P.J.; Lumpkin, J.; Hudson, J.; Rowland, J. [Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2018-685_1734175737.pdf)

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PC-2015-6

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In OCCA case No. PC-2015-6, Kendall Wayne Edwards appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling that granted post-conviction relief, vacating Edwards's murder conviction and ordering a new trial based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. One judge dissented. The case stemmed from an incident on March 9, 2001, where Edwards was accused of shooting Gerald Lamont Ford during a fight outside a convenience store. Edwards was convicted at trial and sentenced to life imprisonment, but he sought post-conviction relief in 2012, claiming several errors occurred during his trial, including improper admission of evidence and ineffective legal representation. The court's analysis focused primarily on the newly discovered evidence claim, which was that another witness, Larika A. Alexander, could potentially exonerate him by stating she saw him being beaten and heard the gunshot without witnessing him fire the weapon. The lower court agreed that this evidence was significant enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial and held that Edwards deserved a new trial. While the majority opinion supported this conclusion, a dissenting judge argued that the new evidence did not sufficiently meet the standard required to warrant a new trial since it was cumulative and lacked materiality. The dissent emphasized that the jury had already evaluated the credibility of the witnesses during the original trial. Ultimately, the court's decision to uphold the lower court's granting of a new trial was based on the notion that justice required the possibility of a different outcome with this new testimony. Thus, Edwards was granted the opportunity for a re-examination of the case.

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C-2013-730

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In OCCA case No. C-2013-730, Mon'tre Brown appealed his conviction for First Degree Felony Murder, First Degree Burglary, and Attempted Robbery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand the case to the District Court. The dissenting opinion argued against the majority's decision. Mon'tre Brown was given several charges, including serious ones like murder and burglary. He pleaded guilty to all counts in April 2013 but later wanted to change his plea, claiming he didn’t understand what he was doing due to his mental condition. The trial court denied his request, leading to this appeal. During the initial plea hearing, there were concerns about Mon'tre's mental competency because of his low IQ, which was reported as around 65. His attorney was aware of his learning disabilities, but they appeared not to conduct a thorough investigation into his mental health before allowing him to plead guilty. Mon'tre claimed he felt pressured to plead guilty because his counsel had said he couldn’t win the case. At a later hearing, Mon'tre's family and mental health professionals testified that he struggle to understand the legal concepts involved in his case, which raised questions about his ability to make informed decisions. Some of the professionals stated he didn’t have a clear understanding of what his guilty plea meant or the consequences of waiving his right to trial. The court found that the attorney had not adequately assessed Mon'tre's competence or sought further evaluations that could have supported his claim of mental retardation. It decided that his attorney's failure to investigate his mental condition and present sufficient evidence during the plea process was ineffective assistance of counsel. Ultimately, the court believed that there’s a reasonable chance that had adequate evidence of Mon'tre's mental condition been presented early, it may have changed the outcome of his guilty plea. Thus, they ruled in favor of allowing Mon'tre to withdraw his guilty plea and directed for conflict-free counsel to represent him in further proceedings.

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J-2011-462

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In OCCA case No. J-2011-462, K.T.L. appealed his conviction for robbery by force/fear and kidnapping. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that the lower court's order denying K.T.L.'s motion to be treated as a juvenile was incorrect and should be reversed. K.T.L. was found to have substantial evidence supporting his request for juvenile treatment, and thus, the court instructed to certify him as a juvenile. One justice dissented, believing that the original decision should be upheld.

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F-2001-1338

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In OCCA case No. F-01-1338, Henderson appealed his conviction for Distribution of a Controlled Substance (Cocaine) and Conspiracy to Distribute a Controlled Dangerous Substance. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for Distribution of a Controlled Substance but dismissed the Conspiracy charge. One judge dissented. Henderson was found guilty by a jury of distributing cocaine and conspiracy to distribute it. The jury recommended a total sentence of thirty-five years for each count, to be served one after the other, along with a hefty fine. On appeal, Henderson raised several issues. He argued that his two convictions were unfair because they were based on the same act, leading to double punishment, which is not allowed. The court agreed with this point and dismissed the conspiracy conviction. The court noted that even though a conspiracy usually stands as a separate crime, in this case, the charges were very closely related and relied on the same actions. Because of this, the law was not followed correctly. While Henderson's other claims about the trial were considered, the judges found them to lack enough merit to change the outcome. The court concluded that enough evidence supported his conviction for distributing cocaine, so that part of the case remained in place, while the conspiracy charge was dropped. Overall, the final decision was that the court upheld the guilty verdict for distribution but reversed the conspiracy conviction.

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F-2001-916

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In OCCA case No. F-2001-916, Gilda Marie Schoonover appealed her conviction for Committing or Permitting Child-Abuse Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Gilda and her husband were charged with the murder of their adopted child, Benjamin, who was just over two years old. The trial took place with a jury, and both Gilda and her husband were found guilty. They were sentenced to life in prison based on the jury's recommendation. During the trial, there were several problems that Gilda highlighted as reasons for her appeal. First, she argued it was wrong for the jury to consider different ways to blame her. They were told that it was possible she either directly hurt the child or allowed her husband to hurt him. Gilda felt that allowing these different ideas confused the jury. She also pointed out that the court did not let the defense see all the evidence it needed, like a written statement from another person who might have helped their case. Furthermore, Gilda was unhappy about how the court allowed some information about past contacts with child services to be used against her. The jury couldn’t be sure which theory they believed—the one where Gilda hurt the child or the one where she let her husband hurt him. The court agreed that the evidence provided did not clearly show that she personally allowed the abuse or knew it was going to happen. Because of these issues, the court decided that Gilda deserved a new trial to ensure she had a fair chance to defend herself. In summary, the court found errors in the trial process, particularly in how the jury was instructed and the evidence presented. Gilda's conviction was overturned, and she was given another chance to have her case heard.

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