Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 927.1 Archives

F-2018-940

Post author:Staff
Post published:September 19, 2019
Post category:F

In the case of LeJeanna Sue Chronister v. State of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals addressed several appeals raised by the appellant following her conviction for Aggravated Manufacture of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) and her subsequent sentencing to twenty years in prison. The appellant raised three primary propositions of error: 1. **Violation of Rights Regarding the 85% Rule**: The appellant contended that her sentence was unconstitutional because she was not informed that the 85% Rule (requiring her to serve 85% of her sentence before becoming eligible for parole) applied to her case. The court concluded that this argument did not hold merit in a non-jury trial setting, stating that the judge, not a jury, was responsible for sentencing and presumed to know the law. The court found no plain error as the sentence was within the statutory range and was the minimum allowed. 2. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: The appellant claimed her counsel was ineffective for not informing her about the 85% Rule, impacting her decision-making during her trial. The court applied the Strickland standard to evaluate the ineffectiveness claim, concluding that the appellant did not demonstrate how the alleged deficiency in counsel's performance prejudiced her case or altered the outcome. 3. **Cumulative Error**: The appellant argued that the combination of errors denied her a fair trial. The court determined that since none of the individual claims of error warranted relief, the cumulative error argument also lacked merit. Ultimately, the court affirmed the judgment and sentence imposed by the District Court of LeFlore County, stating that the appellant had not demonstrated any error that would necessitate modifying the sentence or overturning the conviction. The ruling emphasizes the distinction between non-jury trials and jury trials concerning informing defendants about parole-related laws and the importance of counsel's performance under the criteria established by the Strickland case.

F-2016-194

Post author:Staff
Post published:November 8, 2018
Post category:F

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **DONTE LEMAR PAYTON,** Appellant, *Case No. F-2016-194* v. **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **SUMMARY OPINION** **HUDSON, JUDGE:** Appellant, Donte Lemar Payton, was convicted in the Oklahoma County District Court, Case No. CF-2014-7586, of Manslaughter in the First Degree, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 711(3). The jury acquitted him of first-degree murder but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense. The Honorable Donald L. Deason sentenced him to life imprisonment, and Payton appeals, presenting six propositions of error: **I.** The trial court erred in failing to comply with statutory law regarding juror contact, violating Appellant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. **II.** The court's communication with the jury improperly suggested they could avoid their duty to assess punishment. **III.** Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel. **IV.** The life sentence imposed was excessive under the circumstances. **V.** The trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury on self-defense, violating Appellant's rights. **VI.** Cumulative errors deprived Appellant of due process. Upon thorough review, including the evidence and arguments presented, the Court finds no relief necessary. The judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED. ### Propositions I and II A presumption of prejudice arises from unauthorized judicial communications with a jury after they commence deliberations (Givens v. State, 1985 OK CR 104). In this case, the jury was informed by the bailiff about the trial court's potential to impose a sentence if they could not reach an agreement. This occurred after they had already found Appellant guilty. An evidentiary hearing confirmed that the communication, while improper, was addressed within the statutory framework (22 O.S.2011, § 927.1) regarding jury deadlock. The communication was limited and factual, and the jury was informed to continue deliberations, which ultimately established that they were deadlocked. Appellant failed to object to any of these proceedings or request an Allen charge, thus forfeiting those claims on appeal. The communication did not undermine the integrity of the proceedings, and therefore the presumption of prejudice was adequately overcome. Hence, we deny Propositions I and II. ### Proposition III To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice (Strickland v. Washington, 1984). In this case, the existing record did not support claims of ineffective assistance. Furthermore, there is no clear and convincing evidence suggesting that counsel's failure to present character witness statements at sentencing prejudiced the outcome. Accordingly, Proposition III is denied. ### Proposition IV Considering the complete context, we agree that Appellant's life sentence is not so excessive as to shock the conscience (Duclos v. State, 2017 OK CR 8). The nature of the crime was severe, further justifying the sentence based on the facts presented. ### Proposition V The trial court's decision to deny a self-defense instruction was within its discretion. The standard for prima facie evidence was not met since Appellant's testimony did not suggest a reasonable belief in imminent danger, thus precluding such an instruction (Davis v. State, 2011). ### Proposition VI Allegations of cumulative error must be based on actual determinations of error, which were not established here (Neloms v. State, 2012). Therefore, we deny Proposition VI as well. ### DECISION The judgment and sentence of the District Court are AFFIRMED. Appellant's Application for an Evidentiary Hearing on Sixth Amendment Claims is DENIED. **APPEARANCES:** * For Appellant: Stacy Smith, Attorney at Law * For Appellee: Mike Hunter, Attorney General; John Salmon, Assistant District Attorney; Matthew D. Haire, Assistant Attorney General **OPINION BY:** HUDSON, J. *LUMPKIN, P.J.: CONCUR* *LEWIS, V.P.J.: CONCUR IN RESULTS* *KUEHN, J.: CONCUR* *ROWLAND, J.: RECUSE* **NOTE**: The presence of procedural errors warrants caution, but in this instance, they did not materially affect the outcome. Trial courts should maintain vigilance regarding communications with jurors to avoid future complications.

F-2015-886

Post author:Staff
Post published:November 14, 2016
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2015-886, Russell Carl McCrillis appealed his conviction for two counts of Lewd Molestation. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment but remand the case for the trial court to assess a specific term of years for post-imprisonment supervision. One judge dissented. McCrillis was convicted in a jury trial and received a twenty-year prison sentence and a $20,000 fine for each count of lewd molestation. The sentences were ordered to be served at the same time. McCrillis raised several issues in his appeal. He claimed that his statement to the police should not have been allowed at trial because it was not made freely and voluntarily. He also argued that the jury should have been instructed about the voluntariness of his statement. Additionally, he pointed out that the trial court could not change his sentence to an indefinite probation after prison. Finally, he believed his sentences were too harsh. The court looked closely at whether McCrillis's statement to the police was voluntary and found that he had waived his rights properly and given his statement willingly. This meant the trial court did not make a mistake when it allowed the statement to be presented during the trial. The court did notice that while the judge should have instructed the jury on the voluntary nature of his confession, the lack of instruction didn’t really have an impact on the trial's outcome, as there was strong enough evidence against McCrillis. Regarding the trial court's authority to modify the sentence, the court agreed that it should have set a clear term for post-imprisonment supervision, which means after McCrillis serves his time, he should be supervised for a set number of years. The law says people convicted of certain crimes, like lewd molestation, must have a period of supervision after serving time, usually between nine months and a year. However, there is also a specific law stating that in cases of sexual offenses, supervision could be longer. The court noted that the trial judge didn’t give a fixed duration for supervision, which was a mistake. In the end, while the court agreed with McCrillis on the need for a specified period of supervision upon release, it found that his twenty-year sentence was not too severe based on the details of the crimes committed. Therefore, the court upheld the conviction but sent the case back to have the trial court determine the proper length of post-imprisonment supervision.

F-2007-638

Post author:Staff
Post published:August 17, 2009
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2007-638, Watson appealed his conviction for multiple drug-related offenses. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse some of his convictions, modify others, and rescind certain fines. One judge dissented. Watson was found guilty of trafficking in illegal drugs, possession of a firearm during a felony, and other charges. He was sentenced to many years in prison, with his sentences running one after another. Watson argued that the search warrant used to search his home was not valid, that he was unfairly tried for multiple offenses that seemed to be the same crime, that he had been treated unfairly during the trial, and that he didn’t have good representation from his attorney. The court looked closely at the evidence and found that the warrant to search his home was valid. They noticed that the charges for drug trafficking should not have occurred at the same time for methamphetamine and cocaine since this counted as double punishment for one act. Therefore, they decided to reverse that conviction. They also reversed the conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun because it was tied to the same act as possessing a firearm during the crime. The court agreed there was enough evidence to support his convictions for having a firearm during a felony and for concealing stolen property. They noted that while the prosecutor made a small mistake during their closing argument, it was unlikely that it would change the outcome of the case since the evidence against Watson was strong. Watson's convictions were modified, which means his sentences were reduced. The court overturned specific unfair fines and affirmed the remaining charges, stating that the changes would not shock anyone’s sense of fairness. The judges believed the final combined sentence still made sense and was fair. In conclusion, while the court made changes to Watson’s convictions and sentences, they found most of the trial's foundation to be reasonable, ensuring that these decisions aligned with the law. The case will return to the lower court to fix some details in line with the appellate court's ruling.