Possession of a Stolen Vehicle Archives

F-2004-691

Post author:Staff
Post published:February 2, 2006
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2004-691, Cleon Christopher Johnson appealed his conviction for multiple crimes including third-degree arson, robbery with a firearm, accessory after the fact to shooting with intent to kill, and possession of a stolen vehicle. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction for third-degree arson, but affirmed the convictions for the other charges. One judge dissented regarding the reversal of the arson conviction. Johnson was charged with serious crimes in Tulsa County and was found guilty by a jury. They gave him a total of 89 years in prison for his actions. On appeal, Johnson argued that there was not enough evidence for the arson conviction, that the robbery charge was not proven, and that there was misconduct during the trial. The court agreed with Johnson that there wasn't enough evidence to prove he committed arson, as the value of the property burned was not established. They stated that to prove third-degree arson, it's necessary to show the value of the property was at least $50. Since there was no proof of this value, that specific conviction was overturned. However, they found that there was enough evidence to support the robbery conviction. The jury was able to conclude that Johnson played an important role in that crime. On the point of prosecutorial misconduct, the court mentioned that Johnson's attorney did not object at trial, which limited their review. The comments made during the trial were not serious enough to be considered a significant error. So, the final decision was to reverse the third-degree arson conviction and send it back for dismissal, while upholding the other convictions against Johnson. One judge thought that the evidence was strong enough to support the arson conviction and disagreed with the reversal.

F-2004-433

Post author:Staff
Post published:July 15, 2005
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2004-433, the appellant appealed his conviction for Conjoint Robbery and Possession of a Stolen Vehicle. In a published decision, the court decided to modify the sentence for the robbery charge but affirmed the sentence for the stolen vehicle charge. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant was charged with possessing a stolen vehicle and leaving an accident scene in 2001. Later, he faced a charge for Conjoint Robbery. He initially pleaded no contest to the stolen vehicle charges, which led to a delayed sentencing while he was to complete a rehabilitation program. However, he could not participate in this program due to the new robbery charge. The appellant pleaded no contest to the robbery charge, resulting in concurrent five-year deferred sentences. In 2004, he was accused of a new crime involving a firearm, leading the state to file an application to accelerate his sentences from the previous cases. After entering a stipulation to the violations, he received a five-year sentence for the firearm charge and additional sentences for the previous offenses. On appeal, the appellant argued that his sentences were excessive. While the court upheld the sentences for the stolen vehicle charge, it acknowledged that the sentence for the robbery was too harsh given the circumstances. Therefore, the sentence for the robbery was modified to ten years with five years suspended. The court found that, overall, the sentences were within the legal limits but decided the particular facts called for a reduction in the robbery sentence.

C-2002-1136

Post author:Staff
Post published:July 22, 2003
Post category:C

In OCCA case No. C-2002-1136, the Petitioner appealed his conviction for Possession of a Stolen Vehicle and Eluding a Police Officer. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petition in part, vacating the trial court's order regarding restitution and remanding for a restitution hearing. One Judge dissented.

F-2000-805

Post author:Staff
Post published:October 18, 2001
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2000-805, Dustin Loy Wells appealed his conviction for several crimes, including Shooting with Intent to Kill and Possession of a Stolen Vehicle. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm most of the convictions but reversed one conviction related to assault. One judge dissented on the decision to reverse that conviction. Dustin Loy Wells was tried in a jury trial and found guilty of multiple charges. The trial court then sentenced him to a total of forty-five years in prison and imposed several fines. Wells believed he was unfairly convicted and claimed there were mistakes made during his trial. He raised several points of error on appeal. First, he argued that the trial court should have separated (or severed) his different charges for trial, but the court found that joining them was appropriate. Second, he said there was a mistake when certain identification evidence was allowed. While the court agreed this was an error, it was considered harmless because there was strong other evidence against him. Third, Wells argued that there was not enough evidence to support one of his assault convictions and the court agreed, reversing that specific conviction. Further, he contended that some evidence should not have been admitted at all, but the court found that the trial court had made the right decision. Wells also claimed there was not enough proof that he intended to kill when he shot someone, but the court concluded there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reach that conclusion. Wells pointed to what he believed was prosecutorial misconduct, claiming he did not get a fair trial because the prosecutor had made improper statements about him. However, the court decided that these actions did not change the outcome of the trial. Finally, he claimed that the combined errors were serious enough to warrant a new trial, but the court found that only one conviction needed to be reversed. In summary, while the court upheld most of Wells’s conviction and sentence, it found that one of the assault convictions should be dismissed. One judge disagreed with this part of the decision.