Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8

RE-2004-1015

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In OCCA case No. RE-2004-1015, the appellant appealed his conviction for Rape in the First Degree and Lewd Molestation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of the suspended sentence for Lewd Molestation and reverse the revocation of the suspended sentence for Rape in the First Degree. One judge dissented. The appellant had previously entered a plea of no contest in 2001 to charges of Rape in the First Degree and Lewd Molestation. After this, he was given a ten-year sentence for each charge, which was suspended. However, in 2003, the State filed an Application to Revoke the appellant's suspended sentences, claiming he had violated several conditions of his probation, such as not paying fees and not attending counseling. During a hearing, the appellant admitted to violating the terms of his probation. Initially, the court held off on revoking his sentence to give him chances to comply with the rules. However, after several reviews and additional hearings, the court eventually revoked his sentences in 2004. The appellant argued that the court did not have the right to keep reviewing his case or to revoke his sentences because he believed the last filed application to revoke had expired by that time. The court found that it had been monitoring the appellant's progress, showing that it was acting out of leniency. The appellant also stated that he was not properly notified of the issues to be addressed at the last hearing. In the court's decision, it was explained that when someone admits to violating probation rules, it is generally accepted that the court can act on that admission. The court noted that the legal standard for revoking a suspended sentence is not very high and concluded that they did not find any error with the decision during the hearings. However, the appellant sought to vacate his conviction for Rape, claiming he was underage at the time of the offense and thus legally not able to have committed the crime as defined by the law. The court ultimately agreed with the appellant that there was a critical error regarding the age requirement for a Rape conviction. They decided to reverse the revocation of that particular sentence and stated that the Judgment and Sentence for Count I should be vacated and dismissed entirely. So, the final decision was to keep the revocation of the sentence for Lewd Molestation but to remove the conviction for Rape due to the age issue, allowing for a correction of that mistake in legal proceedings.

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F-2004-410

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-410, Twyla Tanner appealed her conviction for Embezzlement by Bailee. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modify the sentence from forty-five years to twenty years of imprisonment. One judge dissented regarding the sentence modification. Twyla Tanner was found guilty after a jury trial. The court had to decide on several issues raised by Tanner regarding her trial, including errors in denying her motion for a new trial, not allowing a witness to testify, the sufficiency of evidence, the length of her sentence, and whether all of these issues combined affected her right to a fair trial. The court determined that the trial judge made the right choices in handling these issues. They agreed that Tanner’s request for a new trial was not given because it was late. They also supported the judge's decision to prevent a witness from testifying because Tanner did not follow the rules for sharing her evidence in time. The court found enough evidence for the jury to decide she was guilty of stealing. However, they thought that the original sentence of forty-five years was very harsh for the crime and the situation. They changed it to twenty years in prison after considering the facts, including that she did not cause any damage and returned the vehicle she was accused of embezzling. One judge disagreed with reducing Tanner's sentence, believing that the jury's decision was justified based on her past criminal record and that the prosecution's comments during the trial did not unfairly influence the jury.

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F-2004-527

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-527, Christopher Dwayne McGee appealed his conviction for distribution of a controlled substance and conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous drug. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction for conspiracy and dismiss that count due to insufficient evidence, while affirming the conviction for distribution. One judge dissented on certain issues. McGee was found guilty in the District Court of Stephens County for distributing a controlled substance and conspiring to distribute another. He received a twenty-year sentence and a fine for each count. He appealed his convictions based on five main arguments. First, McGee claimed there was not enough evidence to support his conspiracy conviction. The court agreed with this claim, stating that for a conspiracy to exist, there must be two parties who agreed to commit the crime. Since there was no evidence showing that another person was involved in the agreement with McGee, the conspiracy charge was dismissed. Second, McGee argued he was denied his right to present mitigating evidence to the jury. The court noted that character evidence is generally not allowed in non-capital cases, therefore finding his claim without merit. Third, McGee said he was denied the right to represent himself in court. However, the court found that he had withdrawn his request to act as his own attorney, so this claim was also dismissed. Fourth, he argued that he did not receive effective assistance from his attorney. The court concluded that McGee's lawyer had successfully achieved the dismissal of two other charges against him and did not fail in his responsibilities. Finally, McGee felt that he had been wrongly made to defend against his past convictions during the trial. The court explained that after a previous plea deal was canceled, his case was reset as if no plea had happened, and thus, he was not unfairly treated by needing to defend against prior offenses. In summary, the court affirmed McGee's conviction for distribution but reversed and dismissed the conspiracy conviction due to a lack of evidence.

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J-2005-542

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In OCCA case No. J-2005-542, S.H. appealed his conviction for being sentenced as an adult. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the district court's decision, stating that there was not enough convincing evidence to support this adult sentencing. One judge dissented. The court found that S.H. should be sentenced as a youthful offender instead.

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M-2004-802

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In OCCA case No. M-2004-802, the appellant appealed his conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Marijuana). In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant was stopped by a police officer early in the morning because his car was parked in a lot with its lights on, near a closed restaurant. The officer got suspicious due to a series of burglaries happening in the area recently. When the officer approached the car, it began to move. The officer then decided to stop the vehicle to ask what the appellant was doing there. During the trial, the appellant argued that the stop was illegal. He believed that the officer did not have enough reason to suspect that he was doing something wrong. The officer admitted during the hearing that he did not know for sure if the appellant was involved in criminal activity when he made the stop. The court reviewed the situation and concluded that the officer did not have a good reason to think the appellant was doing anything suspicious. They pointed out that the appellant's actions could easily be seen as innocent. The conclusion was that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion, which is necessary to make a legal stop, and therefore the evidence collected after the stop should not have been used against the appellant. Ultimately, the court reversed the conviction, meaning that the case would not proceed further and the appellant's charges would be dismissed. One judge disagreed with the decision, arguing that the officer had good reasons to make the stop based on the circumstances around the time and location.

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RE-2004-812

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In OCCA case No. RE-2004-812, Duckett appealed his conviction for Unlawful Possession of A Controlled Drug. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the order of the District Court regarding the revocation of Duckett's suspended sentence and instructed the court to dismiss the case, leading to Duckett's immediate release. One judge dissented. The case began when Duckett entered a guilty plea for possessing crack cocaine and was given a three-year suspended sentence. However, in 2002, the state wanted to revoke this sentence due to alleged violations of probation. Duckett was arrested and confessed to violating the terms of his probation in early 2003, but his sentencing was postponed several times. When Duckett failed to appear for a hearing in June 2004, a warrant for his arrest was issued. After being taken into custody, he had his sentencing hearing on July 26, 2004, during which the court revoked his suspended sentence due to his absence at the earlier hearing. Duckett appealed this decision, arguing that the court could not revoke his probation after his three-year term had expired. The court agreed with Duckett's argument, stating that the District Court did not have the authority to sentence him after the probation had ended. Although the court had taken steps to help him, such as continuously supervising his probation, the law does not allow for a suspended sentence to be extended indefinitely. The ruling emphasized that once the suspended sentence expired, the District Court lost its power to revoke it. Therefore, the court reversed the earlier decision and instructed the District Court to dismiss the case, allowing Duckett to be released.

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F-2004-729

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-729, Candy Mae Easton appealed her conviction for Manufacturing Methamphetamine and Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse her conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine but affirmed her conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug. One judge dissented concerning the reversal of the manufacturing charge. Candy Mae Easton was on trial after neighbors reported a strong smell related to methamphetamine coming from the home of her co-defendant. Officers investigating found evidence that suggested meth was being made in the house, including white powder and other materials commonly used to manufacture meth. Easton admitted to using meth, but she said she did not help make it. The court examined whether there was enough proof to show that Easton helped her co-defendant in making the drug. The majority opinion stated that just knowing about the manufacturing and using the drug doesn’t mean she encouraged or assisted in making it. The appellate court mentioned that encouragement must be shown by some action or words, which were not present in Easton’s case. As a result, Easton’s conviction for manufacturing meth was reversed, meaning she was found not guilty of that charge. However, the conviction for unlawful possession was upheld because her sentence and fine were within the legal limits and were not seen as too harsh. The dissenting opinion believed there was enough evidence to support that Easton aided in the manufacturing, and thus would have kept her conviction for that charge. The judges' roles were discussed in terms of assessing evidence and the credibility of decisions made by the trial judge, emphasizing that it isn’t their place to change those factual decisions based on their opinions. Ultimately, the case was sent back to be corrected only in terms of the record regarding the possession conviction, while the manufacturing conviction was dismissed.

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C-2005-120

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In OCCA case No. C-2005-120, Charles Hackney McBride appealed his conviction for Manufacturing a Controlled Dangerous Substance and Unlawful Possession of Marijuana. In a published decision, the court decided to grant McBride's request and remand the case for a hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. One judge dissented. McBride had entered a guilty plea to the charges in January 2004 and was placed in a rehabilitation program. After completing the program, he was sentenced in January 2005 to life imprisonment for manufacturing the controlled substance and one year in the county jail for marijuana possession. Eight days after his sentencing, McBride sought to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming his sentence was too harsh and he had not waived his right to a hearing. However, the district court denied his motion without holding a hearing, which was mandatory according to court rules. The appeals court acknowledged that McBride was entitled to this hearing to ensure proper procedures were followed. Therefore, the court decided to require the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on McBride's application to withdraw his plea, allowing him another chance to defend his claims.

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F-2004-332

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-332, Sheila Ann Sutton appealed her conviction for grand larceny and knowingly concealing stolen property. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify her conviction to petit larceny and reversed and dismissed the charge of concealing stolen property. One judge dissented. Sutton was accused of stealing electronic items, including DVD players, with friends. The jury found her guilty and she was sentenced to five years in prison for grand larceny and four years for concealing stolen property, with the sentences running at the same time. During her appeal, Sutton argued several points. She claimed that simply being in a car with stolen shoes did not mean she was hiding them. The court agreed that the evidence did not show she attempted to conceal the shoes and reversed the charge for that reason. Sutton also argued that she only took property worth less than $500, which should be classified as petit larceny, not grand larceny. The evidence showed that she took one DVD player worth $487, and the other players taken by her companions did not change that. The court agreed and changed her conviction to petit larceny. Additionally, Sutton claimed that the jury was not properly instructed about the law surrounding the charges against her. The court found that the instructions were lacking and noted that without proper guidance, the jury might have struggled to understand how to reach their decision on grand larceny. Sutton also pointed out that there was an instruction about flight, but the circumstances didn't support it, meaning it should not have been mentioned during the trial. The court acknowledged this, saying that giving such an instruction without proper context was wrong. After reviewing all of Sutton's claims, the court modified her conviction to petit larceny and changed her sentence to two years in prison. They dismissed the second charge. The dissenting opinion argued that there was enough evidence to support the original conviction and that the jury understood what happened during the events in question. In summary, the court modified Sutton's conviction and sentence due to errors in the trial process, particularly related to jury instructions, while the dissenting judge believed the jury's original decision was justified.

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F-2004-281

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-281, Lori Jo Schram appealed her conviction for Possession of Precursor Substances with the Intent to Manufacture a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Methamphetamine). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction and sentence but vacated the order of restitution. One member of the court dissented. Lori Jo Schram was found guilty by a jury in Grady County after the police found items related to methamphetamine production at a trailer. The jury decided that she should go to prison for ten years, but five years would be suspended, along with a fine of $10,000. The court also said she needed to pay $2,544.46 to the victim. On appeal, Schram raised several points for why she thought her conviction should be reversed. First, she said the trial court made a mistake by not allowing a motion to suppress evidence. She argued the police obtained a search warrant through an illegal search. However, the court explained that an officer was invited to the property and found suspicious items in plain view. Therefore, the court said the search was legal and that the trial court did not make an error. Second, Schram claimed that the prosecution did things that were unfair and that these actions affected her sentence. The court looked at the instances she mentioned and noted that the trial judge told the jury to ignore any improper comments from the prosecutor. The court believed this helped fix any potential errors, and since Schram received a light sentence, the issues raised did not impact it. Finally, Schram argued that the amount of restitution she was ordered to pay was wrong because she was not convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, only possession. The court agreed that the trial court did not properly determine the restitution amount based on the guidelines, so they decided to vacate that order and send it back to the trial court for a proper assessment. Overall, the court upheld the conviction but changed the restitution order, making it necessary for the trial court to reassess how much Schram owed.

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RE-2004-614

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In OCCA case No. RE-2004-614, the appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree rape by instrumentation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the revocation of the appellant's suspended sentence. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant pled guilty to second-degree rape and was sentenced to a total of 10 years and 6 months of imprisonment. However, the judge suspended all but the first 6 months, allowing the appellant to serve that time in prison and then go on probation with specific rules. One of these rules, known as Rule 9, prohibited the appellant from using pornography or visiting places like adult bookstores and massage parlors. Later, the state accused the appellant of violating this rule. They claimed that he participated in a live sex show on the Internet, which was viewed by an undercover police officer. The officer discovered the show after receiving a tip about the appellant's activities. Following a hearing, the judge ruled that the appellant did indeed violate the conditions of his probation and revoked the remaining part of the suspended sentence. The appellant brought forth three main arguments in his appeal. First, he claimed that his right to a fair attorney was compromised because his lawyer had previously worked as a prosecutor in his original rape case. The court found that although an attorney representing both sides creates concerns, in this case, the attorney was no longer working for the prosecution at the time of the revocation hearing. Therefore, the court did not find this to be a reversible error. Second, the appellant argued that the state had not given him enough notice about the specific allegations against him. The court agreed that the notice was lacking but noted that the appellant had actual knowledge of the issues at hand and did not show any harm from the lack of notice. Lastly, the appellant asserted that revoking his entire suspended sentence was too harsh. The court recognized that the appellant had shown good behavior while on probation and that he had been actively working on his rehabilitation. The judge noted that the probation officer and treatment providers believed that a lesser sanction would have been appropriate instead of total revocation. Thus, the court decided to modify the revocation order so that the appellant would only serve the time he had already spent in confinement and would be returned to probation. The revised decision was a mix of affirming some parts of the original ruling while changing the overall outcome regarding the revocation of probation.

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RE-2004-435

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In OCCA case No. RE-2004-435, the appellant appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous substance. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the revocation of his suspended sentences and return the case for further proceedings. One judge dissented. In the original case, the appellant pleaded guilty to three counts involving illegal drugs. The judge sentenced him to several years in prison but suspended the sentences with conditions, including not using drugs or not violating any laws. Later, the state asked to revoke his suspended sentences because he was arrested for new drug-related crimes. The state claimed he broke the terms of his probation. During a hearing, the appellant's probation officer testified but did not have direct evidence against the appellant, like a confession or firsthand knowledge, which led to questions about the evidence's reliability. The judge revoked the appellant's probation, but the appeals court found the evidence insufficient to support this decision. They explained that the state did not provide enough solid proof that the appellant committed new crimes and emphasized the importance of the right to confront witnesses when proving probation violations. As a result, the court reversed the revocation decision and ordered the case to be sent back for further proceedings.

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F-2004-433

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-433, the appellant appealed his conviction for Conjoint Robbery and Possession of a Stolen Vehicle. In a published decision, the court decided to modify the sentence for the robbery charge but affirmed the sentence for the stolen vehicle charge. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant was charged with possessing a stolen vehicle and leaving an accident scene in 2001. Later, he faced a charge for Conjoint Robbery. He initially pleaded no contest to the stolen vehicle charges, which led to a delayed sentencing while he was to complete a rehabilitation program. However, he could not participate in this program due to the new robbery charge. The appellant pleaded no contest to the robbery charge, resulting in concurrent five-year deferred sentences. In 2004, he was accused of a new crime involving a firearm, leading the state to file an application to accelerate his sentences from the previous cases. After entering a stipulation to the violations, he received a five-year sentence for the firearm charge and additional sentences for the previous offenses. On appeal, the appellant argued that his sentences were excessive. While the court upheld the sentences for the stolen vehicle charge, it acknowledged that the sentence for the robbery was too harsh given the circumstances. Therefore, the sentence for the robbery was modified to ten years with five years suspended. The court found that, overall, the sentences were within the legal limits but decided the particular facts called for a reduction in the robbery sentence.

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F-2004-293

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-293, Sarah Lynne Ganis appealed her conviction for nine counts of Child Neglect. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that her convictions were upheld, but her sentence was modified to run all counts concurrently. One judge dissented. Sarah was found guilty of neglecting her children. She was sentenced to a lot of time in prison, with some counts getting longer sentences than others. She appealed this decision because she thought there weren't enough facts to prove she was guilty, the jury wasn't given the right instructions, and she was punished unfairly for the same actions more than once. She also argued that some testimonies and pictures used in the trial were too harsh and unrelated, and that evidence of other issues in her life was unfairly included. Sarah believed these problems made her trial unfair. On review, the court looked closely at Sarah's arguments. They decided that there was enough evidence to support the jury’s decision. Even though some jury instructions could have been better, they didn't think it made a big difference in the outcome of the trial. The court also found that it was appropriate for Sarah to be convicted for separate counts involving different children and incidents, meaning she didn’t suffer from double punishment. Regarding the pictures and testimonies, the court believed they were relevant to the case and didn't unfairly sway the jury. They also thought the evidence of Sarah receiving assistance was closely related to the charges against her, not a separate crime. After considering everything, the court believed that while the convictions stood, the sentences were too heavy and decided to change them so she would serve her time for all counts at the same time, rather than one after the other. Even though there were claims of wrongdoings in how the case was handled during trial, the court found it didn’t lead to a new trial or different outcome.

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F 2004-0328

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In OCCA case No. F 2004-0328, the appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in illegal drugs and distribution of a controlled substance. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the acceleration of the appellant's deferred sentences. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant, who was 19 years old, pled guilty to the charges and received a five-year deferred sentence in each case after completing a rehabilitation program. However, the state later sought to accelerate these sentences due to alleged violations of probation. During a hearing, the judge concluded that the appellant had not complied with conditions and imposed a lengthy sentence of twenty-five years for each charge, running consecutively. The appellant argued several points on appeal. He claimed that the acceleration hearing was unfair because he did not have a lawyer to help him. The court agreed that he had not properly waived his right to counsel. The judge's decision to proceed without an attorney was found to be incorrect, as there was no evidence that the appellant could afford a lawyer. Furthermore, the court noted that there were other errors in the process that impacted the fairness of the hearing. The appellate court found merit in the appellant's first argument about not having a lawyer and therefore reversed the acceleration of his sentences. The judges on the panel emphasized that if a new hearing takes place, the appellant must be represented by a lawyer and informed of his rights regarding any plea agreements.

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RE-2004-445

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In OCCA case No. RE-2004-445, Dewayne Eugene Ring appealed his conviction for attempted burglary. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that Ring should have a chance to withdraw his guilty plea because he was not eligible for a suspended sentence due to his prior convictions. The court found that his previous felony convictions meant that part of his sentence that was suspended was void. Therefore, they ordered that the lower court should give him a chance to withdraw his plea. If he chose not to withdraw it, the court was to make him serve the full sentence. One judge dissented in this opinion.

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S-2004-1009

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In OCCA case No. S-2004-1009, the State of Oklahoma appealed the conviction of Donald Isaiah Phares for negligent homicide. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the dismissal of the prosecution. One judge dissented. To summarize, this case started from a car accident on September 15, 2003, where Phares was involved in a collision that resulted in another driver's death. Phares was first charged with a traffic offense for failing to stop at a stop sign and paid a fine for that. Later, in January 2004, the State filed a charge of negligent homicide against him, claiming his action of not stopping at the stop sign was reckless. Phares argued that being prosecuted for negligent homicide after already being punished for the traffic violation was unfair and violated his rights to not be punished twice for the same act. The court agreed with him, stating that both charges came from the same action, and therefore, he could not be punished for both. They found that the traffic offense was part of the negligent homicide claim and ruling that prosecuting Phares again for negligent homicide would lead to double punishment. The court decided the district court's dismissal was correct as the two charges stemmed from the same event, adhering to the law that prevents someone from facing multiple punishments for the same act. Thus, the court upheld the dismissal of the negligent homicide case against Phares.

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C-2004-957

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In OCCA case No. C-2004-957, Jeremy Clarence Rankin appealed his conviction for various charges. In a published decision, the court decided to grant his petition for Certiorari and remanded the case to the District Court for a new hearing on Rankin's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. One judge dissented, stating that he did not believe there was evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the original plea was made knowingly and voluntarily.

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F-2004-368

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-368, an individual appealed his conviction for multiple counts of sexual crimes against his daughter. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions for Second Degree Rape, Forcible Sodomy, and Second Degree Rape by Instrumentation, but reversed the conviction for Lewd Molestation. One judge dissented on the Forcible Sodomy count. Tommie Loyd Payne was charged with numerous sexual offenses in Muskogee County, with the jury acquitting him of 97 counts but convicting him on 4. The court sentenced him to a total of 70 years in prison, with some sentences to be served one after the other. Payne raised several issues on appeal. He argued that the conviction for Forcible Sodomy violated double jeopardy because the jury instructions blended different elements of the crimes, which could have led to a wrongful conviction based on the same actions. However, the court found that the jury's understanding of the separate charges made this error negligible, so the convictions stood. He also contended that Lewd Molestation should not be punished because it was a lesser included offense of Rape by Instrumentation. The court agreed that both charges referred to the same act, which violated the prohibition against double jeopardy, resulting in the reversal of the conviction for Lewd Molestation. Finally, Payne pointed out that the trial court did not complete a pre-sentence investigation before sentencing, which was a mandatory requirement. However, the lack of this investigation was found to be a harmless error. Overall, the court upheld the serious convictions against Payne while addressing significant legal standards regarding double jeopardy and trial procedures.

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F-2004-666

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-666, the appellant appealed his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modify the sentence to two years imprisonment. One judge dissented. The case involved Steven Randel Hargrove, who was found guilty by a jury for not registering as a sex offender, which is a legal requirement for people with certain criminal backgrounds. He was sentenced to five years in prison by the judge, following the jury's recommendation. Hargrove appealed, arguing several points regarding his trial and conviction. First, he claimed that there wasn't enough evidence to prove that he intentionally failed to register. He felt this violated his rights as protected by the U.S. Constitution and the Oklahoma Constitution. The court reviewed the evidence and decided that while it was unclear if he had intentionally failed to register, there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude otherwise. Therefore, his argument on this point was denied. Second, Hargrove argued that he did not get good representation from his lawyer. He felt his lawyer made mistakes that harmed his case. The court agreed that his lawyer should have tried to keep certain information about Hargrove's past offenses from the jury. This information likely influenced the jury to give him a harsher sentence. As a result, the court recognized this as a significant issue. Finally, Hargrove believed his sentence was too harsh and that the mistakes made during the trial denied him a fair trial. Since the court agreed with him about the ineffective assistance of counsel, they decided to change his sentence from five years to two years in prison. In summary, the court upheld Hargrove's conviction but reduced his prison time due to the errors made during his trial. One judge disagreed with this decision, believing there was not enough proof of Hargrove's intent to fail to register as a sex offender.

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M 2004-0742

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In OCCA case No. M 2004-0742, the appellant appealed his conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicants and failure to wear a seat belt. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the decision and dismiss the case. One judge dissented. The case involved an appellant who was stopped by a police officer for not wearing a seat belt. The officer did not see the appellant driving erratically. However, the officer noticed that the appellant smelled like beer and had bloodshot eyes. The appellant told the officer he had consumed three or more beers, but the officer did not ask how long ago he had been drinking. During the trial, it became clear that the judge did not properly define what under the influence meant according to the law. The judge misunderstood that for someone to be considered under the influence, their ability to drive must be affected. This misunderstanding is very important because it means the trial didn't follow legal rules which are necessary for a fair judgment. Because of the mistake in understanding the law, the court decided that the evidence wasn't enough to support the appellant's conviction for driving under the influence. As a result, they overturned the conviction and directed the lower court to dismiss the case. This means that the appellant's conviction is no longer valid, and there will be no punishment against him for the charges.

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RE-2004-584

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In OCCA case No. RE-2004-584, Sarah Mae Jones appealed her conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance (cocaine). In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of her suspended sentence but modified it to reflect two years and ten months instead of the full sentence. One dissenting opinion was noted. Sarah Mae Jones had initially entered a guilty plea on October 18, 2001, for possession of cocaine and was sentenced to three years in prison, which was suspended. This meant she wouldn't have to serve time in jail if she followed certain rules. However, after violating her probation, she had parts of her suspended sentence revoked on two different occasions. The first revocation happened because she did not meet some requirements like reporting in person, maintaining a job, and avoiding illegal drugs. This led to a 60-day revocation. The second time, in March 2004, the state argued that she had again broken the rules of her probation. The court held another hearing where the judge decided to revoke her entire suspended sentence. On appeal, Jones claimed there wasn't enough evidence to support the complete revocation of her sentence. However, the court found that her own admissions during the hearing showed she had indeed violated her probation terms, which justified the judge’s decision. They explained that proving a violation only needs to show that it was likely she broke the rules, not to have a witness directly see it happen. In her second argument, Jones said the decision to revoke her entire suspended sentence without giving her credit for time already served was too harsh. The state agreed with her on this point, and upon reviewing her case, the court modified the revocation to two years and ten months, accounting for the time she had already spent under the suspended sentence. In conclusion, the court upheld the decision to revoke her suspended sentence but adjusted the length of that sentence to better reflect the circumstances.

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F-2004-82

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-82, Billy Dale Lathrop appealed his conviction for multiple crimes, including conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and child endangerment. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions for conspiracy, possession of methamphetamine, possession of precursor chemicals, and possession of paraphernalia, but to reverse the convictions for child endangerment. Three judges dissented regarding one of the convictions.

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F-2003-1278

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In OCCA case No. F-2003-1278, James Lorenzo Devers appealed his conviction for Inducing a Minor to Engage in Prostitution and Indecent Proposal to a Child. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions with some modifications. One judge dissented. Devers was tried in Tulsa County and found guilty of multiple charges involving sexual misconduct with teenage boys. The jury sentenced him to life imprisonment with fines after considering testimonies from three victims who claimed Devers offered them money to perform sexual acts. Despite some conflicting details regarding the timing of his proposal, the evidence against Devers was strong, including his own confession about some of the offenses. The appeal included several arguments. One claim was about the trial court's decision not to separate the charges for trial. The court maintained that the offenses were connected and reflected a consistent pattern of behavior, justifying their joint consideration. The court found no prejudice in trying the counts together. Devers also argued the jury was given incorrect instructions regarding the punishment for his indecent proposal charge. However, the court noted that the error did not change the outcome since he would have received the same sentence even under the correct guideline. Another point of appeal was regarding whether the jury was informed about parole eligibility. The court ruled the instructions were appropriate since the charges in question did not include those that required serving a certain percentage of the sentence before being eligible for parole. The court acknowledged that there was a mixing of punishment provisions in the instructions but decided any fines would be adjusted because of that error. Ultimately, after reviewing all claims, the court upheld the convictions but modified the fine amount for Devers' offenses. The judgment was affirmed with modifications, while one judge expressed disagreement with some aspects of the decision.

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F-2003-772

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In OCCA case No. F-2003-772, Amy Marie Flippence appealed her conviction for multiple charges, including conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and child endangerment. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm some charges but reversed one conviction for possession of a precursor and also reversed the child endangerment convictions, ordering them to be dismissed. One judge dissented regarding the conspiracy conviction.

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