RE-2018-208

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **DESMOND ZHUMONSHA SMITH,** Appellant, v. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **No. RE-2018-208** **Summary Opinion** **FILED MAY 16, 2019** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant Desmond Zhumonsha Smith appeals the revocation of his suspended sentence from the Garvin County District Court, Case No. CF-2015-498, presided over by the Honorable Leah Edwards. On February 26, 2016, Smith entered a plea of nolo contendere to charges of Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance and Falsely Personate Another to Create Liability. He was subsequently sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for each count. In his first proposition of error, Smith contends that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the claim that he violated the conditions of his probation by engaging in new criminal behavior, specifically Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle and Placing Bodily Fluid on a Government Employee. Upon review, this assertion lacks merit. The standard applicable in revocation hearings is a preponderance of the evidence, which requires the State to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the violations occurred (Tilden v. State, 2013 OK CR 10). Testimony from Officer Cooper and Sheriff Rhodes sufficiently established the necessary proof of Smith's involvement in the new crimes. In his second proposition, Smith argues that the revocation of ten years of his twenty-year suspended sentence is excessive and asserts that it should be modified. The law stipulates that proving just one violation of probation is adequate for revocation (Tilden, 2013 OK CR 10). In this case, the State demonstrated multiple violations, including new charges from two counties. Furthermore, Judge Edwards did not fully revoke Smith's remaining sentence, affirming that such decisions fall under the trial court's discretion, which will not be overturned unless an abuse of that discretion is clearly shown (Jones v. State, 1988 OK CR 20). **DECISION:** The revocation of Desmond Zhumonsha Smith’s suspended sentence in Garvin County District Court Case No. CF-2015-498 is **AFFIRMED**. The mandate is ordered to be issued upon the filing of this decision, pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. **APPEARANCES:** **For Defendant:** Arlan Bullard 110 N. Willow St., Ste. B Pauls Valley, OK 73075 **For Appellant:** Kristi Christopher P.O. Box 926 Norman, OK 73070 **For State:** Laura A. McClain Asst. District Attorney 201 W. Grant St., Room 15 Pauls Valley, OK 73075 Mike Hunter Attorney General of Oklahoma Theodore M. Peeper Asst. Attorney General 313 N.E. 21st Street Oklahoma City, OK 73105 **OPINION BY:** Kuehn, V.P.J. **CONCUR:** Lewis, P.J., Lumpkin, J., Hudson, J. **CONCUR IN RESULTS:** Rowland, J. [**Download PDF**](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/RE-2018-208_1734702735.pdf)

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RE-2018-357

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **CASE NO. RE-2018-357** **JAMES MONROE JONES, Appellant,** **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** James Monroe Jones (Appellant) appeals from the revocation of his suspended sentences in Case Nos. CF-2008-7440, CF-2010-130, CF-2010-290, and CF-2013-6519, adjudicated by the Honorable Timothy R. Henderson, District Judge, in the District Court of Oklahoma County. On June 16, 2010, Appellant pled guilty in Cases CF-2008-7440, CF-2010-130, and CF-2010-290, receiving concurrent sentences with significant portions suspended. Specifically, in CF-2008-7440, he was convicted of two counts of Concealing Stolen Property and sentenced to fifteen years on each count, with the first five years served. Similar sentences were imposed for offenses stemming from the other cases. On May 1, 2015, Appellant entered a negotiated nolo contendere plea in CF-2013-6519 for an amended count of Concealing Stolen Property, resulting in a ten-year sentence with the first year served. On August 26, 2016, the State filed applications to revoke Appellant's suspended sentences due to reported violations, including failure to report, change of address, and new criminal activity related to Domestic Assault and Battery. Enhanced allegations were added on March 7, 2018, encompassing additional crimes attributed to Appellant. A hearing was conducted on April 2, 2018. Appellant's counsel objected to the State's evidence, citing inadequate discovery. The trial court, however, noted Appellant had received relevant documents previously, and dismissed the objections after reviewing the evidence. Judge Henderson ultimately found Appellant had violated his probation through specific new criminal conduct and revoked his suspended sentences in full. Appellant presents two propositions of error on appeal: **PROPOSITION I:** The trial court violated Jones's right to due process and a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article II § 7 of the Oklahoma State Constitution. **PROPOSITION II:** Defense counsel failed to prepare adequately for trial, resulting in ineffective assistance of counsel. **ANALYSIS** In addressing Proposition I, Appellant contends that the overruling of his objections regarding discovery violations deprived him of due process. It is established that defendants have minimal due process rights in revocation hearings, including evidence disclosure. However, since Appellant’s counsel did not request discovery prior to the hearing, the burden falls on them for preparation. The trial court did not deny Appellant the opportunity to defend—therefore, Proposition I is denied. Regarding Proposition II, Appellant asserts his counsel's ineffectiveness based on a lack of preparedness stemming from unrequested discovery. The Strickland standard evaluates ineffective assistance claims through performance deficiency and resultant prejudice. Appellant has not substantiated claims that better-prepared counsel would have altered the outcome, as evidence showed several violations were confirmed. Thus, Proposition II is also denied. **DECISION** The order from the District Court of Oklahoma County revoking Appellant's suspended sentences in Case Nos. CF-2008-7440, CF-2010-130, CF-2010-290, and CF-2013-6519 is **AFFIRMED**. --- **APPEARANCES:** **AT TRIAL** Katie Samples, Assistant Public Defender Marva A. Banks, Assistant Public Defender **ON APPEAL** David Nichols, Assistant District Attorney Mike Hunter, Attorney General Keeley L. Miller, Assistant Attorney General **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **CONCUR:** LEWIS, P.J.; KUEHN, V.P.J.; HUDSON, J.; ROWLAND, J. **[Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/RE-2018-357_1734695459.pdf)**

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F-2012-1039

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In OCCA case No. F-2012-1039, Earnest Toby Bearshead appealed his conviction for Robbery with a Firearm and False Personation. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction for Robbery with a Firearm but reversed his conviction for False Personation. One judge dissented. Bearshead was found guilty of two crimes: Robbery with a Firearm and False Personation. The jury decided he should go to prison for nine years for the robbery and five years for the false personation. The sentences would be served one after the other. Bearshead did not argue against the robbery conviction but did challenge the false personation conviction based on three main issues. First, Bearshead claimed that there wasn't enough evidence to prove he committed false personation. The law says that to be guilty of false personation, a person has to pretend to be someone else and do something that could cause that person to face legal issues or gain some benefit. Bearshead argued that since a video of him talking to the police was not officially accepted as evidence, he could not be said to have assumed another person's identity. Despite this claim, the court found that Bearshead had indeed provided evidence of using a false name when talking to the police. A detective testified that Bearshead initially said his name was “Oscar” and later corrected it to “Toby.” The detective had noted this on a form, showing that Bearshead tried to lie about his identity. The second point Bearshead raised was that even if he did use a false name, he did not do anything to get someone else in trouble, as there were no legal issues connected to the name Oscar Bearshead. The State argued he would have benefitted in some way, such as avoiding responsibility for the robbery. However, there was no evidence that showed Bearshead actually gained anything from pretending to be Oscar. He still faced the charges and was found guilty of the robbery. The court pointed out that Bearshead's jury was not instructed about the possibility of benefiting from using a false name, which was necessary for proving false personation in this case. Without clear evidence that he gained any benefits from the impersonation, the court decided the State did not meet the burden of proving all parts of the crime. As a result, the court reversed Bearshead's conviction for False Personation and ordered it to be dismissed. However, his conviction for Robbery with a Firearm stood, and he would still serve the sentence related to that crime. The decision led to one judge expressing a different opinion from the others.

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C-2010-1139

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In OCCA case No. C-2010-1139, a petitioner appealed his conviction for False Personation of Another to Create Liability. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the appeal. The court concluded that the trial court made a mistake by not holding a hearing on the petitioner's request to withdraw her no-contest plea. The decision requires the case to go back to the lower court for this necessary hearing. One judge dissented.

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F-2001-230

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In OCCA case No. F-2001-230, Shihee Hason Daughrity appealed his conviction for two counts of Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon and one count of False Personation. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions on the robbery counts but reversed the conviction for False Personation. One judge dissented. Daughrity was tried along with another person and was found guilty of robbing someone while using a dangerous weapon and falsely claiming to be someone else. The judge sentenced him to a long time in prison and also made him pay fines. Daughrity thought the trial was unfair and wanted to appeal. The court looked at the reasons Daughrity gave for why he thought he should win his appeal. He questioned whether there was enough proof for the False Personation charge because there wasn't clear evidence that he impersonated an actual person. The court reviewed previous cases to understand what counts as False Personation. They found that in this case, there wasn’t enough proof to show he impersonated someone who could be harmed by his actions. While the evidence seemed to show he used a fake name to escape responsibility for his actions, the instructions given to the jury were incomplete. Because of this, Daughrity's conviction for False Personation was reversed, which means he shouldn’t have been found guilty of that charge based on how the jury was instructed. However, they kept his convictions for robbery since they were clear and backed by enough evidence. In conclusion, while Daughrity's robbery convictions stayed, he won on the False Personation count. The judges made sure that the right procedures were followed, highlighting how important it is for juries to have complete and clear instructions when they are deciding on guilt.

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