Sentencing Powers Archives

RE-2012-1032

Post author:Staff
Post published:February 25, 2014
Post category:RE

In OCCA case No. RE-2012-1032, Jacob Keith Meyer appealed his conviction for possession of a controlled substance and grand larceny. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of his suspended sentences for some charges but remanded for a lawful sentence on one count. One judge dissented. Jacob Keith Meyer had pleaded guilty to four different charges, including possession of methamphetamine and grand larceny, and was given a sentence of eight years in prison, with five years suspended. This meant he would only have to serve the first five years right away, while the rest would be postponed under probation rules. However, in 2012, the State accused him of violating his probation by committing new crimes, which led to a hearing to determine whether he truly violated the terms of his probation. During the hearing, it was shown that contraband, including marijuana, was found in a mattress from the jail cell where Meyer had been sleeping. The evidence suggested that Meyer was aware of the contraband since it was hidden inside the mattress he was lying on. Although Meyer challenged the evidence, stating that it wasn't sufficient to prove he violated probation, the court believed there was enough proof to support the revocation of his suspended sentences for three of the four charges. However, Meyer’s sentence for the first count in one of the cases was too long according to the law, so the court decided to send that particular charge back to the lower court to set a proper sentence. This decision meant that while Meyer would still have his other sentences revoked, the court would not enforce the invalid sentence associated with the larceny charge for the amount it exceeded legal limits. The court ultimately ruled that it had the authority to affirm some parts of Meyer’s case while needing to correct others where the law had been misapplied.

S-2013-315

Post author:Staff
Post published:February 21, 2014
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-315, David Johns appealed his conviction for larceny. In a published decision, the court decided that a trial court cannot modify the terms and conditions of a negotiated deferred judgment without the consent of the State. The case involved Johns, who had entered a guilty plea and was placed on deferred judgment for five years. He filed a motion to change the terms of his deferred judgment, and the trial court agreed to shorten it and dismiss the case, which the State appealed. The court explained that under current laws, the trial court does not have the authority to shorten the deferment period once a plea agreement is in place. This ruling was made to prevent issues that could discourage prosecutors from agreeing to deferred judgments in the future. The court emphasized that any changes to the terms of a deferred judgment must follow statutory guidelines, and the trial court may only act when the conditions are met at the end of the deferment period. It upheld the idea that modifying an agreement without proper authority is not allowed. Therefore, the original decision to cut Johns' probation short was not supported by the law. The court's answer to the reserved question of law confirmed that the trial court was not authorized to cut short the period of deferment after the terms of the plea agreement had been established. #n dissented.

F-2009-749

Post author:Staff
Post published:May 12, 2011
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2009-749, Waymond George Morrison appealed his conviction for multiple offenses, including Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substances (CDS) with Intent to Distribute, Driving a Motor Vehicle Without a License, Distribution of CDS, and Possession of Proceeds from drug-related activities. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction for three counts while reversing one count related to possession of proceeds, ordering that it be dismissed. One justice dissented. Morrison faced several serious charges related to drugs and was sentenced to a total of 100 years in prison for the most severe charges, along with some fines. During his trial, he argued that his rights to due process were violated, that there was an improper handling of testimony, and that he faced double punishment for his actions. The court evaluated his claims: 1. The first issue was whether Morrison’s rights were violated when the court didn’t allow certain testimony. The court decided that the excluded testimony wasn't relevant to the case, so his rights were not infringed upon. 2. The second concern was about the trial being split into two parts (bifurcated). The court ruled that this was a correct decision and that it did not abuse its discretion. 3. Morrison also contended that testimony from a rebuttal witness should not have been permitted. The court found that this was appropriate because the rebuttal witness provided necessary clarifications to previous testimonies. 4. Regarding the issue of double punishment, the court explained that Morrison’s possession and distribution charges were based on separate actions—one for having cocaine and one for selling it. However, his conviction for possession of proceeds was tied to the same act of selling cocaine, so that particular conviction was reversed. 5. The sufficiency of the evidence against him was also questioned. The court found that there was enough evidence for the jury to reasonably convict Morrison of intent to distribute due to the drugs found in his car shortly after a sale. 6. Lastly, Morrison felt his sentence was excessively harsh. The court did not agree, noting that due to his previous criminal record, the sentence was justifiable. In conclusion, the court upheld the majority of Morrison's convictions and sentences, significantly addressing various legal arguments made by him during the appeal process.