F-2018-664

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **KEYUNA CRYSTAL MOSLEY,** Appellant, vs. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **No. F-2018-664** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA SEP 19 2019** **SUMMARY OPINION** JOHN D. HADDEN CLERK **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Keyuna Crystal Mosley was tried by jury and convicted of Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 801, after being previously convicted of two or more felonies, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2017-1853. Following the jury's recommendation, the Honorable Ray C. Elliott sentenced Appellant to twenty (20) years imprisonment, requiring her to serve 85% of her sentence before becoming eligible for parole consideration per 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1. Appellant appeals this conviction and sentence. **Proposition of Error:** Appellant raises one proposition of error: that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt of conjointly committing robbery with a dangerous weapon beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus due process mandates her case be reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss. **Decision:** After thorough consideration of the complete record, including original records, transcripts, exhibits, and briefs, we find the law and evidence do not necessitate relief. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed robbery with a dangerous weapon (Easlick v. State, 2004 OK CR 21, ¶ 15, 90 P.3d 556, 559). To establish robbery with a dangerous weapon, the State must demonstrate that the wrongful taking and carrying away of personal property from another's person or immediate presence occurred by force or fear, specifically involving a knife (21 O.S.2011, § 801; OUJI-CR 2d 4-144). The term “principal” in a crime includes anyone who either directly and actively commits the acts constituting the offense or knowingly and with intent aids and abets in its commission (Hackney v. State, 1994 OK CR 29, ¶ 9, 874 P.2d 810, 814; OUJI-CR 2d 2-5, 2-6). Appellant contends the State failed to prove that she acted conjointly with her boyfriend in committing the robbery. She argues that the victim Seale's testimony was incredible and contradicted by her own statement, and that the State should have corroborated Seale's testimony with additional evidence such as forensic evidence, text records, or records of their online communications. This assertion is incorrect. While the State could have provided such corroborative evidence, it was not required to do so. Seale was both an eyewitness and the victim, and the jury determines the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony (Mason v. State, 2018 OK CR 37, ¶ 13, 433 P.3d 1264, 1269). The jury is entitled to make reasonable inferences supporting their verdict. Even in cases of sharply conflicting evidence, we will not disturb a properly supported verdict (Robinson v. State, 2011 OK CR 15, ¶ 17, 255 P.3d 425, 432). The evidence established that Appellant lured victim Seale to the crime scene, called her accomplice, and directly took and carried away Seale’s property while her accomplice threatened the victim with a knife. We will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the jury (White v. State, 2019 OK CR 2, ¶ 9, 437 P.3d 1061, 1065). Thus, this proposition is denied. **Conclusion:** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Oklahoma County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY** THE HONORABLE RAY C. ELLIOTT, DISTRICT JUDGE **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** TIMOTHY M. WILSON ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY 320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 611 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** ANDREA DIGILIO MILLER PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE 611 COUNTY OFFICE BLDG. 320 ROBERT S. KERR AVE. OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 **COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT** DAN POND KATHERINE BRANDON ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLA. ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS TESSA L. HENRY 320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 505 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR HUDSON, J.: CONCUR ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR **[Download PDF Version Here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-664_1735223763.pdf)**

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F-2009-399

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In OCCA case No. F-2009-399, Jeffery Robert Johnson appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse Johnson's conviction and order a new trial. One judge dissented. Johnson was convicted of stabbing his roommate, Maurice Sartor, after a dispute over money. Johnson claimed he was acting to defend his girlfriend, Malinda Brookey, who was being threatened by Sartor. During the trial, there was a disagreement over how the events happened, especially regarding whether Sartor was the aggressor. The key issue in Johnson's appeal was about a mistake in the jury instructions. The trial court gave the jury a modified instruction about the defense of property that led to confusion. This instruction suggested that Sartor had the right to use force to get his property back, which Johnson argued was not true since he believed he was defending his girlfriend from Sartor's aggression. Johnson's lawyer objected to the instruction at the time of the trial, which meant they could raise this issue in the appeal. The higher court found that this error in the jury instructions was significant enough that it likely affected the fairness of the trial. Because of this, they reversed Johnson's conviction and ordered a new trial while not addressing Johnson's other claims or his request for a new trial based on new evidence. This decision means Johnson will get another chance to present his case in front of a new jury, with the hope that the instructions will be clearer and fairer this time. The dissenting judge disagreed with the majority's decision, believing the original instructions were appropriate and did not compromise Johnson's defense.

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