F-2018-1160

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **RASHAUN HAASTROP,** **Appellant,** **vs.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. F-2018-1160** **FILED DEC - 5 2019** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** **SUMMARY OPINION** *KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:* Appellant, Rashaun Haastrop, was charged in Oklahoma County District Court, Case No. CF-2018-55, with First Degree Burglary, After Conviction of Two Felonies. He was convicted of the lesser related offense of Attempted First Degree Burglary, After Conviction of Two Felonies. On November 13, 2018, the Honorable Ray C. Elliott, District Judge, sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment in accordance with the jury's recommendation. This appeal followed. Appellant raises one proposition of error in support of his appeal: **PROPOSITION:** The State introduced insufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Haastrop had prior convictions out of Illinois and therefore his sentence must be modified. After thorough consideration of this proposition, the briefs of the parties, and the record on appeal, we affirm. Appellant's sole complaint on appeal is that the State failed to sufficiently prove that he was the person named in two Illinois documents reflecting felony convictions for Rashaun Haastrup, or that those convictions were valid and final, i.e., that the defendant in those proceedings had the assistance of counsel and that the convictions had not been appealed. The two latter challenges were not raised below, so we review them only for plain error, as established in *Mathis v. State*, 2012 OK CR 1, ¶ 30, 271 P.3d 67, 78. Plain errors are those errors which are obvious in the record and affect the substantial rights of the defendant; that is, the error affects the outcome of the proceeding, as seen in *Daniels v. State*, 2016 OK CR 2, ¶ 3, 369 P.3d 381, 383. The State offered two certified documents reflecting convictions in Illinois for a Rashaun Haastrup. The chronological entries on these documents show that in each case, (1) Mr. Haastrup was represented by counsel, (2) his rights to appeal were explained to him, but (3) no appeals were taken. The documents were generated several years after the convictions were entered, and neither reveal any activity after formal sentencing. See *Bickerstaff v. State*, 1983 OK CR 116, ¶ 8, 669 P.2d 778, 780. On this record, the trial court's conclusion that the convictions were valid and final was not plainly erroneous. As for whether Appellant (Rashaun Haastrop) and the person named in the documents (Rashaun Haastrup) are the same person, the jury received testimony from a police officer who interviewed Appellant after his arrest. The officer testified that Appellant admitted serving time in Illinois for two different crimes, specifically a drug offense and a theft offense; the State's documents reflected convictions for a drug crime and a theft crime. With identifying information provided by Appellant, the officer retrieved the Illinois documents. Given the unusualness of both names, their similarity, and Appellant's own admissions, a rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the convictions were, in fact, Appellant's, as established by *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) and *Garcia v. State*, 1987 OK CR 49, ¶ 30, 734 P.2d 820, 825. As there is no error, his sole proposition is denied. **DECISION** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Oklahoma County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE RAY C. ELLIOTT, DISTRICT JUDGE** **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** **BENJAMIN MUNDA** **ANDREA DIGILIO MILLER** **BONNIE BLUMERT** **ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER** **OKLAHOMA COUNTY** **320 ROBERT S. KERR AVE.** **SUITE 611** **OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73101** **COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT** **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** **DANIEL GRIDLEY** **MIKE HUNTER** **DANIEL POND** **ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLA.** **ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS** **TESSA L. HENRY** **ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL** **320 ROBERT S. KERR AVENUE** **SUITE 505** **OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102** **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** **LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR** **LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR** **HUDSON, J.: CONCUR** **ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR** [**Click Here To Download PDF**](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1160_1734786705.pdf)

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RE 2009-0510

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In OCCA case No. RE 2009-0510, Edward Q. Jones appealed his conviction for revocation of his suspended sentence. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the revocation. One judge dissented. Edward Jones had previously pled guilty to domestic abuse and was sentenced to a few years in jail, with most of that time suspended, meaning he wouldn’t serve it if he followed the rules set by the court. However, he had problems following those rules, which led the State to ask the court to revoke his suspended sentence. There were two main hearings regarding this. In the first hearing, the judge found that Edward had broken the probation rules and took away three and a half years of his suspended time. Edward didn't appeal that decision. Later, the State filed another request to revoke his sentence, saying he had not followed the rules again. In the second hearing, the judge decided to take away all of his suspended time. Edward argued that he should have had a lawyer to help him at the hearing, which he really wanted. He felt that the short time between being told he could have a lawyer and the date of his hearing was not enough time for him to get one. He argued that he was unfairly treated without a lawyer and that he shouldn’t have to suffer because he missed a deadline due to a lack of money for the application fee to get a lawyer. The State countered by saying that since Edward didn't file for a court-appointed lawyer by the deadline set by the judge, he gave up his right to have one. They also argued that the right to have a lawyer at a revocation hearing is not a constitutional right but a statutory right. They said he didn't get the lawyer because he wasn't trying hard enough to get one and was just delaying things. The judges looked at earlier cases where people were found to have given up their right to a lawyer because they didn't act quickly enough to get one. They concluded that while there was a short delay for Edward, the reasons didn't clearly show he was deliberately trying to delay his hearing. They pointed out that Edward might not have known what he was doing in waiving his right to counsel, and the judge didn't look into whether he could have afforded a lawyer or not. After reviewing the evidence and the arguments, the court decided that Edward was not fairly represented when he attended his hearing without a lawyer. They noted that there was conflicting testimony from police officers about the events leading to his probation violations, which made it difficult for them to feel confident about the decision made at the hearing. Because of these issues, the court reversed the revocation of his suspended sentence. They sent it back to the district court to hold a new hearing where Edward could have a lawyer or show he knew he was giving up that right clearly. In doing so, they ordered that any confusion or problems found in the previous record should be clarified.

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