**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **CAMERON LEE SCHEMMER,**
Appellant,
v.
**THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,**
Appellee. **Case No. F-2018-1023** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS**
**STATE OF OKLAHOMA**
**JAN 23 2020** **SUMMARY OPINION**
**JOHN D. HADDEN**
**CLERK** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Appellant, Cameron Lee Schemmer, was tried by the court and convicted of Count 1, Forcible Sodomy, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 888, and Counts 2-4, Lewd Molestation, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1123, in Kingfisher County District Court, Case No. CF-2017-96. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years imprisonment with all but the last five years suspended for Count 1. For Counts 2-4, the court sentenced him to twenty-five years imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently to one another but consecutively to the sentence for Count 1. As a result, Appellant will be required to serve 85% of his sentences before becoming eligible for parole, as per 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1. From this judgment and sentence, Appellant appeals, raising the following propositions of error: **I.** The record in this case does not sufficiently demonstrate that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.
**II.** Mr. Schemmer received an excessive sentence when the trial court followed the wrong sentencing statute. Upon thorough consideration of these propositions and the entire record, including the original record, transcripts, and briefs of the parties, we find no relief is warranted under the law and evidence presented. **Proposition I:** Appellant argues that the record is insufficient to support a finding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Since he did not object before the non-jury trial, we review this claim for plain error, as established in *Simpson v. State*, 1994 OK CR 40, 876 P.2d 690. Plain error requires that Appellant demonstrate an actual error that is plain or obvious and affects substantial rights. A defendant may waive their right to a jury trial, but the waiver must be knowingly, competently, and intelligently made. The record shows that prior to trial, the court engaged in a colloquy with Appellant regarding his jury trial waiver. Appellant confirmed his satisfaction with his attorney and expressly indicated his desire to waive the jury trial right. This established a knowing and intelligent waiver by Appellant. Therefore, we deny this proposition as the trial court's assessment was in compliance with the law. **Proposition II:** Appellant contends his sentence is illegal because the Information alleged that R.N. was a child under sixteen, not under twelve. Thus, Appellant argues that the sentencing range should have been from one or three years to twenty years instead of a minimum of twenty-five years, as required when the child is under the age of twelve. Since Appellant failed to object at sentencing, we again look for plain error. The Information indicated that R.N. was under the age of sixteen at the time of the offenses, and the evidence revealed she was ten years old when the abuse began and eleven when it ceased. Appellant was charged under 21 O.S.2011, § 1123(A), which necessitates a minimum of twenty-five years imprisonment when the child is under twelve years of age. A court in a non-jury trial retains the presumption of knowing the law correctly. The facts show that R.N. was indeed under twelve when the offenses occurred, and the court found this circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the claim of an illegal sentence based on an erroneous application of the statute is without merit. **DECISION:** The **JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED**. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, the **MANDATE is ORDERED issued** upon this ruling. **APPEARANCES:**
**Trial Counsel:** Blayne Allsup
**Appellate Counsel for Appellant:** Cindy Brown Danner
**Counsel for State:** John Salmon, Assistant District Attorney, and Theodore M. Peepers, Assistant Attorney General. **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J.
**COUNSEL FOR THE STATE:** CONCURS
**LEWIS, P.J.:** Concur
**KUEHN, V.P.J.:** Concur in Result
**HUDSON, J.:** Concur
**ROWLAND, J.:** Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J., CONCURRING IN RESULT:** While I concur with the outcomes reached, I note a discrepancy in the standard of review applied to Proposition I. The burden rests with the State to prove any constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as highlighted in *Chadwell v. State* and *Chapman v. California*. The majority's application of the plain error standard does not recognize this shifting burden adequately. **[Document ends here]**