Rehabilitation

F-2018-1004

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **SHANNON SHEREE JOHNSON,** **Appellant,** **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. F-2018-1004** **FILED FEB 13, 2020** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** **SUMMARY OPINION** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** On April 18, 2017, Appellant Shannon Sheree Johnson entered a plea of guilty in Oklahoma County District Case No. CF-2015-8771. The trial court delayed her sentencing in this case and suspended the probation requirements for her prior cases—CF-2013-2846, CF-2014-1596, and CM-2015-1832—pending successful completion of the Oklahoma County Mental Health Court program. According to the plea agreement, if Appellant did not successfully complete the Mental Health Court, the trial court would revoke her suspended sentences in Case Nos. CF-2013-2846 and CF-2014-1596, convert her deferred sentences to convictions with a one-year prison sentence in Case No. CM-2015-1832, and impose concurrent ten-year sentences for Counts 1 and 2 in Case No. CF-2015-8771. The State filed a motion to terminate Appellant’s participation in the Mental Health Court, alleging her non-compliance with the program, including failure to follow court rules, lack of progress, unauthorized departure from inpatient treatment, and not graduating from treatment. After a hearing, Special Judge Geary Walke terminated her participation in Mental Health Court and sentenced her in accordance with her plea agreement. Appellant contends that the termination was an abuse of discretion, arguing that the judge should have considered intermediate sanctions before imposing the sentences. She cites her period of sobriety prior to the hearing as a reason for less severe punishment options. However, evidence presented at the hearing indicated that Appellant had consistently missed meetings, court appearances, and drug tests, and had not made adequate efforts to complete her treatment. Appellant's counsel argues that Judge Walke should have recognized relapses as part of the rehabilitation process under 22 O.S.Supp.2014, § 472(F). This section allows for discretion in determining whether conduct justifies revocation of a participant from the program. The record does not support Appellant's position that Judge Walke acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in the face of substantial evidence demonstrating her failure to comply with the program. As Appellant has not shown that the trial court's decision was contrary to law or the facts of the case, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion. **DECISION** The termination of Appellant's participation in the Mental Health Court program is AFFIRMED. The mandate is ordered to be issued upon the filing of this decision. --- **APPEARANCES** **ON APPEAL** Melissa French, Counsel for Defendant Andrea Digilio Miller, Counsel for Appellant Heather Coyle, Assistant District Attorney Mike Hunter, Oklahoma Attorney General Tessa Henry, Assistant Attorney General **OPINION BY:** KUEHN, V.P.J. LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR HUDSON, J.: CONCUR ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR

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F-2018-1222

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The document is a summary opinion from the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma regarding Larry Donelle Brown, Jr.'s appeal following his resentencing for a first-degree murder conviction. Here's a brief breakdown of the key points: 1. **Background**: - Larry Donelle Brown, Jr. was convicted of first-degree murder as a juvenile and initially sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. - This sentence was later challenged, and the Oklahoma Court granted post-conviction relief, allowing Brown to be resentenced. 2. **Resentencing**: - Upon resentencing by Judge Sharon K. Holmes, Brown received a life sentence with the possibility of parole, with credit for time served. 3. **Appeal**: - Brown's appeal argues that his life sentence effectively amounts to a life sentence without parole, violating his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. - He cites the U.S. Supreme Court rulings in *Miller v. Alabama* and *Graham v. Florida*, which assert that juveniles should have a meaningful opportunity for parole based on their maturity and rehabilitation. 4. **Court Findings**: - The court found no constitutional violation in Brown's sentence. - It reiterated previous rulings that a life sentence with the possibility of parole does not violate the standards set by the Supreme Court regarding juvenile offenders. - The court noted that Brown, having served over 21 years, appears eligible for parole consideration and affirmed that he had not been denied fair notice or opportunity in the parole process. 5. **Conclusion**: - The sentence was affirmed, indicating that the court found the sentencing to be constitutional and appropriate given the circumstances surrounding Brown's case. Overall, the Court concluded that Brown's concerns regarding parole and the juvenile sentencing principles established by prior Supreme Court rulings were sufficiently addressed by his current life sentence with the possibility of parole.

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JS 2018-0917

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In OCCA case No. JS 2018-0917, M. W. appealed his conviction for Rape, First Degree, and Sexual Battery. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the ruling that allowed him to be treated as a Juvenile instead of as an adult. One judge dissented.

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JS-2016-1062

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In OCCA case No. JS-2016-1062, Z.N. appealed his conviction for First Degree Burglary. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling that granted Z.N. certification as a juvenile. The State had claimed that the judge made a mistake in allowing Z.N. to be treated as a juvenile. However, the court found that the judge's decision was reasonable given the evidence and factors surrounding the case. The ruling included considerations of the nature of the crime, Z.N.'s background, and the potential for rehabilitation. No judge dissented.

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RE-2010-457

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In OCCA case No. RE-2010-457, Jacquelin Clariece Alexander appealed her conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of her suspended sentence for one charge, but reversed the revocation for the other charge, sending it back for dismissal. One member of the court dissented.

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J-2011-462

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In OCCA case No. J-2011-462, K.T.L. appealed his conviction for robbery by force/fear and kidnapping. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that the lower court's order denying K.T.L.'s motion to be treated as a juvenile was incorrect and should be reversed. K.T.L. was found to have substantial evidence supporting his request for juvenile treatment, and thus, the court instructed to certify him as a juvenile. One justice dissented, believing that the original decision should be upheld.

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J-2010-839

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In OCCA case No. J-2010-839, M.D.M. appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's denial of M.D.M.'s request for juvenile certification, but reversed the order allowing the State to sentence him as an adult. M.D.M. dissented. M.D.M. was charged as a Youthful Offender and requested to be treated as a juvenile instead. The trial court denied his motion, stating that he could be rehabilitated and that the public would be safe if he was treated as a Youthful Offender. The court's decision was based on facts and evidence presented during the hearing. On appeal, M.D.M. argued that the trial court made several mistakes in denying his request. He believed the written order did not match what was discussed in court and that he was not given a fair chance for rehabilitation while being treated as a Youthful Offender. The court ruled that the trial court's initial decision was reasonable and did not abuse its discretion in treating M.D.M. as a Youthful Offender. However, the court also found that the written order mistakenly stated that M.D.M. should be sentenced as an adult. The court clarified that M.D.M. should be treated as a Youthful Offender if convicted. The decision included guidance for the trial court to ensure that M.D.M.'s case is handled appropriately moving forward.

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J-2010-653

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In OCCA case No. J-2010-653, the appellant appealed his conviction for multiple charges, including arson and assault on a police officer. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the juvenile court's order certifying the appellant as an adult. Two justices dissented. The appellant, who was around seventeen-and-a-half years old at the time of the incidents, faced serious charges, including arson and endangering human life. The state wanted to treat him as an adult, and a judge agreed to this on June 25, 2010. However, the appellant's defense argued that the state did not provide clear and convincing evidence to support this decision. During the appeal, the court examined whether the evidence justified treating the appellant as an adult. The judges noted that the law allows for such decisions only in exceptional cases, where a child is deemed not able to benefit from rehabilitation provided in juvenile programs. The appellant's side argued that he was receptive to treatment, as shown by his actions post-incident. He was receiving proper medical treatment after struggling with prescription medication and alcohol use, and he was advancing in his rehabilitation efforts. The justices found that the evidence presented showed the appellant was amenable to treatment and could be rehabilitated if kept within the juvenile system. The court emphasized that just because the acts committed were serious does not mean the child should be treated as an adult without proper evidence. Ultimately, the appeal resulted in the reversal of the certification order, meaning the appellant should not be treated as an adult and should be retained in the juvenile system. The dissenting opinions raised concerns about the risks of letting the appellant remain a juvenile, suggesting that not treating him as an adult could endanger the community given the serious nature of his actions. They believed that the judge's original decision should have been upheld. In conclusion, the majority opinion favored rehabilitation over punishment as an adult, highlighting the importance of the juvenile justice system's focus on the potential for reform and supervision.

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RE-2010-304

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In OCCA case No. RE-2010-304, Jason Dean Vansickle appealed his conviction for Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the order related to his suspended sentences. One judge dissented. Here’s a summary of the case: Jason was found guilty of two counts of Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property. The judge initially decided to wait five years before making a final decision about Jason's punishment, allowing him to follow some rules during that time. But later, the state said Jason broke those rules by using drugs and not paying fees. After a hearing, the judge decided that Jason did break the rules and ordered that he serve a year in jail. The judge added that if Jason could finish rehab during that year, he could avoid additional punishment. Jason disagreed with the judge's decision, especially the part about needing to serve a calendar year in jail, believing it meant he had to stay there every day without earning any time off. The court agreed with Jason that the judge didn't have the authority to set his punishment this way. It clarified that any time taken off his punishment should be based on the original sentence without this added calendar requirement. The court decided that the year part of the sentence, as described by the judge, should be changed. They kept the other parts of the judge's decision the same but removed the requirement for serving a calendar year in jail. Overall, the case highlighted that judges must follow specific rules when deciding on punishments and that adding extra conditions could go beyond what they are allowed to do.

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F 2007-1165

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In OCCA case No. F 2007-1165, the appellant appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug with intent to distribute and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the order that terminated his participation in the Drug Court program and instructed to reinstate him into the program. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant pled guilty to two charges related to drug possession in 2003 and was given a sentence with most of it suspended. After allegations of new violations in 2006, he entered the Drug Court program, which aimed to help him stay away from drugs. However, the State filed to terminate him from the program in 2007, claiming he violated the rules. During the appeal, the appellant argued that the court made a mistake by ending his participation in Drug Court. The court considered whether the reasons for termination were valid. The violations included not completing community service, not writing sentences for a sanction, and not bringing a required book to a meeting. However, evidence showed that the appellant was making progress, had a job, and had been clean for a good period. The court found that the claimed violations weren't enough to justify removing him from the program because there was no clear deadline for completing the tasks. The court emphasized that relapses can happen during rehabilitation and that participants should be given chances to improve. Ultimately, they believed that the appellant was still on the right path and deserved to stay in the Drug Court program. The decision was to reverse the termination and allow the appellant to continue with the program. The dissenting opinion argued that the appellant had not followed the rules enough and that the court had to be strict to help him take responsibility for his actions.

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F-2007-346

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In OCCA case No. F-2007-346, Shawn Dion Reid appealed his conviction for various drug-related offenses including possession of methamphetamine and marijuana with intent to distribute. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the termination of Reid from the Drug Court Program; however, it vacated the judgments and sentences imposed on certain counts that had been dismissed prior to his guilty pleas. One judge dissented.

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F-2006-850

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In OCCA case No. F-2006-850, Jeffrey Airehart appealed his conviction for drug-related offenses. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse his termination from the Drug Court program and instructed that he be reinstated. One judge dissented. Jeffrey Airehart was removed from a Drug Court program due to several positive drug tests. The judge had previously sanctioned him for these tests by imposing short jail terms. Airehart claimed that terminating him was unfair because he had already faced penalties for the same violations. He argued that this violated laws meant to protect individuals from being punished multiple times for the same issue, known as double jeopardy. The court agreed with Airehart's first argument, stating that the Drug Court system is designed to help individuals recover by allowing for relapses and providing a structured way to deal with them rather than terminating their participation after violations. Since Airehart had already been punished, the court ruled that it was not right to terminate him again for those same actions. Regarding his second argument, Airehart said that he did not get proper notice of the grounds for his termination, which made it hard for him to prepare his defense. The court found that while the State could consider his overall performance in the program to decide on termination, the specific terminations were based on violations for which he had been already punished. Therefore, the additional reasons the State brought up were not the basis for his termination. Ultimately, the court ordered that Airehart be reinstated to the Drug Court program and that previous jail sentences related to his termination be canceled, emphasizing the importance of encouraging rehabilitation rather than simply punishing individuals who struggle with addiction.

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J-2005-1078

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In OCCA case No. J-2005-1078, the appellant appealed his conviction for First Degree Rape. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the order that sentenced the appellant as an adult and directed that he be treated as a youthful offender in the event of a conviction. No judge dissented. The case began when the appellant was charged as a youthful offender on September 23, 2004. After a request to be treated as a juvenile was denied, the state filed a motion to sentence the appellant as an adult. This motion led to a trial that was scheduled for September 12, 2005. However, just before the trial started, the state asked to cancel the trial and have a hearing on the motion to sentence him as an adult, which was scheduled for October 12, 2005. During the appeal, the appellant raised three main issues. He argued that the delays in bringing the charges against him were unfair and that the case should be dismissed. He also claimed that the state could not pursue adult sentencing because the trial had already begun before the hearing, and lastly, he said there wasn't enough evidence to show he couldn't be helped through the juvenile system. The court looked closely at the timing of when the trial started and when the hearing to sentence him as an adult happened. They determined that the trial had indeed started when jury selection began, and the law required that the hearing on the adult sentencing motion should have happened before the trial began. Since it did not, the court found that the district court made a mistake by allowing the state to strike the trial after jury selection had started and then proceed with the sentencing hearing. As a result, the order to sentence the appellant as an adult was reversed, and the case was sent back to the district court with instructions to treat the appellant as a youthful offender if he were to be convicted.

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RE-2004-614

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In OCCA case No. RE-2004-614, the appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree rape by instrumentation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the revocation of the appellant's suspended sentence. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant pled guilty to second-degree rape and was sentenced to a total of 10 years and 6 months of imprisonment. However, the judge suspended all but the first 6 months, allowing the appellant to serve that time in prison and then go on probation with specific rules. One of these rules, known as Rule 9, prohibited the appellant from using pornography or visiting places like adult bookstores and massage parlors. Later, the state accused the appellant of violating this rule. They claimed that he participated in a live sex show on the Internet, which was viewed by an undercover police officer. The officer discovered the show after receiving a tip about the appellant's activities. Following a hearing, the judge ruled that the appellant did indeed violate the conditions of his probation and revoked the remaining part of the suspended sentence. The appellant brought forth three main arguments in his appeal. First, he claimed that his right to a fair attorney was compromised because his lawyer had previously worked as a prosecutor in his original rape case. The court found that although an attorney representing both sides creates concerns, in this case, the attorney was no longer working for the prosecution at the time of the revocation hearing. Therefore, the court did not find this to be a reversible error. Second, the appellant argued that the state had not given him enough notice about the specific allegations against him. The court agreed that the notice was lacking but noted that the appellant had actual knowledge of the issues at hand and did not show any harm from the lack of notice. Lastly, the appellant asserted that revoking his entire suspended sentence was too harsh. The court recognized that the appellant had shown good behavior while on probation and that he had been actively working on his rehabilitation. The judge noted that the probation officer and treatment providers believed that a lesser sanction would have been appropriate instead of total revocation. Thus, the court decided to modify the revocation order so that the appellant would only serve the time he had already spent in confinement and would be returned to probation. The revised decision was a mix of affirming some parts of the original ruling while changing the overall outcome regarding the revocation of probation.

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J-2004-1117

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In OCCA case No. J-2004-1117, the appellant appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder and three counts of Assault with Intent to Kill. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the denial of the appellant's request to be certified as a Youthful Offender but reversed the decision regarding the Assault charges, allowing those to be tried as a Youthful Offender. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant was charged as an adult with serious crimes, including murder. The appellant wanted to be treated as a Youthful Offender, which would mean he could receive rehabilitation instead of severe punishment. A special judge conducted hearings to decide if the appellant could be certified as a Youthful Offender, meaning he would be tried in a different system designed for young people. During the hearings, expert witnesses gave differing opinions about whether the appellant could be helped and rehabilitated if treated as a Youthful Offender. One expert believed the chances were good, while others thought the appellant needed more time to be rehabilitated. Based on all the information and expert opinions, the judge decided not to certify the appellant as a Youthful Offender and instead required him to be tried as an adult for the murder charge. On appeal, the appellant argued three main points: first, that the judge made a mistake by not certifying him as a Youthful Offender, second, that the judge should have removed himself from the case, and third, that he should not have been charged as an adult for the Assault with Intent to Kill counts since those should be treated as Youthful Offender crimes. The court looked at the evidence presented in the trial, including testimonies from experts and details of the appellant's life. The conclusion was that the judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding the appellant should be tried as an adult for the murder charge. However, the court did agree with the appellant concerning the Assault with Intent to Kill charges; since he was between 15 and 17 and those charges are typically handled differently, the court ordered that he be processed as a Youthful Offender for those counts. In the end, the court upheld the decision regarding the murder charge but reversed the decision on the Assault with Intent to Kill charges, indicating that the appropriate course was for those to be treated under the Youthful Offender system.

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J-2004-305

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In OCCA case No. J-2004-305, D.H.D. appealed his conviction for Murder in the First Degree. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the denial of D.H.D.'s motion for certification as a juvenile but reversed the denial for certification as a youthful offender, meaning D.H.D. would be tried in a system that focuses on rehabilitation rather than punishment. One judge dissented.

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J-2001-80

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In OCCA case No. J-2001-80, B. D. S. appealed his conviction for Murder in the First Degree. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the District Court’s order denying his motion for certification as a youthful offender and remand the case for certification. One judge dissented. The case began when B. D. S. was charged as an adult with a serious crime. He wanted to be recognized as a youthful offender instead of being treated like an adult in the legal system. The court had to decide whether he should be classified as a youthful offender, which could mean a different kind of punishment and possible help for rehabilitation. B. D. S. argued that the trial court made mistakes. He said the court did not follow the rules about notifying his family of his rights regarding the case, and he claimed his lawyer did not do enough to defend him by speaking up about this issue. After listening to the arguments, the court found that the trial court did not provide proper notice to B. D. S.’s parents or guardian. This lack of communication meant that he might not have received a fair chance in court. The judges agreed that this was important and decided that B. D. S. should be given another chance to be classified as a youthful offender. The dissenting judge felt differently. This judge believed that the trial court's decision not to classify B. D. S. as a youthful offender was the right choice. This judge thought that the evidence showed B. D. S. had committed a serious crime in a cold and calculated way, and that he had a history of violent behavior, which warranted treating him as an adult. The dissenting opinion emphasized the importance of public safety and questioned whether B. D. S. could be rehabilitated. In summary, the court’s majority agreed that B. D. S. should be treated as a youthful offender for a fresh evaluation, while the dissenting judge maintained that the evidence showed he should remain classified as an adult.

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