Sexual Battery

F-2021-785

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In OCCA case No. F-2021-785, Kyle Robert Forsyth appealed his conviction for sexual battery and larceny of merchandise from a retailer. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm Forsyth's conviction but remanded the case for a hearing to determine whether he should receive credit for time served in jail. One justice dissented. Forsyth was tried without a jury and found guilty of sexual battery and larceny. The judge gave him a ten-year sentence for the sexual battery and thirty days in jail for the larceny, with the sentences to run one after the other. Forsyth argued that his rights were violated because the same judge presided over both the preliminary hearing and the trial, which he claimed broke the two-judge rule in legal procedures. However, the court found that the judge listed on the preliminary hearing was not the one who actually presided over it, so there was no error. Forsyth also argued that he should have received credit for the time he stayed in jail before sentencing. He was unable to pay bail and was in jail for nearly ten months. His lawyer pointed out that it is unfair to make someone serve a longer sentence just because they cannot afford to pay bail. The court agreed that this issue of credit for time served needed more examination. They sent the case back to see if there were other reasons that kept Forsyth in jail other than his inability to pay bail. Overall, the court upheld Forsyth’s convictions but wanted to further investigate whether he should get credit for the time he had already spent in jail.

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F-2019-310

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In OCCA case No. F-2019-310, Kedrin Ray Dixon appealed his conviction for first-degree burglary, sexual battery, and possession of a controlled dangerous substance. In a published decision, the court decided to modify the sentence for sexual battery to ten years imprisonment, making it consecutive to the other sentence, and otherwise affirmed the convictions. One judge dissented regarding the modification of the sentence for sexual battery. Dixon was found guilty by a jury on multiple counts after a trial in the District Court of Washington County. The jury sentenced him to twenty years in prison for burglary and sexual battery, and one year for possession of a controlled substance. The trial judge ordered the sentences for burglary and sexual battery to be served back-to-back. Dixon then appealed, raising several points of error, including issues related to jury instructions and evidence. The first issue was about the trial judge not mentioning that he was presumed innocent in the instructions at the start of the trial. The court found this error was not significant since the final instructions did include the presumption of innocence. Next, Dixon claimed that the evidence was not strong enough for the first-degree burglary conviction. The court disagreed, stating that there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find him guilty. Dixon also argued that he should have been allowed to present evidence regarding his intoxication at the time of the crime. The court ruled that the trial judge had the right to refuse his request since the evidence did not clearly support intoxication as a defense. Another point of concern for Dixon was what he called evidentiary harpoons, which are when comments are made that suggest knowledge of other crimes. The court found that he did not object to these comments at the trial and they did not seriously affect the verdict. Dixon claimed that he was unfairly prevented from presenting a full defense regarding reports of his previous erratic behaviors. The court decided that these reports were not very relevant to his defense and that excluding them did not significantly harm his case. A notable issue was a mistake in how the jury was informed about the potential punishment for sexual battery. The trial judge incorrectly stated that it could be punished by twenty years, which was incorrect. The State agreed that this was an error. Instead of sending Dixon back for a new trial, the court decided to lower his sentence for sexual battery to ten years because of this error. Dixon stated that his total sentences were too harsh, but after reviewing the circumstances, the court determined that the sentences were acceptable even after the changes made to one of them. Lastly, Dixon argued that there were too many errors in the case that made it unfair for him. The court did acknowledge the instructional error but believed there were no other significant errors affecting the outcome of the trial. In summary, the court modified Dixon's sentence for sexual battery and kept the other parts of his conviction intact. The final decision still upheld his guilty verdicts on all counts.

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F-2018-1161

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **KENNETH ALLEN DAY,** Appellant, **V.** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. Case No. F-2018-1161 **SUMMARY OPINION** **HUDSON, JUDGE:** Appellant Kenneth Allen Day was tried and convicted by a jury in the District Court of Oklahoma County (Case No. CF-2017-2586) of: 1. **Count 1:** Sexual Battery (21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 1123(B)) 2. **Counts 2 and 3:** Indecent Exposure (21 O.S.2011, § 1021) The jury recommended a sentence of 30 days imprisonment on Count 1, and 1 year imprisonment each on Counts 2 and 3. The Honorable Timothy R. Henderson, District Judge, presided over the trial and executed the sentences as per the jury's recommendations, ordering them to run consecutively and consecutively to Oklahoma County Case No. CF-16-6470. Day was granted credit for 177 days served and was subject to various costs and fees. Day appeals, raising the following proposition of error: **I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED OKLA. STAT. TIT. 57, § 138(G) BY REFUSING TO GRANT MR. DAY CREDIT FOR ALL TIME SERVED WHILE AWAITING TRIAL AND SENTENCING, CLAIMING THAT THE STATUTE WAS DISCRETIONARY AND NOT MANDATORY.** Upon a thorough review of the entire record including transcripts, exhibits, and the parties' briefs, we find no legal error necessitating relief. Therefore, Day's judgments and sentences are AFFIRMED. **Proposition I:** Day's claim pertains to the nature of credit for time served—whether it is mandatory or discretionary. Citing *Loyd v. State*, 1981 OK CR 5, 624 P.2d 74, Day contends that 57 O.S.Supp.2015, § 138(G) mandates credit for all time served prior to judgment and sentence. However, as recently discussed and clarified in *Luna-Gonzales v. State*, 2019 OK CR 11, this argument has been rejected. This Court noted that *Loyd* is inconsistent with the majority of case law on this subject and that the Oklahoma Legislature has amended § 138 multiple times since 1980, which indicates a legislative intent to modify the ruling in *Loyd*. The current statute indicates that defendants automatically receive credit for jail time served only post-judgment and sentencing. Significantly, *Loyd* is overruled to the extent it conflicts with this interpretation. We also recognize that the district court exercised its discretion appropriately in awarding Day partial credit for time served, which aligns with previous ruling in *Luna-Gonzales* that grants sentencing judges discretion regarding credit for pre-sentencing incarceration. Thus, Day's argument is rejected, and his assertion is firmly denied. **DECISION** The judgments and sentences of the District Court are AFFIRMED. According to Rule 3.15 of the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the MANDATE shall be issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HENDERSON, DISTRICT JUDGE** **APPEARANCES AT TRIAL** RICHARD HULL (Counsel for Appellant) HALLIE ELIZABETH BOVOS KRISTEN MESSINA, ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER **APPEARANCES ON APPEAL** LORI MCCONNELL MIKE HUNTER RACHEL SMITH JULIE PITTMAN, ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL, (Counsel for Appellee) **OPINION BY:** HUDSON, J. **LEWIS, P.J.:** CONCUR **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** CONCUR **LUMPKIN, J.:** CONCUR **ROWLAND, J.:** CONCUR For further details and access to full judgment, [Click Here to Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1161_1734786325.pdf)

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F-2018-485

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-485, Scott Thomas Stout appealed his conviction for First Degree Rape and Sexual Battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction. One judge dissented. Scott Thomas Stout was found guilty by a jury in Kay County for forcing himself on a long-time friend and for sexual battery. The jury did not find him guilty of two other charges of Rape by Instrumentation. The judge sentenced him to twenty years for the rape charge and four years for the sexual battery charge, which he must serve consecutively. Furthermore, he must serve at least 85% of his sentence before being considered for parole. Stout raised two main points in his appeal. First, he argued that the prosecutor acted improperly and that these actions denied him a fair trial. Second, he claimed that the trial court made a mistake by allowing the prosecution to call a witness in the middle of his defense to present evidence. In the first point, Stout pointed out three specific issues with the prosecutor's conduct. He said the prosecutor tried to make the jury feel sorry for the victim, asked questions that seemed to give opinions on the victim's credibility, and used first names for witnesses inappropriately. The court looked at all of the evidence and determined that these actions did not distract from the overall fairness of the trial. The jury acquitted Stout on two of the charges and recommended lighter sentences for the others. Therefore, the court ruled that Stout did not experience unfairness due to prosecutorial misconduct. Regarding the second point in his appeal, Stout argued that it was wrong for the prosecutor to cause the defense to stop its case to bring in a detective to verify some evidence. The court noted that the prosecutor's interruption was related to a question raised by Stout's own lawyer and that the trial judge had acted fairly in allowing it. The judge ruled that this did not disrupt the trial's fairness. In conclusion, the court found no errors in how the trial was conducted and affirmed Stout's conviction, meaning the original decision stood.

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J-2018-1066

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**Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma** **Case No. J-2018-1066** **Decided on: August 8, 2019** **A.O. (Appellant)** **v.** **The State of Oklahoma (Appellee)** **Opinion of the Court by Presiding Judge Lewis:** **Background:** The appellant, A.O., a minor, was charged as a juvenile with Sexual Battery per 21 O.S. Supp. 2017, § 1123(B) in McIntosh County District Court (Case No. JDL-2017-29). Subsequently, on February 26, 2018, an Amended Delinquent Petition was filed, charging him with Child Sexual Abuse under 21 O.S. Supp. 2014, § 843.5(E). Following a non-jury trial held on September 25, 2018, the court adjudicated A.O. as delinquent. **Issues on Appeal:** 1. A.O. contends he was never informed of his right to a jury trial, claiming a violation of due process. 2. He argues that the conduct in question—touching the victim's buttocks over clothing—does not constitute Child Sexual Abuse as intended by the legislature. 3. A.O. claims the prosecutor expressed an opinion on his guilt, violating his due process rights. **Rulings:** 1. **Proposition I**: The court found no merit in A.O.'s claim regarding his jury trial rights. The record demonstrated that both A.O. and his guardian were informed of the right to a jury trial and that they consciously waived this right. 2. **Proposition II**: On this issue, the court ruled in favor of A.O. The court determined that the state failed to prove each element of the underlying crime of Child Sexual Abuse. Specifically, the court stated that to convict under § 843.5(E), the state bears the burden of proving the elements of lewd acts, which were not sufficiently demonstrated in court. 3. **Proposition III**: The court found the prosecution's remarks during the trial did not constitute plain error, as the comments related to the evidence presented and did not deprive A.O. of a fair trial. **Final Decision:** The adjudicating order of Child Sexual Abuse was **REVERSED**. The matter is **REMANDED** to the district court to amend the adjudication to Assault and Battery under 21 O.S. 2011, § 644. The court affirmed the adjudication as modified. **Dissenting Opinion by Vice Presiding Judge Kuehn:** Judge Kuehn expressed concerns about the implications of the majority ruling, arguing that it effectively renders § 843.5(E) unconstitutional due to its vagueness and conflict with age-based elements in other statutes, which could lead to arbitrary enforcement. The dissent maintains that the elements of § 843.5(E) should not require additional instructions unless those elements are included in the Information—and calls for the conviction to be reversed entirely based on the statute's broad language, which might punish conduct that is arguably not criminal. In conclusion, the court's ruling finds resonance in the legislative intention behind the statutes governing Child Sexual Abuse and the need for clarity in legal definitions, especially concerning age restrictions in sexual offenses. **Links:** [Download PDF of the Opinion](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/J-2018-1066_1734449875.pdf)

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F-2018-512

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-512, Robert Neal Owens appealed his conviction for Sexual Battery and Child Abuse by Injury. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment and sentence of the district court. One judge dissented. Owens was found guilty by a judge in a non-jury trial for touching a victim inappropriately and causing harm to a child by putting the child in a chokehold. Owens argued that the evidence against him was not strong enough for a conviction. However, the court believed that enough evidence was presented to support both convictions. The court looked closely at the facts and found that a reasonable person could determine Owens was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge concluded that the punishment Owens received, which added up to fifty-five years in prison, was not excessive given his history of prior convictions and the nature of his crimes. Therefore, the court upheld the original sentences. Ultimately, Owens' appeal did not change the outcome of his case, and he remained sentenced to prison.

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JS 2018-0917

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In OCCA case No. JS 2018-0917, M. W. appealed his conviction for Rape, First Degree, and Sexual Battery. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the ruling that allowed him to be treated as a Juvenile instead of as an adult. One judge dissented.

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F-2012-951

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In OCCA case No. F-2012-951, Darrell Williams appealed his conviction for Sexual Battery and Rape by Instrumentation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse his convictions and remand the case for further proceedings. One judge dissented. Darrell Williams was found guilty by a jury in Payne County of multiple counts, including Sexual Battery and two counts of Rape by Instrumentation. Although the jury had acquitted him of two other charges, he was sentenced to one year in jail for each conviction, with the sentences to run at the same time. Williams felt that his trial was unfair and raised several reasons, or propositions, for his appeal. Williams argued that the jury was unfairly influenced by outside information during their discussions, which he believed violated his right to a fair trial. He indicated that some jurors visited the scene of the crime without permission and discussed what they saw during their deliberations. The court agreed with his concern that such behavior could affect the jury's decision-making process. During the appeal, the court conducted an investigation to see if the jurors did indeed visit the crime scene and if they talked about it while deciding the case. Testimony revealed that several jurors had made those unauthorized visits and shared their observations. Since the details about the crime's location and lighting were crucial to whether the identification of Williams was accurate, the court concluded that exposure to such outside information during deliberations could have impacted the verdict. Additionally, Williams complained that a bailiff might have made comments about needing a unanimous verdict, which could have pressured the jurors. The trial court looked into this matter as well, but they ultimately found that it was not clear if such comments were made and whether they had any effect on the jurors' decisions. The court found serious enough mistakes in the trial process and decided that Williams did not receive a fair trial. This led them to reverse the earlier judgments against him and send the case back to the lower court for a possible new trial. In summary, the court's main reasons for reversing the convictions were the unauthorized jury visits to the crime scene and the potential influence of the bailiff's comments on the jury's verdict.

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S-2013-483

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In OCCA case No. S-2013-483, the defendant appealed his conviction for various crimes involving minors, including sodomy, lewd acts, and sexual battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to deny the State's appeal regarding the exclusion of certain evidence. One judge dissented from this decision. Thomas Bradley Porton was charged with serious crimes against children. The crimes included sodomy and other lewd acts, as well as providing alcohol to minors and possessing indecent photographs. These charges were based on incidents that occurred in McCurtain County. During the pretrial, the State wanted to use photographs found on Porton's computer as evidence. However, the judge ruled that these photographs could not be used in court. The State believed that the photos were important to prove their case against Porton. They argued that the photographs showed a pattern of behavior that related to the crimes he was charged with. The State appealed the judge's decision to keep the photographs out of the trial. They said that their ability to prove Porton's guilt was greatly affected without this evidence. The law allows the State to appeal when evidence is excluded if it is believed to be in the interests of justice. However, the court found that the State did not show that the photographs were a critical part of the evidence needed to prove the case. Because of this, the appeal was denied, meaning the photographs would not be part of the trial. The ruling pointed out that the trial judge had looked closely at the case and had reasonable grounds to decide that the photographs were not relevant or that their potential to cause unfair problems outweighed their usefulness as evidence. One judge disagreed with the majority opinion. He felt that the photographs should not have been excluded because they could help prove Porton's motive and intent regarding the charges. He argued that evidence of other actions taken by the defendant should have been considered, especially since there were connections between the photographs and the charges against Porton. In summary, the court upheld the lower court's decision to exclude the evidence, impacting the State's case against Porton, while one judge believed this decision was incorrect and would have allowed the evidence.

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S-2012-834

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In OCCA case No. S-2012-834, the State of Oklahoma appealed an order that granted a motion to dismiss several charges against Jeffrey Porras. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling. One judge dissented. The case involved charges against Porras, who is a physician. He was accused of committing sexual battery and rape against multiple victims while they were receiving medical treatment. The accusations included five counts of sexual battery and one count of second-degree rape, with the incidents alleged to have occurred in different counties over a period of time from 2005 to 2007. The trial court dismissed some of the counts because it felt that the incidents were not part of a single plan or scheme. The law allows for multiple charges to be tried together if they are connected in a way that shows they are part of the same pattern of criminal behavior. However, the court decided that the alleged crimes in Oklahoma County and Cleveland County were separate and did not meet the criteria for joining them in one trial. In making this decision, the court looked at how the offenses occurred over a span of two years and did not significantly overlap in timing or in the way they were committed. This means that the crimes did not depend on each other and were not part of a continuous plan that would justify being tried together. The appellate court agreed with the trial judge's reasoning, stating that there was no clear error in the decision to dismiss those charges. The ruling reaffirmed that the charges from different counties could be handled separately without causing injustice to anyone. The dissenting judge, however, believed that the charges should not have been dismissed since they had common elements and were related to his actions as a doctor. The dissent argued that since all victims were patients and the incidents happened in similar situations, it was appropriate to consider them as part of a greater plan to commit these crimes. In conclusion, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision to dismiss certain charges against Porras, maintaining that the evidence did not sufficiently show a connection that warranted a single trial for all the charges.

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C-2010-1179

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In OCCA case No. C-2010-1179, Donnell Devon Smith appealed his conviction for multiple crimes including robbery, sexual battery, and others. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to deny his appeal. One judge dissented. Smith was charged with various offenses in multiple cases and pleaded guilty to all charges on October 19, 2010. He received several sentences, some of which were life sentences, and others ranged from ten to twenty years. After entering his pleas, Smith requested to withdraw them, saying he felt coerced and that he had not been properly informed about the punishments he faced for his crimes. The court looked at three main points raised in Smith's appeal: 1. Smith argued he should be allowed to withdraw his plea for one count of attempted robbery because the ten-year sentence he received was too long. The court found that his sentence was actually five years too long and modified it to the correct five-year maximum. 2. Smith claimed he did not understand the range of sentences for some charges and that this lack of understanding meant his pleas were not voluntary. The court decided that while he had been misadvised, the pleas still appeared to be valid overall because he benefitted from how the sentences were set up to run concurrently. 3. He asserted that he was punished twice for some of the same actions and that some of his pleas lacked enough factual support. The court concluded that the evidence supported the different charges, and there were no double jeopardy issues. The court ultimately affirmed his convictions for all cases besides modifying the sentence that was too long and correcting a minor paperwork mistake regarding how sentences should run together. The court ruled that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily made despite the confusion around sentencing ranges. The decision closed by affirming the ruling of the lower court regarding Smith's attempt to withdraw his pleas, confirming most of the sentences while adjusting the one that exceeded the maximum allowed by law.

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F-2009-149

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In OCCA case No. F-2009-149, Kenneth Clark Knox appealed his conviction for Sexual Battery. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but vacate the three years of post-imprisonment supervision. One judge dissented. The case began when Kenneth Knox was tried by a jury and found guilty of Sexual Battery after having previously been convicted of more than two felonies. The jury recommended a punishment of four years in prison, which the trial court imposed, along with three years of supervision after prison. Knox appealed for several reasons. First, he argued that the evidence presented by the State was not strong enough to prove that he committed sexual battery. He believed that the conviction should be overturned and the charges dismissed. However, the court found that, when looking at the evidence favorably for the State, there was enough proof for a reasonable jury to conclude that Knox touched the victim inappropriately. Second, Knox claimed that the law regarding post-imprisonment supervision was not in effect when he committed the crime, so the three years of supervision imposed by the court should be canceled. The court agreed, explaining that the law was only effective after the crime took place, meaning Knox should not have been sentenced to post-prison supervision under that law. Lastly, Knox suggested that if the court did not agree with his other points, they should fix the written judgment to match what the judge said during sentencing. The court decided that they would vacate the supervision requirement and instructed the lower court to correct the judgment to show that Knox's sentence was only four years in prison. In conclusion, while Knox's conviction remained, the court removed the extra three years of supervision from his sentence. The case has been sent back to the lower court to make the necessary changes to the judgment.

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F-2006-17

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In OCCA case No. F-2006-17, McFarland appealed his conviction for sexual battery and second-degree rape by instrumentation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for sexual battery but modified the sentence for the second-degree rape by instrumentation by vacating the $10,000 fine. One judge dissented. McFarland was found guilty of two serious crimes and was sentenced to a total of eight years in prison and fines. He argued that charging him with both crimes was unfair because they were part of the same event, meaning he faced double punishment. The court examined the evidence and determined that the acts were separate enough that charging him with both was allowed and did not violate his rights. He also claimed that the prosecutor made inappropriate comments during the trial that affected his chances for a fair trial. Some of these comments were found to be improper, but the court decided they did not seriously harm McFarland’s case. Additionally, McFarland argued that the instructions given to the jury about the fines were wrong, which led to the $10,000 fine for the second-degree rape charge being improper. The court agreed with him on this point, finding that jurors were wrongly instructed that they had to impose a fine. In summary, while the court upheld the conviction and the sentence for sexual battery, it modified the sentence for the second-degree rape charge by removing the fine.

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F-2005-620

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In OCCA case No. F-2005-620, Ryan Anthony Van Winkle appealed his conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon and forcible oral sodomy. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon but affirmed the conviction for forcible oral sodomy. One judge dissented regarding the reversal of the assault conviction. The case began when Van Winkle was tried by a jury and found guilty of two serious crimes. The jury decided that he should spend five years in prison for the assault and eight years for the sodomy, with these sentences to be served one after the other. During the appeal, several issues were raised. One major question was whether Van Winkle could be punished for both crimes because they were part of the same event. Van Winkle argued that the assault was the same act that made the sodomy forcible, which means he shouldn’t be punished for both under the law. The court looked closely at the details of the case. It found that Van Winkle had threatened the victim with a knife and made her agree to the sodomy because she feared for her safety. They decided that the assault with the knife was not a separate crime from the sodomy since they were tied closely together in this incident. Because of this, the court reversed the conviction for the assault, ordering that charge to be dismissed. While addressing the other arguments made by Van Winkle in his appeal, such as claims about not having a fair trial, the court decided these didn’t require changes since they were mainly related to the assault conviction. In summary, the court kept the conviction for forcible oral sodomy but did not allow the assault charge to stand due to how closely related the two acts were. One judge disagreed with the decision to reverse the assault conviction, believing that both crimes were deserving of punishment.

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F-2004-1261

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-1261, Jonathan Dwight Harjo appealed his conviction for rape in the first degree. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modify the sentence to ten years in prison. One judge dissented regarding the sentence modification.

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RE-2004-593

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In OCCA case No. RE-2004-593, the Appellant appealed his conviction for revoking his suspended sentence. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation but modify the length of the sentence. One judge dissented. The case began when the Appellant, after pleading guilty to Sexual Battery, was sentenced to five years in prison, which was suspended under certain conditions. However, he did not follow these conditions, leading to the State filing a motion to revoke his suspended sentence multiple times. Initially, the Appellant missed treatment sessions, failed to pay necessary fees, and showed a lack of effort to engage in his treatment. After some violations, he had a short revocation of sixty days. Later, the State found he had violated other conditions, such as not registering as a sex offender and changing his residence without informing his probation officer. During the hearing, the judge decided that the Appellant had not followed the rules, thus revoking his suspended sentence and requiring him to serve five years in prison. The Appellant argued that since he had already lost sixty days, his remaining time should be less than five years. The State agreed, stating it should be four years and ten months instead. The court acknowledged the Appellant’s previous short revocation and made the necessary adjustment to his sentence length. Although the Appellant argued the full revocation was too harsh, the court upheld the trial judge’s decision, stating that it was within their discretion to revoke the sentence based on the Appellant's repeated failures to comply with probation rules. In conclusion, the court upheld the decision to revoke the Appellant's remaining suspended sentence but corrected the duration of time he was required to serve.

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C-2003-848

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In OCCA case No. C-2003-848, Todd Wayne McFarland appealed his conviction for Sexual Battery and Rape by Instrumentation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to allow McFarland to withdraw his plea due to being denied effective assistance of counsel. One member of the court dissented. McFarland had entered a no contest plea after being told by his attorney that he could receive a deferred sentence. However, it turned out that he was not eligible for this type of sentence. McFarland argued that he would not have pleaded no contest if he had known the correct information. After reviewing all the records and evidence, the court agreed that McFarland’s attorney had given him incorrect advice and that this affected his decision to plead. Therefore, the court felt he should be allowed to change his plea.

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