Okla. Stat. tit. 10A § 2-2-401 Archives

J-2018-1066

Post author:Staff
Post published:August 8, 2019
Post category:J

**Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma** **Case No. J-2018-1066** **Decided on: August 8, 2019** **A.O. (Appellant)** **v.** **The State of Oklahoma (Appellee)** **Opinion of the Court by Presiding Judge Lewis:** **Background:** The appellant, A.O., a minor, was charged as a juvenile with Sexual Battery per 21 O.S. Supp. 2017, § 1123(B) in McIntosh County District Court (Case No. JDL-2017-29). Subsequently, on February 26, 2018, an Amended Delinquent Petition was filed, charging him with Child Sexual Abuse under 21 O.S. Supp. 2014, § 843.5(E). Following a non-jury trial held on September 25, 2018, the court adjudicated A.O. as delinquent. **Issues on Appeal:** 1. A.O. contends he was never informed of his right to a jury trial, claiming a violation of due process. 2. He argues that the conduct in question—touching the victim's buttocks over clothing—does not constitute Child Sexual Abuse as intended by the legislature. 3. A.O. claims the prosecutor expressed an opinion on his guilt, violating his due process rights. **Rulings:** 1. **Proposition I**: The court found no merit in A.O.'s claim regarding his jury trial rights. The record demonstrated that both A.O. and his guardian were informed of the right to a jury trial and that they consciously waived this right. 2. **Proposition II**: On this issue, the court ruled in favor of A.O. The court determined that the state failed to prove each element of the underlying crime of Child Sexual Abuse. Specifically, the court stated that to convict under § 843.5(E), the state bears the burden of proving the elements of lewd acts, which were not sufficiently demonstrated in court. 3. **Proposition III**: The court found the prosecution's remarks during the trial did not constitute plain error, as the comments related to the evidence presented and did not deprive A.O. of a fair trial. **Final Decision:** The adjudicating order of Child Sexual Abuse was **REVERSED**. The matter is **REMANDED** to the district court to amend the adjudication to Assault and Battery under 21 O.S. 2011, § 644. The court affirmed the adjudication as modified. **Dissenting Opinion by Vice Presiding Judge Kuehn:** Judge Kuehn expressed concerns about the implications of the majority ruling, arguing that it effectively renders § 843.5(E) unconstitutional due to its vagueness and conflict with age-based elements in other statutes, which could lead to arbitrary enforcement. The dissent maintains that the elements of § 843.5(E) should not require additional instructions unless those elements are included in the Information—and calls for the conviction to be reversed entirely based on the statute's broad language, which might punish conduct that is arguably not criminal. In conclusion, the court's ruling finds resonance in the legislative intention behind the statutes governing Child Sexual Abuse and the need for clarity in legal definitions, especially concerning age restrictions in sexual offenses. **Links:** [Download PDF of the Opinion](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/J-2018-1066_1734449875.pdf)

J-2014-0646

Post author:Staff
Post published:October 23, 2014
Post category:J

In OCCA case No. J-2014-0646, D.S.C. appealed his conviction for lewd or indecent acts to a child under 16. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the order adjudicating him as a delinquent child and remand the case for further proceedings. One justice dissented. D.S.C., who was born on September 17, 1997, had been charged with two counts of lewd or indecent acts, and a petition was filed on December 21, 2012. His trial occurred without a jury on July 9, 2014, and the decision was made to find him delinquent, meaning that the court said he had committed an act that is considered wrong for a child of his age. D.S.C. appealed this decision, arguing that he had been denied a right to a jury trial. He claimed that he agreed to waive his jury trial as part of a deal to enter a sex offender program, which he did not end up getting into. Because he could not start or complete this program, he felt that he should not have waived his right to a jury trial. He believed that the deal between him and the State was unfair because it was not fulfilled, and therefore, the agreement should not hold. The court agreed with D.S.C. and pointed out that he had the right to demand a jury trial, which could only be waived under certain conditions. Since the conditions of the deal were not met, the waiver of the jury trial was not valid. This means that once the deal fell through, D.S.C. should have been given the chance to have a jury trial. Because of this ruling, the court decided to reverse the earlier decision that found D.S.C. delinquent and send it back to the lower court so that it can be handled differently. Since the court found this issue important, they did not see a need to discuss the other claims D.S.C. made in his appeal. Therefore, the outcome focused on the jury trial right, leading to the decision that he deserved another chance to have a trial with a jury.