Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1123(B)

F-2019-310

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In OCCA case No. F-2019-310, Kedrin Ray Dixon appealed his conviction for first-degree burglary, sexual battery, and possession of a controlled dangerous substance. In a published decision, the court decided to modify the sentence for sexual battery to ten years imprisonment, making it consecutive to the other sentence, and otherwise affirmed the convictions. One judge dissented regarding the modification of the sentence for sexual battery. Dixon was found guilty by a jury on multiple counts after a trial in the District Court of Washington County. The jury sentenced him to twenty years in prison for burglary and sexual battery, and one year for possession of a controlled substance. The trial judge ordered the sentences for burglary and sexual battery to be served back-to-back. Dixon then appealed, raising several points of error, including issues related to jury instructions and evidence. The first issue was about the trial judge not mentioning that he was presumed innocent in the instructions at the start of the trial. The court found this error was not significant since the final instructions did include the presumption of innocence. Next, Dixon claimed that the evidence was not strong enough for the first-degree burglary conviction. The court disagreed, stating that there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find him guilty. Dixon also argued that he should have been allowed to present evidence regarding his intoxication at the time of the crime. The court ruled that the trial judge had the right to refuse his request since the evidence did not clearly support intoxication as a defense. Another point of concern for Dixon was what he called evidentiary harpoons, which are when comments are made that suggest knowledge of other crimes. The court found that he did not object to these comments at the trial and they did not seriously affect the verdict. Dixon claimed that he was unfairly prevented from presenting a full defense regarding reports of his previous erratic behaviors. The court decided that these reports were not very relevant to his defense and that excluding them did not significantly harm his case. A notable issue was a mistake in how the jury was informed about the potential punishment for sexual battery. The trial judge incorrectly stated that it could be punished by twenty years, which was incorrect. The State agreed that this was an error. Instead of sending Dixon back for a new trial, the court decided to lower his sentence for sexual battery to ten years because of this error. Dixon stated that his total sentences were too harsh, but after reviewing the circumstances, the court determined that the sentences were acceptable even after the changes made to one of them. Lastly, Dixon argued that there were too many errors in the case that made it unfair for him. The court did acknowledge the instructional error but believed there were no other significant errors affecting the outcome of the trial. In summary, the court modified Dixon's sentence for sexual battery and kept the other parts of his conviction intact. The final decision still upheld his guilty verdicts on all counts.

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F-2018-1161

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **KENNETH ALLEN DAY,** Appellant, **V.** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. Case No. F-2018-1161 **SUMMARY OPINION** **HUDSON, JUDGE:** Appellant Kenneth Allen Day was tried and convicted by a jury in the District Court of Oklahoma County (Case No. CF-2017-2586) of: 1. **Count 1:** Sexual Battery (21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 1123(B)) 2. **Counts 2 and 3:** Indecent Exposure (21 O.S.2011, § 1021) The jury recommended a sentence of 30 days imprisonment on Count 1, and 1 year imprisonment each on Counts 2 and 3. The Honorable Timothy R. Henderson, District Judge, presided over the trial and executed the sentences as per the jury's recommendations, ordering them to run consecutively and consecutively to Oklahoma County Case No. CF-16-6470. Day was granted credit for 177 days served and was subject to various costs and fees. Day appeals, raising the following proposition of error: **I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED OKLA. STAT. TIT. 57, § 138(G) BY REFUSING TO GRANT MR. DAY CREDIT FOR ALL TIME SERVED WHILE AWAITING TRIAL AND SENTENCING, CLAIMING THAT THE STATUTE WAS DISCRETIONARY AND NOT MANDATORY.** Upon a thorough review of the entire record including transcripts, exhibits, and the parties' briefs, we find no legal error necessitating relief. Therefore, Day's judgments and sentences are AFFIRMED. **Proposition I:** Day's claim pertains to the nature of credit for time served—whether it is mandatory or discretionary. Citing *Loyd v. State*, 1981 OK CR 5, 624 P.2d 74, Day contends that 57 O.S.Supp.2015, § 138(G) mandates credit for all time served prior to judgment and sentence. However, as recently discussed and clarified in *Luna-Gonzales v. State*, 2019 OK CR 11, this argument has been rejected. This Court noted that *Loyd* is inconsistent with the majority of case law on this subject and that the Oklahoma Legislature has amended § 138 multiple times since 1980, which indicates a legislative intent to modify the ruling in *Loyd*. The current statute indicates that defendants automatically receive credit for jail time served only post-judgment and sentencing. Significantly, *Loyd* is overruled to the extent it conflicts with this interpretation. We also recognize that the district court exercised its discretion appropriately in awarding Day partial credit for time served, which aligns with previous ruling in *Luna-Gonzales* that grants sentencing judges discretion regarding credit for pre-sentencing incarceration. Thus, Day's argument is rejected, and his assertion is firmly denied. **DECISION** The judgments and sentences of the District Court are AFFIRMED. According to Rule 3.15 of the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the MANDATE shall be issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HENDERSON, DISTRICT JUDGE** **APPEARANCES AT TRIAL** RICHARD HULL (Counsel for Appellant) HALLIE ELIZABETH BOVOS KRISTEN MESSINA, ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER **APPEARANCES ON APPEAL** LORI MCCONNELL MIKE HUNTER RACHEL SMITH JULIE PITTMAN, ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL, (Counsel for Appellee) **OPINION BY:** HUDSON, J. **LEWIS, P.J.:** CONCUR **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** CONCUR **LUMPKIN, J.:** CONCUR **ROWLAND, J.:** CONCUR For further details and access to full judgment, [Click Here to Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1161_1734786325.pdf)

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F-2018-485

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-485, Scott Thomas Stout appealed his conviction for First Degree Rape and Sexual Battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction. One judge dissented. Scott Thomas Stout was found guilty by a jury in Kay County for forcing himself on a long-time friend and for sexual battery. The jury did not find him guilty of two other charges of Rape by Instrumentation. The judge sentenced him to twenty years for the rape charge and four years for the sexual battery charge, which he must serve consecutively. Furthermore, he must serve at least 85% of his sentence before being considered for parole. Stout raised two main points in his appeal. First, he argued that the prosecutor acted improperly and that these actions denied him a fair trial. Second, he claimed that the trial court made a mistake by allowing the prosecution to call a witness in the middle of his defense to present evidence. In the first point, Stout pointed out three specific issues with the prosecutor's conduct. He said the prosecutor tried to make the jury feel sorry for the victim, asked questions that seemed to give opinions on the victim's credibility, and used first names for witnesses inappropriately. The court looked at all of the evidence and determined that these actions did not distract from the overall fairness of the trial. The jury acquitted Stout on two of the charges and recommended lighter sentences for the others. Therefore, the court ruled that Stout did not experience unfairness due to prosecutorial misconduct. Regarding the second point in his appeal, Stout argued that it was wrong for the prosecutor to cause the defense to stop its case to bring in a detective to verify some evidence. The court noted that the prosecutor's interruption was related to a question raised by Stout's own lawyer and that the trial judge had acted fairly in allowing it. The judge ruled that this did not disrupt the trial's fairness. In conclusion, the court found no errors in how the trial was conducted and affirmed Stout's conviction, meaning the original decision stood.

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S-2013-483

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In OCCA case No. S-2013-483, the defendant appealed his conviction for various crimes involving minors, including sodomy, lewd acts, and sexual battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to deny the State's appeal regarding the exclusion of certain evidence. One judge dissented from this decision. Thomas Bradley Porton was charged with serious crimes against children. The crimes included sodomy and other lewd acts, as well as providing alcohol to minors and possessing indecent photographs. These charges were based on incidents that occurred in McCurtain County. During the pretrial, the State wanted to use photographs found on Porton's computer as evidence. However, the judge ruled that these photographs could not be used in court. The State believed that the photos were important to prove their case against Porton. They argued that the photographs showed a pattern of behavior that related to the crimes he was charged with. The State appealed the judge's decision to keep the photographs out of the trial. They said that their ability to prove Porton's guilt was greatly affected without this evidence. The law allows the State to appeal when evidence is excluded if it is believed to be in the interests of justice. However, the court found that the State did not show that the photographs were a critical part of the evidence needed to prove the case. Because of this, the appeal was denied, meaning the photographs would not be part of the trial. The ruling pointed out that the trial judge had looked closely at the case and had reasonable grounds to decide that the photographs were not relevant or that their potential to cause unfair problems outweighed their usefulness as evidence. One judge disagreed with the majority opinion. He felt that the photographs should not have been excluded because they could help prove Porton's motive and intent regarding the charges. He argued that evidence of other actions taken by the defendant should have been considered, especially since there were connections between the photographs and the charges against Porton. In summary, the court upheld the lower court's decision to exclude the evidence, impacting the State's case against Porton, while one judge believed this decision was incorrect and would have allowed the evidence.

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S-2012-834

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In OCCA case No. S-2012-834, the State of Oklahoma appealed an order that granted a motion to dismiss several charges against Jeffrey Porras. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling. One judge dissented. The case involved charges against Porras, who is a physician. He was accused of committing sexual battery and rape against multiple victims while they were receiving medical treatment. The accusations included five counts of sexual battery and one count of second-degree rape, with the incidents alleged to have occurred in different counties over a period of time from 2005 to 2007. The trial court dismissed some of the counts because it felt that the incidents were not part of a single plan or scheme. The law allows for multiple charges to be tried together if they are connected in a way that shows they are part of the same pattern of criminal behavior. However, the court decided that the alleged crimes in Oklahoma County and Cleveland County were separate and did not meet the criteria for joining them in one trial. In making this decision, the court looked at how the offenses occurred over a span of two years and did not significantly overlap in timing or in the way they were committed. This means that the crimes did not depend on each other and were not part of a continuous plan that would justify being tried together. The appellate court agreed with the trial judge's reasoning, stating that there was no clear error in the decision to dismiss those charges. The ruling reaffirmed that the charges from different counties could be handled separately without causing injustice to anyone. The dissenting judge, however, believed that the charges should not have been dismissed since they had common elements and were related to his actions as a doctor. The dissent argued that since all victims were patients and the incidents happened in similar situations, it was appropriate to consider them as part of a greater plan to commit these crimes. In conclusion, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision to dismiss certain charges against Porras, maintaining that the evidence did not sufficiently show a connection that warranted a single trial for all the charges.

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C-2010-1179

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In OCCA case No. C-2010-1179, Donnell Devon Smith appealed his conviction for multiple crimes including robbery, sexual battery, and others. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to deny his appeal. One judge dissented. Smith was charged with various offenses in multiple cases and pleaded guilty to all charges on October 19, 2010. He received several sentences, some of which were life sentences, and others ranged from ten to twenty years. After entering his pleas, Smith requested to withdraw them, saying he felt coerced and that he had not been properly informed about the punishments he faced for his crimes. The court looked at three main points raised in Smith's appeal: 1. Smith argued he should be allowed to withdraw his plea for one count of attempted robbery because the ten-year sentence he received was too long. The court found that his sentence was actually five years too long and modified it to the correct five-year maximum. 2. Smith claimed he did not understand the range of sentences for some charges and that this lack of understanding meant his pleas were not voluntary. The court decided that while he had been misadvised, the pleas still appeared to be valid overall because he benefitted from how the sentences were set up to run concurrently. 3. He asserted that he was punished twice for some of the same actions and that some of his pleas lacked enough factual support. The court concluded that the evidence supported the different charges, and there were no double jeopardy issues. The court ultimately affirmed his convictions for all cases besides modifying the sentence that was too long and correcting a minor paperwork mistake regarding how sentences should run together. The court ruled that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily made despite the confusion around sentencing ranges. The decision closed by affirming the ruling of the lower court regarding Smith's attempt to withdraw his pleas, confirming most of the sentences while adjusting the one that exceeded the maximum allowed by law.

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