Non-jury trial

F-2018-1023

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **CAMERON LEE SCHEMMER,** Appellant, v. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **Case No. F-2018-1023** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JAN 23 2020** **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN** **CLERK** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Appellant, Cameron Lee Schemmer, was tried by the court and convicted of Count 1, Forcible Sodomy, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 888, and Counts 2-4, Lewd Molestation, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1123, in Kingfisher County District Court, Case No. CF-2017-96. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years imprisonment with all but the last five years suspended for Count 1. For Counts 2-4, the court sentenced him to twenty-five years imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently to one another but consecutively to the sentence for Count 1. As a result, Appellant will be required to serve 85% of his sentences before becoming eligible for parole, as per 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1. From this judgment and sentence, Appellant appeals, raising the following propositions of error: **I.** The record in this case does not sufficiently demonstrate that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. **II.** Mr. Schemmer received an excessive sentence when the trial court followed the wrong sentencing statute. Upon thorough consideration of these propositions and the entire record, including the original record, transcripts, and briefs of the parties, we find no relief is warranted under the law and evidence presented. **Proposition I:** Appellant argues that the record is insufficient to support a finding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Since he did not object before the non-jury trial, we review this claim for plain error, as established in *Simpson v. State*, 1994 OK CR 40, 876 P.2d 690. Plain error requires that Appellant demonstrate an actual error that is plain or obvious and affects substantial rights. A defendant may waive their right to a jury trial, but the waiver must be knowingly, competently, and intelligently made. The record shows that prior to trial, the court engaged in a colloquy with Appellant regarding his jury trial waiver. Appellant confirmed his satisfaction with his attorney and expressly indicated his desire to waive the jury trial right. This established a knowing and intelligent waiver by Appellant. Therefore, we deny this proposition as the trial court's assessment was in compliance with the law. **Proposition II:** Appellant contends his sentence is illegal because the Information alleged that R.N. was a child under sixteen, not under twelve. Thus, Appellant argues that the sentencing range should have been from one or three years to twenty years instead of a minimum of twenty-five years, as required when the child is under the age of twelve. Since Appellant failed to object at sentencing, we again look for plain error. The Information indicated that R.N. was under the age of sixteen at the time of the offenses, and the evidence revealed she was ten years old when the abuse began and eleven when it ceased. Appellant was charged under 21 O.S.2011, § 1123(A), which necessitates a minimum of twenty-five years imprisonment when the child is under twelve years of age. A court in a non-jury trial retains the presumption of knowing the law correctly. The facts show that R.N. was indeed under twelve when the offenses occurred, and the court found this circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the claim of an illegal sentence based on an erroneous application of the statute is without merit. **DECISION:** The **JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED**. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, the **MANDATE is ORDERED issued** upon this ruling. **APPEARANCES:** **Trial Counsel:** Blayne Allsup **Appellate Counsel for Appellant:** Cindy Brown Danner **Counsel for State:** John Salmon, Assistant District Attorney, and Theodore M. Peepers, Assistant Attorney General. **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE:** CONCURS **LEWIS, P.J.:** Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** Concur in Result **HUDSON, J.:** Concur **ROWLAND, J.:** Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J., CONCURRING IN RESULT:** While I concur with the outcomes reached, I note a discrepancy in the standard of review applied to Proposition I. The burden rests with the State to prove any constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as highlighted in *Chadwell v. State* and *Chapman v. California*. The majority's application of the plain error standard does not recognize this shifting burden adequately. **[Document ends here]**

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F-2018-198

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-198, Ann Sykes appealed her conviction for Abuse by Caretaker (Neglect) and Abuse by Caretaker (Financial Exploitation). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment and sentence. One judge dissented. Ann Sykes was found guilty of two types of abuse against her son, who is a vulnerable adult. The first conviction was for not providing him with basic needs like food and shelter. The second conviction was for mishandling his money. The court sentenced her to eight years in prison but suspended three years, meaning she would only serve five years in custody. Appellant raised several problems with the trial process. She claimed that hearsay evidence, which is when someone repeats what another person said outside of court, was used against her unfairly. However, the court found that much of the evidence was not considered hearsay because it was not meant to prove the truth of the statements, and any hearsay that was improperly admitted didn't impact the trial's outcome. Sykes also argued that witnesses were allowed to testify without personal knowledge of the information they shared. The court disagreed, stating that witnesses had information based on their own experiences or observations. Another point of appeal was about whether the trial court made mistakes by letting certain opinions into evidence. A social worker testified about how not getting enough nutrition could affect someone's mental state. The court decided that the social worker was qualified to give that information based on her experience. Sykes claimed her two convictions meant she was being punished twice for the same actions, which is called double punishment. The court found that the actions leading to the two charges were different enough to allow both charges to stand without violating the law. She also believed that the charges against her were not clearly stated in the official documents, but the court noted that she didn’t raise this issue during the trial, so it wasn’t considered on appeal. Another argument was that she was denied a right to have a lawyer appointed to help her during the trial. The court found that although there was a lack of a hearing on this, Sykes did have a lawyer who represented her during the trial. Sykes claimed her lawyer did not do a good enough job. The court noted that for a claim like this, Sykes needed to show both that her lawyer did not perform well and that this affected the trial's outcome. The court did not find evidence that the lawyer's actions changed the trial's result. Lastly, Sykes claimed that even with the errors made during her trial, they did not add up to deny her a fair trial overall. The court agreed, concluding that the errors did not require the reversal of her conviction. Overall, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence, meaning Sykes will continue to serve the time given by the lower court. The application to further review her claims about lawyer effectiveness was denied as well.

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F-2018-940

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In the case of LeJeanna Sue Chronister v. State of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals addressed several appeals raised by the appellant following her conviction for Aggravated Manufacture of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) and her subsequent sentencing to twenty years in prison. The appellant raised three primary propositions of error: 1. **Violation of Rights Regarding the 85% Rule**: The appellant contended that her sentence was unconstitutional because she was not informed that the 85% Rule (requiring her to serve 85% of her sentence before becoming eligible for parole) applied to her case. The court concluded that this argument did not hold merit in a non-jury trial setting, stating that the judge, not a jury, was responsible for sentencing and presumed to know the law. The court found no plain error as the sentence was within the statutory range and was the minimum allowed. 2. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: The appellant claimed her counsel was ineffective for not informing her about the 85% Rule, impacting her decision-making during her trial. The court applied the Strickland standard to evaluate the ineffectiveness claim, concluding that the appellant did not demonstrate how the alleged deficiency in counsel's performance prejudiced her case or altered the outcome. 3. **Cumulative Error**: The appellant argued that the combination of errors denied her a fair trial. The court determined that since none of the individual claims of error warranted relief, the cumulative error argument also lacked merit. Ultimately, the court affirmed the judgment and sentence imposed by the District Court of LeFlore County, stating that the appellant had not demonstrated any error that would necessitate modifying the sentence or overturning the conviction. The ruling emphasizes the distinction between non-jury trials and jury trials concerning informing defendants about parole-related laws and the importance of counsel's performance under the criteria established by the Strickland case.

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J-2018-1066

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**Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma** **Case No. J-2018-1066** **Decided on: August 8, 2019** **A.O. (Appellant)** **v.** **The State of Oklahoma (Appellee)** **Opinion of the Court by Presiding Judge Lewis:** **Background:** The appellant, A.O., a minor, was charged as a juvenile with Sexual Battery per 21 O.S. Supp. 2017, § 1123(B) in McIntosh County District Court (Case No. JDL-2017-29). Subsequently, on February 26, 2018, an Amended Delinquent Petition was filed, charging him with Child Sexual Abuse under 21 O.S. Supp. 2014, § 843.5(E). Following a non-jury trial held on September 25, 2018, the court adjudicated A.O. as delinquent. **Issues on Appeal:** 1. A.O. contends he was never informed of his right to a jury trial, claiming a violation of due process. 2. He argues that the conduct in question—touching the victim's buttocks over clothing—does not constitute Child Sexual Abuse as intended by the legislature. 3. A.O. claims the prosecutor expressed an opinion on his guilt, violating his due process rights. **Rulings:** 1. **Proposition I**: The court found no merit in A.O.'s claim regarding his jury trial rights. The record demonstrated that both A.O. and his guardian were informed of the right to a jury trial and that they consciously waived this right. 2. **Proposition II**: On this issue, the court ruled in favor of A.O. The court determined that the state failed to prove each element of the underlying crime of Child Sexual Abuse. Specifically, the court stated that to convict under § 843.5(E), the state bears the burden of proving the elements of lewd acts, which were not sufficiently demonstrated in court. 3. **Proposition III**: The court found the prosecution's remarks during the trial did not constitute plain error, as the comments related to the evidence presented and did not deprive A.O. of a fair trial. **Final Decision:** The adjudicating order of Child Sexual Abuse was **REVERSED**. The matter is **REMANDED** to the district court to amend the adjudication to Assault and Battery under 21 O.S. 2011, § 644. The court affirmed the adjudication as modified. **Dissenting Opinion by Vice Presiding Judge Kuehn:** Judge Kuehn expressed concerns about the implications of the majority ruling, arguing that it effectively renders § 843.5(E) unconstitutional due to its vagueness and conflict with age-based elements in other statutes, which could lead to arbitrary enforcement. The dissent maintains that the elements of § 843.5(E) should not require additional instructions unless those elements are included in the Information—and calls for the conviction to be reversed entirely based on the statute's broad language, which might punish conduct that is arguably not criminal. In conclusion, the court's ruling finds resonance in the legislative intention behind the statutes governing Child Sexual Abuse and the need for clarity in legal definitions, especially concerning age restrictions in sexual offenses. **Links:** [Download PDF of the Opinion](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/J-2018-1066_1734449875.pdf)

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F-2018-350

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-350, Jonathan Brent Buccino appealed his conviction for three counts of embezzlement. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction. One judge dissented. Jonathan was found guilty in a trial where the judge decided the case without a jury. He was accused of taking money from an investment, which he was supposed to use for software development, but instead, he used the money for other purposes. The judge gave him five years in prison for each count, but these sentences were suspended, meaning he wouldn’t go to prison right away, if at all. During his appeal, Jonathan claimed that the evidence against him was not strong enough to prove he committed a crime. He argued that the only proof was what people said in their testimony, not any written documents. He believed that this meant the state did not meet its obligation to show he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court explained that when figuring out if there was enough evidence for a conviction, they look at it in a way that favors the state. This means they assume the evidence presented was correct and that the jury found the witnesses believable. Even if there were different opinions, the judge made the final call on what was credible. The court found that Jonathan was only allowed to use the invested money for software development, and the state showed he used it elsewhere, which was enough to prove he was guilty. In his second claim, Jonathan argued that the “Statute of Frauds” should have applied to his case. He thought that this statute meant any agreement needed to be in writing if it couldn’t be completed within a year, and since he didn’t have a written agreement, his case shouldn’t have been criminal. The court explained that embezzlement doesn’t need a contract, and whether or not there was a written agreement was not important. The crime was based on his actions, not on whether a written contract existed. The court also noted that the decision to bring a criminal case was the district attorney’s responsibility and that the evidence provided was enough to charge him with a crime, regardless of whether he might have been open to a civil case as well. In conclusion, the court affirmed Jonathan’s conviction, meaning they agreed with the original decision of the trial court.

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F-2017-863

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In OCCA case No. F-2017-863, Joe Zacharias Harp appealed his conviction for Child Sexual Abuse. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction. One judge dissented. Harp was found guilty of Child Sexual Abuse in a trial that did not involve a jury. The judge sentenced him to thirty years in prison and three years of post-imprisonment supervision. He raised five main points in his appeal. First, he argued that he should not have been tried after entering a no contest plea because jeopardy should have attached at that moment. However, the court found that he did not show that an error occurred in this area. Since he went ahead with the trial without raising the issue, the court ruled he had waived this point. Second, Harp claimed that the court wrongly allowed certain statements made by the victim to be used as evidence without first holding a reliability hearing. The court acknowledged that he had not disagreed with this at trial but concluded that the statements were reliable enough and that the error did not affect Harp's rights in any significant way. For the third point, Harp said that the victim's testimony was too vague and unbelievable and that it needed support from other evidence to count as valid. The court disagreed, stating that the victim's testimony was consistent and made sense, thus supporting a conviction without needing corroboration. The fourth point was about his lawyer not properly supporting his plea and rights during the trial. The court stated Harp did not meet the requirements to prove that his lawyer had failed in their duty. Lastly, Harp mentioned that the errors in his trial added up to unfair treatment, but the court ruled against this claim as well, finding no significant cumulative error. In conclusion, the court affirmed the original judgment and Harp's sentence.

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C-2018-943

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In OCCA case No. M 2018-0277, the appellant appealed his conviction for speeding (21-25 mph over the limit). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment and sentence from the District Court. One judge dissented. The appellant was found guilty after a non-jury trial in Texas County. He was fined $10.00 for speeding. During the appeal, the appellant claimed that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was indeed speeding. He argued that there was no rule in Oklahoma law that allowed a speeding conviction based solely on visual estimation. The State countered this claim by saying that Oklahoma law does not require a radar gun to show that someone was speeding. A trained Oklahoma State Trooper testified that he could visually estimate a vehicle's speed within 5 miles per hour of its real speed. He specifically said that he saw the appellant's vehicle speeding. The court reviewed the evidence to see if a reasonable person could find that the essential parts of the speeding crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court concluded that any logical juror could decide that there was enough proof of the speeding violation. In conclusion, the court upheld the appellant's conviction for speeding, stating that the evidence presented was sufficient.

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F-2017-851

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In OCCA case No. F-2017-851, Anthony Harold Warnick appealed his conviction for Possession of Child Pornography, After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction but modified the fee for his indigent defense. The dissenting opinion was not specified. Warnick was tried without a jury and found guilty, receiving a 35-year prison sentence. He argued several points in his appeal, claiming errors and issues with how his previous convictions were used to enhance his sentence. He stated that his earlier convictions should not have been considered because they were misdemeanors at the time of the offenses or were too old to count against him. The court reviewed specific claims regarding the earlier convictions and determined there were no plain errors in how they were assessed. They found that Warnick's previous convictions were appropriately used to enhance his sentence, as he did not successfully challenge their validity in previous appeals or post-conviction actions. One error was found concerning the fee for his defense representation, which was set too high at $500 instead of the legal limit of $250. The court corrected this fee to the legal amount and directed the trial court to make this change. Overall, the court concluded that no significant errors impacted Warnick's trial or his sentence, except for the mentioned fee correction. His appeal was mostly denied, reinforcing his conviction but providing a slight adjustment in the costs associated with his defense. The dissenting opinion on this case was not detailed in the decision.

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F-2017-241

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In OCCA case No. F-2017-241, Joseph Tunley, Jr. appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and send the case back for a new trial. The court found that Tunley's original waiver of his right to a jury trial was not shown to be knowing, intelligent, or competent, which is required by law. The dissenting opinion was not specified, but it indicates that there may have been differing views on the matter.

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M-2016-108

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In OCCA case No. M-2016-108, Marty Spence Duncan appealed his conviction for Domestic Abuse - Assault and Battery and Assault. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse Duncan's judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial because the record did not show that he had waived his right to a jury trial. One judge dissented.

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F-2015-715

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In OCCA case No. F-2015-715, Kevin Judd Lemons appealed his conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs, After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies, and other related charges. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify his sentence to seventeen years in prison and reduce his fine to $10,000.00. One judge dissented regarding how the sentence was amended. The case began with Lemons being charged for drug trafficking and related offenses. During the trial, he was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison and fined $25,000. He argued several points in his appeal, including that the search of his vehicle was illegal, and the evidence against him was insufficient. He also claimed that he received an excessive sentence and that his defense attorney did not represent him well. The court reviewed these arguments carefully. On the first point, the court found that the police did not act improperly during the traffic stop which led to the discovery of drugs and paraphernalia. The court explained that the officers were following the law during the search. Regarding the second point, the court noted that Lemons himself had admitted to his prior felony convictions, which relieved the State from having to further prove these convictions. This meant his claims about insufficient evidence for his previous felonies were not valid for the appeal. For the claim about his sentence being too harsh, the court agreed that Lemons had been sentenced incorrectly under the wrong punishment range. They adjusted the duration of his prison time downward to correct this mistake. They also ruled that the fine imposed was not appropriate under the law, which allowed them to reduce it to a lower amount. Lastly, Lemons contended that his lawyer failed to support him effectively. The court found that most of the points mentioned did not show a serious problem with the representation that would warrant further action. Overall, the court upheld Lemons' conviction but decided to make changes to both his prison time and the fine he had to pay. While most judges agreed, one judge thought that rather than changing the sentence directly, the case should be sent back for a new sentencing hearing.

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M-2013-1049

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In OCCA case No. M-2013-1049, Wilson appealed his conviction for Domestic Abuse Assault and Battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. One judge dissented. Wilson was charged with Domestic Abuse Assault and Battery in 2012. In February 2013, after a trial without a jury, he was found guilty. The judge sentenced him to one year in jail, with thirty days to be served, and imposed a $500 fine. Wilson challenged his conviction by raising several issues, including that he was not properly informed about his right to a jury trial and that he did not knowingly waive that right. The court found that there was no valid waiver of Wilson's right to a jury trial in the court record. They explained that for a waiver to be valid, the defendant must clearly understand what they are giving up. Since there were no documents or transcripts showing that Wilson knew about his right to a jury trial or chose to waive it, the court ruled that there was fundamental error. The majority opinion concluded by reversing Wilson's conviction and ordering a new trial because of the issues surrounding the jury trial waiver. One judge disagreed and believed that the record showed Wilson had been properly informed about his rights and that he had made a competent choice to proceed with a bench trial. However, the majority decision carried the ruling, leading to a new trial for Wilson.

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M-2014-235

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In OCCA case No. M-2014-235, Donald Wayne Farino appealed his conviction for Obtaining Cash By False Pretenses and Petit Larceny. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse his convictions and send the case back for a new trial. No one dissented.

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J-2014-980

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In OCCA case No. J-2014-980, the Appellant appealed his conviction for Lewd or Indecent Acts to a Child Under 16. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to vacate the order adjudicating him as a delinquent child due to the lack of sufficient evidence that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a trial by jury. One judge dissented.

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J-2014-0646

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In OCCA case No. J-2014-0646, D.S.C. appealed his conviction for lewd or indecent acts to a child under 16. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the order adjudicating him as a delinquent child and remand the case for further proceedings. One justice dissented. D.S.C., who was born on September 17, 1997, had been charged with two counts of lewd or indecent acts, and a petition was filed on December 21, 2012. His trial occurred without a jury on July 9, 2014, and the decision was made to find him delinquent, meaning that the court said he had committed an act that is considered wrong for a child of his age. D.S.C. appealed this decision, arguing that he had been denied a right to a jury trial. He claimed that he agreed to waive his jury trial as part of a deal to enter a sex offender program, which he did not end up getting into. Because he could not start or complete this program, he felt that he should not have waived his right to a jury trial. He believed that the deal between him and the State was unfair because it was not fulfilled, and therefore, the agreement should not hold. The court agreed with D.S.C. and pointed out that he had the right to demand a jury trial, which could only be waived under certain conditions. Since the conditions of the deal were not met, the waiver of the jury trial was not valid. This means that once the deal fell through, D.S.C. should have been given the chance to have a jury trial. Because of this ruling, the court decided to reverse the earlier decision that found D.S.C. delinquent and send it back to the lower court so that it can be handled differently. Since the court found this issue important, they did not see a need to discuss the other claims D.S.C. made in his appeal. Therefore, the outcome focused on the jury trial right, leading to the decision that he deserved another chance to have a trial with a jury.

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F-2011-962

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In OCCA case No. F-2011-962, Jonas Alan Thornton appealed his conviction for Assault with a Dangerous Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse Thornton's conviction and remand the case for a new trial due to concerns over the impartiality of the trial judge. One judge dissented. Thornton was convicted after a non-jury trial where the judge was someone he had previously consulted while looking for legal advice regarding the case against him. The incident occurred in January 2010 when Thornton allegedly fired a handgun into a house. After being arrested, he spoke with the judge, who was not in his judge role at that time. Later, the judge was elected and presided over Thornton’s trial. During the appeal, Thornton claimed that the judge should have recused himself because of their prior interaction, which could influence how the judge viewed the case. The court found that the judge failed to follow rules requiring him to step aside, which led to a decision that Thornton did not receive a fair trial. The court stated that even though Thornton did not directly ask for the judge to disqualify himself at the time, this did not eliminate the obligation for the judge to recognize a conflict of interest. The relationship between Thornton and the judge meant that the fairness of the trial could be doubted. As a result, the court ruled that Thornton's conviction needed to be reversed, and he would get a new trial. This decision effectively set aside the earlier trial's results and meant that any further claims Thornton made concerning his representation or other trial aspects were not addressed since the focus was on the impartiality of the judge.

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M 2011-0870

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In OCCA case No. M 2011-0870 and case No. M 2011-0871, Sherry Kay Taylor appealed her conviction for driving under the influence and other related offenses. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse her conviction and ordered a new trial. One judge dissented.

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M-2010-341

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In OCCA case No. M-2010-341, Katherine Denise Burns appealed her conviction for Harassment by Use of an Electronic Device. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse her conviction and instructed to dismiss the case. One judge dissented. Burns was found guilty in a trial in the District Court of Seminole County, where she was accused of sending harassing text messages to Jennifer Johnson. The court sentenced her to six months in jail, but the sentence was suspended. Burns argued that the way the charges were written (the Information) was not clear enough and that the evidence against her was not strong enough to convict her. During the trial, the State presented evidence that Burns sent three text messages to Johnson. The first message included Johnson's social security number, the second suggested Burns knew personal information about Johnson, and the third revealed Johnson's home address. The State claimed that Burns violated a law that prohibits making electronic communications without disclosing one’s identity in a way that annoys, abuses, threatens, or harasses another person. However, the court found that the messages did not meet the legal requirement because Burns’s cell phone number was visible to Johnson. The court concluded that since Burns's identity was clear, she could not be convicted under the law cited by the State. Ultimately, the court decided that there wasn’t enough evidence to prove that Burns committed the specific crime she was charged with, leading them to reverse her conviction and dismiss the case.

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F-2009-236

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In OCCA case No. F-2009-236, James Lee Copeland, Jr. appealed his conviction for Attempted Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction but ordered the district court to correct the official record to properly reflect the conviction and remove an incorrect statement about parole eligibility. One judge dissented.

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F-2008-538

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In OCCA case No. F-2008-538, Jerry Johnson appealed his conviction for Robbery by Force. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that Johnson did not competently, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial, which means that he deserves a new trial. However, the evidence presented in his bench trial was sufficient to support his conviction, so they remanded the case for a new trial. One judge dissented.

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M-2007-62

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In OCCA case No. M-2007-62, Jimmy Dale Luttrell appealed his conviction for Domestic Assault and Battery in the Presence of a Minor Child. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse Luttrell's conviction due to insufficient evidence. One judge dissented. Luttrell was found guilty by a special judge and was sentenced to one year in jail with the sentence suspended, along with fines and costs. The main issue in the appeal was the lack of evidence against Luttrell. The victim, who was Luttrell's wife, did not testify at the trial. Since the wife did not provide testimony, the judge did not allow police officers to share what she had told them or to show her written statement. This left no evidence that proved Luttrell was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The State tried to argue that even without the victim's testimony, there was enough evidence for a reasonable person to conclude Luttrell was guilty. However, the court found that in previous similar cases, the victim's statements were allowed as evidence. Since Luttrell's case did not have any proof to establish that he committed the crime, the court reversed his conviction. Because of double jeopardy rules, Luttrell cannot be tried again for the same accusation, and the case was sent back to dismiss the charges.

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F-2005-874

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In OCCA case No. F-2005-874, Leroy Mitchell, Jr. appealed his conviction for First Degree Rape. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and grant him a new trial. One judge dissented. Leroy Mitchell, Jr. was found guilty of a serious crime after a trial without a jury. He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, but five of those years were suspended, meaning he didn't have to serve that time unless he got into trouble again. Mitchell believed there were problems during his trial and decided to appeal. He had several reasons for his appeal. First, he argued that some statements made during the trial were unfair because they were hearsay. Hearsay is when someone repeats what another person said rather than saying what they directly experienced. In Mitchell's case, he felt that the way the hearsay was used violated his rights, particularly his right to confront witnesses against him. Also, he claimed that some of the evidence presented in court was unreliable and that he did not have a fair chance to defend himself. He worried that the evidence related to other crimes might have influenced the judge unfairly. Mitchell also said that his lawyer did not perform well during the trial, which led to more problems. After reviewing everything, the court agreed that Mitchell's rights were not properly protected during the trial. Specifically, they found that the court allowed too much hearsay without the necessary checks to ensure it was reliable. This made it hard to believe the outcome of the trial was fair. As a result, the court decided to reverse the original judgment and said that Mitchell deserves another trial where these issues can be addressed properly.

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F-2005-405

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In OCCA case No. F-2005-405, Edward Mark Szczepan, Jr., appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery upon a Police Officer. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modified the sentence. The dissenting opinion was not recorded. Szczepan was tried in a non-jury trial and found guilty of assaulting a police officer. The court sentenced him to four years in prison and a $1,000 fine. He challenged two things in his appeal. First, he questioned whether he properly waived his right to a jury trial. The court found that the record showed he had indeed made a valid waiver. The second challenge was about whether the evidence was enough to prove he had prior felony convictions. The State admitted they failed to show this evidence during the trial. Because the prior convictions must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the court agreed that the evidence was insufficient. Since the State could not present proof of Szczepan's prior convictions, the court noted that he could not be given the enhanced sentence that came with those convictions. Thus, the court modified his sentence to one year in prison and reduced the fine to $500. Overall, while the court upheld the conviction, Szczepan's punishment was made less severe due to the lack of evidence for the prior convictions.

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F 2005-362

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In OCCA case No. F 2005-362, Pat Lee Richardson appealed his conviction for First Degree Manslaughter. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction but modified his sentence. One judge dissented regarding the sentence modification. Pat Lee Richardson was found guilty of First Degree Manslaughter after a trial without a jury in Comanche County. He was sentenced to 35 years in prison. He appealed, arguing that he had a defense based on Oklahoma's Make My Day Law, which allows people to use force against intruders in their homes. Richardson claimed the victim was an intruder when he was stabbed. The court explained that the Make My Day Law applies only when someone enters a home, but the victim was standing on the porch, not inside the house. Therefore, Richardson could not use that law as a defense. The court also noted that stabbing the victim a second time while he was on the ground was not justified. Richardson argued that his lawyer did not provide good assistance by not presenting the Make My Day Law defense. However, the court believed this did not affect the outcome of his trial since the law did not apply to his case. He also argued that his actions were justifiable as self-defense. The court stated that there was no evidence to show that he was in danger at the moment he stabbed the victim, considering the victim presented no serious threat. Lastly, Richardson argued that his 35-year sentence was too harsh. The court agreed and modified his sentence to 20 years, feeling that the original sentence was shocking and too severe when taking into account certain factors of the case. Overall, the court upheld the guilty verdict but decided to reduce the prison time that Pat Lee Richardson would have to serve.

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F-2005-363

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In OCCA case No. F-2005-363, Adan Ramos, Jr. appealed his conviction for Robbery by Force or Fear. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. The court found that there was no valid waiver of Ramos's right to a jury trial, which is a fundamental right. Ramos's other claims about ineffective assistance of counsel, exclusion of evidence, and interpreter issues became moot since the court ordered a new trial.

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