In OCCA case No. F-2019-37, Suggs appealed his conviction for first-degree burglary. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse and remand for a new trial on that count due to an instructional error, while affirming the convictions on the other counts. One judge dissented.
The opinion you provided appears to be a detailed court ruling from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals regarding the case of Jasmine Michelle Irvin, who was convicted of First Degree Murder. Below is a summary of the key points from the opinion: ### Case Summary - **Appellant**: Jasmine Michelle Irvin - **Appellee**: State of Oklahoma - **Case Number**: F-2018-622 - **Court**: Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals - **Judge**: Cynthia Ferrell Ashwood - **Verdict**: Convicted of First Degree Murder - **Sentence**: Life in prison without the possibility of parole ### Facts of the Case - The victim, Robert Godwin, was found shot to death in a secluded area. - Evidence indicated that Appellant had expressed a desire to have the victim killed and had made attempts to recruit others to help. - Appellant contacted the victim, leading him to the location where he was killed. - The victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the back, and information from cell phone data supported the timeline of events leading to the murder. ### Legal Propositions 1. **Waiver of Jury Trial**: Appellant challenged whether she knowingly and intelligently waived her right to a jury trial. The court found that the waiver was clear and the trial court had adequately assessed her understanding of the waiver. 2. **Victim Impact Testimony**: Appellant contended that her due process rights were violated due to the admission of victim impact testimony from a non-family member. The court acknowledged the error but did not find it sufficient to warrant relief since the trial judge was presumed to consider only competent evidence in sentencing. 3. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: Appellant alleged her counsel was ineffective for not ensuring her waiver of the jury trial was valid and for failing to object to the victim impact testimony. The court found no deficiency in counsel's performance. 4. **Accumulation of Errors**: The court addressed Appellant's claim that the cumulative errors denied her a fair trial. It was determined that since no reversible errors were found, the cumulative error claim lacked merit. ### Conclusion - The court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court, concluding there were no reversible errors present. - An additional concurrence discussed the standard of review for the waiver of jury trial but ultimately supported the affirmation of the conviction. For more details or to read the full opinion, you may refer to the link provided in your original text.
**Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma Summary Opinion** **David Neil Dunn v. The State of Oklahoma** **Case No. C-2017-1050** **Filed November 8, 2018** **Summary:** The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case of David Neil Dunn, who sought to withdraw his no contest plea for various serious charges. Dunn appealed on the basis that he was denied his due process right to be present during the evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw the plea, and claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. **Key Points:** 1. **Charges and Plea**: Dunn was charged with multiple felonies, including First Degree Robbery and Burglary. He entered a blind plea of no contest, which resulted in significant prison sentences. 2. **Motion to Withdraw Plea**: Dunn filed a motion to withdraw his plea shortly after sentencing, claiming various legal grounds, including concerns about the validity of his plea. An evidentiary hearing was held, but Dunn was not present as he had been transported to the Department of Corrections. 3. **Court's Ruling**: The Court found that Dunn had a due process right to be present during this critical stage of the proceedings. The absence of Dunn hindered a fair and just hearing, particularly concerning his claims about the voluntariness of his plea. 4. **Counsel’s Role**: The court clarified that defense counsel's belief that Dunn's presence was unnecessary does not equate to a valid waiver of his right to be present. The decision emphasized that Dunn's testimony was crucial for effectively contesting the plea's validity. 5. **Outcome**: The Court granted Dunn's petition for certiorari and remanded the case back to the District Court for a proper evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw the plea, ensuring he would be present. 6. **Dissenting Opinion**: One judge dissented, arguing that the absence of Dunn did not constitute a violation of his rights, noting that his counsel had effectively represented him at the hearing. It was contended that the procedural complexities of representation should not be interpreted as waivers of due process. **Conclusion**: The Court ruled in favor of Dunn, stressing the importance of a defendant's presence in legal proceedings, particularly when their rights and pleas are being challenged, which underscores the principles of fairness and due process within the judicial system. For a detailed reading, [click here to download the PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2017-1050_1733996496.pdf).
In OCCA case No. C-2017-33, a person appealed his conviction for manslaughter. In a published decision, the court decided to modify his sentence to run concurrently with another sentence. One judge dissented. In this case, the person, who we'll refer to as the appellant, had entered a guilty plea to first degree manslaughter. He ended up being sentenced to twenty-three years in prison. After some time, the appellant decided he wanted to take back his guilty plea. He claimed he didn't fully understand the consequences of his plea when he entered it, and he felt he was pressured into making that choice. The court held three hearings to talk about the appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea. Ultimately, the judge denied his request, finding that his plea was made voluntarily and knowingly. The appellant raised two main arguments in his appeal. First, he argued that his plea was not given voluntarily or knowingly. Second, he said he did not get proper legal help from his attorney, which affected his case. The court looked closely at the entire record, including the hearings and the agreements made during the plea process. They found that even though the appellant felt he was pressured, he actually understood what he was doing when he entered his plea. They decided that the plea was valid and should not be withdrawn. However, the court also recognized that the state did not follow the agreement regarding a related case. The state had promised not to seek a revocation of the appellant's other suspended sentence, but after the appellant filed to withdraw his plea, the state moved to revoke that sentence anyway. The court determined that this was a significant breach of the plea agreement, which affected the fairness of the situation. Since the appellant was also facing the loss of additional years in prison because of the state's actions, the court decided to modify his sentence. Instead of having the two sentences run one after the other, the court ordered them to run at the same time. This way, the appellant would not be unfairly punished because of the state’s breach of their agreement. In conclusion, the court agreed the appellant’s plea was valid and was made knowingly and voluntarily. However, to correct the mistake made by the state regarding the plea agreement, they modified his sentence to ensure fairness. One judge disagreed with some parts of the decision.
In OCCA case No. F-2013-974, Karena L. Gilbreath-Hancock appealed her conviction for Actual Physical Control of a Motor Vehicle under the Influence of Alcohol. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to remand the case for resentencing but affirmed her original conviction. One judge dissented. Gilbreath-Hancock was found guilty after a jury trial and was sentenced to two and a half years in prison along with a fine. She appealed for two main reasons. First, she claimed that her lawyer had a conflict of interest. However, the court found there was no actual conflict because Gilbreath-Hancock did not object to her lawyer's representation during the trial. The court stated that just because she disagreed with her lawyer's strategy, it did not mean there was a conflict of interest. Second, Gilbreath-Hancock argued that her rights were violated as the trial court failed to give the jury all the possible sentencing options available. The court agreed that the trial court made a mistake and needed to correct it. Because of this, they ordered the case to be sent back for resentencing, making sure that the jury would know all their options. In summary, while the court upheld the conviction of Gilbreath-Hancock, they recognized a mistake in the sentencing process and ordered that it be fixed.
In OCCA case No. F-2011-482, Christopher D'Shun Cleveland appealed his conviction for perjury. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify his sentence from ten years to seven years imprisonment but otherwise affirmed the conviction. One judge dissented. The case began when Cleveland was found guilty of perjury in the District Court of Oklahoma County and was sentenced to ten years in prison. He raised two main points in his appeal. First, he claimed that two witnesses, who were attorneys, should have been sworn before they testified. He argued this violated both a state law and his constitutional rights. However, the court found that the trial judge’s reminder to the attorneys that they were testifying under oath was adequate, and no major error was shown. In his second point, Cleveland argued that the jury should have been instructed to consider whether the statements he made were important to the case when deciding his sentence. He believed that not allowing this instruction led to a sentence that was too harsh. While the court recognized that the denial of this instruction was an error, it ultimately decided that the error was not severe enough to overturn the conviction. Instead, they modified his sentence length. Overall, Cleveland's punishment was reduced, but his conviction remained in place. The court stated its decision firmly, ensuring that Cleveland's rights were considered, while also balancing the necessary legal standards.
In OCCA case No. F-2009-129, David Deontae McCoy appealed his conviction for burglary, robbery, and assault. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm some of the convictions, reversed one, and ordered a new trial for that count. One judge dissented. David Deontae McCoy was found guilty by a jury for several serious crimes, including first-degree burglary, robbery by two or more persons, and assaults with dangerous weapons. He received long prison sentences for each count, but they would all be served at the same time. McCoy argued that his convictions were based on unreliable eyewitness accounts, especially regarding a witness named Megan Kinter. He claimed that because the eyewitnesses were mistaken, his convictions should be thrown out. He also pointed out that the trial court made a mistake by not giving a specific warning to the jury about believing eyewitness identification. Another important point McCoy raised was about getting punished multiple times for the same incidents. He said that the law protects him from being punished more than once for the same crime and argued that some of his charges violated that protection. McCoy thought he did not get a fair trial because the jury was not given all the necessary details about what his assault charges entailed. He also claimed that certain photographs shown during the trial should not have been allowed because they could be unfairly upsetting and hurt his case. Additionally, McCoy accused the prosecutors of bad behavior during the trial, which he said prevented him from having a fair trial. He claimed that his lawyer did not help him enough during the trial, which is also a right he has. After reviewing McCoy's arguments, the court found that the evidence against him was strong enough that he was likely involved in the crimes. They said that even if there were issues about the eyewitness identification, it did not weaken the case enough to change the outcome of the trial. The court mentioned that the trial judge did not correctly instruct the jury about the important parts needed to prove one of the assaults. Because of this, they decided that it was necessary to reverse that conviction and order a new trial. For another assault charge, although there was also a mistake in instructions, the court believed that it wouldn't have changed the result of the trial. So, they did not reverse that conviction. Finally, the court corrected a mistake about how McCoy's convictions were recorded, making sure the written records reflected what he was actually charged with. So, while two of McCoy’s convictions were kept, one was sent back for a new trial due to issues with how the jury was instructed.
In OCCA case No. RE 2009-0510, Edward Q. Jones appealed his conviction for revocation of his suspended sentence. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the revocation. One judge dissented. Edward Jones had previously pled guilty to domestic abuse and was sentenced to a few years in jail, with most of that time suspended, meaning he wouldn’t serve it if he followed the rules set by the court. However, he had problems following those rules, which led the State to ask the court to revoke his suspended sentence. There were two main hearings regarding this. In the first hearing, the judge found that Edward had broken the probation rules and took away three and a half years of his suspended time. Edward didn't appeal that decision. Later, the State filed another request to revoke his sentence, saying he had not followed the rules again. In the second hearing, the judge decided to take away all of his suspended time. Edward argued that he should have had a lawyer to help him at the hearing, which he really wanted. He felt that the short time between being told he could have a lawyer and the date of his hearing was not enough time for him to get one. He argued that he was unfairly treated without a lawyer and that he shouldn’t have to suffer because he missed a deadline due to a lack of money for the application fee to get a lawyer. The State countered by saying that since Edward didn't file for a court-appointed lawyer by the deadline set by the judge, he gave up his right to have one. They also argued that the right to have a lawyer at a revocation hearing is not a constitutional right but a statutory right. They said he didn't get the lawyer because he wasn't trying hard enough to get one and was just delaying things. The judges looked at earlier cases where people were found to have given up their right to a lawyer because they didn't act quickly enough to get one. They concluded that while there was a short delay for Edward, the reasons didn't clearly show he was deliberately trying to delay his hearing. They pointed out that Edward might not have known what he was doing in waiving his right to counsel, and the judge didn't look into whether he could have afforded a lawyer or not. After reviewing the evidence and the arguments, the court decided that Edward was not fairly represented when he attended his hearing without a lawyer. They noted that there was conflicting testimony from police officers about the events leading to his probation violations, which made it difficult for them to feel confident about the decision made at the hearing. Because of these issues, the court reversed the revocation of his suspended sentence. They sent it back to the district court to hold a new hearing where Edward could have a lawyer or show he knew he was giving up that right clearly. In doing so, they ordered that any confusion or problems found in the previous record should be clarified.
In OCCA case No. F 2007-201, Kristopher Lee Morphew appealed his conviction for Second-degree Murder. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse Morphew's Judgment and Sentence and remand the case for a new trial. One judge dissented. Morphew was found guilty of Second-degree Murder after a jury trial. The jury decided on a punishment of twenty years of prison time. However, Morphew argued that he did not receive a fair trial due to several reasons, including ineffective help from his lawyer, errors in jury instructions, and misconduct by the prosecution. The main issue that led to the court's decision was about how the jury was instructed regarding what depraved mind meant in the context of Second-degree Murder. The jury was confused about a key part of the instruction, and the trial judge did not clarify it properly. Because of this, the court found that the instructions did not adequately explain the law and could have led to a misunderstanding during the trial. Since this error was significant enough to possibly change the outcome of the case, the court concluded that Morphew deserved a new trial. The other points raised by Morphew were not discussed because the error regarding jury instructions was sufficient to reverse the conviction. In summary, the court's decision sends Morphew back for a new trial to ensure he receives a fair chance to defend himself under the correct laws and instructions.
In OCCA case No. F-2006-1086, Anthony Paul Free appealed his conviction for Lewd Molestation. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Free was found guilty of Lewd Molestation after an incident on December 10, 2005, involving a seven-year-old girl. The girl's aunt saw Free touching her inappropriately. During the trial, the State introduced evidence of Free's prior sexual offenses from twenty years earlier, which Free objected to. He argued that this evidence was unfair and did not relate to the current case. The court ultimately found that the past offenses had no clear connection to the current charges. They determined that using this older evidence was likely to prejudice the jury against Free, which isn't allowed. As a result, the trial court's decision to admit this evidence was seen as a substantial violation of Free's rights, leading the court to reverse the previous conviction and call for a new trial.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-1150, Kendall Dewayne Carr appealed his conviction for First Degree Robbery by Force and Fear and False Personation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction for First Degree Robbery and affirmed the conviction for False Personation. One judge dissented. Carr was found guilty by a jury in the District Court of Cleveland County. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison for robbery and 4 years for false personation, with both sentences running at the same time. Carr argued that the trial court's instruction to the jury, known as a dynamite charge, forced them to reach a decision unfairly. The court examined the entire case, including trial records and evidence. They decided that the instruction given during deliberations was coercive. This means it pressured jurors to go along with the majority without respecting their own honest beliefs. The court noted that the instruction did not tell jurors to stick to their true feelings about the case. They found that this mistake was serious enough to require a new trial for the robbery conviction. The court made this decision based on the law, stating that an accurate jury instruction is important for a fair trial. While one judge had a different opinion and thought the error wasn't as serious, the majority believed that not warning jurors to hold onto their honest beliefs could have affected the outcome of the trial. As a result, they reversed the decision on the robbery while keeping the other conviction intact.
In OCCA case No. F 2004-1124, the appellant appealed his conviction for Shooting with Intent to Kill. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. One judge dissented. The case involved Keith William Matson, who was convicted in Garvin County for shooting with the intent to kill. On May 17, 2004, he chose to have a judge decide his case instead of a jury. However, when the judge made the decision on August 10, 2004, Mr. Matson was not present, and he did not get the chance to hear closing arguments from his lawyer before the verdict was given. Mr. Matson raised a number of issues in his appeal. He argued that the judge should not have been able to make orders after a certain date, that the way the judge found him guilty was not allowed by Oklahoma law, and that he was not there when the judgment was announced. He also claimed that he had been denied a fair trial because of the unusual way the trial was conducted and that he did not get good legal help. The appeals court looked closely at what happened in the trial. It noted that after an earlier attempt to have a jury trial in October 2003 ended in a mistrial because the jury could not agree, Mr. Matson was advised by his lawyer to waive the right to a jury and allow the judge to review transcripts of the earlier trial. However, the law clearly states that a defendant must be present and allowed to have closing arguments during a trial, which did not happen in Mr. Matson's case. Because of these issues, the appeals court decided that Mr. Matson’s conviction needed to be reversed, and he deserved a new trial. The court stated that it was important to make sure that every defendant has a fair trial and their rights are fully protected. The decision made by the judge during the last trial was found to be a serious mistake, which led to the court ruling in favor of a new trial for Mr. Matson. In summary, the court found that the procedure used in Mr. Matson's trial did not follow the law and was unfair, which is why they reversed the conviction and called for a new trial.
In OCCA case No. F 2004-582, Ryan Golden appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In a published decision, the court decided that he was entitled to a new trial because he was not given the correct number of chances to challenge jurors. The ruling was that the trial court's mistake was serious enough to affect the fairness of the trial, and because of this error, the original sentence was reversed and a new trial was ordered. One judge dissented, arguing that there should have been a demonstration of actual prejudice or harm caused by the mistake.
In OCCA case No. RE-2004-614, the appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree rape by instrumentation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the revocation of the appellant's suspended sentence. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant pled guilty to second-degree rape and was sentenced to a total of 10 years and 6 months of imprisonment. However, the judge suspended all but the first 6 months, allowing the appellant to serve that time in prison and then go on probation with specific rules. One of these rules, known as Rule 9, prohibited the appellant from using pornography or visiting places like adult bookstores and massage parlors. Later, the state accused the appellant of violating this rule. They claimed that he participated in a live sex show on the Internet, which was viewed by an undercover police officer. The officer discovered the show after receiving a tip about the appellant's activities. Following a hearing, the judge ruled that the appellant did indeed violate the conditions of his probation and revoked the remaining part of the suspended sentence. The appellant brought forth three main arguments in his appeal. First, he claimed that his right to a fair attorney was compromised because his lawyer had previously worked as a prosecutor in his original rape case. The court found that although an attorney representing both sides creates concerns, in this case, the attorney was no longer working for the prosecution at the time of the revocation hearing. Therefore, the court did not find this to be a reversible error. Second, the appellant argued that the state had not given him enough notice about the specific allegations against him. The court agreed that the notice was lacking but noted that the appellant had actual knowledge of the issues at hand and did not show any harm from the lack of notice. Lastly, the appellant asserted that revoking his entire suspended sentence was too harsh. The court recognized that the appellant had shown good behavior while on probation and that he had been actively working on his rehabilitation. The judge noted that the probation officer and treatment providers believed that a lesser sanction would have been appropriate instead of total revocation. Thus, the court decided to modify the revocation order so that the appellant would only serve the time he had already spent in confinement and would be returned to probation. The revised decision was a mix of affirming some parts of the original ruling while changing the overall outcome regarding the revocation of probation.
In OCCA case No. M-2004-66, Foy Anthony Boyd appealed his conviction for Driving While Impaired (DWI). In a published decision, the court decided to reverse Boyd’s judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Boyd was convicted in the District Court of Coal County after a jury trial. He was sentenced to pay court costs and a fine because he was found guilty of DWI. Boyd argued that he should not have been convicted because he believed the results of his breath test should not have been used as evidence. He claimed that the rules about how the breath test should be given were not followed, so the results were not valid. The state, which was against Boyd in the case, argued that they did not make a mistake and that there was enough evidence to convict him without the breath test results. However, the court pointed out that it was the responsibility of the state to prove that all rules were followed when giving the breath test. The state did not show what the relevant rules were or that the officers followed them properly. Boyd presented evidence showing that the breath test was not conducted according to the rules that the Board had in place. The state just had officers say they believed the rules were followed without providing the actual rules or clearing up the concerns about them. The court decided that this was a significant error. Even though officers testified that Boyd showed signs of being impaired before the breath test was done, the court concluded that the use of the test in the trial was a violation of Boyd's rights. Since the state didn't prove that the breath test was done correctly, the court believed Boyd deserved a new trial. Boyd asked for his conviction to be completely dismissed. However, the court felt that it was fairer to allow the state to have another chance to present the case with proper evidence. If the state could show that the breath test was given correctly in the retrial, they could use those results against Boyd. The court ordered that Boyd's conviction be overturned and that the case be sent back for a new trial where the state could fix the issues with the evidence. In the dissenting opinion, the judge believed that the evidence supporting Boyd’s conviction was strong enough even without the breath test. This judge pointed out that the officers had seen signs of intoxication in Boyd, like the smell of alcohol, his bloodshot eyes, and his poor performance on sobriety tests. The judge argued that Boyd's guilty verdict should stand since traditional signs of impairment by officers could be enough for a conviction.
In OCCA case No. J-2003-1180, T.C.S. appealed his conviction for second-degree burglary. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the District Court's decision and remand the case for a new trial. One judge dissented. T.C.S. was found to be delinquent after a hearing where he was accused of committing burglary when he was 16 years old. The court looked at evidence and decided that the testimony from an accomplice needed to be supported by more evidence to connect T.C.S. to the crime. Since the only supporting evidence showed that T.C.S. was in the same place as the accomplice later that night, it was not enough to prove he committed the burglary. The judges agreed that for a conviction based on an accomplice's testimony, there must be more proof that ties the defendant to the crime. As such, since this was not met, the judges reversed the earlier decision and said T.C.S. deserves a new trial.
In OCCA case No. RE 2001-1070, Billy Joe Baldwin appealed his conviction for Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property, Feloniously Pointing a Weapon, and Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of Baldwin's suspended sentences but modified the sentences to one year revoked with the remainder suspended, to run concurrently. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. J 2001-878, G.S. appealed his conviction for petit larceny. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the trial court's decision and send the case back for a new trial. One judge dissented. G.S. was found to be a delinquent child for committing a crime that would be a crime for an adult, called petit larceny. This meant that he was taken to court to see if he really did what he was accused of. After the trial, a judge decided that G.S. should be placed in a special care program for children and that he should pay for court costs and fees for his lawyer. G.S. was unhappy with this decision and decided to appeal, which means he wanted a higher court to look at his case again. He brought up three main problems with his case: 1. He argued that there wasn’t enough of a record for the higher court to review, so his conviction should be changed. 2. He thought that his lawyer didn’t give enough information to the higher court, which meant he didn’t get the help he needed. 3. He also said that there was no evidence showing he agreed to give up his right to a jury trial, which he thought was wrong. The court looked closely at everything, including the records and the written arguments from both sides. They decided that G.S. was right about not having proof he gave up his right to a jury trial. Because of this, they thought the trial court's decision should be reversed, meaning G.S. would get another chance to have his case heard. The judges agreed that the original trial didn’t follow the right rules. A big part of this situation was that when a child is accused of something serious, like stealing, they have rights, including having a jury to listen to their case. In G.S.’s case, there was no paperwork or proof showing he understood and agreed to give up that right. So, the court decided that G.S. should have a new trial to give him a fair chance to defend himself. The decision made by the original trial court was erased, and the case was sent back so it could be done again properly.
In OCCA case No. F 2001-434, the appellant appealed his conviction for multiple drug-related charges. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and dismiss some of the charges while affirming others. One judge dissented regarding the dismissal of a particular charge. William Forrest Mondier was found guilty of attempting to make drugs, possessing drugs, and allowing a place for drug users. The court looked at his case and found mistakes in how the jury was instructed regarding one of the charges. Because the jury didn't have the right information, they couldn't properly decide if Mondier had acted knowingly or intentionally when maintaining a place used for drugs. Therefore, that conviction was reversed. The court also found that Mondier's possession of marijuana and methamphetamine was too similar to keep both convictions, so they reversed one of them. However, his other convictions, including drug manufacturing and possession of drug paraphernalia, remained in place, as there was enough evidence against him for those charges. There were also several arguments raised by the appellant about the fairness of his trial and the enforcement of laws regarding the charges, but the court denied those claims. The final decision was to reverse and dismiss the charge of maintaining a place for drug users and the marijuana charge. The convictions for attempting to manufacture drugs and possessing paraphernalia were affirmed. One judge disagreed with the dismissal and wanted a new trial instead.