S-2019-242

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In OCCA case No. S-2019-242, the State of Oklahoma appealed Wesley Warren Peritt Weaver, II's conviction for Sexual Abuse of a Child Under 12. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's ruling that denied the State's request to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior sexual offenses as propensity evidence. One judge dissented. This case started on January 5, 2017, when the defendant, Weaver, was charged with sexually abusing his daughter, A.W., from 2011 to 2016. During a preliminary hearing, A.W. claimed that her father abused her and shared this information with her mother. The case involved testimonies from both A.W.'s mother and a forensic interviewer who assessed A.W. The State later sought to present evidence of previous sexual offenses allegedly committed by Weaver against another child, A.A., to demonstrate a pattern of behavior. A.A. testified that Weaver had molested her several years earlier. However, during a hearing, the trial court decided not to allow this evidence, stating that its probative value was less than the potential for unfair prejudice against Weaver. The State of Oklahoma appealed this ruling. They argued that the trial court made an error in not permitting the sexual propensity evidence, which could provide context for Weaver's behavior in the current case. The appellate court looked closely at the details of the case and the rules surrounding the admissibility of such evidence. Ultimately, the appellate court ruled to affirm the trial court's decision, meaning that the prior offense evidence would not be allowed during the trial against Weaver. The court concluded that the trial court's decision was reasonable and did not abuse its discretion. They found solid reasoning in the trial court's assessment of the evidence's relevance versus its potential negative impact on the jury's perception. One judge disagreed with the majority opinion, believing that the trial court had not fully considered the nuances of the sexual propensity laws and had conflated different types of evidentiary standards. This dissenting opinion emphasized the importance of acknowledging the differences between types of evidence when it comes to sexual offenses. In short, the case involved serious allegations against Weaver regarding his daughter, and while the State attempted to build a strong case by including prior incidents, the court ultimately felt that allowing such evidence would not be appropriate during the trial.

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J-2005-1078

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In OCCA case No. J-2005-1078, the appellant appealed his conviction for First Degree Rape. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the order that sentenced the appellant as an adult and directed that he be treated as a youthful offender in the event of a conviction. No judge dissented. The case began when the appellant was charged as a youthful offender on September 23, 2004. After a request to be treated as a juvenile was denied, the state filed a motion to sentence the appellant as an adult. This motion led to a trial that was scheduled for September 12, 2005. However, just before the trial started, the state asked to cancel the trial and have a hearing on the motion to sentence him as an adult, which was scheduled for October 12, 2005. During the appeal, the appellant raised three main issues. He argued that the delays in bringing the charges against him were unfair and that the case should be dismissed. He also claimed that the state could not pursue adult sentencing because the trial had already begun before the hearing, and lastly, he said there wasn't enough evidence to show he couldn't be helped through the juvenile system. The court looked closely at the timing of when the trial started and when the hearing to sentence him as an adult happened. They determined that the trial had indeed started when jury selection began, and the law required that the hearing on the adult sentencing motion should have happened before the trial began. Since it did not, the court found that the district court made a mistake by allowing the state to strike the trial after jury selection had started and then proceed with the sentencing hearing. As a result, the order to sentence the appellant as an adult was reversed, and the case was sent back to the district court with instructions to treat the appellant as a youthful offender if he were to be convicted.

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