In OCCA case No. C-2011-945, Hall appealed his conviction for robbery with a firearm, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, and assault with a dangerous weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to deny Hall's petition to withdraw his plea but reversed the conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon with instructions to dismiss it. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. S-2012-214, Nhanh Van Dang and Nhi Thi Nguyen appealed their conviction for trafficking in illegal drugs and conspiracy to traffic in illegal drugs. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence, meaning the charges against them could not proceed. One judge dissented. The case began when law enforcement stopped the vehicle driving by Dang and Nguyen. They were suspected of breaking traffic laws, but the court found that the officers did not have enough reason to pull them over. The original judge ruled that there wasn’t enough evidence to support the stop, which led to the suppression of the evidence gathered afterward. The state tried to argue that the stop was justified because of alleged traffic violations. However, the appeals court agreed with the lower court's decision, saying the evidence did not clearly show that the officers had a good reason to stop the vehicle. Since the stop was deemed improper, the gathered evidence could not be used in court against Dang and Nguyen. Therefore, the appeals court confirmed that the right decision was made by the lower court in suppressing the evidence, reinforcing the idea that fair legal procedures must be followed.
In OCCA case No. S-2011-765, Steven Cory Lymen appealed his conviction for Second Degree Burglary. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to deny the State's appeal to reverse the trial court's decision. The court determined that the trial court did not misuse its authority when it suppressed evidence and dismissed the case. The State had argued that the witness's identification of Lymen was valid despite it being considered unduly suggestive initially, but the court ultimately agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the identification was not reliable.
In OCCA case No. C-2011-592, Philipe Jean Pace appealed his conviction for Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property, After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the writ and allow the Petitioner to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial. One judge dissented. Philipe Jean Pace was charged with a crime and, instead of going to trial, he decided to plead nolo contendere, which means he did not contest the charges. The trial judge accepted his plea and sentenced him to twenty years in prison, but he only had to serve the first ten years. After the plea, Pace wanted to change his mind and asked to withdraw his plea, but the court said no. In his appeal, Pace argued two main points. First, he said he didn't understand what he was doing when he gave up his right to have a lawyer help him. He claimed that he didn't really know what would happen if he represented himself. Second, he believed that he was confused and didn’t make a proper decision to plead guilty. The higher court looked at all the details, including what happened in the trial court. They found that the original court did not really explain to Pace the risks of not having a lawyer. They noted that just because he had signed a form saying he wanted to waive his right to counsel, it didn't mean he actually understood what he was giving up. The judges pointed out that there was no evidence in the record that he was properly informed about the dangers of self-representation or that he clearly stated he wanted to represent himself. Because of these problems, the higher court ruled that the lower court made a mistake when it denied Pace's request to withdraw his plea. They believed it was important for a person to fully understand their rights and the consequences of their choices in court. As a result, the court decided that Pace could withdraw his plea and would be able to have a trial.
In OCCA case No. F-2010-665, Roy C. Williams appealed his conviction for Second Degree Felony Murder and two counts of Using a Vehicle to Facilitate the Discharge of a Firearm. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse one count of his conviction while affirming the others. One judge dissented. Roy C. Williams was sentenced for his involvement in a drive-by shooting that resulted in the death of one person and injuries to another. Williams was found guilty by a jury in the Tulsa County District Court of two counts related to using a vehicle in the shooting and one count for murder. The judge sentenced him to a total of eighteen years in prison, which included twelve years for the murder charge and three years for each of the other counts, to be served one after the other. Williams raised several arguments as reasons for appealing his conviction. He believed that his confession to the police should not have been used against him because he claimed he did not have his right to remain silent protected. He also thought that the evidence against him was not strong enough to support his convictions. Upon reviewing the case, the court decided that the law enforcement officials acted correctly when they obtained Williams's confession. The court said that he willingly talked to them, so this argument was denied. Regarding the second argument, the court noted that Williams knowingly drove to a place where rival gang members were located with guns in the vehicle. This behavior was enough to show he was part of the act that led to the shooting, so this argument was also denied. The third argument was about a legal principle called the merger doctrine. Williams’s defense argued that his felony murder charge should not stand because it was related to the same act as the charge for using a vehicle to facilitate the shooting. However, the court decided to keep the felony murder conviction, stating that both charges could stand because of the way the law is now interpreted. For his fourth argument concerning double jeopardy, which means a person cannot be tried for the same crime twice, the court agreed. They stated that the charges were based on the same set of facts, so they could not convict him on both counts pertaining to the same act. Because of this, the conviction for the second count of using a vehicle was reversed. The fifth argument was about whether Williams should receive credit for the time he spent in jail before the trial. The court ruled that it was up to the trial judge to decide whether to grant that credit and found no evidence that the judge made a mistake in denying it. This argument was also denied. The sixth argument claimed that his lawyer did not do a good job representing him during the trial. The court found that even if his lawyer made some mistakes, they did not affect the overall outcome of the case. After reviewing all of his arguments, the court decided to reverse the second count concerning the vehicle but kept the murder conviction and the first charge intact. Thus, Williams had mixed results from his appeal, with one conviction dismissed but others upheld. In conclusion, the decision resulted in one count being reversed and the remaining convictions affirmed, meaning Williams would continue to serve his sentence, minus the count that was reversed.
In OCCA case No. S-2011-545, the State of Oklahoma appealed his conviction for evidence suppression. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's order. One judge dissented. The case involved the State of Oklahoma appealing a decision made by a special judge in Cleveland County. The State was unhappy with the judge's ruling to suppress evidence, which they felt was unfair. The main reason for the appeal was that the State believed the judge did not have the right to impose punishment on them for what they claimed was a misunderstanding of the Discovery Code. Essentially, they argued that they had not violated any rules regarding the sharing of evidence and information before the trial. The court had to look at whether the judge's decision was reasonable or if it was clearly wrong. The judges found that the special judge had good reason to impose sanctions on the State because it was determined that the State did not follow the proper procedures for sharing evidence. This is known as discovery. The court highlighted that it is very important in criminal cases for both sides to share information so that there are no surprises during the trial. This process helps ensure fairness and allows both sides to prepare adequately. The court explained that there are rules in place for how evidence should be shared and that these rules are crucial to ensuring justice. The district court had determined that the State should have done more to preserve evidence that could have been useful for the defense. Because they did not do this, the special judge decided to impose penalties on the State as a form of punishment for not following the rules. After reviewing the situation, the court found that the special judge acted within his rights in deciding to sanction the State. As a result, the court affirmed the decision made by the district court in Cleveland County. The judges agreed that enforcing these discovery rules is necessary to avoid similar problems in future cases. So, in the end, the court supported the lower court's ruling by stating that the sanctions against the State were appropriate. This decision encourages the State and other prosecutors to comply with the Discovery Code in future cases, ensuring fair trials for everyone involved.
In OCCA case No. S-2011-544, the State of Oklahoma appealed a court's decision where evidence was suppressed in a criminal case. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to uphold the lower court's ruling. One member of the court did not agree with this decision. The case began when the district court, under the Special Judge, found that the State had not followed the rules about sharing evidence, known as the Discovery Code. The State argued that it had done nothing wrong and claimed that the court should not have punished them for this. They believed the judge’s decision to tell the jury about the supposed violation was also wrong, especially since they didn't act in bad faith. The court examined the arguments from both sides and concluded that the district court did not make a mistake. They believed that the State really did not follow the rules and agreed that it was appropriate to impose penalties for this. The court also explained that they don't usually review jury instructions in these matters. Ultimately, the higher court decided to keep the ruling from the district court, meaning the previous decision to suppress the evidence remained in effect. The ruling was considered important in the context of the legal process. In the end, the reasoning emphasized that having a fair process helps both sides in a case and that knowing the strengths and weaknesses of each other's arguments can make trials go better. Even though some might think the penalties were harsh, the court felt it was essential to make sure that such rules are followed in the future.
In OCCA case No. F-2010-644, Jones appealed his conviction for kidnapping, possession of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions but vacate the fine related to the drug paraphernalia charge. One judge dissented. Jones was found guilty after a jury trial in which he faced several charges, including kidnapping and drug offenses. The jury sentenced him to thirty years for the kidnapping and twenty years for the cocaine possession, with the drug paraphernalia charge resulting in one year and a $1,000 fine. In his appeal, Jones raised multiple issues, including whether the jury was properly instructed, if his trial was fair, and if his lawyer was effective. He specifically challenged how the trial was conducted regarding the instructions given to the jury and the evidence allowed by the court. The court found that the jury had been adequately instructed and that any mistakes made in the instructions did not affect the final outcome of the trial. While it agreed that the jury was improperly instructed about determining punishment in a bifurcated trial for the misdemeanor charge, it noted that all of his sentences ran concurrently, which reduced the impact of that error. Jones also argued that introducing evidence of his other crimes was unfair, but the court decided that this evidence was relevant and crucial for the jury to understand the context of the case. As for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court ruled that Jones failed to demonstrate how his lawyer's performance was deficient or how it affected the outcome of his trial. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for the charges against him and found that his sentences were appropriate, rejecting his claim that they were excessive. Finally, when considering if the combined errors denied him a fair trial, the court decided that the errors did not undermine his conviction, except for vacating the fine of $1,000 for the drug paraphernalia charge. Overall, the court affirmed the convictions for kidnapping and possession of cocaine but made one adjustment regarding the fine for the drug paraphernalia charge due to a procedural issue.
In OCCA case No. S 2011-0801, the State of Oklahoma appealed the conviction of Wendel Hughes for preventing a witness from giving testimony, use of a firearm while committing a felony, and false reports of crime. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling that dismissed the charges of preventing a witness from testifying and use of a firearm while committing a felony. One judge dissented. Wendel Hughes was charged in Sequoyah County with three serious offenses. During the preliminary hearing, the magistrate determined that there wasn't enough evidence to support the charges of preventing a witness from giving testimony or using a firearm during a felony. The State thought this decision was wrong and appealed the ruling. The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to see if there is likely enough evidence to believe that a crime happened and that the accused person committed it. The court reviewed the case to check if the lower court made a mistake in its decision. They found that the evidence the State provided was not strong enough to show that Hughes committed the crimes. So, they decided not to change the ruling of the lower court. The court affirmed the dismissal of the two counts against Hughes, meaning they agreed with the previous decision. The judge who disagreed with the majority opinion thought that the evidence should have been enough to go to trial. He argued that the evidence suggested Hughes had intentions to stop the witness from providing testimony and that a jury should decide if he was guilty based on all the facts of the case. In summary, Hughes's charges were dismissed because the courts did not find enough evidence of his wrongdoing based on the information presented during the preliminary hearing.
In OCCA case No. S-2011-774, the State of Oklahoma appealed the decision regarding the conviction of DeJear. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the previous ruling, which found there was not enough evidence to prove that DeJear was under the supervision of the Department of Corrections, making the charges not applicable. One judge dissented from this opinion.
In OCCA case No. F-2010-203, Travis Lee Danley appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder and other charges. In a published decision, the court decided to modify his conviction for Larceny from a House to Petit Larceny but affirmed the other convictions. One judge dissented. Danley was found guilty of two counts of First Degree Murder, Second Degree Arson, Larceny from a House, and Larceny of an Automobile, and sentenced to life in prison without parole on the murder counts, among other sentences. The events occurred on August 31, 2008, when Danley shot two victims in a home after an argument, attempted to cover up the crime, and fled the scene with stolen items. During his trial, Danley raised several issues on appeal, including that the district court should have declared a mistrial after the jury heard testimony about his probation, whether there was enough evidence for the larceny conviction, prosecutorial misconduct, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and cumulative error from the trial. The court found that the mention of Danley being on probation did not prejudice the trial significantly and upheld the district court's ruling. However, it agreed with Danley that the evidence did not support a conviction for Larceny from a House, as he was a guest in the home and did not unlawfully enter. Therefore, his charge was modified to Petit Larceny due to insufficient evidence regarding the value of the stolen items. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct were also considered, with the court noting that the prosecutor's questions and comments did not render the trial unfair. Danley’s argument regarding ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected, as the jury instructions were deemed adequate at the time of the trial. Lastly, the court ruled that even if there were errors during the trial, they did not cumulatively harm Danley's right to a fair trial. In summary, the court affirmed most of the trial's decisions but modified one conviction due to insufficient evidence, affirming the principle that defendants deserve fair treatment under the law.
In OCCA case No. S-2011-0467, a person appealed his conviction for possessing a firearm after a previous conviction. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling which found that the application of a new law to this case was unconstitutional. One judge dissented. To explain further, the person involved, known as the appellee, was charged after a new law was enacted that changed the rules about possessing firearms for people with past convictions. Originally, under the law at the time the appellee completed his past sentence, he was allowed to possess a firearm. However, the law changed in 2010 to make it more difficult for people with certain convictions to have firearms, requiring them to wait ten years instead of just having their rights restored after finishing their sentence. The appeal began after a magistrate found that using the new law against the appellee was unfair because it changed the rules after he had already completed his legal obligations. The court needed to determine if this application of the law was considered an ex post facto law, which is illegal under the Constitution because it punishes someone for actions that were not against the law when they were done. The appellee had completed his deferred sentence successfully and had regained the right to possess a firearm. The court recognized that the law should not punish people for actions that were legal at the time they were done, and applying the new law to the appellee would violate this principle. Therefore, the decision from the lower court was upheld, meaning the appellee would not face penalties from the new law. The ruling confirmed that once someone has completed their deferred sentence, they should not have to follow new rules that were created after the fact regarding possession of firearms.
In OCCA case No. C-2011-546, Myron Emanuel Louie appealed his conviction for Assault with a Dangerous Weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to remand the case for the appointment of conflict-free counsel. One judge dissented. Myron Louie was originally charged with a more serious crime, but he later pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. However, after pleading guilty, he wanted to change his mind and withdraw his plea. The court sentenced him to ten years in prison, even after he expressed his desire to withdraw the plea. Louie then filed a motion to officially withdraw his guilty plea, but the court denied his request during a hearing. During the appeal, Louie claimed that his lawyer had a conflict of interest that affected how well he was represented. He argued that this made it hard for him to get fair legal help, especially during the hearing to withdraw his plea. The judges explained that a lawyer must represent their client fully and not have any conflicts that could hurt the client’s case. The court agreed that the original lawyer did not handle the motion to withdraw effectively and that this lack of proper representation meant Louie's appeal needed to be looked at again with a new lawyer who doesn't have a conflict of interest. They ordered the case to go back to the original court to appoint a new attorney. The judges also stated that if the new attorney managed to get the guilty plea withdrawn, this would be considered a successful outcome in this appeal. But if the motion to withdraw was denied again, all the decisions and details of that hearing would need to be sent back to the appellate court for review. In conclusion, the case was sent back to be re-evaluated with a new lawyer, making it a measurement of fairness and justice for Louie.
In OCCA case No. RE-2011-277, Johnson appealed his conviction for Feloniously Carrying a Firearm. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of his suspended sentence but vacated an additional Victim Compensation Assessment. Johnson dissented. The case began when Johnson entered a guilty plea on August 3, 2005, and was sentenced to ten years in prison, with six months of that sentence being served in jail and the rest suspended, meaning he wouldn't have to serve it unless he broke the law again. He was also fined and had to pay a fee for victim compensation to help those who had been hurt by crimes. Later, in November 2005, the State, which is like the government in this case, claimed Johnson broke his probation by getting into trouble again, which included resisting arrest and having drugs. Because of this, on March 10, 2006, the court decided to make him serve eighteen months of his suspended sentence. Johnson continued to have problems. He was charged with more crimes in 2008, including stealing from a house and having drugs. He went through a special program to help people with drug problems and successfully finished it. In June 2010, the court dismissed some applications to revoke his probation because of progress he made. However, on March 1, 2011, the State filed another application saying Johnson broke the rules again, claiming he tried to escape from the police, attacked a police officer, and had more drugs. A hearing was held on March 14, 2011, where the judge decided to revoke ninety months of Johnson's suspended sentence. Johnson argued in his appeal that the judge was wrong to make him pay another victim compensation fee during the revocation hearing. He believed this fee could only be applied when someone was first convicted, and since the revocation wasn't a new conviction, he shouldn’t have to pay it again. The State said it didn’t matter since the record only showed the original fee, but Johnson insisted the extra fee should be removed. The court agreed with Johnson, explaining that a victim compensation fee should only be applied at the time of the original sentencing, not at a revocation hearing. Therefore, the court decided to remove the $200 fee that was added during the revocation. In his final point, Johnson asked the court to lessen the time he had to serve because he had made improvements while on probation. However, the court found that the judge in charge did not abuse his discretion in deciding how long to revoke Johnson's suspended sentence. Overall, the court confirmed the revocation of Johnson’s sentence but dismissed the new Victim Compensation fee.
In OCCA case No. F-2010-651, Frank Leroy Gibson appealed his conviction for Manufacture of Controlled Dangerous Substance (Methamphetamine) and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Gibson's convictions but modified his sentence on Count I to 25 years of imprisonment instead of Life. One judge dissented regarding the sentencing modification. Gibson was found guilty by a jury of manufacturing methamphetamine and possessing drug paraphernalia after a police search of his home. The jury considered various pieces of evidence, including burned pseudoephedrine blister packs and a coffee grinder with traces of the drug. Gibson argued that there wasn't enough evidence to prove he manufactured methamphetamine, but the court disagreed, stating sufficient circumstantial evidence pointed to his involvement. Gibson also raised concerns about how the jury was instructed regarding a question they had during sentencing discussions. He claimed the response given by the judge was improper. However, the court found that the response did not negatively affect his rights. Another point of appeal involved how the State proved Gibson’s prior felony convictions. Gibson argued that the use of certain documents to establish his past convictions was wrong. The court noted he did not object to this during the trial, so it upheld the use of the documents. Gibson also claimed that his post-arrest silence was mentioned inappropriately during the trial, which could lead to unfair treatment. The court assessed this point and found that the reference did not affect the fairness of the trial overall. Gibson argued that the prosecutor acted inappropriately during the trial, making inflammatory comments and expressing personal opinions. The court examined these claims and concluded that while some comments by the prosecutor were improper, they did not affect the outcome of the trial. There was also a concern about the trial judge informing the jury that Gibson's attorney was facing criminal charges. The court acknowledged the trial court's comments were poorly chosen but ultimately decided that they did not cause significant harm to Gibson’s case. The court determined that while Gibson's sentence was initially excessive due to the previous errors and comments related to the trial, the evidence of his guilt was strong, and thus reduced his sentence on the methamphetamine charge to 25 years in prison. The possession charge remained unchanged and the sentences were to run concurrently. In conclusion, while Gibson’s convictions were upheld, the court modified his sentence for fairness considering the cumulative effects of the prosecutor's statements and the judge's comments.
In OCCA case No. F 2010-0888, Eugene Turner appealed his conviction for assault and battery on a police officer, escape from detention/arrest, and domestic assault. In a published decision, the court decided that the District Court did not have the authority to accelerate Turner's deferred sentence for the assault on the police officer because the time limit for filing had already passed. The ruling was based on a prior case, which stated that a deferred sentence starts on the day it is given. Since the State didn’t file their application until after the deadline, Turner's case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. RE-2010-706, Cynthia McGhee appealed her conviction for embezzlement and using a computer to defraud. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the order revoking three years of her suspended sentence. One judge dissented. Here is a brief summary of the case: Cynthia McGhee was originally sentenced in 2004 for embezzlement and related charges. She received a total of fifty years in prison, but twenty of those years were suspended, meaning she did not have to serve that time in prison as long as she followed certain rules. One of the rules was that she had to pay back a large amount of money, over $244,000, which she had taken in the embezzlement. In 2010, the state accused her of not paying the money she owed. A judge held a hearing to discuss this. McGhee admitted she did not pay the restitution but argued that it was not because she didn't want to, but because she couldn't afford to. The judge decided to revoke three years of her suspended sentence because McGhee failed to pay. On appeal, the court looked at whether the district judge made a mistake. The court found that McGhee had shown enough evidence to suggest that her inability to pay was not her fault. They explained that a person's probation should not be revoked for not paying money unless it is proven they could have paid it and chose not to. The original judge had not considered McGhee's ability to pay when making the decision. Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided that the revocation of McGhee's suspended sentence was an abuse of discretion, meaning the judge made a wrong choice. They reversed the decision and sent the case back for a new hearing to determine if McGhee could pay the restitution.
In OCCA case No. M-2010-341, Katherine Denise Burns appealed her conviction for Harassment by Use of an Electronic Device. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse her conviction and instructed to dismiss the case. One judge dissented. Burns was found guilty in a trial in the District Court of Seminole County, where she was accused of sending harassing text messages to Jennifer Johnson. The court sentenced her to six months in jail, but the sentence was suspended. Burns argued that the way the charges were written (the Information) was not clear enough and that the evidence against her was not strong enough to convict her. During the trial, the State presented evidence that Burns sent three text messages to Johnson. The first message included Johnson's social security number, the second suggested Burns knew personal information about Johnson, and the third revealed Johnson's home address. The State claimed that Burns violated a law that prohibits making electronic communications without disclosing one’s identity in a way that annoys, abuses, threatens, or harasses another person. However, the court found that the messages did not meet the legal requirement because Burns’s cell phone number was visible to Johnson. The court concluded that since Burns's identity was clear, she could not be convicted under the law cited by the State. Ultimately, the court decided that there wasn’t enough evidence to prove that Burns committed the specific crime she was charged with, leading them to reverse her conviction and dismiss the case.
In OCCA case No. F-2010-558, Torrez Ceasar appealed his conviction for Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance (PCP) with Intent to Distribute. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and modify it to Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance (PCP) alone, with a sentence of imprisonment for twenty years. One judge dissented. The case began when Ceasar was tried by a jury and found guilty of possessing PCP with the intent to distribute it. The trial took place in the District Court of Oklahoma County, where the judge sentenced him to a long prison term of twenty-five years. Ceasar challenged his conviction on several points. First, Ceasar argued that the evidence did not prove he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He claimed the state failed to show that he actually possessed the PCP or that he intended to distribute it. The court examined whether a reasonable person could have found him guilty based on the evidence presented. They found enough evidence to support that he had thrown a bottle of PCP into a car, suggesting he had possession of it. However, the question of whether he intended to distribute it was more complex. The law stated that merely having a drug is not enough to show intent to distribute. The court compared Ceasar's situation with another case where the defendants had a large amount of marijuana but were not selling it. The court noted that without proof of other selling signs, such as packaging for sale or cash, it was not clear if Ceasar intended to distribute the drugs. The evidence related to Ceasar's intoxication seemed more consistent with personal use rather than distribution, leading to the decision to change his conviction to simple possession of PCP. Ceasar also raised concerns about the admission of evidence related to his alleged gang affiliation. The court concluded that while this type of evidence can be seen as unfairly prejudicial, in this case, it did not significantly impact the trial outcome. The reference to gang signs was deemed minor and not overly emphasized during the trial, so the decision to allow it was considered fair. Lastly, Ceasar argued that the trial judge erred by not allowing his jury to consider a lesser charge of public intoxication. However, the court determined that public intoxication was not a lesser included offense of drug possession with intent to distribute. The laws concerning these charges protected different public interests, so the judge was correct in denying this instruction to the jury. In summary, after reviewing all arguments and the evidence, the court found that Ceasar's original conviction for Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance with Intent to Distribute was not supported by sufficient evidence of intent to distribute. Therefore, his conviction was changed to simply possessing the substance, and the sentence was adjusted to twenty years in prison. The dissenting opinion raised concerns about the majority interpretation of intent and evidence but ultimately, the revised conviction stood.
In OCCA case No. F-2010-131, Darius Darrell Payne appealed his conviction for trafficking in illegal drugs, possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, unlawful possession of marijuana (second offense), failure to obtain a drug tax stamp, and possession of paraphernalia. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm Payne's convictions on all counts but remanded the matter for a new sentencing proceeding on certain counts due to errors in jury instructions. One judge dissented. The case began when police officers went to a house where Payne was present, looking for a man with an arrest warrant. When they entered, they found illegal drugs, a gun, and cash, leading to Payne's arrest. During the trial, the jury found Payne guilty on multiple charges and set significant punishment for his crimes, including life in prison without the possibility of parole for the drug trafficking offense. Payne raised several issues on appeal. He argued that being punished for both trafficking and failure to obtain a drug tax stamp for the same drugs was unfair and violated laws against double punishment. The court found that the laws allowed for separate punishments, so this argument was rejected. Payne also claimed that the jury wasn't properly instructed about the requirements for his life sentence. The court agreed that the instruction was incorrect, leading to a ruling that he should have a new sentencing hearing for this and another charge related to marijuana possession. Additionally, the court noted that the trial court should not have separated the misdemeanor charge regarding drug paraphernalia, which led to a penalty that was likely influenced by prior convictions that weren't relevant for that specific charge. As a result, the court reduced his sentence for possession of paraphernalia from one year to three months. Lastly, there were also some mistakes on the official documents from the trial that needed to be corrected, such as the wrong section numbers and indications of pleading guilty that were factually incorrect. In summary, while Payne's convictions were upheld, the court found that certain errors related to sentencing and jury instructions necessitated further proceedings. The final decision called for changes to some sentences while affirming others.
In OCCA case No. S 2011-0024, Joel Christion Aranda appealed his conviction for multiple charges including Use of a Vehicle in Discharge of a Weapon and Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling, which had dismissed several counts against Aranda. One judge dissented, believing there was enough evidence to proceed with some of the charges.
In OCCA case No. S 2011-0023, David Franco appealed his conviction for several charges related to using a vehicle in the discharge of a weapon, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, feloniously pointing a firearm, and other related charges. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the ruling that dismissed some of the charges against him. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2010-307, the appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but vacated the sentence for re-sentencing. One judge dissented, suggesting a modification of the sentence to life imprisonment instead of life without the possibility of parole.
In OCCA case No. J-2011-514, J.F. appealed his conviction for Lewd Acts With a Child Under Sixteen. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the motion for certification as a juvenile. One judge dissented. The case began when the State of Oklahoma charged J.F. on March 7, 2011, for actions that allegedly happened when he was 15 years old. J.F. filed a motion to be treated as a juvenile instead of facing adult charges. A hearing was held where evidence was presented. The court had a specialist provide testimony, and several documents were submitted to support J.F.'s request for juvenile status. The State argued that the court should not have allowed J.F. to be certified as a juvenile, stating that he had not shown enough proof. The court, however, did not find any mistakes in the decisions made by the trial judge and agreed that J.F. should be treated as a juvenile. In the end, the court upheld the earlier decision, allowing J.F. to proceed in the juvenile system.
In OCCA case No. S-2011-208, the State of Oklahoma appealed the decision made by a Special Judge regarding the suppression of evidence connected to Shea Brandon Seals. In an unpublished decision, the court upheld the Special Judge's ruling, agreeing that there was not enough reason to stop Seals' vehicle. The court found that the evidence supported the decision that Seals did not break any traffic laws, and thus, the law enforcement officer did not have a valid reason to stop him. The State also tried to argue that there was reasonable suspicion for the stop, but this argument was presented for the first time during the appeal, so the court did not consider it. The decision to deny the State's appeal was supported by competent evidence and adhered to legal standards. One member of the court dissented.