Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 812.1 Archives

F-2018-888

Post author:Staff
Post published:February 6, 2020
Post category:F

This document is a summary opinion from the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma regarding the appeal of Justin William Dunlap, who was convicted of First Degree Rape by Instrumentation of a Victim under the Age of Fourteen and sentenced to ten years in prison. Dunlap raised multiple propositions of error in his appeal, including claims of insufficient waiver of a jury trial, challenges to the credibility of the victim's testimony, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, excessive sentencing, and inadequate defense representation, among others. The court considered each proposition in detail: 1. **Waiver of Jury Trial**: The court found that Dunlap's waiver was knowing and voluntary, supported by a written waiver signed by all necessary parties. 2. **Sufficiency of Evidence**: The court analyzed the testimony of the victim (D.H.) and found it sufficient to support the conviction, affirming that the evidence met the necessary legal standard. 3. **Prosecutorial Misconduct**: The court concluded there was no misconduct that affected the trial's fairness, finding that the prosecutor's comments did not misstate the evidence or improperly comment on Dunlap's failure to testify. 4. **Excessive Sentencing**: The court determined that the sentence was within statutory guidelines and did not shock the conscience given the serious nature of the crime. 5. **Right to Present a Defense**: The court upheld the trial court's decision to exclude certain evidence, finding no abuse of discretion in limiting what could be presented as a defense. 6. **Speedy Trial**: The court found no violation of Dunlap's right to a speedy trial, noting delays were justified and not solely attributable to the prosecution. 7. **Competency Evaluation**: The court ruled that since Dunlap did not request an evaluation and provided no evidence to support his claims, this argument was unmeritorious. 8. **Conflict of Interest**: The argument regarding conflicting interests between attorneys was found to lack merit as Dunlap did not demonstrate how this negatively impacted his defense. 9. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: The court scrutinized claims of ineffective assistance, applying the Strickland standard, and found that Dunlap did not demonstrate that any alleged deficiencies affected the trial's outcome. 10. **Cumulative Error**: The court dismissed this claim as there were no individual errors that would warrant a new trial. The court affirmed the judgment and sentence, upholding the findings of the lower court and denying Dunlap's requested evidentiary hearing related to ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, a concurring opinion emphasized the handling of extra-record materials submitted by Dunlap, noting the importance of adhering to established procedural rules and advocating for more careful consideration of supplementary materials going forward. In summary, the appeal was denied, and the conviction stands as affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

PC 2017-755

Post author:Staff
Post published:May 24, 2019
Post category:PC

In OCCA case No. PC 2017-755, the petitioner appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In a published decision, the court decided to vacate the previous sentence and allow for resentencing with a jury. The dissenting opinions argued against the majority decision, indicating that the judge had the discretion to deny jury resentencing based on prior waivers. The case started when the petitioner was just seventeen years old and pleaded guilty to First Degree Murder in 2006. Originally, he was sentenced to life in prison without the chance for parole. After some time, he claimed that this sentence was unfair because he was a minor when he was sentenced. The court agreed and decided to let him be resentenced but had to deal with the issue of whether his resentencing should involve a jury. The petitioner argued that since he was seeking resentencing, he should be allowed a jury trial. However, the state disagreed, pointing out that he had waived his right to a jury trial when he originally pleaded guilty. The judge decided that because of this waiver, he didn’t have to give the petitioner a jury for resentencing. In this case, the court looked at previous decisions that said when a juvenile is sentenced to life without parole, they should have a jury trial unless they give up that right. The majority of the court found that the petitioner did not truly waive his right to a jury for the resentencing, as he was relying on new rules from recent important cases. Ultimately, the court decided that it was wrong for the judge to deny the jury resentencing. They chose to vacate that decision and said the case should go back to the lower court to figure out the right way to do the resentencing, with the ability to include a jury if the petitioner asked. The dissenting opinions argued that the judge had actually acted correctly by denying the request for a jury because the petitioner had already waived that right back when he pleaded guilty. They believed that the rules shouldn’t allow a person to change their mind long after the original decision. The court ordered that the petitioner’s guilty plea and conviction were still valid, but they needed to follow the correct process under the law for the new sentencing.

F-2012-437

Post author:Staff
Post published:May 6, 2013
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2012-437, Mark J. Lawler appealed his conviction for rape in the first degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Mark J. Lawler was found guilty of rape in the first degree by a jury and given a sentence of thirty-five years in prison. He claimed that the trial court made mistakes during his trial. First, Lawler thought he should have been allowed to represent himself instead of having a lawyer. He argued that this was his right under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The court agreed with him, stating that he had clearly asked to represent himself at least five days before the trial, which was a reasonable request. The court also found that Lawler understood the risks involved in defending himself without a lawyer. The trial court was wrong to deny his request, so that was a significant error. Second, Lawler argued that he did not get a speedy trial, which is another right he had under the law. Although there were delays in the trial, the court found that they were not entirely Lawler's fault. The reasons for the delays included busy courts and other issues that were not intentional. However, the court also decided that Lawler did not show he was hurt by the delay, so they did not agree with his claim on this point. In summary, the court found that the trial court made a mistake by not allowing Lawler to represent himself. Because of this error, they reversed his conviction and sent the case back for a new trial.