Proximate Cause Archives

F-2018-1103

Post author:Staff
Post published:January 16, 2020
Post category:F

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **BERT GLEN FRANKLIN,** **Appellant,** **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **Case No. F-2018-1103** **OPINION** LUMPKIN, JUDGE: Appellant, Bert Glen Franklin, was tried by jury and convicted in a consolidated trial of Count 1, First Degree Murder (Child Abuse), and of Count 2, Solicitation of First Degree Murder. The jury recommended punishment of life imprisonment without parole on Count 1 and life imprisonment on Count 2, with the sentences running consecutively. Appellant appeals from this judgment and sentence raising two propositions of error. **PROPOSITION I: Joinder of Charges** Appellant contends that his cases should not have been joined in one trial, asserting that this improper joinder resulted in prejudice. However, as Appellant failed to object at trial, we must review this for plain error, which requires an actual error that is plain or obvious and that affects the Appellant's substantial rights. The statute governing joinder of charges, 22 O.S.2011, § 438, permits the trial of two or more offenses together if they could have been joined in a single indictment. Our analysis is guided by reconciling the factors set forth in previous case law. 1. **Same Type of Offenses:** The charges of murder and solicitation reflect a common theme of violence directed towards individuals involved with the defendant, qualifying them as the same type of offenses. 2. **Proximity in Time:** While the offenses occurred approximately seventeen months apart, the delay was due to Appellant's incarceration. They are sufficiently related given the circumstances under which Appellant acted. 3. **Proximity in Location:** Both offenses were committed within Oklahoma County, suggesting a logical relationship between the two. 4. **Overlapping Proof:** Evidence supporting each charge would have been admissible in separate trials since they are intrinsically linked to Appellant’s actions and intent. Given these observations, we find that the joinder was proper, and Appellant suffered no prejudice; therefore, no error occurred. We deny Proposition I. **PROPOSITION II: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel** Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the joinder. Under the Strickland test, Appellant must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient and that such performance prejudiced his case. Since we determined in Proposition I that the joinder was appropriate, Appellant cannot show that any failure to object prejudiced his case. As a result, we also deny Proposition II. **DECISION** The judgment and sentence are affirmed. The mandate is ordered issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. --- **APPEARANCES:** **For Appellant:** R. Scott Adams Box 926 Norman, OK 73070 **For Appellee:** Mike Hunter Attorney General of Oklahoma Theodore M. Peeper, Asst. Attorney General 320 Robert S. Kerr, #505 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 --- **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **LEWIS, P.J.:** Concur in Result **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** Recuse **HUDSON, J.:** Concur **ROWLAND, J.:** Recuse --- [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1103_1734788162.pdf) This ruling affirms the conviction and sentences of Bert Glen Franklin and addresses the legal standards regarding the joinder of offenses and ineffective assistance of counsel.

S-2013-687

Post author:Staff
Post published:April 22, 2014
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-687, the appellant appealed his conviction for DUI manslaughter. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling, stating that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the appellant's actions were the direct cause of the victim's death. Two justices dissented from the decision. The case involved an incident that took place on October 11, 2012, when the appellee was charged with first-degree manslaughter. This charge stemmed from the accidental death of his wife, Linda Vaughan, while he was driving under the influence of alcohol. During the preliminary hearing, it was revealed that Vaughan was intoxicated, with a blood alcohol level of .14, and that his wife had exited the truck he was driving. She was killed when he accidentally ran over her. Vaughan argued that the state's evidence failed to show that his driving while intoxicated was the direct cause of Linda's death. Testimony from a highway patrolman indicated that while Vaughan may have been more aware of his surroundings if he were sober, Linda's death would have occurred regardless of his intoxication. The court examined whether the state had presented enough evidence to prove that the appellee's actions directly caused the victim's death. They found that the evidence showed Linda made the choice to leave the vehicle and that her death was caused by her own actions, not by the appellee's impaired driving. Because there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of DUI manslaughter, the court upheld the decision of the lower court, which had granted Vaughan's demurrer, meaning they did not find probable cause to believe a crime had been committed. In the end, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that the evidence was not strong enough to support the charge against Vaughan. The decision did not minimize the tragedy of the accident but emphasized the importance of concrete evidence in such cases.

F-2010-495

Post author:Staff
Post published:April 4, 2012
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2010-495, Marco Lamonte Carroll appealed his conviction for one count of Second Degree Felony Murder and two counts of Using a Vehicle to Facilitate the Discharge of a Firearm. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions for Counts 1 and 3 but reverse Count 2 based on double jeopardy grounds. One judge dissented. Carroll was found guilty in a case related to a drive-by shooting that led to one person's death and another's injury. The evidence indicated that there were multiple guns in the vehicle, and shots were fired from more than one of them. The jury's conclusion that Carroll participated in the incident was deemed sufficient by the court. Carroll raised several reasons for his appeal. He argued that there wasn't enough evidence for the charge of Drive-by Shooting, which also supported his Second-Degree Murder conviction. He believed that the merger doctrine should mean his murder charge couldn't be based on the same act that caused the death, meaning his murder conviction should be vacated. He claimed that being convicted of both murder and using a vehicle to facilitate the shooting violated double jeopardy laws, which protect from being tried for the same crime twice. Finally, he argued that the trial court wrongly refused to give him credit for the time he spent in jail before the trial. After looking closely at all the arguments and the case records, the court upheld Carroll's convictions for Second Degree Murder and Using a Vehicle to Facilitate the Discharge of a Firearm related to the second shooting incident. However, they agreed that counting the charge for the first shooting incident separately violated double jeopardy principles, leading to the reversal of that conviction. Overall, while Carroll's main murder conviction and the second vehicle charge were confirmed, the charge of Using a Vehicle to Facilitate the Discharge of a Firearm from the first shooting was dismissed. The court concluded that the trial judge had functioned properly regarding the defendant's time served and did not find grounds to change that part of the decision.

RE-2011-249

Post author:Staff
Post published:February 28, 2012
Post category:RE

In OCCA case No. RE-2011-249, the appellant appealed his conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree and causing an accident resulting in great bodily injury while driving under the influence. In a published decision, the court decided that the order revoking the appellant's suspended sentence was an abuse of discretion and modified the sentence to time served. One judge dissented.

F-2006-114

Post author:Staff
Post published:March 8, 2007
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2006-114, Tuydale Eugene LeFlore appealed his conviction for Second Degree Murder, Leaving the Scene of an Accident Involving Damage, and Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment for Leaving the Scene and Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle, but modified his sentence for Second Degree Murder from sixty years to thirty years. One judge dissented regarding the modification of the sentence for the murder charge, arguing that there was no evidence that the jury considered parole during their decision.

F-2002-855

Post author:Staff
Post published:August 14, 2003
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2002-855, Brandon Grimland appealed his conviction for First Degree Manslaughter. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modified the sentence from one hundred years to twenty-five years imprisonment. One judge dissented, believing the case should be sent back for re-sentencing. Grimland was found guilty of causing the death of another person through a beating that led to severe injuries. The trial jury recommended a very long sentence of one hundred years, but there were concerns about how the prosecutor talked about parole, which might have influenced the jury's decision. The court agreed that the way the prosecutor approached the topic was not right and decided to reduce the sentence to a more reasonable twenty-five years. While the conviction stood, the judges thought it was important to correct the sentence based on how the trial was conducted.