Sentencing Options

F-2017-1011

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In OCCA case No. F-2017-1011, Johnny Ray Hopes appealed his conviction for Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance With Intent to Distribute and two counts of Assault and Battery on a Police Officer. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions. One judge dissented. Johnny Ray Hopes was found guilty by a jury for having illegal drugs and for attacking police officers. The jury decided he should go to prison for four years for the drug crime and for thirteen months in jail with a $500 fine for each of the two assaults. The judge ordered that all of these punishments would happen one after the other, not at the same time. Hopes had a few reasons for his appeal. First, he said that the trial court did not properly explain what it meant to represent himself in court. He believed that because he was not fully informed, his choice to represent himself was not made knowingly or voluntarily. The court looked at the facts and found that Hopes was well informed about what it meant to represent himself. They agreed that he made a clear decision and understood the risks involved in not having a lawyer. Therefore, the court decided that he had made a valid choice to represent himself. Second, Hopes claimed that the trial court made a mistake by not allowing the jury to hear about a lesser crime called Resisting Arrest. The court explained that for a jury to receive instructions about a lesser crime, there must be enough evidence for a reasonable jury to be able to find the person guilty of that lesser crime instead of the more serious crime they were charged with. The court found that there wasn’t enough evidence to support a charge of Resisting Arrest because Hopes had attacked the officers rather than just resisting their attempts to arrest him. So, they decided the trial court did not make a mistake by not including that lesser charge. Lastly, Hopes argued that the trial court shouldn’t have made his punishments run consecutively. The court explained that there is no rule saying he must receive concurrent sentences, meaning they cannot run at the same time. They confirmed that the judge had the right to decide that Hopes should serve his time one after the other. The court found that there was no evidence showing that the judge didn't consider all the facts when making that decision. In conclusion, the court upheld Hopes’ convictions and punishments. The appeal did not change the earlier decision. One judge disagreed, believing there were reasons to reconsider the case.

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F-2017-1104

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In OCCA case No. F-2017-1104, Joseph Johnson appealed his conviction for first degree murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction. One judge dissented. Joseph Johnson was found guilty of killing Quavis Trae Cato during an argument over a car. The jury sentenced Johnson to life in prison without parole. The incident happened on October 10, 2016, when Johnson shot Cato 14 times, after a dispute over a stolen car. Witnesses testified that Johnson was armed with two guns and returned to the argument after briefly leaving the scene. During the trial, Johnson's defense argued for instructions on lesser charges of manslaughter, claiming he acted in the heat of passion or self-defense. However, the court found no evidence that Cato provoked Johnson sufficiently to warrant such instructions. The judges decided that Johnson escalated the situation by bringing guns into the argument and that simply being angry or upset does not justify the use of deadly force. Johnson also claimed that the prosecutor's closing arguments contained misconduct, asserting that they misled the jury about the facts and the law of self-defense, but the court found no errors that affected the fairness of the trial. Finally, Johnson’s defense argued that his lawyer didn't perform adequately by not presenting expert testimony about psychological conditions that might have affected his perception of the situation. However, the court concluded that even if the lawyer's performance was deficient, it wouldn't have changed the outcome of the trial because Johnson had initiated the conflict while armed. In summary, the court upheld the conviction for murder, concluding that Johnson acted with intent and malice when he killed Cato. The judges agreed that there was no basis for a lesser charge or for claims of ineffective counsel. Overall, the ruling was in favor of maintaining the original sentence.

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F-2013-974

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In OCCA case No. F-2013-974, Karena L. Gilbreath-Hancock appealed her conviction for Actual Physical Control of a Motor Vehicle under the Influence of Alcohol. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to remand the case for resentencing but affirmed her original conviction. One judge dissented. Gilbreath-Hancock was found guilty after a jury trial and was sentenced to two and a half years in prison along with a fine. She appealed for two main reasons. First, she claimed that her lawyer had a conflict of interest. However, the court found there was no actual conflict because Gilbreath-Hancock did not object to her lawyer's representation during the trial. The court stated that just because she disagreed with her lawyer's strategy, it did not mean there was a conflict of interest. Second, Gilbreath-Hancock argued that her rights were violated as the trial court failed to give the jury all the possible sentencing options available. The court agreed that the trial court made a mistake and needed to correct it. Because of this, they ordered the case to be sent back for resentencing, making sure that the jury would know all their options. In summary, while the court upheld the conviction of Gilbreath-Hancock, they recognized a mistake in the sentencing process and ordered that it be fixed.

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RE-2009-239

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In OCCA case No. RE-2009-239, the appellant appealed his conviction for uttering a forged instrument. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the order of revocation to allow for concurrent sentences instead of consecutive sentences. One judge dissented regarding the finding of excessiveness in the revocation order. In the case, the appellant, who was originally given the benefit of a deferred sentence and then suspended sentences, was accused of violating his probation by not reporting to his probation officer. The sentencing judge ultimately revoked his suspended sentences and imposed a total of eight years in prison, which he argued was excessive. The court reviewed the record and statements made by the judge during the revocation hearing. They determined that although the judge had the power to revoke less than the full suspension, the circumstances of the case warranted a modification to allow the sentences to be served concurrently, rather than consecutively as originally ordered. Additionally, the appellant contended that a second assessment for victim compensation was unlawful, as it exceeded the statutory limit. However, the court noted that the compensation assessments were appropriate and not void, concluding that this issue did not affect the validity of the revocation order itself. The final decision directed the district court to change the revocation order to reflect concurrent serving of sentences while affirming the other aspects of the revocation.

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F-2008-433

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In OCCA case No. F-2008-433, #x appealed his conviction for First Degree Child Abuse Murder. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modify the sentence to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after thirty years. #n dissented. Vicki Leigh Chiles was the owner of a day care and was taking care of several children, including a two-year-old boy named Joshua Minton. One day, Joshua didn't want to take his afternoon nap and was being noisy. To handle this, Chiles put him in a separate bedroom by himself and covered his mouth and hands with masking tape. Tragically, while he was alone, Joshua vomited and suffocated. When officials arrived at the day care for a surprise inspection, they found Chiles trying to give Joshua CPR. Unfortunately, he was not breathing, and emergency responders could not save him. The medical examiner determined that Joshua died due to lack of oxygen caused by the masking tape blocking his mouth after he vomited. During the trial, Chiles wanted the jury to be told that her actions could be considered an accident and asked for instructions about discipline. However, the court denied these requests. The court determined that it was clear her actions were not done with usual caution, which meant they couldn't qualify as an accident under the law. Chiles also argued that the jury should have been allowed to consider a lesser charge of second-degree murder. However, the court explained that because Joshua was a child and Chiles’ actions were considered unreasonable force, this charge was not available. Additionally, Chiles felt it was a mistake that the jury wasn't properly informed about what life without parole meant. The jury had confusion about the sentencing options available to them regarding her punishment. Due to this confusion, the court decided to change her sentence to allow for the possibility of parole after thirty years, instead of life without parole. In conclusion, while Chiles' conviction was upheld, her punishment was modified to allow for the possibility of parole, recognizing the jury's confusion about the sentencing terms.

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F-2005-252

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In OCCA case No. F-2005-252, Charles Earl Lindsay appealed his conviction for robbery with an imitation firearm. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify his conviction. One judge dissented. Charles Earl Lindsay was tried in Cleveland County and found guilty of robbery with an imitation firearm. The jury decided he should be sentenced to 40 years in prison. Lindsay did not agree with this decision and argued several points in his appeal. First, he claimed that there was not enough evidence to prove he committed robbery using an imitation firearm. The court agreed that while the state proved most parts of the robbery, they did not prove that Lindsay threatened the victim with the imitation firearm since she never actually saw it during the crime. Because of this, the court thought it was fair to change his conviction to first-degree robbery, saying he unnecessarily hurt the victim and scared her. Lindsay also argued that the prosecution had made mistakes during the trial, including allowing a police officer to testify about the victim identifying him. Although the court noted this was not a good practice, they felt it did not change the outcome of the trial since Lindsay’s attorney had challenged the identification in other ways. Another point Lindsay raised was that his lawyer did not help him properly. The court decided that the lawyer’s actions did not break any laws protecting his rights, so this argument did not succeed. Lindsay further stated he had an unfair trial because he was brought into the courtroom in handcuffs in front of the jury. The court acknowledged this was an error but said that this alone did not warrant a different outcome. Lindsay’s attorney also did not ask for the jury to consider any lesser charges of robbery, but the court found this was appropriate since Lindsay claimed he was innocent. Regarding closing arguments by the prosecutor, the court found that a fair trial was still upheld. However, the court did recognize there were mistakes regarding Lindsay's sentencing, particularly not informing the jury about some rules related to sentencing. In the end, the court reversed Lindsay's original conviction and instead convicted him of first-degree robbery. They also decided to reduce his sentence to 20 years in prison, taking into account all the discussed errors. The case was sent back to the lower court to correct the judgment and sentence based on these decisions.

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F-2004-767

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-767, Reginald Lamond Brazell appealed his conviction for Robbery in the First Degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modify the sentence to thirty years imprisonment. One member of the court dissented. Brazell was found guilty of committing a robbery, and the jury sentenced him to forty years in prison. He challenged this conviction by arguing that the evidence against him was not strong enough, that he should have been given instructions about a lesser crime (second-degree robbery), and that the jury should have been told about parole eligibility under the eighty-five percent rule. The court reviewed the evidence and decided it was sufficient to support the conviction. They also agreed that the jury did not need to hear about the second-degree robbery since the evidence did not support that claim. However, they found that the jury should have been instructed about the eighty-five percent rule, which relates to how much of the sentence a person must serve before being eligible for parole. As a result, the court affirmed the conviction but shortened Brazell's sentence to thirty years.

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F-2005-129

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In OCCA case No. F-2005-129, Denise Sue Watie appealed her conviction for sexually abusing a minor. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment but modify the sentence. One judge dissented. Denise Sue Watie was found guilty by a jury in Tulsa County for sexually abusing her son. The jury suggested that she should serve eight years in prison. She was sentenced accordingly on January 24, 2005. After her conviction, she decided to appeal the decision, stating several reasons why she believed the trial was unfair. First, Watie claimed the court made an error by allowing certain evidence that she thought was unnecessary and repetitive. However, the court found that the admission of a videotaped interview of the complainant was acceptable under the law. Since the court followed the correct procedures, this part of her appeal was denied. Next, Watie argued that her confession to the police should not have been allowed because it was taken without informing her of her rights. The court examined how the police interviewed her. They noted that she was not arrested and could leave at any time. Because of this, the court concluded that the interview was not a custodial interrogation and did not require the police to read her the Miranda rights. Thus, Watie's statements were considered voluntary, and these claims were also denied. Watie also contended that the jury should have been instructed about the requirement that she would serve at least 85% of her sentence in prison. The court agreed that this information was important and should have been provided to the jury upon Watie’s request. Due to this oversight, her sentence was modified from eight years to six years. Lastly, Watie claimed that her sentence was too harsh. Since the court found that the jury should have been informed about the 85% rule, they reduced her sentence but did not fully agree with her position on its harshness. The decision to modify the sentence made her final argument about the severity of the punishment unnecessary. In conclusion, the judgment of the district court was affirmed, but her sentence was reduced to six years. The appeal brought attention to important legal procedures, but ultimately, the court decided that the original conviction stood, with a slight change to the length of time she would serve in prison.

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F-2004-1081

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-1081, Charles Edward Moore, Jr. appealed his conviction for robbery with firearms, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm most of his convictions and modify some sentences. One of the judges dissented. Charles Edward Moore faced serious charges and was found guilty by a jury. He received a total of fourteen years for each robbery, ten years for each kidnapping, and ten years for possession of a firearm related to a past felony. The judge ordered that Moore serve these sentences one after the other. On appeal, Moore argued several points. First, he believed he was unfairly punished for two separate robbery counts concerning the same incident. However, the court decided that this did not violate any laws about double punishments. Next, Moore claimed a conflict between his robbery conviction and the charge for possession after a felony. The court agreed with Moore regarding this point and reversed his conviction for that charge. Additionally, Moore argued that the trial court made an error by not allowing a jury instruction about his eligibility for parole. The court found this to be a mistake but decided to change the sentences for the robbery convictions from fourteen years to ten years each. The court maintained the trial judge's decision to have the sentences served consecutively. Moore also argued that he did not receive effective help from his lawyer, but the court believed that his case would not have ended differently even with better representation. He further disagreed with the court's admission of evidence about his past wrongdoings, but the court denied that claim too. Lastly, Moore asserted that the combined errors during his trial should lead to a reversal. The court disagreed and upheld the decisions made during the trial. In summary, while the court agreed to modify some of Moore's sentences, it affirmed most of the convictions and found no significant errors that would affect the overall outcome of the trial.

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C-2003-848

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In OCCA case No. C-2003-848, Todd Wayne McFarland appealed his conviction for Sexual Battery and Rape by Instrumentation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to allow McFarland to withdraw his plea due to being denied effective assistance of counsel. One member of the court dissented. McFarland had entered a no contest plea after being told by his attorney that he could receive a deferred sentence. However, it turned out that he was not eligible for this type of sentence. McFarland argued that he would not have pleaded no contest if he had known the correct information. After reviewing all the records and evidence, the court agreed that McFarland’s attorney had given him incorrect advice and that this affected his decision to plead. Therefore, the court felt he should be allowed to change his plea.

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C-2003-31

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In OCCA case No. C-2003-31, Nemol Joe Fox appealed his conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor, Second or Subsequent Offense, and misdemeanor Driving Under Revocation. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari. One judge dissented. Mr. Fox entered a plea of nolo contendere, which means he did not admit guilt but accepted the punishment. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, with five years suspended, plus fines for both charges. He later asked to withdraw his plea, saying he didn’t fully understand what he was agreeing to. The court found that Mr. Fox was not properly advised about the option of treatment for his drinking problem, which is allowed under the law for such cases. Because of this, the court decided that his plea should be allowed to be withdrawn. The original sentence was reversed, and Mr. Fox was granted another chance to address these issues. One judge disagreed, stating that the trial court likely considered all options, including treatment, when deciding on the sentence. The dissenting judge felt that Mr. Fox should not get to change his plea because he and his lawyer had not raised this issue earlier in court. Overall, the main decision was that Mr. Fox did not get the fair chance he should have had to understand his options, specifically regarding treatment for his alcohol issues.

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F-2001-637

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In OCCA case No. F-2001-637, James Ricky Ezell, III appealed his conviction for First Degree Robbery, False Impersonation, and Eluding a Police Officer. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Ezell's judgment but ordered the case to be sent back for resentencing. One judge dissented. Ezell was found guilty by a jury of robbing a convenience store and other crimes. The jury gave him long sentences for each crime, which the trial court ordered to be served one after the other. Ezell argued that his right to a fair trial was hurt because an African-American was removed from the jury, that the judge’s policy of always giving consecutive sentences was wrong, and that his sentences were too harsh. The court decided that the prosecutor had a good reason for removing the juror, so there was no unfair trial. However, it agreed that the judge's strict policy against considering running sentences together was a mistake. The court found that while sentences usually should run consecutively, judges must look at all options, including the chance to run sentences together, especially if a defendant has prior convictions. In conclusion, while Ezell's conviction was upheld, the court said the sentencing decision was not fully considered and sent the case back for the judge to look at this again. One judge disagreed with the decision to send the case back for resentencing, believing that the original sentences were justified given the nature of Ezell's crimes.

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F-2001-264

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In OCCA case No. F-2001-264, Gavin Lee Hawkins appealed his conviction for lewd molestation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for one count and modify the sentence for the other count. One judge dissented. Gavin Lee Hawkins was found guilty of two counts of lewd molestation in Grady County. The jury sentenced him to serve ten years for the first count and twenty years for the second count, with both sentences to be served one after the other. Hawkins appealed, raising several issues he believed were errors that affected his trial. First, Hawkins argued that the prosecutor made a mistake during her closing arguments, which he thought was serious enough to affect the outcome of the case. The court agreed that the closing argument was improper and decided to change the twenty-year sentence for the second count to ten years. Next, Hawkins claimed that the trial court did not consider all the options when deciding his sentence. However, the court found no evidence that the trial court failed to do its job correctly in this regard. Hawkins also said he should have been allowed to call a witness named Bianca Thomas, but the court decided that the trial judge acted within reason when excluding her from testifying. Lastly, Hawkins felt that his lawyer did not help him properly during the trial. While the court agreed that his lawyer's performance was not up to standard, they concluded that it did not negatively impact Hawkins's case overall. Ultimately, the court affirmed the decision for the first count of lewd molestation and adjusted the sentence for the second count to ten years, while still keeping the sentence structure as ordered by the lower court.

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MA-2001-117

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In OCCA case No. MA-2001-117, the Petitioner appealed his conviction for two counts of Murder in the First Degree and two counts of Robbery With a Dangerous Weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petition for an extraordinary writ, which means the court decided to stop the prosecution from seeking the death penalty in the retrial. The dissenting opinion noted concerns regarding the outcome of the case based on previous legal interpretations and precedents. The case began with the Petitioner charged in two separate cases, related to tragic events that resulted in the loss of life and armed robbery. Initially, the jury found him guilty of all charges and recommended life sentences without parole for the murders and life imprisonment for the robbery offenses. However, this verdict was reversed, and the case was sent back for separate trials, which created a new legal situation. The Petitioner argued that he should not face the death penalty again because the first jury had already decided on a life sentence, indicating that they did not believe the death penalty should apply. This idea connects to the legal protection known as the Double Jeopardy Clause, which prevents someone from being tried multiple times for the same offense. The court looked closely at the issue of double jeopardy, discussing how it applies not just to being tried for the same crime, but also regarding the severity of punishment. They acknowledged that once a jury has had a chance to decide on a punishment like the death penalty, the state should not get a second opportunity to change that if the first jury chose not to impose it. As a result, the court found that the Petitioner should not have to go through the additional stress and public scrutiny of another capital sentencing trial when they had already made a clear decision against it previously. Thus, the petition to prohibit the state from seeking the death penalty was granted.

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