Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 264

S-2018-6

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** Court Case No: S-2018-51 and S-2018-6 **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellant, **V.** **SHELLEY MARIE BRADLEY,** Appellee. **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellant, **V.** **DYLAN THOMAS BRODIE,** Appellee. **SUMMARY OPINION** **ROWLAND, JUDGE:** 1. The State of Oklahoma, Appellant, appeals from an order affirming the ruling of the magistrate, sustaining the defendants' demurrers to evidence on Counts 1 and 2, and denying the State's request to amend the Informations, in Case Nos. CF-2017-445 and CF-2017-446 in the District Court of Wagoner County. **STATEMENT OF THE CASE** 2. Appellees, Shelley Marie Bradley and Dylan Thomas Brodie, were charged with intimidation of a witness and conspiracy to commit a felony. The magistrate sustained the demurrers to the evidence and denied amendments to include additional charges. 3. The matter was assigned to Judge Mark L. Dobbins as the reviewing judge, who affirmed the magistrate's ruling. 4. The State appealed; on August 9, 2018, this Court held oral arguments, after which the ruling was reversed. **SUMMARY OF FACTS** 5. The Appellees are related to Jacob Ode, charged with several offenses following a police pursuit. Hawkins, a relative of the Appellees, was a passenger and initially provided a statement implicating Ode. 6. Later, Hawkins was approached by the Appellees and persuaded to change her statement to indicate Ode was not the driver during the pursuit. 7. The magistrate found no evidence demonstrating that Hawkins was threatened or coerced into altering her testimony. **ANALYSIS** ### I. Intimidation of Witness 8. The State argued sufficient evidence existed for the charge of witness intimidation. However, the records demonstrated no evidence of Hawkins being prevented from testifying or coerced through force or fear. 9. The judges did not err in finding there wasn’t enough evidence to support the claim of intimidation. ### II. Conspiracy to Commit Intimidation 10. The State similarly could not provide sufficient evidence to show any conspiracy between the Appellees to intimidate Hawkins, as no threats or coercion were substantiated. ### III. Conspiracy to Commit Perjury by Subornation 11. The State argued it presented sufficient evidence to show a conspiracy to commit perjury by subornation. The appellate judges found sufficient cause to remand for the trial on this charge. ### IV. False Preparation of Exhibits 12. The evidence presented indicated that Hawkins’ second statement was prepared under the Appellees' guidance with the intent to be submitted as evidence. 13. The failure to include this evidence as a charge of False Preparation of Exhibits was deemed an error by the appellate judges. **DECISION** 14. The order of the District Court sustaining the magistrate's decisions is REVERSED. The case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to proceed to trial for the charges of Conspiracy to Commit Perjury by Subornation and False Preparation of Exhibits. **APPEARANCES** - **For the State:** Douglas G. Dry, Assistant District Attorney - **For the Appellees:** Michon Hastings Hughes & Clinton C. Hastings, Attorneys at Law **OPINION BY: ROWLAND, J.** - LUMPKIN, P.J., LEWIS, V.P.J., HUDSON, J., and KUEHN, J., concur. --- **[Download PDF of Full Opinion](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/S-2018-6_1734333945.pdf)**

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S-2016-169

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In OCCA case No. S-2016-169, Patrick Lee Walker appealed his conviction for distributing a controlled dangerous substance (methamphetamine) within 2,000 feet of a school. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's ruling that granted Walker's motion to quash and dismissed the case. One judge dissented. The case began when Walker was charged in Kay County District Court with distributing methamphetamine after a controlled purchase was made by a confidential informant. A deputy had coordinated this controlled buy and testified that the informant bought meth from Walker at a location in Kay County. The informant was searched before the transaction to ensure she had no drugs. After meeting Walker, they drove together to Osage County where the exchange happened. There was a lack of evidence presented about the exact location where the drugs were handed over, which was crucial to prove that the crime occurred within the required distance of a school. During the preliminary hearing, the judge decided that while the distribution started in Kay County, there wasn't enough evidence to show that the drugs were handed over in that county or within 2,000 feet from a school. Because of this, the judge dismissed the case when Walker's defense claimed that the evidence was insufficient. The court discussed whether the trial court had made an error in dismissing the case. The main two arguments from the State's appeal were that the district court wrongly decided it didn't have the required evidence for venue and that it unfairly denied the State's request to amend the Information (the official charge). The court explained that the State must show probable cause that a crime happened and clarify where that crime occurred. They noted that although it was shown that a crime likely happened, it was not in the form correctly charged due to not proving all essential elements of the offense, as required under Oklahoma law. While the trial court's decision to dismiss the case was recognized as legally incorrect, it did not lead to a different outcome because the State did not ask to amend the charge during the hearing. Therefore, even though the lower court may have acted without the right understanding of the law regarding amendments, it did not influence the decision because of the procedural issues involved. The court ultimately upheld the dismissal of the charges against Walker, agreeing with the lower court's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of the crime occurring within the jurisdiction required by law. The ruling was affirmed, and thus the case remained closed without further proceedings.

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S-2013-510

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In OCCA case No. S-2013-509 and S-2013-510, two individuals appealed their convictions for first-degree murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the dismissal of the charges against them based on their claim of immunity under the Stand Your Ground law. The court found that the appeal by the State of Oklahoma was not authorized to challenge the dismissal order. One judge dissented.

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S-2013-509

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In OCCA case No. S-2013-509, Julio Juarez Ramos and Isidro Juarez Ramos appealed their convictions for first-degree murder. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling granting the Appellees immunity from prosecution under Oklahoma's Stand Your Ground law. #1 dissented.

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S-2013-687

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In OCCA case No. S-2013-687, the appellant appealed his conviction for DUI manslaughter. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling, stating that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the appellant's actions were the direct cause of the victim's death. Two justices dissented from the decision. The case involved an incident that took place on October 11, 2012, when the appellee was charged with first-degree manslaughter. This charge stemmed from the accidental death of his wife, Linda Vaughan, while he was driving under the influence of alcohol. During the preliminary hearing, it was revealed that Vaughan was intoxicated, with a blood alcohol level of .14, and that his wife had exited the truck he was driving. She was killed when he accidentally ran over her. Vaughan argued that the state's evidence failed to show that his driving while intoxicated was the direct cause of Linda's death. Testimony from a highway patrolman indicated that while Vaughan may have been more aware of his surroundings if he were sober, Linda's death would have occurred regardless of his intoxication. The court examined whether the state had presented enough evidence to prove that the appellee's actions directly caused the victim's death. They found that the evidence showed Linda made the choice to leave the vehicle and that her death was caused by her own actions, not by the appellee's impaired driving. Because there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of DUI manslaughter, the court upheld the decision of the lower court, which had granted Vaughan's demurrer, meaning they did not find probable cause to believe a crime had been committed. In the end, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that the evidence was not strong enough to support the charge against Vaughan. The decision did not minimize the tragedy of the accident but emphasized the importance of concrete evidence in such cases.

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F 2004-1238

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In OCCA case No. F 2004-1238, James Alan Wade appealed his conviction for Embezzlement of Rented Property. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand the case with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented. Mr. Wade was found guilty by a jury of embezzling a rented car and was sentenced to twenty years in prison. He appealed this conviction, raising several arguments. He claimed there wasn't enough evidence to prove his prior felony convictions and that his sentence was too harsh. He also argued that his lawyer didn’t do enough to protect his rights during the trial. The court looked closely at whether there was enough proof that Mr. Wade had committed the crime he was accused of. One key point was whether the car he rented was valued correctly according to the law. The court found that the prosecution didn't provide evidence proving the car's value was over $1,000, which is necessary for the embezzlement charge. Because of this lack of evidence, the court decided that Mr. Wade should not have been convicted and ordered that the case be dismissed. The dissenting judge, however, thought that there was enough evidence for the jury to make their decision and believed the conviction should be upheld.

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F-2000-1232

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In OCCA case No. F-2000-1232, Virginia Lee Patton appealed her conviction for Second Degree Murder and Injury to a Minor Child. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for Second Degree Murder but reversed the conviction for Neglect of a Minor Child with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented. Virginia Lee Patton was found guilty by a jury of killing someone (which was labeled as Second Degree Murder) and of causing harm to a child (originally charged as Injury to a Minor Child). The jury recommended a punishment of fifty years in prison for the murder, and a one-year sentence for the charge related to the minor child. The sentences were set to be served one after the other. During her appeal, Patton claimed two main issues. First, she argued that there wasn't enough evidence to support the murder conviction and that it was wrong to charge her with Second Degree Murder. Secondly, she pointed out that it was unfair to charge her with two crimes based on the same situation, which might violate her rights. The court examined all details and evidence from the trial. After reviewing everything, the judges agreed that there was enough evidence to support the murder conviction. They felt that a reasonable person could conclude she was guilty of that offense based on the facts presented during the trial. However, the court also recognized that charging Patton with both Second Degree Murder and Neglect of a Minor Child was a problem because it relied on the same evidence for both charges. Due to this, they decided to reverse the conviction for Neglect of a Minor Child and ordered it to be dismissed, meaning she would not be punished for that crime. In summary, the court upheld the serious conviction for murder while removing the lesser charge related to the child. One judge disagreed with the decision about the murder conviction.

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