Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1053 Archives - Page 2 of 3

S-2013-695

Post author:Staff
Post published:June 19, 2014
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-694, Fred A. Green appealed his conviction for kidnapping and first-degree burglary. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the dismissal of the charges against him and his co-defendants, Ronald Krushe and Christopher Thornburg. One judge dissented. The case began when Green, Krushe, and Thornburg were charged after they went to a home to arrest two individuals, Billy and Pam Jones, for breaching their bail bond. They entered the home without permission and removed the Joneses, leading to their arrest. However, the court found that since Green, Krushe, and Thornburg were acting as bail bondsmen with the legal authority to arrest, they did not commit the crimes of burglary or kidnapping. The state argued that their actions were unlawful since they entered the home with the intent to kidnap. However, the court determined that the bondsmen acted within their rights, resulting in the dismissal of charges.

S-2013-694

Post author:Staff
Post published:June 19, 2014
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-694, Fred A. Green, Ronald Krushe, and Christopher Thornburg appealed their conviction for kidnapping and first-degree burglary. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the dismissal of the charges against them. One judge dissented. The case began when the three men, who were bail bondsmen, went to a home to arrest two individuals, Billy and Pam Jones, who were staying there. They knocked on the door, entered the home, and handcuffed the Joneses to take them into custody. The homeowner, Patrick Wills, and his wife were not happy about this and called the police. While Green and his employees thought they were legally allowed to arrest the Joneses because they had a valid bond, the State of Oklahoma disagreed and charged them with burglary and kidnapping. The trial court disagreed, stating that the bondsmen did have the right to make the arrests. The State argued that the men acted unlawfully because of certain statements made during the incident, but the court found that they were working within their rights as bail bondsmen. Ultimately, the court upheld the decision to dismiss the charges, stating there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding that the bondsmen were acting legally.

S-2013-696

Post author:Staff
Post published:June 19, 2014
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-694, S-2013-695, S-2013-696, the defendants appealed their conviction for kidnapping and first-degree burglary. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the dismissal of the charges against the defendants. No one dissented. The case began when three bail bondsmen, Fred Green and his two employees, Ronald Krushe and Christopher Thornburg, were charged with kidnapping and burglary after they tried to arrest two people, Billy and Pam Jones, who had skipped out on their bail. They went to a home in Pawnee County where the Joneses were staying and entered without permission. They handcuffed the couple and attempted to take them to jail. However, the defendants argued that they had the legal right to arrest the Joneses because they had a valid bond with them. The court found that since they were acting within their legal authority when they arrested the couple, they did not commit kidnapping or burglary. The State disagreed, claiming that the defendants had intended to commit a crime. However, the court concluded that the defendants were within their rights and did not abuse their power. Therefore, the charges were dismissed, and the court upheld this dismissal in their ruling.

S-2013-718

Post author:Staff
Post published:May 22, 2014
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-718, Tutson and Heartfield appealed their conviction for Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Marijuana) With the Intent to Distribute and other related charges. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's ruling to suppress evidence, which means they agreed that the evidence should not be used against Tutson and Heartfield because the consent to search was not clearly given. One judge dissented.

S-2013-315

Post author:Staff
Post published:February 21, 2014
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-315, David Johns appealed his conviction for larceny. In a published decision, the court decided that a trial court cannot modify the terms and conditions of a negotiated deferred judgment without the consent of the State. The case involved Johns, who had entered a guilty plea and was placed on deferred judgment for five years. He filed a motion to change the terms of his deferred judgment, and the trial court agreed to shorten it and dismiss the case, which the State appealed. The court explained that under current laws, the trial court does not have the authority to shorten the deferment period once a plea agreement is in place. This ruling was made to prevent issues that could discourage prosecutors from agreeing to deferred judgments in the future. The court emphasized that any changes to the terms of a deferred judgment must follow statutory guidelines, and the trial court may only act when the conditions are met at the end of the deferment period. It upheld the idea that modifying an agreement without proper authority is not allowed. Therefore, the original decision to cut Johns' probation short was not supported by the law. The court's answer to the reserved question of law confirmed that the trial court was not authorized to cut short the period of deferment after the terms of the plea agreement had been established. #n dissented.

S-2013-140

Post author:Staff
Post published:February 20, 2014
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-140, Haley appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of marijuana. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling that dismissed the supplemental information, which had attempted to elevate Haley's charge to a felony. One justice dissented. The State of Oklahoma had originally charged Haley with unlawful possession of marijuana as a subsequent offense, which is a felony, due to his prior felony conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The district court held that Haley's previous conviction for a different drug offense could not be used to enhance his current charge for marijuana. The case focused on the wording in the law about how to classify repeat offenders. The law specifies that someone can be charged with a felony for a second or subsequent violation of marijuana possession only if their past violations were also under the same marijuana law. Since Haley's previous conviction was for a different substance, the court ruled that it could not be used to upgrade his current marijuana charge. The majority opinion held that the statute must be read as requiring a prior violation of the specific marijuana law to qualify for felony enhancement. The dissenting opinion argued that the law should consider any prior drug conviction to establish the felony status. The dissent believed the majority misinterpreted the intent of the law and that it could lead to confusion in future cases.

S-2013-413

Post author:Staff
Post published:November 20, 2013
Post category:S

S-2013-415

Post author:Staff
Post published:November 20, 2013
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-413 & 415, Mark Anthony Herfurth appealed his conviction for Failure to Register as a Sex Offender and Sex Offender Living within 2000 feet of a School. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling to dismiss the charges against him. One judge dissented. Mark Anthony Herfurth was taken to court because he was accused of not registering as a sex offender and for living too close to a school after he had been convicted of a crime related to indecent exposure. In his earlier conviction, he had agreed to register as a sex offender for a certain number of years. However, when laws changed in 2007, it meant that people in his situation could be assigned a risk level and have to register for longer. Herfurth argued that he shouldn't be held to the new law because he had already completed his requirements from his original plea. The judge agreed with him and dismissed the charges, saying that the laws could not be applied to him retroactively. The State of Oklahoma did not agree with this decision. They believed that the new law should apply to Herfurth since he was still required to register as a sex offender. They argued that laws are meant to protect the public, and because he was registering at the time of the new law's change, he should follow the new rules. However, upon review, the court decided that the lower court did not make a mistake. They concluded that the 2007 law was a significant change and should only apply going forward, not backward. The court also stated that applying the 2007 law to Herfurth after his original plea would have changed his obligations unfairly. Therefore, the appeals court agreed with the lower court's decision to dismiss the charges against Herfurth, stating that they have a duty to interpret laws as they were intended at the time of the original guilty plea. The dissenting judge felt differently, believing that the law should have applied to Herfurth based on the new requirements.

S-2013-322

Post author:Staff
Post published:October 23, 2013
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-322, Ridge appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the order that suppressed evidence obtained during the investigative detention. One judge dissented. The case began when a police detective observed what he thought was a drug deal involving Ridge. He saw Ridge in his car and another vehicle pull up next to him. Ridge got into the other car briefly, then returned to his own. Suspecting a drug transaction, the detective blocked Ridge's car and approached it. When he smelled marijuana, he questioned Ridge, who initially claimed the other person was just delivering puppy papers. Eventually, Ridge admitted there was marijuana under his seat. Ridge filed a motion to suppress the evidence from this encounter because he argued that the police did not have a good enough reason to stop him. Initially, a different judge denied Ridge's motion. However, after Ridge requested a reconsideration, the case was transferred to another judge, who granted the motion to suppress. The main issues on appeal were whether the new judge should have been able to review the case and whether the detective had enough reason to stop Ridge. The court ruled that the new judge was allowed to reconsider the motion. They stated that earlier rulings on suppression motions were not final and could be evaluated again. Regarding the stop, the court found that the detective did not have sufficient reason to detain Ridge. They stated that just observing Ridge getting in and out of a car was not enough to suspect him of criminal activity. Overall, the court agreed with the district court’s decision to suppress the evidence, meaning it could not be used in court against Ridge.

S-2013-103

Post author:Staff
Post published:October 2, 2013
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-103, Uriel Alajandro Lopez and Maria Magana appealed their conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling which granted a motion to suppress evidence. One judge dissented. Lopez and Magana were charged in McIntosh County after Trooper Koch stopped their vehicle. Before the trial started, they filed to suppress evidence related to the traffic stop and the search of their vehicle. The district court agreed and granted their motions, leading the state to appeal. The state argued two main points for the appeal. First, they believed the trooper had a valid reason to stop the vehicle, claiming that Magana broke traffic laws by following another vehicle too closely and failing to move for an emergency vehicle. However, the court found that the trooper's basis for the stop was questionable because the laws did not support his reasoning. The trooper said Magana was driving less than two seconds behind a truck, which he thought was unsafe. But he was unable to prove that this was a valid reason under the law. The rules of driving were not clear enough to justify his stop. The court noted that the trooper’s idea of a two-second rule was not mentioned in the traffic laws, which made it hard to understand if there was any real violation. The court also looked at a second reason the state provided, which was that the trooper had seen Magana not move to the left lane for an emergency vehicle. However, the trooper didn’t take any action based on this perceived violation when he stopped the car. Since this point wasn't strongly developed during the hearing, the court didn’t consider it either. Second, the state argued that searching the vehicle was legal because of signs of criminal activity and the consent given by both Lopez and Magana. But since the first argument about the stop was not valid, the search did not hold up in court. Therefore, the appeal was denied and the decision to suppress the evidence was upheld. In conclusion, the court agreed with the district court's decision to grant the motion to suppress, stating that the trooper did not have a good reason for the stop. The opinion from the court was not published for public record, but it reinforced the importance of adhering to the rules of evidence and the proper procedures during traffic stops.

S-2012-554

Post author:Staff
Post published:June 12, 2013
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2012-553, Frank Lee Armstrong appealed his conviction for unlawful drug charges. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling that suppressed the evidence obtained during the search of a vehicle occupied by Armstrong and Sheila Carol Johnson. Johnson also appealed her conviction in a related case, S-2012-554. The court found that the law enforcement officers did not execute the search warrant in a timely manner as required, which led to the suppression of the evidence. The judge's determination was based on the conclusion that the search was not conducted immediately as directed by the issuing judge, and therefore, the court upheld the lower court's decision, sustaining the motions to suppress. No dissenting opinion was filed.

S-2012-553

Post author:Staff
Post published:June 12, 2013
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2012-553, Armstrong appealed his conviction for unlawful drug possession and distribution. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the ruling that evidence obtained during a search of a vehicle occupied by Armstrong and Johnson should be suppressed. Johnson dissented. The case started when police met with an informant who said they could buy methamphetamine from Armstrong. The police observed a controlled purchase of drugs and later obtained a search warrant for Armstrong's home. They executed this search warrant a few days later and found Armstrong and Johnson in a car outside his residence, where they discovered several drug-related items. Both Armstrong and Johnson hired the same lawyer and filed motions to suppress the evidence from the car search. The district court agreed with their argument that the police had not executed the search warrant immediately, as the warrant required. Because of this, the court decided the search was not valid. The appeals court looked into whether the district court had made a mistake. They decided that the court did not abuse its discretion and confirmed the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence. This means that the evidence collected during the search could not be used against them in court. The court emphasized that the terms of the warrant were not followed as required. The ruling highlighted the importance of following legal procedures when executing search warrants. In summary, Armstrong's appeal was not successful, and the ruling to suppress the evidence was upheld.

S-2012-244

Post author:Staff
Post published:April 8, 2013
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2012-244, the State of Oklahoma appealed the conviction of Sonya Renee Wichert for unlawful purchase of pseudoephedrine. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the dismissal of the case against Wichert. One judge dissented. Wichert faced eleven counts related to breaking the Meth Registry Act, which had come into effect on November 1, 2010. She had a previous conviction for possession of methamphetamine and was on probation. The case stemmed from an investigation that revealed she purchased pseudoephedrine after the law took effect, leading to her arrest. At her preliminary hearing, Wichert argued that the law shouldn't apply to her because her conviction happened before the law was in place. The judge agreed with her, stating there could be serious problems with fairness if the law was applied to her without her having been informed of it. Because of this lack of notice about the new law, the district court decided to dismiss the charges. The court referenced a previous case, Wolf v. State, which established that individuals who are on probation when a law takes effect must be notified if it affects them. Without proper notice regarding the Meth Registry Act, the court ruled that it would not be fair to hold Wichert accountable under this law. Thus, the overall decision was to uphold the dismissal of her case because applying the law without notification did not meet the necessary fairness requirements.

S-2012-166

Post author:Staff
Post published:January 7, 2013
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2012-166, Moises Gonzales-Tello appealed his conviction for Aggravated Trafficking in Heroin. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling to suppress evidence gathered during a traffic stop. One judge dissented. The State of Oklahoma appealed a decision made by the district court. This decision was based on a traffic stop where law enforcement officers discovered evidence of a crime, but the evidence was later deemed inadmissible. The district court ruled that the stop had taken too long and that the officer did not have a proper reason to keep the suspect detained after the initial reason for the stop was completed. During the traffic stop, the officer noticed several unusual things that made him suspicious. He called for a drug-sniffing dog to come to the scene. Even though the officer asked for permission to search the car, he did not actually let the suspect leave and did not return his driver's license or paperwork. The dog arrived about 30 minutes after the stop began, but did not find anything. After the dog didn't indicate any signs of drugs, the officer conducted his own search and found a significant amount of heroin. The court looked closely at whether the officer had enough reason to continue holding the suspect after the initial reason for the traffic stop was accomplished. While the State argued that the officer's actions were justified, the court explained that to search a car without a warrant, an officer must have either permission from the owner or a strong reason to believe the car contains evidence of a crime. In this case, the dog did not find anything and the officer did not get enough proof that would justify a search. If there had been clear consent from the suspect for the search, the situation might have been different. However, the way the officer asked for consent made it seem as if the suspect did not truly have a choice. When the court reviewed the case, they found that the district court made a reasonable decision in ruling that the initial detention was too long and that the search was not justified. The State also argued against using the Exclusionary Rule, which prevents illegally obtained evidence from being used in court. The court did not agree with the State on this argument, as they did not provide enough support for their claim. In summary, the court decided to maintain the district court's order to suppress the evidence found during the traffic stop, agreeing that the officers did not follow the correct procedures.

S-2012-194

Post author:Staff
Post published:October 30, 2012
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2012-194, Campbell appealed his conviction for Driving Under the Influence. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling to suppress evidence and dismiss the case, meaning Campbell's charges were dropped. No one dissented. Here’s a summary of what happened: James Monroe Campbell was accused of driving under the influence of alcohol. Before the trial began, he asked the court to dismiss the case by filing a request called a Motion to Dismiss. During a hearing before the trial, the judge decided that the evidence against Campbell should not be used, and this meant the case was dismissed. The State of Oklahoma, unhappy with this decision, decided to appeal, which means they wanted another court to review what happened. They filed their appeal based on certain laws that say they have the right to challenge the dismissal of cases when it involves important evidence being excluded. The State argued two main points in its appeal. First, they claimed the judge made a mistake by dismissing Campbell's case because he believed Campbell broke the law by not staying entirely in one lane while driving. Second, they argued the judge was wrong because the police officer had a good reason to stop Campbell’s car in the first place. To decide if the original judge made a mistake, the court looked at whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to pull Campbell over. A reasonable suspicion is a legal term meaning the officer had a good reason to believe a law was possibly being broken. The officer in this case stated that he stopped Campbell because he saw Campbell's car touch the line marking the lane. However, when the judge looked closely at the evidence, including a video of the incident, she thought that Campbell was driving pretty straight and did not see enough evidence to support the claim that he was breaking any laws. The judge also mentioned that the officer’s concerns did not seem strong enough to justify the stop. Therefore, she decided to dismiss the case because there was not enough evidence to support stopping Campbell's car. When reviewing the situation, the appeals court sided with the original judge's decision and agreed that there was no abuse of discretion, meaning they believed she made the correct choice based on the information available. The court also stated that since the issue of Campbell possibly driving under the influence wasn't raised during the earlier hearing, they could not consider that during the appeal. In conclusion, the court upheld the decision to suppress evidence and dismissed the charges against Campbell, which was a win for him.

S-2012-214

Post author:Staff
Post published:August 13, 2012
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2012-214, Nhanh Van Dang and Nhi Thi Nguyen appealed their conviction for trafficking in illegal drugs and conspiracy to traffic in illegal drugs. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence, meaning the charges against them could not proceed. One judge dissented. The case began when law enforcement stopped the vehicle driving by Dang and Nguyen. They were suspected of breaking traffic laws, but the court found that the officers did not have enough reason to pull them over. The original judge ruled that there wasn’t enough evidence to support the stop, which led to the suppression of the evidence gathered afterward. The state tried to argue that the stop was justified because of alleged traffic violations. However, the appeals court agreed with the lower court's decision, saying the evidence did not clearly show that the officers had a good reason to stop the vehicle. Since the stop was deemed improper, the gathered evidence could not be used in court against Dang and Nguyen. Therefore, the appeals court confirmed that the right decision was made by the lower court in suppressing the evidence, reinforcing the idea that fair legal procedures must be followed.

S-2010-540

Post author:Staff
Post published:January 20, 2011
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2010-540, Cavner appealed his conviction for Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to uphold the district court's decision to suppress the evidence. One judge dissented. The case began when the State of Oklahoma charged Cavner with Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol. He argued that the traffic stop was not justified because there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. The district court agreed to suppress the evidence but did not dismiss the case entirely. On appeal, the State argued that the district court made an error by suppressing the evidence. When reviewing these kinds of cases, the court looks at the facts presented and defers to the trial court's findings unless something is clearly wrong. It was nighttime when Deputy Yarber observed a vehicle in the parking lot of an abandoned grocery store. He noted that the car left the parking lot in a lawful manner as he and another officer approached. The deputy did not mention any specific criminal activity and had no reason to believe something illegal was happening. Another officer had previously looked into possible drug activity in the area, but that had not been reported recently. In such situations, officers are allowed to check on people they find in unusual circumstances. However, since the vehicle drove away from the parking lot before Yarber could approach, he needed to stop it on a highway, which changes the situation from a simple question into a detention, known as a traffic stop. The law requires that a traffic stop must be supported by something more than just a hunch or general suspicion. The court explained that deputies must have reasonable suspicion to make a legal traffic stop. They look for specific facts suggesting that a crime may be occurring, which was not the case here. The deputy did not have enough evidence or reasons to suspect that Cavner was committing a crime simply because he was in the parking lot of an abandoned store late at night. The court referenced a prior case to support its decision, comparing the circumstances to those in a previous ruling where a stop was also deemed unlawful due to lack of reasonable suspicion. In Cavner's case, the court ruled that the officers did not have enough evidence to justify the traffic stop. Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court's order to suppress the evidence gathered during the stop, meaning the evidence could not be used against Cavner. The decision highlighted the importance of having proper legal grounds for police actions, ensuring that citizens' rights are protected under the law.

S-2009-858

Post author:Staff
Post published:September 10, 2010
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2009-858, Jeffrey Dale Brumfield appealed his conviction for Possession of Methamphetamine. In a published decision, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that evidence discovered during a search of his vehicle should be suppressed. The ruling was based on the fact that the officer did not have enough probable cause to conduct the search after initially letting the Brumfields go. In this case, one judge dissented. In OCCA case No. S-2009-862, Margaret Ann Brumfield also appealed her conviction for Possession of Methamphetamine. The decision in her case followed the same reasoning as her husband's case, reaffirming the district court's decision to suppress evidence. The judge's ruling was similarly supported by the reasoning that the officer lacked the necessary probable cause for the searches conducted. Again, one judge dissented on the conclusion reached by the majority. The essential facts involved a traffic stop initiated because of speeding and a lack of a valid driver's license. The officer suspected drug use and searched the vehicle, which initially produced no evidence. The second search resulted in the discovery of methamphetamine after a recording revealed incriminating conversation. Ultimately, the court concluded that the officer's actions were not justified legally, leading to the suppression of the evidence collected.

S-2009-862

Post author:Staff
Post published:September 10, 2010
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2009-858, Jeffrey Dale Brumfield appealed his conviction for Possession of Methamphetamine. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's order suppressing evidence. Margaret Ann Brumfield was also charged with the same crime in a companion case numbered S-2009-862, and the same ruling applied. The case began when Trooper Johnson stopped the vehicle driven by Mr. Brumfield for speeding and discovered he did not have a valid driver's license. Mrs. Brumfield was a passenger in the vehicle. During the stop, the officer suspected Mr. Brumfield was under the influence of a drug, so he had both Brumfields sit in the patrol car while he searched the vehicle. Initially, he found nothing, and he allowed them to leave. However, after listening to a conversation the couple had in the patrol car, he suspected there might be drugs under the passenger seat. When he searched again, he found methamphetamine. The State appealed the district court’s decision, arguing that the officer did have the right to search the vehicle due to Mr. Brumfield’s behavior and suspected drug use. However, the court upheld the lower court's decision, stating that reasonable suspicion (which the trooper had) is not enough for probable cause. The initial search was not justified, leading to the suppression of the evidence found later. Thus, the court's final decision affirmed the district court’s ruling that the search was unreasonable, and therefore, the evidence obtained could not be used in court against the Brumfields.

S-2009-363

Post author:Staff
Post published:January 26, 2010
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2009-363, Heather Renee Trask appealed her conviction for First Degree Child Abuse Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling that prevented the State from arguing alternative theories of guilt against her. One judge dissented. Heather Trask was arrested and charged with very serious crimes after her baby daughter, Mackenzie, died. The baby had injuries that suggested she had been hurt badly. Evidence from doctors showed that the baby died from head injuries caused by blunt force trauma. When the baby was found, she was not breathing and could not be revived. During the trial of Heather's husband, he testified about the night of the baby’s incident. Heather left for work after 7:00 p.m. on the night of the tragedy, and her husband was the only adult with the baby after that time. The experts in the trial said the baby must have suffered severe injuries shortly before she died, but they could not pinpoint the exact moment it happened. The district court listened to the arguments and decided that there was enough evidence to show that Heather’s husband was likely the one who caused the fatal injuries. Because of this, the court ruled that the State could not present alternative theories that might shift blame to Heather. After hearing everything, the appeals court agreed with the district court's decision. They determined that the lower court did not make a mistake by blocking the State from using other theories to argue guilt. Therefore, the ruling that prevented the State from pursuing various angles was upheld, affirming the decision made by the district court.

S-2009-235

Post author:Staff
Post published:December 14, 2009
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2009-235, Angel Chavez appealed his conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs (Cocaine). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's ruling, which granted a motion to suppress evidence. The court found that the police officer did not have enough reason to keep Chavez detained after a traffic stop, meaning the search that followed was not valid. One judge dissented.

S-2008-761

Post author:Staff
Post published:February 5, 2009
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2008-761, Robert Lee Smallen appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's suppression order of his statements made during a police interview. Smallen's refusal to waive his rights to silence and counsel was upheld, and he was found not to have voluntarily waived those rights. One judge dissented.

F-2007-340

Post author:Staff
Post published:October 24, 2008
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2007-340, Robert Dewayne Hayes, III appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder Youthful Offender, Shooting with Intent to Kill, and Assault with a Dangerous Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions for First Degree Murder and Assault with a Dangerous Weapon, but reversed the conviction for Shooting with Intent to Kill with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented.

S-2008-176

Post author:Staff
Post published:October 9, 2008
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2008-176, the State of Oklahoma appealed its case against a person charged with multiple crimes, including trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The trial court had ruled that some evidence obtained from a locked safe in the motel room during the arrest should be suppressed, meaning it couldn't be used in court. The State argued two main points in its appeal. First, they believed the trial court made an error by not allowing a detective to share specific statements from a witness who gave permission to search the hotel room. Second, they thought the officers had the right to search the locked safe without needing a warrant. After looking closely at the case and the reasons for the trial court's decisions, the court concluded that the trial judge had done the right thing. It found that the trial court's rulings about hearsay, which refers to using second-hand information as evidence, were not wrong. The judges decided the officers should have obtained a warrant before searching that locked safe. The court affirmed, meaning they agreed with the trial court's decision to suppress the evidence from the safe. A judge dissented but the main ruling stood.

S 2007-1212

Post author:Staff
Post published:August 6, 2008
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S 2007-1212, Jason L. Bandy appealed his conviction for Negligent Homicide. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to deny the appeal regarding the suppression of a blood test. The court found that the State did not show that reviewing the case would be in the best interests of justice, and they concluded that the suppressed evidence was not a significant part of their case against Bandy. Consequently, the case was sent back to the trial court for further action consistent with this opinion. One judge dissented.