In OCCA case No. MA 2018-0296, J.M.F. appealed his conviction for Lewd Acts with a Child. In a published decision, the court decided to grant his application for a writ of mandamus and remand the matter to the District Court. The court found that J.M.F. was personally indigent and entitled to receive transcripts at public expense for his appeal, despite the trial court's earlier ruling about his parents' ability to pay. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. S-2013-694, Fred A. Green, Ronald Krushe, and Christopher Thornburg appealed their conviction for kidnapping and first-degree burglary. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the dismissal of the charges against them. One judge dissented. The case began when the three men, who were bail bondsmen, went to a home to arrest two individuals, Billy and Pam Jones, who were staying there. They knocked on the door, entered the home, and handcuffed the Joneses to take them into custody. The homeowner, Patrick Wills, and his wife were not happy about this and called the police. While Green and his employees thought they were legally allowed to arrest the Joneses because they had a valid bond, the State of Oklahoma disagreed and charged them with burglary and kidnapping. The trial court disagreed, stating that the bondsmen did have the right to make the arrests. The State argued that the men acted unlawfully because of certain statements made during the incident, but the court found that they were working within their rights as bail bondsmen. Ultimately, the court upheld the decision to dismiss the charges, stating there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding that the bondsmen were acting legally.
In OCCA case No. S-2013-694, Fred A. Green appealed his conviction for kidnapping and first-degree burglary. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the dismissal of the charges against him and his co-defendants, Ronald Krushe and Christopher Thornburg. One judge dissented. The case began when Green, Krushe, and Thornburg were charged after they went to a home to arrest two individuals, Billy and Pam Jones, for breaching their bail bond. They entered the home without permission and removed the Joneses, leading to their arrest. However, the court found that since Green, Krushe, and Thornburg were acting as bail bondsmen with the legal authority to arrest, they did not commit the crimes of burglary or kidnapping. The state argued that their actions were unlawful since they entered the home with the intent to kidnap. However, the court determined that the bondsmen acted within their rights, resulting in the dismissal of charges.
In OCCA case No. S-2013-694, S-2013-695, S-2013-696, the defendants appealed their conviction for kidnapping and first-degree burglary. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the dismissal of the charges against the defendants. No one dissented. The case began when three bail bondsmen, Fred Green and his two employees, Ronald Krushe and Christopher Thornburg, were charged with kidnapping and burglary after they tried to arrest two people, Billy and Pam Jones, who had skipped out on their bail. They went to a home in Pawnee County where the Joneses were staying and entered without permission. They handcuffed the couple and attempted to take them to jail. However, the defendants argued that they had the legal right to arrest the Joneses because they had a valid bond with them. The court found that since they were acting within their legal authority when they arrested the couple, they did not commit kidnapping or burglary. The State disagreed, claiming that the defendants had intended to commit a crime. However, the court concluded that the defendants were within their rights and did not abuse their power. Therefore, the charges were dismissed, and the court upheld this dismissal in their ruling.
In OCCA case No. PR-2006-120, a petitioner appealed her conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug (methamphetamine) and driving without seatbelts. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petitioner's request for relief in part and deny it in part. One judge dissented. The case began when the petitioner was charged with possessing methamphetamine and driving without a seatbelt. She initially agreed to a plea deal with the state, which involved accepting guilt for the drug charge and a fine for the seatbelt violation. However, when the petitioner refused to follow through with the state’s conditions for the plea, she attempted to enter a non-negotiated or blind guilty plea. The judge refused to accept her blind plea and insisted she proceed to trial, stating she did not have an absolute right to plead guilty. The petitioner believed she should be allowed to enter her guilty plea without the state’s conditions. This disagreement led her to file a petition with the court seeking orders to either allow her to plead guilty or to prevent the judge from forcing her to go to trial. After reviewing the facts of the case, the court found that the petitioner had a clear legal right to have her guilty plea accepted if it met the necessary legal requirements. The court noted that it was a mistake for the judge to reject her plea without evaluating whether it was voluntary and if there was a factual basis for it. The court granted part of the petitioner’s request by directing the district court judge to conduct a hearing on her blind plea and accept it if it correctly fulfilled the legal standards. However, the court denied her request to have her plea regarding the seatbelt violation accepted, as that plea required the judge’s approval. The dissenting judge expressed concerns about whether the petitioner had truly shown that she was being harmed by the trial court's refusal to accept her plea, suggesting that any challenges to a guilty plea rejection should typically be taken up in direct appeals rather than with this type of petition. The dissenting judge also supported the trial judge's discretion, arguing that the right to a jury trial must be upheld. In summary, the court ruled that the petitioner should be given a chance to enter her guilty plea under the law, but that her plea regarding the seatbelt violation did not have to be accepted.