F-2005-785

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In OCCA case No. F-2005-785, Charles Milton Smith, Sr., and in case No. F-2005-786, Bonnie Smith appealed their convictions for multiple crimes. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse their convictions and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Charles Milton Smith, Sr. was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance (methamphetamine), child endangerment, and possession of a controlled substance. Bonnie Smith faced similar charges for manufacturing a controlled substance and child endangerment. During the trial, both were found guilty of the charges against them. The jury recommended sentences that included lengthy prison time and substantial fines. However, they claimed that their rights were violated because they did not have court-appointed lawyers. Initially, they were considered unable to afford an attorney, but after someone paid their bond, the trial court ruled that they were no longer indigent and had to represent themselves, which they argued was not fair. The court looked closely at whether the trial court properly assessed their financial situation before denying them their right to legal representation. They pointed out that just because bond was posted, it does not automatically mean someone can afford a lawyer. The court found that there was no record showing that the trial court had properly checked their financial status or informed them that they might still qualify for a lawyer. Since having a lawyer is essential for a fair trial, the court reversed the Smiths' convictions and ordered a new trial where they would have a chance to properly have legal representation.

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PR-2006-120

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In OCCA case No. PR-2006-120, a petitioner appealed her conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug (methamphetamine) and driving without seatbelts. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petitioner's request for relief in part and deny it in part. One judge dissented. The case began when the petitioner was charged with possessing methamphetamine and driving without a seatbelt. She initially agreed to a plea deal with the state, which involved accepting guilt for the drug charge and a fine for the seatbelt violation. However, when the petitioner refused to follow through with the state’s conditions for the plea, she attempted to enter a non-negotiated or blind guilty plea. The judge refused to accept her blind plea and insisted she proceed to trial, stating she did not have an absolute right to plead guilty. The petitioner believed she should be allowed to enter her guilty plea without the state’s conditions. This disagreement led her to file a petition with the court seeking orders to either allow her to plead guilty or to prevent the judge from forcing her to go to trial. After reviewing the facts of the case, the court found that the petitioner had a clear legal right to have her guilty plea accepted if it met the necessary legal requirements. The court noted that it was a mistake for the judge to reject her plea without evaluating whether it was voluntary and if there was a factual basis for it. The court granted part of the petitioner’s request by directing the district court judge to conduct a hearing on her blind plea and accept it if it correctly fulfilled the legal standards. However, the court denied her request to have her plea regarding the seatbelt violation accepted, as that plea required the judge’s approval. The dissenting judge expressed concerns about whether the petitioner had truly shown that she was being harmed by the trial court's refusal to accept her plea, suggesting that any challenges to a guilty plea rejection should typically be taken up in direct appeals rather than with this type of petition. The dissenting judge also supported the trial judge's discretion, arguing that the right to a jury trial must be upheld. In summary, the court ruled that the petitioner should be given a chance to enter her guilty plea under the law, but that her plea regarding the seatbelt violation did not have to be accepted.

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