Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1123(A)

F-2018-1023

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **CAMERON LEE SCHEMMER,** Appellant, v. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **Case No. F-2018-1023** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JAN 23 2020** **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN** **CLERK** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Appellant, Cameron Lee Schemmer, was tried by the court and convicted of Count 1, Forcible Sodomy, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 888, and Counts 2-4, Lewd Molestation, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1123, in Kingfisher County District Court, Case No. CF-2017-96. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years imprisonment with all but the last five years suspended for Count 1. For Counts 2-4, the court sentenced him to twenty-five years imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently to one another but consecutively to the sentence for Count 1. As a result, Appellant will be required to serve 85% of his sentences before becoming eligible for parole, as per 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1. From this judgment and sentence, Appellant appeals, raising the following propositions of error: **I.** The record in this case does not sufficiently demonstrate that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. **II.** Mr. Schemmer received an excessive sentence when the trial court followed the wrong sentencing statute. Upon thorough consideration of these propositions and the entire record, including the original record, transcripts, and briefs of the parties, we find no relief is warranted under the law and evidence presented. **Proposition I:** Appellant argues that the record is insufficient to support a finding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Since he did not object before the non-jury trial, we review this claim for plain error, as established in *Simpson v. State*, 1994 OK CR 40, 876 P.2d 690. Plain error requires that Appellant demonstrate an actual error that is plain or obvious and affects substantial rights. A defendant may waive their right to a jury trial, but the waiver must be knowingly, competently, and intelligently made. The record shows that prior to trial, the court engaged in a colloquy with Appellant regarding his jury trial waiver. Appellant confirmed his satisfaction with his attorney and expressly indicated his desire to waive the jury trial right. This established a knowing and intelligent waiver by Appellant. Therefore, we deny this proposition as the trial court's assessment was in compliance with the law. **Proposition II:** Appellant contends his sentence is illegal because the Information alleged that R.N. was a child under sixteen, not under twelve. Thus, Appellant argues that the sentencing range should have been from one or three years to twenty years instead of a minimum of twenty-five years, as required when the child is under the age of twelve. Since Appellant failed to object at sentencing, we again look for plain error. The Information indicated that R.N. was under the age of sixteen at the time of the offenses, and the evidence revealed she was ten years old when the abuse began and eleven when it ceased. Appellant was charged under 21 O.S.2011, § 1123(A), which necessitates a minimum of twenty-five years imprisonment when the child is under twelve years of age. A court in a non-jury trial retains the presumption of knowing the law correctly. The facts show that R.N. was indeed under twelve when the offenses occurred, and the court found this circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the claim of an illegal sentence based on an erroneous application of the statute is without merit. **DECISION:** The **JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED**. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, the **MANDATE is ORDERED issued** upon this ruling. **APPEARANCES:** **Trial Counsel:** Blayne Allsup **Appellate Counsel for Appellant:** Cindy Brown Danner **Counsel for State:** John Salmon, Assistant District Attorney, and Theodore M. Peepers, Assistant Attorney General. **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE:** CONCURS **LEWIS, P.J.:** Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** Concur in Result **HUDSON, J.:** Concur **ROWLAND, J.:** Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J., CONCURRING IN RESULT:** While I concur with the outcomes reached, I note a discrepancy in the standard of review applied to Proposition I. The burden rests with the State to prove any constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as highlighted in *Chadwell v. State* and *Chapman v. California*. The majority's application of the plain error standard does not recognize this shifting burden adequately. **[Document ends here]**

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F-2017-1284

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In OCCA case No. F-2017-1284, Jesse Earl Maupin appealed his conviction for Lewd or Indecent Acts to a Child Under 16. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment and sentence. One judge dissented. Maupin was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to life in prison. He raised several issues on appeal, arguing that there was not enough evidence to prove he was guilty, that his life sentence was not a valid punishment, that the sentence was too harsh, and that there were mistakes in his trial that required a new trial. The court carefully reviewed the evidence and found that there was enough proof for the jury to convict Maupin based on the law. They explained that juries can use both direct evidence and indirect evidence to make their decisions. Maupin also claimed that a life sentence should not have been an option given the laws around his charges. The court found that the sentence was legal and appropriate. They ruled that a life sentence is a valid punishment when the law does not specify a maximum sentence. Regarding the sentence itself, the court determined that the life sentence did not shock their conscience or seem overly harsh given the circumstances of the case. Finally, since the court found no errors in the trial, they also declined to grant a new trial based on the idea of cumulative errors. In conclusion, the court affirmed Maupin's conviction and sentence.

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F-2017-1142

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In OCCA case No. F-2017-1142, Daniel Ryan Chadwell appealed his conviction for forty counts of Lewd Acts with a Child Under 16. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm Chadwell's judgment and sentence. One judge dissented. Chadwell was found guilty by a jury of many serious offenses. He was accused of committing inappropriate acts with children who were under the age of 16. The jury decided he should spend a very long time in prison, giving him a total of several hundred years in sentences. He did not get found guilty on two of the counts. Chadwell's appeal included two main arguments. First, he claimed the jury received wrong instructions about how to decide his punishment. Specifically, he argued that the instructions mentioned the punishment for crimes against children under 12, which was not applicable to his case since he was charged with acts involving children under 16. The court found that while the instructions did have an error, the mistake was not serious enough to change the outcome. They noted that all the child victims were proven to be under 12 at the time of the crimes, so the error was harmless. Second, Chadwell argued that the prosecutor acted unfairly during the trial, which made it impossible for him to have a fair chance. However, the court looked at what happened during the entire trial and found that these actions did not make the trial unfair either. In the end, the court decided that Chadwell's appeal did not provide enough reason to change the original decision. Therefore, his sentences remained as decided by the jury.

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F-2010-547

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In OCCA case No. F-2010-547, Berry appealed his conviction for Lewd Molestation and Kidnapping. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to uphold Berry's conviction for Lewd Molestation but reversed his conviction for Kidnapping. One member of the court dissented. Berry was found guilty by a jury of Lewd Molestation and Kidnapping in Tulsa County. The case involved a two-year-old girl who wandered away from her home and encountered Berry. Witnesses saw Berry beckon the girl to his truck, pick her up, and drive away. Police later found the girl in Berry's truck, seemingly unresponsive, although no definitive physical harm or evidence of sexual assault was found. Berry argued that he should not have been punished for both crimes because the acts of Lewd Molestation and Kidnapping were connected and arose from the same action. The court agreed that the crimes involved the same incident when Berry took the girl, thus violating Oklahoma's law against double punishment. They affirmed the Lewd Molestation conviction but reversed the Kidnapping conviction, indicating the offenses were inseparable in this instance. One judge disagreed, believing that the Kidnapping and Lewd Molestation were distinct, separate crimes, and thus both should stand.

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F-2007-200

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In OCCA case No. F-2007-200, Jamie Cruz appealed his conviction for Indecent or Lewd Acts with a Child Under Sixteen. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment but reverse the sentences and remand for resentencing. One judge dissented. The case involved Jamie Cruz, who was found guilty on two counts of engaging in inappropriate conduct with an eight-year-old boy named T.M. Cruz was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for each count, to be served concurrently. The case had a long history of delays and court proceedings before it finally went to trial. During the trial, the evidence included Cruz’s admissions made during a polygraph examination he took while on probation. His defense argued that these admissions were wrongly obtained and that the trial court made errors in not considering his motion to suppress these statements. The trial court denied requests for continuances which the defense claimed were needed to prepare adequately for trial. Several arguments were made on appeal, including claims that the trial court should have suppressed the admissions made during the polygraph test because it violated his right against self-incrimination. Cruz argued that the compulsion to take the polygraph test because of his probation created a situation where he did not have a true choice, as refusing to comply could lead to his imprisonment. The court ruled that Cruz's rights were not violated. They said he had failed to assert his privilege against self-incrimination when he did not refuse to answer questions during the polygraph. The majority opinion found the polygraph examination was part of the conditions of his probation, and thus the admissions were not compelled in a manner that would invalidate them. Cruz also argued about other evidentiary issues during the trial, including the admission of prior bad acts as evidence and restrictions on jury selection. The court noted that while some of the trial court’s actions could be seen as problematic, they did not rise to the level of prejudice needed to overturn the conviction. In conclusion, while the court affirmed the convictions, they found that Cruz should not have received the life sentences as structured and directed that the case be sent back for proper resentencing under the relevant laws, as the previous sentencing did not follow the correct statutory guidance.

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F-2006-854

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In OCCA case No. F-2006-854, Delbert L. Gibson appealed his conviction for two counts of lewd molestation. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction but modified his sentence to twenty-five years imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently. One judge dissented. Gibson was found guilty of sexually fondling two young girls, aged thirteen and eleven, in September 2002. During the incident, Gibson followed the older girl into a bedroom and began to fondle her. The younger girl was also fondled shortly after. The girls told their mother about the incident and reported it to the police. Gibson raised four main points of error during his appeal. The first claimed he did not receive a speedy trial. The court looked at how long he waited for the trial, why there was a delay, whether he asked for a quick trial, and if the delay harmed his case. Gibson was charged in November 2002 but was not arrested until March 2005, with the trial occurring in June 2006. The court found that even though the delay seemed long, Gibson did not complain about it before the trial, which hurt his argument. Therefore, the court believed he was not denied a speedy trial. Gibson's second point was about other-crimes evidence that was presented during his trial. The state brought up a past incident where Gibson had fondled a ten-year-old girl while working as a school photographer twenty years earlier. The court agreed that this evidence was probably not properly connected to the current case but felt it did not significantly impact the jury’s decision, especially since the two young girls provided strong testimonies. In his third point, Gibson argued the jury was incorrectly instructed on the penalties for his crimes. He believed that the law didn’t support a mandatory life sentence without parole based on the charges brought against him. The court analyzed the laws and determined that the proper penalties did not include mandatory life sentences, leading them to modify his sentence instead. Finally, Gibson claimed that all these problems together denied him a fair trial. Since the court found no major errors, the cumulative effect claim was also denied. Overall, the court upheld Gibson's conviction for molestation, but changed his sentence to a total of twenty-five years in prison instead of life without parole.

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F-2014-478

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In OCCA case No. F-2014-478, David Glen Heard appealed his conviction for two counts of Lewd Molestation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction but vacated the imposition of post-imprisonment supervision. One judge dissented. David Glen Heard was found guilty of two counts of Lewd Molestation after being tried by a jury in Tulsa County. The charges stemmed from an incident on June 15, 2006, when Heard was observed behaving inappropriately towards two young girls at a Walmart store. He followed them around the store and attempted to look under their dresses. Witnesses reported his unsettling behavior, and he was later found with a pornographic magazine in his car and identified as a registered sex offender. At the time of the incident, he was on probation for previous sex-related offenses against children. During the trial, testimonies from various witnesses were presented, including a woman who testified about a similar incident involving Heard from years prior. Evidence was admitted under the law to show motive and absence of mistake, which supported the prosecution's case against him. Heard raised several arguments during his appeal, including claims that the statute he was convicted under was vague, the admission of other testimonies was inappropriate, and errors in jury instructions and the failure of his counsel to object to certain evidence. The court found that the law did not provide for a vagueness claim since Heard's actions clearly violated the statute in question. The admission of prior testimonies was ruled permissible as relevant to the case. The trial court’s instructions were also deemed not harmful to the verdict. However, the court recognized an error when ordering post-imprisonment supervision, as it was not authorized for the crimes Heard committed at the time. Thus, while his conviction was confirmed, the order for post-imprisonment supervision was vacated. Ultimately, Heard’s two twenty-year sentences were upheld due to the nature of his actions and background as a repeat offender.

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F-2003-1261

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In OCCA case No. F-2003-1261, Ronnie Odell Gargus appealed his conviction for Rape by Instrumentation, five counts of Sodomy, and Lewd Acts with a Child. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Gargus' convictions and sentences. One judge dissented. The case involved a jury trial where Gargus was found guilty of serious sexual offenses against a child. The jury decided on lengthy prison sentences for each count, totaling a significant amount of time in prison. Gargus raised two main points in his appeal. First, he argued that he should have been allowed to ask the State's expert witness about any bias in his testimony against Gargus. The court acknowledged that usually, a witness cannot be questioned about their past arrests if there was no conviction. However, the court agreed that there are times when it is important to explore a witness’s potential bias, especially if the witness has pending criminal issues. Despite this, the court found that excluding the questioning about the expert's bias did not change the outcome of the case since there was also strong evidence against Gargus, including the child’s own credible testimony. Second, Gargus claimed he was not properly informed before the court ordered him to pay restitution to the victim. The court noted that Gargus did not raise this issue during the trial. However, they agreed that the amount of restitution was not clearly supported by evidence, and that needed to be corrected. The court ordered a new hearing to determine the correct amount that Gargus should pay. Overall, the court upheld the convictions and long sentences but recognized that some legal issues concerning restitution needed further attention. They will have a new hearing to ensure the restitution amount is fair and based on proper evidence.

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F-2001-264

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In OCCA case No. F-2001-264, Gavin Lee Hawkins appealed his conviction for lewd molestation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for one count and modify the sentence for the other count. One judge dissented. Gavin Lee Hawkins was found guilty of two counts of lewd molestation in Grady County. The jury sentenced him to serve ten years for the first count and twenty years for the second count, with both sentences to be served one after the other. Hawkins appealed, raising several issues he believed were errors that affected his trial. First, Hawkins argued that the prosecutor made a mistake during her closing arguments, which he thought was serious enough to affect the outcome of the case. The court agreed that the closing argument was improper and decided to change the twenty-year sentence for the second count to ten years. Next, Hawkins claimed that the trial court did not consider all the options when deciding his sentence. However, the court found no evidence that the trial court failed to do its job correctly in this regard. Hawkins also said he should have been allowed to call a witness named Bianca Thomas, but the court decided that the trial judge acted within reason when excluding her from testifying. Lastly, Hawkins felt that his lawyer did not help him properly during the trial. While the court agreed that his lawyer's performance was not up to standard, they concluded that it did not negatively impact Hawkins's case overall. Ultimately, the court affirmed the decision for the first count of lewd molestation and adjusted the sentence for the second count to ten years, while still keeping the sentence structure as ordered by the lower court.

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