Standard of Reasonableness Archives

C-2018-1235

Post author:Staff
Post published:August 29, 2019
Post category:C

**COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **AUGUST 29, 2019** **CASE NO. C-2018-1235** **ROY DEAN HARJO,** *Petitioner,* **vs.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** *Respondent.* **SUMMARY OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Roy Dean Harjo entered a blind plea to Counts I, Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon, and Counts II-V, Assault with a Dangerous Weapon, after previous convictions for two or more felonies, in the District Court of Pottawatomie County, Case No. CF-2017-665. Following a sentencing hearing, the Honorable John Canavan sentenced Harjo to life on each Count I-V, concurrent for Counts II-V but consecutive to Count I, requiring Harjo to serve 85% before parole eligibility. Harjo filed a motion to withdraw his pleas, which was denied after a hearing on November 28, 2018. Harjo then filed a timely Petition for Writ of Certiorari, asserting four propositions of error: I. Harjo should be allowed to withdraw his pleas for Counts II-V due to lack of factual basis. II. His plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was uninformed about sentencing ranges, violating his rights under the Constitution. III. His plea was not knowing and voluntary due to misinformation regarding sentencing. IV. He was denied effective assistance of counsel. **Decision:** After comprehensive review, we find the evidence does not warrant relief. Proposition I cannot be considered as it was not presented in the motion to withdraw or the certiorari petition. In Propositions II and III, we find the pleas were knowing and voluntary. Harjo's assertion that he believed he would receive a thirty-year maximum sentence is contradicted by the record, which shows he understood the plea form stating potential life sentences. Therefore, his claims regarding plea counsel’s advice lack merit. In Proposition IV, we determine that there was no ineffective assistance from either plea or conflict counsel. Harjo's claim regarding the factual basis for his plea is unsupported, as ample facts exist to justify the plea. Any assertion that conflict counsel was ineffective for not challenging plea counsel also fails, as no substantial claims could have been made given the determination of a solid factual basis. **Conclusion:** The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is therefore **DENIED**. Upon filing this decision, the **MANDATE is ORDERED issued.** **This decision is concurred by all Justices.** --- *To view the complete decision, click [here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2018-1235_1734229271.pdf).*

F-2001-264

Post author:Staff
Post published:May 17, 2002
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2001-264, Gavin Lee Hawkins appealed his conviction for lewd molestation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for one count and modify the sentence for the other count. One judge dissented. Gavin Lee Hawkins was found guilty of two counts of lewd molestation in Grady County. The jury sentenced him to serve ten years for the first count and twenty years for the second count, with both sentences to be served one after the other. Hawkins appealed, raising several issues he believed were errors that affected his trial. First, Hawkins argued that the prosecutor made a mistake during her closing arguments, which he thought was serious enough to affect the outcome of the case. The court agreed that the closing argument was improper and decided to change the twenty-year sentence for the second count to ten years. Next, Hawkins claimed that the trial court did not consider all the options when deciding his sentence. However, the court found no evidence that the trial court failed to do its job correctly in this regard. Hawkins also said he should have been allowed to call a witness named Bianca Thomas, but the court decided that the trial judge acted within reason when excluding her from testifying. Lastly, Hawkins felt that his lawyer did not help him properly during the trial. While the court agreed that his lawyer's performance was not up to standard, they concluded that it did not negatively impact Hawkins's case overall. Ultimately, the court affirmed the decision for the first count of lewd molestation and adjusted the sentence for the second count to ten years, while still keeping the sentence structure as ordered by the lower court.