Revocation of Probation

RE-2018-234

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JERRY WAYNE LANDS, NOT FOR PUBLICATION** **Appellant,** **v.** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. RE-2018-234** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **MAY 30, 2019** **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** **KUEHN, VICE-PRESIDING JUDGE:** On March 7, 2008, Appellant Jerry Wayne Lands, represented by counsel, entered a negotiated plea of no contest to the charge of Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Methamphetamine) After Former Conviction of a Felony in Pittsburg County Case No. CF-2007-420. He was sentenced to ten (10) years, all suspended, subject to terms and conditions of probation. Between May 2008 and March 2009, at least five (5) applications to revoke his probation were filed. On December 5, 2008, Lands was charged with additional offenses and ultimately, on April 13, 2009, the district court revoked five years of his suspended sentence in Case No. CF-2007-420. Subsequent to Lands' guilty plea in Case No. CF-2008-526, where he received a ten-year sentence with five years suspended, the State filed multiple revocation applications in both cases. On October 26, 2017, the State filed another Application to Revoke Lands' suspended sentences, which culminated in a full revocation during a hearing held on July 11, 2017. **PROPOSITIONS OF ERROR:** 1. Lands contends that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to grant a continuance for him to hire counsel. 2. He argues there was no valid waiver of the twenty-day requirement, resulting in loss of jurisdiction to revoke his sentence. 3. He claims the evidence was insufficient to support the allegations in the revocation motions. 4. He asserts the revocation of his entire remaining sentences was excessive. **DECISION:** 1. **Continuance Denial:** The court found no abuse of discretion by Judge Hogan in denying the requested continuance, which was sought on the day of the hearing without prior notification of intent to hire private counsel. 2. **Waiver of the 20-Day Rule:** The waiver was valid despite Lands' claim that it was made without the representation of counsel, as the appellate record indicated he knowingly waived his right to a timely hearing. 3. **Sufficiency of Evidence:** The court ruled there was sufficient evidence to warrant revocation of Lands' suspended sentences. Violations of probation can be established by a preponderance of evidence, and the record supported the trial court's findings. 4. **Excessiveness of Revocation:** The court concluded that revocation of Lands' entire suspended sentences was not excessive, given his extensive history of probation violations. **RULING:** The order of the District Court of Pittsburg County revoking Appellant's suspended sentences is **AFFIRMED**. **COUNSEL:** *Appellant:* Wesley J. Cherry *Appellee:* Max E. Moss, Jr., Assistant District Attorney; Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma **OPINION BY:** KUEHN, V.P.J. *LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR* *LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR IN RESULTS* *HUDSON, J.: CONCUR* *ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR* **MANDATE ORDERED.** For a complete view and reference, [Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/RE-2018-234_1734698244.pdf).

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RE-2018-357

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **CASE NO. RE-2018-357** **JAMES MONROE JONES, Appellant,** **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** James Monroe Jones (Appellant) appeals from the revocation of his suspended sentences in Case Nos. CF-2008-7440, CF-2010-130, CF-2010-290, and CF-2013-6519, adjudicated by the Honorable Timothy R. Henderson, District Judge, in the District Court of Oklahoma County. On June 16, 2010, Appellant pled guilty in Cases CF-2008-7440, CF-2010-130, and CF-2010-290, receiving concurrent sentences with significant portions suspended. Specifically, in CF-2008-7440, he was convicted of two counts of Concealing Stolen Property and sentenced to fifteen years on each count, with the first five years served. Similar sentences were imposed for offenses stemming from the other cases. On May 1, 2015, Appellant entered a negotiated nolo contendere plea in CF-2013-6519 for an amended count of Concealing Stolen Property, resulting in a ten-year sentence with the first year served. On August 26, 2016, the State filed applications to revoke Appellant's suspended sentences due to reported violations, including failure to report, change of address, and new criminal activity related to Domestic Assault and Battery. Enhanced allegations were added on March 7, 2018, encompassing additional crimes attributed to Appellant. A hearing was conducted on April 2, 2018. Appellant's counsel objected to the State's evidence, citing inadequate discovery. The trial court, however, noted Appellant had received relevant documents previously, and dismissed the objections after reviewing the evidence. Judge Henderson ultimately found Appellant had violated his probation through specific new criminal conduct and revoked his suspended sentences in full. Appellant presents two propositions of error on appeal: **PROPOSITION I:** The trial court violated Jones's right to due process and a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article II § 7 of the Oklahoma State Constitution. **PROPOSITION II:** Defense counsel failed to prepare adequately for trial, resulting in ineffective assistance of counsel. **ANALYSIS** In addressing Proposition I, Appellant contends that the overruling of his objections regarding discovery violations deprived him of due process. It is established that defendants have minimal due process rights in revocation hearings, including evidence disclosure. However, since Appellant’s counsel did not request discovery prior to the hearing, the burden falls on them for preparation. The trial court did not deny Appellant the opportunity to defend—therefore, Proposition I is denied. Regarding Proposition II, Appellant asserts his counsel's ineffectiveness based on a lack of preparedness stemming from unrequested discovery. The Strickland standard evaluates ineffective assistance claims through performance deficiency and resultant prejudice. Appellant has not substantiated claims that better-prepared counsel would have altered the outcome, as evidence showed several violations were confirmed. Thus, Proposition II is also denied. **DECISION** The order from the District Court of Oklahoma County revoking Appellant's suspended sentences in Case Nos. CF-2008-7440, CF-2010-130, CF-2010-290, and CF-2013-6519 is **AFFIRMED**. --- **APPEARANCES:** **AT TRIAL** Katie Samples, Assistant Public Defender Marva A. Banks, Assistant Public Defender **ON APPEAL** David Nichols, Assistant District Attorney Mike Hunter, Attorney General Keeley L. Miller, Assistant Attorney General **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **CONCUR:** LEWIS, P.J.; KUEHN, V.P.J.; HUDSON, J.; ROWLAND, J. **[Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/RE-2018-357_1734695459.pdf)**

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RE-2011-710

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In OCCA case No. RE-2011-710, Jermaine Richard Newton appealed his conviction for two counts of Assault with a Dangerous Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the revocation order of his suspended sentences to time served. One judge dissented. Newton had originally pleaded guilty to the charges and was given a ten-year suspended sentence, which meant he would not go to prison right away as long as he followed certain rules. One of the rules was that he could not break any laws. Later, he was accused of violating a protective order that had been put in place to keep him away from a specific person. The court examined whether there was enough evidence to show that Newton had broken the order. They found that there was enough proof that he had violated the order by being near the person it was intended to protect. The court also looked at whether the decision to revoke his suspended sentences was fair or too harsh. The judges noted that he was young and hadn't been in trouble before this violation. They concluded that sending him to prison for the full ten years was not necessary since he hadn't done anything very dangerous lately. In the end, the court decided he should not serve the full ten years but should instead be given a second chance, and they ordered that he should be returned to probation. The judges who agreed with this decision believed it was a fair outcome. However, one judge disagreed and felt that the original decision to revoke his suspended sentences should stand.

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RE-2009-1019

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In OCCA case No. RE-2009-1019 and RE-2009-1020, the appellant appealed his conviction for the revocation of his suspended sentences. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the full revocation of his seven-year suspended sentences to a three-year revocation with four years remaining suspended. One judge dissented. The case involved the appellant, who had previously pleaded guilty to multiple drug charges and received a suspended sentence. Later, the State accused him of violating his probation by committing new crimes. The judge found enough evidence to revoke his entire suspended sentence, which the appellant contested. The appellant argued that a small amount of marijuana found in a car he was driving was not enough to prove he controlled it because it was not his car. He also claimed that revoking his entire sentence was too harsh and should be changed. However, the court upheld the judge's finding that the appellant indeed had control over the marijuana since he was driving the car alone and had acknowledged ownership of the drug paraphernalia in the car. The court found merit in the appellant's argument about the harshness of the punishment because the reasons for revoking the full sentence were incorrect. The judge had based his decision on prior allegations that didn't hold up to factual scrutiny during the revocation hearing. The violations were also deemed minor and were not even prosecuted. In the end, the court decided to cut the original seven-year full revocation down to three years while keeping four years suspended, demonstrating that the punishment still reflected the violations but was fairer given the circumstances.

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RE-2004-812

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In OCCA case No. RE-2004-812, Duckett appealed his conviction for Unlawful Possession of A Controlled Drug. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the order of the District Court regarding the revocation of Duckett's suspended sentence and instructed the court to dismiss the case, leading to Duckett's immediate release. One judge dissented. The case began when Duckett entered a guilty plea for possessing crack cocaine and was given a three-year suspended sentence. However, in 2002, the state wanted to revoke this sentence due to alleged violations of probation. Duckett was arrested and confessed to violating the terms of his probation in early 2003, but his sentencing was postponed several times. When Duckett failed to appear for a hearing in June 2004, a warrant for his arrest was issued. After being taken into custody, he had his sentencing hearing on July 26, 2004, during which the court revoked his suspended sentence due to his absence at the earlier hearing. Duckett appealed this decision, arguing that the court could not revoke his probation after his three-year term had expired. The court agreed with Duckett's argument, stating that the District Court did not have the authority to sentence him after the probation had ended. Although the court had taken steps to help him, such as continuously supervising his probation, the law does not allow for a suspended sentence to be extended indefinitely. The ruling emphasized that once the suspended sentence expired, the District Court lost its power to revoke it. Therefore, the court reversed the earlier decision and instructed the District Court to dismiss the case, allowing Duckett to be released.

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