In OCCA case No. F-2005-1057, Saul Mintz appealed his conviction for two counts of Robbery with a Firearm. In a published decision, the court decided that while his conviction was affirmed, his sentence for the second count should be modified to ten years' imprisonment. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F 2005-288, George Luther Carter, III appealed his conviction for Sexual Abuse of a Child. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Carter was accused of sexually abusing a child and was found guilty by a jury. They decided he should spend thirty years in prison for this crime. After the trial, Carter appealed, arguing that the trial court made several mistakes. Carter's main reasons for appealing included that the court should not have allowed evidence of other alleged crimes he had committed, and that the use of a videotape during the trial was not fair. He also believed the verdict was not supported well by the evidence. The court looked closely at these points and decided that admitting the evidence of the other alleged crime was a mistake. The evidence did not clearly connect to the case at hand and could have unfairly influenced the jury's decision. Since the court was not sure that this mistake did not change the outcome of the trial, they decided to grant Carter a new trial. In summary, Carter’s conviction was reversed because the trial court allowed improper evidence that could have affected the jury's verdict. The remaining arguments did not need to be discussed since the first point was enough for a new trial.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-357, Bruce Morris Barnett appealed his conviction for trafficking in illegal drugs and misdemeanor possession of marijuana. In a published decision, the court decided that while the trial judge made a mistake by imposing a fine of $100,000 instead of the minimum fine of $25,000, the convictions were upheld. The judge's sentence was modified to change the fine, but the overall decision affirmed the jury's findings regarding the evidence for the convictions. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-405, Edward Mark Szczepan, Jr., appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery upon a Police Officer. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modified the sentence. The dissenting opinion was not recorded. Szczepan was tried in a non-jury trial and found guilty of assaulting a police officer. The court sentenced him to four years in prison and a $1,000 fine. He challenged two things in his appeal. First, he questioned whether he properly waived his right to a jury trial. The court found that the record showed he had indeed made a valid waiver. The second challenge was about whether the evidence was enough to prove he had prior felony convictions. The State admitted they failed to show this evidence during the trial. Because the prior convictions must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the court agreed that the evidence was insufficient. Since the State could not present proof of Szczepan's prior convictions, the court noted that he could not be given the enhanced sentence that came with those convictions. Thus, the court modified his sentence to one year in prison and reduced the fine to $500. Overall, while the court upheld the conviction, Szczepan's punishment was made less severe due to the lack of evidence for the prior convictions.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-363, Adan Ramos, Jr. appealed his conviction for Robbery by Force or Fear. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. The court found that there was no valid waiver of Ramos's right to a jury trial, which is a fundamental right. Ramos's other claims about ineffective assistance of counsel, exclusion of evidence, and interpreter issues became moot since the court ordered a new trial.
In OCCA case No. F-2014-478, David Glen Heard appealed his conviction for two counts of Lewd Molestation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction but vacated the imposition of post-imprisonment supervision. One judge dissented. David Glen Heard was found guilty of two counts of Lewd Molestation after being tried by a jury in Tulsa County. The charges stemmed from an incident on June 15, 2006, when Heard was observed behaving inappropriately towards two young girls at a Walmart store. He followed them around the store and attempted to look under their dresses. Witnesses reported his unsettling behavior, and he was later found with a pornographic magazine in his car and identified as a registered sex offender. At the time of the incident, he was on probation for previous sex-related offenses against children. During the trial, testimonies from various witnesses were presented, including a woman who testified about a similar incident involving Heard from years prior. Evidence was admitted under the law to show motive and absence of mistake, which supported the prosecution's case against him. Heard raised several arguments during his appeal, including claims that the statute he was convicted under was vague, the admission of other testimonies was inappropriate, and errors in jury instructions and the failure of his counsel to object to certain evidence. The court found that the law did not provide for a vagueness claim since Heard's actions clearly violated the statute in question. The admission of prior testimonies was ruled permissible as relevant to the case. The trial court’s instructions were also deemed not harmful to the verdict. However, the court recognized an error when ordering post-imprisonment supervision, as it was not authorized for the crimes Heard committed at the time. Thus, while his conviction was confirmed, the order for post-imprisonment supervision was vacated. Ultimately, Heard’s two twenty-year sentences were upheld due to the nature of his actions and background as a repeat offender.
In OCCA case No. F-2004-1147, James Earl Ware appealed his conviction for first-degree rape and lewd molestation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for first-degree rape but reverse the conviction for lewd molestation with instructions to dismiss that charge. One judge dissented. The case involved accusations made by a girl named D.P. who testified that Ware had molested and raped her when she was 12 years old. During the trial, D.P. shared experiences of how Ware touched her inappropriately multiple times, with one incident where he penetrated her. Her brother also testified that he saw Ware kissing D.P. Ware denied the allegations and claimed that D.P. and her brother were lying about him. He argued that the evidence presented was not strong enough to prove he was guilty. However, the trial judge found D.P.'s testimony credible and believed Ware did commit the acts he was accused of, despite saying that she initially had doubts. The court noted that Ware could not challenge the evidence because he presented his defense after listening to the prosecution's case. It was decided that, while the evidence was strong enough to uphold the first-degree rape conviction, the lewd molestation charge did not have enough proof to support a guilty verdict. Therefore, the conviction for lewd molestation was dismissed, while the conviction for first-degree rape was confirmed.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-366, Timothy Purcell Teafatiller appealed his conviction for Possession of Concealed Drug. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand the case for further proceedings. One judge dissented. Teafatiller was found guilty by a jury for having a small amount of methamphetamine that was discovered in his wallet. He was sentenced to six years in prison. He raised seven main points in his appeal. The court mainly focused on one significant issue: the destruction of the evidence against him, which Teafatiller argued violated his rights. The drugs were received by a state bureau for testing and then sent back to the sheriff’s office for destruction without informing Teafatiller or his lawyer. This meant that Teafatiller could not have the chance to test the evidence that was being used against him. The court found that this action went against laws meant to protect the rights of individuals and ensure a fair trial. The judges concluded that the destruction of the evidence constituted a serious violation of Teafatiller's rights. While in previous similar cases, not having evidence might not have led to a reversible error, in this situation, the specific evidence that formed the basis of the charges was completely destroyed. Because there was no opportunity for Teafatiller to review or challenge the evidence, the court decided the only fair action was to reverse the conviction. As a result, the court mandated that the case be sent back for new proceedings where Teafatiller would have the chance to examine the evidence against him, ensuring his rights were upheld.
In OCCA case No. F 2005-41, James Nye appealed his conviction for Manufacture or Attempted Manufacture of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Methamphetamine). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction but modify his sentence. One judge dissented. James Nye was found guilty by a jury in a district court in Grady County. The jury decided he should go to prison for sixty years for his crime. After the trial, Nye believed there were problems that made his trial unfair, so he appealed the decision. He raised six main reasons for his appeal: 1. He said there wasn't enough good evidence to prove he did the crime based on what his co-defendant said. 2. He thought the court made mistakes by allowing too much evidence that helped the co-defendant's story without being necessary. 3. He claimed that the people working for the state did things that were unfair and made the jury give him a harsher sentence. 4. He felt that some evidence presented was not related to the case and led to a higher sentence than it should have been. 5. He argued that the sentence he got was too harsh. 6. Finally, he believed that all these problems combined made the trial not fair. After looking at the evidence and the reasons presented by Nye, the court agreed that his conviction should not be changed because there was enough evidence to support the decision. However, they also found that there were issues in the trial that affected his sentence. The court recognized that while some mistakes were made, they ultimately did not affect the conviction itself. The court highlighted that the prosecutor said things that should not have been said and presented evidence that was prejudicial. The judge noted that bringing up Nye’s past in court and how long he spent in jail might have made the jury unfairly biased against him. Because of these mistakes and the belief that the original sentence was excessive, the court changed the sentence from sixty years to a new sentence of twenty years. The judges felt that this new sentence was a fairer punishment for the crime Nye committed. One judge disagreed with the amount the sentence was lowered to, suggesting it should be reduced to thirty-five years instead. In summary, James Nye's conviction is upheld, but he will now serve twenty years in prison instead of sixty because of errors made in the trial.
In OCCA case No. S-2005-840, #Ranney appealed his conviction for #driving under the influence and driving with a revoked license. In an (unpublished) decision, the court decided to deny Ranney's motion to dismiss the State's appeal. The court remanded the case back to the District Court with instructions to vacate its order that had previously granted Ranney's motions to suppress evidence and quash the charging information. #One judge dissented. The case began when Ranney was accused of hitting a sign in a convenience store parking lot while possibly being drunk. The police officer noticed things like the smell of alcohol and Ranney's slurred speech. Ranney admitted to drinking beer when the officer questioned him. At a preliminary hearing, Ranney tried to get his statements thrown out, but that motion was denied. Later, at a different hearing, Ranney asked again to have his statements and the charges dismissed. He argued he wasn't free to go when the officer spoke to him and that his statements were made because he felt pressured. He also claimed the officer didn’t have a good reason to come up and question him. The judge, after considering the situation, decided to grant Ranney’s request without explaining why. This left everyone confused about the reasons behind the decision. The State then asked the judge for a written explanation, but she didn’t respond. The State decided to appeal her decision, but Ranney argued that the appeal should be dismissed because there were no clear reasons from the judge about her ruling. While the court agreed there was a problem with the record, they didn’t think the State should be punished because it was mainly the judge’s fault for not providing explanations. So, the court ordered the case to go back to the lower court. They said the District Court should take away its previous decision and then handle Ranney's motions again, this time making sure to provide clear reasons for any new decisions.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-314, the appellant appealed his conviction for the Manufacture of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (methamphetamine). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the conviction to Attempting to Unlawfully Manufacture Methamphetamine. One judge dissented. Here’s a summary of the case: Morton D. Hayner was found guilty of making methamphetamine in a trial. The jury sentenced him to life in prison and imposed a $50,000 fine. Hayner argued that the evidence was not enough to prove he manufactured meth, he should have been given chances for lesser charges, and that the fine was too high for him since he didn't have much money. The court looked carefully at the evidence and agreed with Hayner on the first point. They said he was actually trying to manufacture meth but had not finished the process when the police arrived. So, they changed his conviction from manufacturing to attempting to manufacture. On the second point, the court found that Hayner was not denied the chance to consider lesser charges. For the third point, the court decided the fine was appropriate because it matched the seriousness of the crime. In conclusion, Hayner's conviction was changed to Attempting to Unlawfully Manufacture Methamphetamine, but the life sentence and fine were kept the same.
In OCCA case No. F-2004-1226, Anthony Jerome Johnson appealed his conviction for multiple crimes, including felony eluding an officer, obstructing an officer, and robbery with a firearm. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions for eluding an officer and robbery with a firearm, but reversed the conviction for obstructing an officer, with instructions to dismiss that charge. One judge dissented regarding the reversal of the obstruction charge. The case stemmed from an incident where Johnson carjacked a woman’s car and fled from police after they initiated a traffic stop. During his escape, he ran numerous stop signs and caused danger to others on the road. Following a high-speed chase, he crashed the car and then ran on foot, trying to evade capture from arresting officers. At trial, Johnson was found guilty and sentenced to several years in prison as well as a fine for the offenses committed. On appeal, he argued four points. First, he claimed that the charges against him violated protections against double jeopardy, stating that the actions he took should not be counted as separate crimes since they arose from one act of fleeing. Second, he contended that evidence for felony eluding was not sufficient, suggesting the situation warranted a lesser charge. Third, he asserted that there was insufficient evidence for the armed robbery conviction. Lastly, he believed inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony supported reducing his sentence. The court, after reviewing the case thoroughly, determined that the convictions and sentences for eluding and robbery were valid. The court found sufficient evidence supporting these convictions, including testimony from eyewitnesses and evidence that directly linked Johnson to the robbery. However, they agreed with Johnson's argument regarding the obstructing charge, concluding both his car and foot chases should be treated as one continuous act of fleeing, therefore only allowing the conviction for eluding. In the end, the court affirmed the convictions for eluding an officer and robbery but instructed that the obstruction charge be dismissed. The dissenting opinion expressed a different view on the obstruction charge, arguing that Johnson's actions could be considered separate acts deserving of distinct charges.
In OCCA case No. RE-2005-355, Bobby Ray Wyles, Jr. appealed his conviction for Second Degree Burglary and False Personation. In a published decision, the court decided that the trial judge wrongly ordered Wyles’ sentences to run consecutively with a later sentence instead of concurrently, which violated the original sentencing agreements. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. RE 2005-0473, the appellant appealed his conviction for burglary in the second degree and knowingly concealing stolen property. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the revocation of his suspended sentences because the hearing was not held within the required twenty days. The appellant had a dissenting opinion.
In OCCA case No. PR-2006-120, a petitioner appealed her conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug (methamphetamine) and driving without seatbelts. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petitioner's request for relief in part and deny it in part. One judge dissented. The case began when the petitioner was charged with possessing methamphetamine and driving without a seatbelt. She initially agreed to a plea deal with the state, which involved accepting guilt for the drug charge and a fine for the seatbelt violation. However, when the petitioner refused to follow through with the state’s conditions for the plea, she attempted to enter a non-negotiated or blind guilty plea. The judge refused to accept her blind plea and insisted she proceed to trial, stating she did not have an absolute right to plead guilty. The petitioner believed she should be allowed to enter her guilty plea without the state’s conditions. This disagreement led her to file a petition with the court seeking orders to either allow her to plead guilty or to prevent the judge from forcing her to go to trial. After reviewing the facts of the case, the court found that the petitioner had a clear legal right to have her guilty plea accepted if it met the necessary legal requirements. The court noted that it was a mistake for the judge to reject her plea without evaluating whether it was voluntary and if there was a factual basis for it. The court granted part of the petitioner’s request by directing the district court judge to conduct a hearing on her blind plea and accept it if it correctly fulfilled the legal standards. However, the court denied her request to have her plea regarding the seatbelt violation accepted, as that plea required the judge’s approval. The dissenting judge expressed concerns about whether the petitioner had truly shown that she was being harmed by the trial court's refusal to accept her plea, suggesting that any challenges to a guilty plea rejection should typically be taken up in direct appeals rather than with this type of petition. The dissenting judge also supported the trial judge's discretion, arguing that the right to a jury trial must be upheld. In summary, the court ruled that the petitioner should be given a chance to enter her guilty plea under the law, but that her plea regarding the seatbelt violation did not have to be accepted.
In OCCA case No. C-2005-398, Elisa Nielson appealed her conviction for Lewd Acts with a Child Under the Age of 16. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petition for certiorari and remand the case for further proceedings. One judge dissented from the decision. Elisa Nielson had entered a guilty plea for her crime on February 7, 2005. The judge sentenced her to twenty years in prison, but she would only have to serve ten years if she followed certain rules. Nielson later wanted to take back her guilty plea because she thought there was confusion about what her sentence would be. She argued that a deal was made where she wouldn't be sentenced to more than five years in prison, but when it came time for sentencing, the judge did not follow that recommendation. Nielson brought her case to a higher court, saying that the trial judge should have let her change her mind about the guilty plea before sentencing. The higher court looked at all the facts and agreed with her. They found that the confusion about the plea meant she should have been allowed to withdraw it. The court decided Nielson's issue about the sentence was not relevant after they allowed her to withdraw her plea. So, they granted her request and sent the case back to the lower court to work things out according to their ruling. One judge disagreed and said that Nielson understood what she was doing when she accepted her guilty plea. He thought the agreement was clear and that the lower court had done everything correctly. He would not have granted her appeal.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-129, Denise Sue Watie appealed her conviction for sexually abusing a minor. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment but modify the sentence. One judge dissented. Denise Sue Watie was found guilty by a jury in Tulsa County for sexually abusing her son. The jury suggested that she should serve eight years in prison. She was sentenced accordingly on January 24, 2005. After her conviction, she decided to appeal the decision, stating several reasons why she believed the trial was unfair. First, Watie claimed the court made an error by allowing certain evidence that she thought was unnecessary and repetitive. However, the court found that the admission of a videotaped interview of the complainant was acceptable under the law. Since the court followed the correct procedures, this part of her appeal was denied. Next, Watie argued that her confession to the police should not have been allowed because it was taken without informing her of her rights. The court examined how the police interviewed her. They noted that she was not arrested and could leave at any time. Because of this, the court concluded that the interview was not a custodial interrogation and did not require the police to read her the Miranda rights. Thus, Watie's statements were considered voluntary, and these claims were also denied. Watie also contended that the jury should have been instructed about the requirement that she would serve at least 85% of her sentence in prison. The court agreed that this information was important and should have been provided to the jury upon Watie’s request. Due to this oversight, her sentence was modified from eight years to six years. Lastly, Watie claimed that her sentence was too harsh. Since the court found that the jury should have been informed about the 85% rule, they reduced her sentence but did not fully agree with her position on its harshness. The decision to modify the sentence made her final argument about the severity of the punishment unnecessary. In conclusion, the judgment of the district court was affirmed, but her sentence was reduced to six years. The appeal brought attention to important legal procedures, but ultimately, the court decided that the original conviction stood, with a slight change to the length of time she would serve in prison.
In OCCA case No. F-2004-997, Johnny Freddy Locust appealed his conviction for burglary in the first degree. In an unpublished decision, the court affirmed the judgment but modified his sentence to fifteen years imprisonment. One judge dissented in part, expressing disagreement with the court's decision to modify the sentence without it being raised in the appeal. Johnny Freddy Locust was found guilty by a jury for breaking into a building without permission. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison and a fine after the trial judge decided his punishment. Locust appealed, saying that the trial had mistakes. He argued that the instructions given to the jury were wrong and that the evidence did not prove he was guilty. He also claimed his lawyer did not do a good job defending him, and that overall, the errors during the trial meant that he did not get a fair chance. During the appeal, the court looked closely at what Locust's arguments were and reviewed the evidence from his trial. They found that while there was a mistake in not giving the jury proper instructions about consent, this mistake did not change the outcome of the trial. They agreed that even though the instructions were important, Locust still had enough evidence against him to be found guilty. The court also said that even though his lawyer could have done better by not asking for the right instructions, this did not likely change the trial's final result. In the end, they decided to lower his prison sentence from twenty years to fifteen years. The judgment against him for breaking and entering remained the same, and he still had to pay the fine. One judge disagreed with the decision to change the sentence because it was not an issue brought up during the appeal, believing that the matter had been overlooked. Overall, Locust's appeal led to a shorter prison term, but his conviction still stood.
In OCCA case No. F 2004-816, Martin appealed his conviction for several serious crimes against children. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions but modified the sentences. One judge dissented. Solly Lee Martin, Jr. was found guilty of multiple charges which included lewd molestation, attempted forcible oral sodomy, and child sexual abuse. The trial happened in Ottawa County, where he received very long sentences for these crimes, which involved terms that ranged from 10 years to life in prison. Some sentences were ordered to be served together, while others had to be served after. During his appeal, Martin claimed he was not given a fair trial. He argued that the trial judge wouldn't allow him to show evidence about the complainant's past which he thought could help his case. In another claim, he said that some testimony during the trial was unfairly negative against him and could influence the jury's decision. The court looked closely at Martin's complaints. They found that he did not properly follow the rules to show the evidence he wanted to introduce, so his first complaint was not accepted. For the second complaint, the court agreed that some of the testimony presented was error, as it talked too much about what the crime might do to the victims in the future, which is generally not allowed in these types of cases. Despite these issues, the court decided that overall, Martin's convictions would remain, but they agreed to change his sentences. Instead of them running one after the other, they made them all run at the same time. The final decision was that although the court kept the convictions, there were changes to make sure the sentences were fair.
In OCCA case No. F-2004-1266, Darrell W. Hogan appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse Hogan's conviction and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Hogan was found guilty of killing his cellmate, James Wise, at the prison. On the morning of February 24, 2004, Wise had threatened Hogan with a knife. Later, Hogan killed Wise by choking him with a laundry bag drawstring and then called for help, but Wise died weeks afterward. Hogan confessed to the crime when investigators spoke with him. During his trial, Hogan was supposed to have nine chances to dismiss potential jurors, known as peremptory challenges, but he was only allowed five. He argued that this was unfair and violated his rights. The court agreed with Hogan's argument, stating that denying him the proper number of peremptory challenges was a serious mistake. They ruled that he deserved a new trial where he would have all his legal rights. The dissenting judge felt that the mistake was not harmful and that Hogan did not prove he was disadvantaged by the limited number of challenges, and therefore, the trial's outcome should have been upheld.
In OCCA case No. F 2004-1091, Mortarice D. Collier appealed his conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs (Marijuana) and Failure to Affix Tax Stamp. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the convictions. One judge dissented. Collier was found guilty of having illegal drugs and not paying the required tax on them. His trial was held without a jury, and he was sentenced to spend time in prison and pay fines. The trial court later reduced his prison time. Collier raised several issues on appeal, claiming that there wasn't enough evidence against him, that he did not get a speedy trial, that the fees for his imprisonment should be changed, and that the police didn't keep the marijuana properly to prove it was really his. After looking at all the arguments and evidence, the court found that the police did not show they kept the marijuana safe and secure after it was taken from Collier's vehicle. There were gaps in the evidence about where the drug was kept, which made it unclear if it was the same marijuana taken from Collier. The court believed that without proper care of the evidence, they could not trust the results of the tests done on the marijuana. Because of this, they decided to reverse Collier's convictions and said they should be dismissed. The judges’ votes were divided, with one dissenting opinion arguing that the original convictions should not be overturned based on speculation about tampering. The dissenting judge believed there was enough evidence to support the arrest and that the case should not have been dismissed.
In OCCA case No. J-2005-1078, the appellant appealed his conviction for First Degree Rape. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the order that sentenced the appellant as an adult and directed that he be treated as a youthful offender in the event of a conviction. No judge dissented. The case began when the appellant was charged as a youthful offender on September 23, 2004. After a request to be treated as a juvenile was denied, the state filed a motion to sentence the appellant as an adult. This motion led to a trial that was scheduled for September 12, 2005. However, just before the trial started, the state asked to cancel the trial and have a hearing on the motion to sentence him as an adult, which was scheduled for October 12, 2005. During the appeal, the appellant raised three main issues. He argued that the delays in bringing the charges against him were unfair and that the case should be dismissed. He also claimed that the state could not pursue adult sentencing because the trial had already begun before the hearing, and lastly, he said there wasn't enough evidence to show he couldn't be helped through the juvenile system. The court looked closely at the timing of when the trial started and when the hearing to sentence him as an adult happened. They determined that the trial had indeed started when jury selection began, and the law required that the hearing on the adult sentencing motion should have happened before the trial began. Since it did not, the court found that the district court made a mistake by allowing the state to strike the trial after jury selection had started and then proceed with the sentencing hearing. As a result, the order to sentence the appellant as an adult was reversed, and the case was sent back to the district court with instructions to treat the appellant as a youthful offender if he were to be convicted.
In OCCA case No. C-2005-207, William Allen Pelican, Jr. appealed his conviction for multiple counts of rape. In a published decision, the court decided to grant his petition for certiorari and remand the case for a new hearing. One judge dissented. Pelican was sentenced after entering a plea deal where he accepted nolo contendere pleas to three counts of serious crimes. These included rape by instrumentation and first-degree rape. He was given a total sentence of 22.5 years, with part of it suspended, and was also fined. Later, Pelican sought to withdraw his pleas, but the trial judge forced his lawyer to talk about the case despite the attorney having a conflict of interest. The lawyer felt he could not fully support Pelican because he also represented someone else. Because the trial judge didn’t let the lawyer withdraw before discussing the case, Pelican was not effectively helped by his attorney. This was seen as unfair to Pelican since he deserved a lawyer who could fully support his case without conflicts. The court recognized this problem, stating that everyone has the right to have a lawyer who can represent them fully and without conflicts. Because of these issues, the court decided to give Pelican another chance to have a hearing with new legal help so he could properly address his request to withdraw his pleas. The decision was made to correct the case records and ensure that Pelican would be fairly represented in the future.
In OCCA case No. F-2004-430, the appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree manslaughter. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the judgment and sentence and remand the case with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented. William Antwyoe Watson was accused of killing Steven Roberson, but Watson argued he acted in self-defense. The jury had found him guilty of first-degree manslaughter and sentenced him to four years in prison. Watson believed he was defending himself when Roberson attacked him in his home. The appeals court looked carefully at the evidence and found that Watson had been attacked earlier that evening. Roberson had entered Watson's apartment unlawfully and threatened him. The court decided that the state did not prove Watson was not acting in self-defense when he used a knife to protect himself. Therefore, they believed he should be found not guilty. Because of this, the court reversed Watson's conviction and said the case should be dismissed. The issues raised by Watson regarding the trial were no longer needed to be discussed, as the main decision was significant enough. In summary, the court concluded that Watson's actions were justifiable based on the circumstances he faced, and they reversed his conviction for manslaughter.
In OCCA case No. F 2004-773, Alfonzo Daniel appealed his conviction for Lewd Acts with a Child under Sixteen and Making Indecent Proposals to a Child under Sixteen. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Mr. Daniel was charged with serious crimes in Oklahoma. He went to trial, where the jury found him guilty of two counts. He was given twenty years for each count, and the sentences were to be served one after the other, making it a total of forty years. Mr. Daniel thought the trial was unfair for many reasons and decided to appeal. He raised several complaints about what happened during the trial. He argued that a videotaped interview of him should not have been allowed because it was wrongly obtained. He also claimed the judge didn’t watch the whole tape before deciding it was involuntary. He felt that certain information, known as hearsay, was also improperly shared during the trial, and that some testimonies were included which didn’t really connect to his case. Mr. Daniel believed he couldn't properly defend himself because his questioning of the witness was limited and some rules given to the jury were unfair. After looking through all the records and arguments, the court agreed that the admission of the videotaped interview was a significant mistake. The court stated that this mistake was not minor and could have affected the jury’s decision. Therefore, they decided to send the case back for a new trial, where these mistakes could be corrected. The other points Mr. Daniel raised were not examined further since the first mistake was enough to warrant a new trial. The judge who disagreed believed that the errors made were not significant enough to change the outcome of the trial and felt the conviction should stand.