Okla. Stat. tit. 10A § 2-2-601

J-2018-1066

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**Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma** **Case No. J-2018-1066** **Decided on: August 8, 2019** **A.O. (Appellant)** **v.** **The State of Oklahoma (Appellee)** **Opinion of the Court by Presiding Judge Lewis:** **Background:** The appellant, A.O., a minor, was charged as a juvenile with Sexual Battery per 21 O.S. Supp. 2017, § 1123(B) in McIntosh County District Court (Case No. JDL-2017-29). Subsequently, on February 26, 2018, an Amended Delinquent Petition was filed, charging him with Child Sexual Abuse under 21 O.S. Supp. 2014, § 843.5(E). Following a non-jury trial held on September 25, 2018, the court adjudicated A.O. as delinquent. **Issues on Appeal:** 1. A.O. contends he was never informed of his right to a jury trial, claiming a violation of due process. 2. He argues that the conduct in question—touching the victim's buttocks over clothing—does not constitute Child Sexual Abuse as intended by the legislature. 3. A.O. claims the prosecutor expressed an opinion on his guilt, violating his due process rights. **Rulings:** 1. **Proposition I**: The court found no merit in A.O.'s claim regarding his jury trial rights. The record demonstrated that both A.O. and his guardian were informed of the right to a jury trial and that they consciously waived this right. 2. **Proposition II**: On this issue, the court ruled in favor of A.O. The court determined that the state failed to prove each element of the underlying crime of Child Sexual Abuse. Specifically, the court stated that to convict under § 843.5(E), the state bears the burden of proving the elements of lewd acts, which were not sufficiently demonstrated in court. 3. **Proposition III**: The court found the prosecution's remarks during the trial did not constitute plain error, as the comments related to the evidence presented and did not deprive A.O. of a fair trial. **Final Decision:** The adjudicating order of Child Sexual Abuse was **REVERSED**. The matter is **REMANDED** to the district court to amend the adjudication to Assault and Battery under 21 O.S. 2011, § 644. The court affirmed the adjudication as modified. **Dissenting Opinion by Vice Presiding Judge Kuehn:** Judge Kuehn expressed concerns about the implications of the majority ruling, arguing that it effectively renders § 843.5(E) unconstitutional due to its vagueness and conflict with age-based elements in other statutes, which could lead to arbitrary enforcement. The dissent maintains that the elements of § 843.5(E) should not require additional instructions unless those elements are included in the Information—and calls for the conviction to be reversed entirely based on the statute's broad language, which might punish conduct that is arguably not criminal. In conclusion, the court's ruling finds resonance in the legislative intention behind the statutes governing Child Sexual Abuse and the need for clarity in legal definitions, especially concerning age restrictions in sexual offenses. **Links:** [Download PDF of the Opinion](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/J-2018-1066_1734449875.pdf)

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J-2019-65

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **G.E.J., Appellant, v. THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** **No. J-2019-65** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA MAY 23, 2019 JOHN D. HADDEN ROWLAND, JUDGE** **SUMMARY OPINION** On August 27, 2018, G.E.J. was charged as a juvenile with (1) Soliciting for First Degree Murder and (2) Reckless Conduct with a Firearm in Rogers County District Court. A show cause hearing was held, resulting in probable cause for continued juvenile detention. G.E.J. eventually entered a no contest stipulation leading to adjudication as a delinquent on October 30, 2018. Following a hearing on January 17, 2019, the trial court denied his motion to withdraw the stipulation. G.E.J. raised several issues on appeal regarding the denial of due process, the voluntariness of his plea, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the sufficiency of proceedings leading to his stipulation. The Court reviewed the claims in light of the record and hearings. The Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, emphasizing: 1. **Detention Period**: G.E.J. argued that he was detained for 24 days before charges were filed, which he claimed constituted a denial of due process. The Court found that he was represented by counsel during this period and had a bond set, distinguishing his case from precedent cases involving more severe delays without legal representation or bonding. 2. **Voluntariness of Plea**: G.E.J. contended that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, citing that he believed he would be released upon entering the stipulation. However, testimonial evidence indicated that his attorney’s statements were not misleading and that G.E.J. was adequately informed of the charges and the evidence against him. 3. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: Claims of ineffective assistance were examined under the Strickland standard, requiring a showing of deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The Court found no shown deficiency by his attorneys and ruled that even if there were lapses, they did not prejudice the outcome. 4. **Factual Basis for Stipulation**: The absence of a lengthy factual basis during the stipulation hearing did not undermine the sufficiency of the process; the Court noted adequate evidence existed to support the stipulation through prior hearings. The appeal was evaluated under the standards for an abuse of discretion, and the findings of the trial judge who observed G.E.J. throughout the proceedings were upheld. **DECISION**: The Court affirmed the decision of the Rogers County District Court, upholding the denial of G.E.J.’s motion to withdraw his stipulation. **Counsel for Juvenile**: Jeffrey Price **Counsel for Appellant**: Sarah MacNiven **Counsel for State**: Edith Singer **OPINION BY: ROWLAND, J.** **LEWIS, P.J.: Concur** **KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur** **LUMPKIN, J.: Concur** **HUDSON, J.: Concur** [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/J-2019-65_1734448303.pdf)

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J 2016-0745

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In OCCA case No. J 2016-0745, J.M.D. appealed his conviction for Endeavoring to Perform an Act of Violence. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the order adjudicating J.M.D. as a delinquent child and remand the matter to the District Court with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented. The case began when a delinquent petition was filed against J.M.D., a 15-year-old boy, accusing him of planning to hurt others. The case went to trial where the judge heard the evidence. J.M.D. had made a list of people he did not like and called it a Hit List. However, he said he was just joking and having fun with a friend when he made the list. He did not plan to hurt anyone. The court found that the evidence was not strong enough to prove that J.M.D. really intended to harm anyone. The judges agreed that just writing a list, even with a bad name, does not mean someone is a danger to others. Because there was no proof of a real intention to do harm, the court decided that J.M.D. should not be labeled as a delinquent child. The judges also noted that the law requires strong proof in these cases. Since the state failed to show that J.M.D. was really trying to hurt someone, he should not have been found guilty. Therefore, they decided to dismiss the case against him.

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J-2014-980

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In OCCA case No. J-2014-980, the Appellant appealed his conviction for Lewd or Indecent Acts to a Child Under 16. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to vacate the order adjudicating him as a delinquent child due to the lack of sufficient evidence that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a trial by jury. One judge dissented.

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J-2014-0646

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In OCCA case No. J-2014-0646, D.S.C. appealed his conviction for lewd or indecent acts to a child under 16. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the order adjudicating him as a delinquent child and remand the case for further proceedings. One justice dissented. D.S.C., who was born on September 17, 1997, had been charged with two counts of lewd or indecent acts, and a petition was filed on December 21, 2012. His trial occurred without a jury on July 9, 2014, and the decision was made to find him delinquent, meaning that the court said he had committed an act that is considered wrong for a child of his age. D.S.C. appealed this decision, arguing that he had been denied a right to a jury trial. He claimed that he agreed to waive his jury trial as part of a deal to enter a sex offender program, which he did not end up getting into. Because he could not start or complete this program, he felt that he should not have waived his right to a jury trial. He believed that the deal between him and the State was unfair because it was not fulfilled, and therefore, the agreement should not hold. The court agreed with D.S.C. and pointed out that he had the right to demand a jury trial, which could only be waived under certain conditions. Since the conditions of the deal were not met, the waiver of the jury trial was not valid. This means that once the deal fell through, D.S.C. should have been given the chance to have a jury trial. Because of this ruling, the court decided to reverse the earlier decision that found D.S.C. delinquent and send it back to the lower court so that it can be handled differently. Since the court found this issue important, they did not see a need to discuss the other claims D.S.C. made in his appeal. Therefore, the outcome focused on the jury trial right, leading to the decision that he deserved another chance to have a trial with a jury.

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J 2013-0130

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In OCCA case No. J 2013-0130, D.I.S. appealed his conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the order adjudicating D.I.S. as a delinquent child and remand the matter to the District Court with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented. This case began when a Juvenile Petition was filed on July 25, 2012, against D.I.S., who was just 14 years old. He was charged with three counts of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon in Pontotoc County. After a hearing on February 5, 2013, the judge found that D.I.S. had committed the offenses and declared him a delinquent child. He was ordered to stay with his mother under supervision until another court hearing about his situation. D.I.S. appealed this decision, arguing that the evidence wasn’t strong enough to prove he used a dangerous weapon, or that he had intent to cause serious harm. The law requires that to be declared a delinquent child, the evidence must clearly show proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeals court agreed with D.I.S. and said that the evidence was not sufficient to support the idea that he was guilty of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. Therefore, they reversed the previous ruling and instructed the lower court to dismiss the case against him. The case was important because it highlighted the need for strong evidence when judging a child in the juvenile justice system. The court made it clear that if the facts aren’t strong enough, they cannot find a child guilty of serious charges. This ruling protects the rights of young people by ensuring they are only judged based on solid evidence.

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