Statutory Requirements

S-2022-41

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In OCCA case No. S-2022-41, the State of Oklahoma appealed the conviction of Joshua Kyle Rhynard for unlawful possession of a controlled drug with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, possession of a controlled dangerous substance (marijuana), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that the appeal was improperly brought and dismissed it. One judge dissented, arguing that the State made a sufficient case for review based on the importance of the evidence that had been suppressed. The dissenting opinion believed that the trial court made an error in suppressing the evidence found during a search because the officers executing the warrant used reasonable belief about the address they were searching.

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F-2019-605

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In OCCA case No. F-2019-605, Jerome Matthew McConell appealed his conviction for Obtaining Merchandise by False Pretenses. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment and sentence of the district court, except for certain parts which were stricken. One member of the court dissented. McConell was found guilty after a bench trial in the District Court of McCurtain County. He was sentenced to thirty months in prison, but he argued that his trial was unfair for three main reasons. First, he claimed he was not allowed to confront some witnesses properly because hearsay evidence was permitted. Hearsay is when someone testifies about what another person said outside of court, which usually isn't allowed as direct evidence. However, the court found no real error in this situation because McConell's lawyer brought up the same issues during questioning. Therefore, the court did not see a violation of his rights. Second, McConell argued that evidence from another incident should not have been allowed by the court because the state did not give proper notice about it. However, the court decided that the evidence was relevant and no mistakes were made in permitting it. Lastly, McConell noted that the written sentence and conditions after his trial did not match what was discussed in court. The judge had ordered conditions that he should not enter a casino and also mentioned costs for prosecution that were not allowed under the law. The court agreed that these parts of the judgment were incorrect and decided to strike them from his sentence. In summary, the appeals court did affirm McConell's conviction, meaning they upheld the trial's decision, but they corrected some errors in how his sentence was recorded and ordered the lower court to make those changes.

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F-2016-997

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In the case of Jimmie Lee Lovell, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed his convictions for First Degree Manslaughter and Driving Under the Influence. Lovell challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress blood test results, arguing he was not given an opportunity for independent testing as required by statute. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion, since Lovell did not request a sample for independent testing during the proper timeframe. Additionally, Lovell argued that the jury’s verdicts—guilty of First Degree Manslaughter and not guilty of Negligent Homicide—were inconsistent. The appeals court found that no objection had been raised regarding the verdict at trial, and therefore reviewed for plain error, concluding there was no actual error affecting his rights, as the jury’s intent was clear. The court noted a variance between the jury’s recommended punishment in Count II (Ten days and a $1,000 fine) and the subsequent sentence (one year in jail). The case was remanded for correction of this discrepancy. Overall, the court affirmed the judgment and sentence in Count I, affirmed the judgment in Count II, and ordered the trial court to correct the Judgment and Sentence in Count II in accordance with the jury's recommendation.

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F-2006-191

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In OCCA case No. F-2006-191, Hurst appealed his conviction for Lewd Molestation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse Hurst's sentence and remand the case for resentencing. One judge dissented. Hurst was found guilty of a crime involving inappropriate touching, which led to a sentence of 13 years in prison. Hurst raised four main arguments for his appeal: 1. He claimed the trial court did not give proper instructions to the jury, which made it unfair for him. 2. He argued that some evidence used against him in court was obtained in an illegal way, violating his rights. 3. He said that his attorney was not allowed to talk about certain things during closing arguments, which hurt his defense. 4. He believed that all these errors combined made his trial unfair. The court looked closely at all parts of the case, including the trial records and evidence. They found that Hurst deserved to have a new sentence because the jury had not been properly instructed, particularly about how much time they could decide to give him. This was his first offense and he should have been warned about the sentencing rules. The jury had asked for help with the sentencing, which meant they might have been confused. As for the other arguments, the court decided there weren’t any mistakes that would change the result of the case, like the refusal to give instruction on eyewitness identification or the claims about the way evidence was gathered. The court also agreed that the trial judge was right in limiting what Hurst's attorney could say during closing arguments. In summary, the court affirmed the guilty verdict but reversed the sentence and sent the case back for a new sentencing hearing where the jury would be properly instructed.

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PR-2006-120

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In OCCA case No. PR-2006-120, a petitioner appealed her conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug (methamphetamine) and driving without seatbelts. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petitioner's request for relief in part and deny it in part. One judge dissented. The case began when the petitioner was charged with possessing methamphetamine and driving without a seatbelt. She initially agreed to a plea deal with the state, which involved accepting guilt for the drug charge and a fine for the seatbelt violation. However, when the petitioner refused to follow through with the state’s conditions for the plea, she attempted to enter a non-negotiated or blind guilty plea. The judge refused to accept her blind plea and insisted she proceed to trial, stating she did not have an absolute right to plead guilty. The petitioner believed she should be allowed to enter her guilty plea without the state’s conditions. This disagreement led her to file a petition with the court seeking orders to either allow her to plead guilty or to prevent the judge from forcing her to go to trial. After reviewing the facts of the case, the court found that the petitioner had a clear legal right to have her guilty plea accepted if it met the necessary legal requirements. The court noted that it was a mistake for the judge to reject her plea without evaluating whether it was voluntary and if there was a factual basis for it. The court granted part of the petitioner’s request by directing the district court judge to conduct a hearing on her blind plea and accept it if it correctly fulfilled the legal standards. However, the court denied her request to have her plea regarding the seatbelt violation accepted, as that plea required the judge’s approval. The dissenting judge expressed concerns about whether the petitioner had truly shown that she was being harmed by the trial court's refusal to accept her plea, suggesting that any challenges to a guilty plea rejection should typically be taken up in direct appeals rather than with this type of petition. The dissenting judge also supported the trial judge's discretion, arguing that the right to a jury trial must be upheld. In summary, the court ruled that the petitioner should be given a chance to enter her guilty plea under the law, but that her plea regarding the seatbelt violation did not have to be accepted.

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