Legal Representation

F-2021-211

  • Post author:
  • Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2021-211, Michael Ray Dawkins appealed his conviction for assault and battery with a deadly weapon, felon in possession of a firearm, and maiming. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for assault and battery with a deadly weapon and felon in possession of a firearm but reversed the conviction for maiming and instructed to dismiss it. A dissenting opinion was not noted. The case involved a jury trial where Dawkins was found guilty on all counts after shooting a woman named Krystal Traylor. He received a sentence of 45 years for the assault and battery, 25 years for the firearm possession, and another 45 years for the maiming, with some sentences running concurrently and others consecutively. Dawkins raised several claims on appeal, including that his constitutional right to an attorney of his choice was violated, that he faced double punishment for the same act, and that there were errors in admitting certain evidence during his trial. Upon review, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Dawkins's request for a new attorney, as he did not provide valid reasons for wanting to change lawyers. It was also determined that Dawkins’s convictions for assault and battery and maiming stemmed from a single act, which should not result in multiple punishments. Therefore, the court reversed the maiming conviction. Further, the court found that the identification of Dawkins by the victim was correctly admitted as evidence, dismissing the hearsay claim. Dawkins's assertions about prior bad acts being admitted were also rejected, as they were deemed relevant and essential for establishing motive and intent. The court noted that a limiting instruction had been provided to jurors, mitigating concerns over the impact of these past acts. Finally, regarding Dawkins's claim for a speedy trial violation, the court found that the delays were mainly attributable to him or his defense strategies, concluding that he was not prejudiced by the delay. Overall, most of Dawkins's claims were denied, leading to the affirmation of his main convictions and the reversal of the maiming charge.

Continue ReadingF-2021-211

RE-2020-452

  • Post author:
  • Post category:RE

In OCCA case No. RE-2020-452, Katlin Maye Ford appealed her conviction for Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the order revoking her suspended sentence. One judge dissented. Katlin pled guilty to Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon and received a ten-year sentence that was suspended. This means she did not have to go to prison right away but had to follow certain rules. One rule was that she needed to pay restitution, which is money that goes to the victim to help with their losses. In October 2018, the State of Oklahoma asked the court to end her suspended sentence because she had not paid the restitution. In November 2018, Katlin decided to represent herself in court, meaning she did not want a lawyer. She admitted that she had not paid the restitution as ordered. The court then allowed more time for her to get back on track with her payments. However, in June 2020, the court decided to take away three years of her suspended sentence because she still had not paid the restitution. Katlin thought this was unfair and appealed the decision, making some important claims: 1. She said she was not given proper legal help when she needed it. 2. She believed the court should have helped her get a lawyer for her hearing. 3. She argued that any failure to pay the restitution was not intentional. In examining her first claim, the court noted that people have the right to have a lawyer when their suspended sentences are being revoked. For someone to give up that right, they must do it knowingly, which means they understand what they are doing. The court found that there was no clear record showing that Katlin had enough information about self-representation or that she made her decision with full understanding of the consequences. Since the court did not make sure she understood everything about waiving her right to a lawyer, the appeal was successful. The original decision to revoke her suspended sentence was reversed, meaning Katlin would get another chance to address her restitution payments and have proper legal representation. Therefore, the court instructed for the case to go back to the lower court for further actions that are consistent with its opinion. One judge disagreed with the majority's decision.

Continue ReadingRE-2020-452

C-2020-668

  • Post author:
  • Post category:C

In OCCA case No. C-2020-668, Jeffrey Montrell Alexander McClellan appealed his conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs, After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the lower court's order denying McClellan's application to withdraw his guilty plea and remanded the case for a new hearing with conflict-free counsel. One judge dissented. McClellan had entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to twelve years in prison and fined one thousand dollars. Later, he wrote a letter to the court saying he wanted to appeal because he believed he didn’t have proper legal help. The court treated this letter as a request to withdraw his guilty plea, but this request was denied. McClellan’s main argument was that he was not given effective assistance of counsel, especially at the hearing where he wanted to withdraw his plea. He said that the attorney who was supposed to help him at the hearing had represented him during the plea, creating a conflict of interest. The court agreed with him, saying that defendants have a right to a lawyer who can represent their interests without any conflicts. Since McClellan’s attorney did not actively defend him during the hearing and was the same attorney who represented him at the plea, the court found this to be a problem. As a result, the court ordered that McClellan gets a new hearing to discuss withdrawing his guilty plea, but this time with a different attorney who has no conflicting interests.

Continue ReadingC-2020-668

F-2017-1203

  • Post author:
  • Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2017-1203, Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta appealed his conviction for child neglect. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction to prosecute him, based on a prior ruling regarding Indian territory laws. One judge dissented, expressing concerns about the implications of the ruling and the handling of precedents.

Continue ReadingF-2017-1203

F-2017-357

  • Post author:
  • Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2017-357, Shawn Lee McDaniel appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to vacate the judgment and sentence, remanding the matter with instructions to dismiss. The main issue in this case was whether the victim was considered an Indian under federal law and whether the crime took place in Indian country, which is defined as land within the boundaries of Indian reservations. Both questions were answered affirmatively. The court looked to a previous case, McGirt v. Oklahoma, which established that certain lands in Oklahoma were still recognized as Indian reservations under federal law. McDaniel’s appeal was based on the fact that the murder occurred within the historic boundaries of the Cherokee Nation and that the victim was a recognized member of the Cherokee Nation at the time of his death. The court remanded the case to a lower court, which found that both of these conditions were true, meaning federal, not state, authorities had jurisdiction over the case. The court’s decision concluded that since the crime fell under the federal jurisdiction, the state of Oklahoma did not have the authority to prosecute McDaniel. Consequently, the judgement was vacated, and the matter was directed to be dismissed. While most judges agreed with the results, there were dissenting opinions which expressed concern and highlighted issues within the majority opinion, particularly regarding its adherence to historical precedents and the implications of McGirt's ruling.

Continue ReadingF-2017-357

C-2019-815

  • Post author:
  • Post category:C

In OCCA case No. C-2019-815, the petitioner appealed his conviction for First Degree Burglary, Second Degree Burglary, and Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to vacate the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand the case for a new hearing. One member of the court dissented. The case began when the petitioner, after entering guilty pleas for the charges, expressed a desire to withdraw those pleas. He believed he had not been properly represented by his attorney and filed a letter to withdraw his plea. A hearing was held where the petitioner appeared without his attorney. During this hearing, he claimed that he felt misled regarding the likely outcome of his plea. The petitioner argued that the hearing to withdraw his plea was unlawful because he was not given proper legal representation. He said that he didn’t effectively waive his right to counsel at that hearing and claimed there was a conflict of interest since his attorney had represented him in the original plea. The court found that there was no valid waiver of his right to counsel, meaning he didn’t fully understand the implications of representing himself. The trial court had not thoroughly questioned him about his need for counsel or his rights, leading to confusion about whether he was proceeding with an attorney or alone. The state agreed that the hearing had issues because the petitioner didn’t receive conflict-free representation. Therefore, the court ruled that the previous denial of his motion to withdraw his plea was a mistake and sent the case back for a new hearing where these issues could be properly addressed.

Continue ReadingC-2019-815

C-2019-15

  • Post author:
  • Post category:C

In OCCA case No. C-2019-15, Nicholas Allan Daniel appealed his conviction for First Degree Felony Murder (Distribution of a Controlled Dangerous Substance) and Robbery with a Firearm. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant his request for a writ of certiorari, modifying his conviction for First Degree Felony Murder while reversing his conviction for Robbery with a Firearm. One judge dissented from this opinion. Nicholas Daniel faced serious charges after being accused of killing a man while trying to sell drugs and also robbing him. He pleaded guilty to these charges but later wanted to withdraw his plea. He felt that his lawyer did not help him enough during the process, and he raised several reasons for this claim. He argued that the lawyer had a conflict of interest, that he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea, that the plea lacked a good factual basis, and that he did not get effective help from his lawyer. The court carefully examined each of Daniel's arguments. In the first argument, the court found no real conflict of interest because Daniel’s dissatisfaction stemmed from the state’s evidence and the sentence, not from his lawyer's performance. In the second argument, it was decided that Daniel had entered the plea with a clear understanding that he would face sentencing and that it was done voluntarily. For the third argument, about the factual basis for his felony murder conviction, the court found that there were issues with how the charges were presented. It was determined that the way Daniel described the incident in his plea was inadequate to meet the legal requirements for felony murder because he was treated primarily as a buyer, not a seller of drugs. Thus, the combined crimes could not both stand. In terms of Daniel's claims against his lawyer's effectiveness, the court acknowledged that his lawyer could have done better. However, it ruled against some of Daniel's more serious arguments on the effectiveness of his lawyer, finding that he did not provide sufficient proof that his lawyer’s actions negatively affected his defense. In the final decision, the court adjusted Daniel's felony murder conviction based on the issues around how the charges were processed and reversed the robbery conviction, as it should not stand alongside the adjusted murder charge. Ultimately, the court confirmed Daniel's modified conviction for felony murder but sent the case back regarding the robbery count. One judge disagreed with parts of this conclusion, stating that the trial court had not made a mistake in the first place and therefore should not have granted the appeal. The judge argued that since Daniel's plea was expressed clearly and voluntarily, it should have been upheld without modification. The judge emphasized the importance of adhering to proper legal processes and rules when making such determinations. Thus, the outcome celebrated the importance of ensuring that legal principles and procedures are correctly applied, even as it affirmed Daniel’s conviction under modified circumstances.

Continue ReadingC-2019-15

F-2018-1263

  • Post author:
  • Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2018-1263, Leatherwood appealed his conviction for Murder in the First Degree, Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Dangerous Substance, Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a Felony, Maintaining a Place for Keeping/Selling Controlled Substances, and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions. One judge dissented. Travis Michael Leatherwood fatally shot Aaron Smith on Halloween night in 2017. They were once friends and worked together selling marijuana, but their friendship soured when Smith stole marijuana from Leatherwood. On the night of the shooting, Smith, upset by an exchange of insults with Leatherwood, went to confront him, unarmed. Leatherwood shot Smith with a rifle before he could say a word. Smith later died from the gunshot wound. After the shooting, police found a lot of evidence connecting Leatherwood to marijuana distribution at his home, including a rifle that he had used to shoot Smith and other drug-related items. Leatherwood argued in court that he acted in self-defense, but the jury did not agree. They concluded that he was the aggressor, especially since he called Smith a coward and provoked him. The jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, along with several drug-related charges. Leatherwood raised multiple issues on appeal, including claims that the state did not prove he acted outside of self-defense, that the court gave confusing jury instructions, allowed improper amendments to the charges, and that he had ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court disagreed with all of his claims. In terms of self-defense, the court ruled that Leatherwood’s actions and words indicated he was not acting in self-defense but rather was the one who provoked the situation. He had armed himself before Smith arrived and shot him before any confrontation occurred. The court also discussed the jury instructions, concluding that the district court did not err by omitting instructions on a lesser charge of heat of passion manslaughter since there was no evidence to support that Smith's actions would provoke such a response from Leatherwood. As for the amendment of charges, the court determined that Leatherwood was sufficiently informed of the charges he faced and that he could defend against them adequately. The evidence showed that he had both the firearm and the controlled substances as part of his operations, fulfilling the requirements for his convictions. Leatherwood's claim that his lawyer was ineffective was also denied because the court found that the lawyer's strategies were reasonable given the overwhelming evidence against Leatherwood. The lawyer focused his arguments on the more serious murder charge rather than the drug offenses, which the jury could have easily decided against Leatherwood irrespective of those counts. Finally, the court ruled that Leatherwood's sentence was not excessive given the nature of the crime and his actions. The judge pointed out that the jury was aware of his age (20 at the time of the crime) and other circumstances, which did not make the sentence shockingly excessive. Ultimately, the court affirmed Leatherwood's convictions and ordered a separate hearing regarding the restitution amount, which needed to be calculated more accurately.

Continue ReadingF-2018-1263

F-2018-114

  • Post author:
  • Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2018-114, Andrew Huff appealed his conviction for four counts of Child Neglect and one count of Child Sexual Abuse. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction and sentence. One judge dissented. Andrew Huff was convicted of neglecting his children and sexually abusing a minor. He was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years for the neglect charges and thirty years for the sexual abuse, with all sentences running concurrently. He raised several arguments against his conviction, claiming his rights were violated through various means. First, Huff stated that his video-recorded statements to an investigator should not have been allowed in court because he didn't properly waive his right to counsel. The court found no error in admitting the statement, stating that Huff’s questioning did not clearly indicate he wanted a lawyer at that moment. Next, Huff argued that hearsay evidence was incorrectly allowed, which hurt his chance of a fair trial. However, the court found that any hearsay used was not harmful to the case since other clear evidence proved the charges. Huff also claimed improper admission of other crimes evidence during his police interview, but again, the court concluded there was enough evidence for a verdict regardless of those statements. Regarding jury instructions, Huff felt the jury did not receive proper guidance on the laws for child sexual abuse, which the court acknowledged but deemed harmless since overwhelming evidence supported the verdict. Huff’s claim of insufficient evidence was denied as the court found that evidence presented allowed for rational conclusions supporting the guilty verdicts on both child neglect and sexual abuse. He also brought up issues regarding prosecutorial misconduct during the trial. The court examined these claims and determined any alleged misconduct was not severe enough to warrant a reversal of the conviction. Huff argued that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the introduction of certain evidence and not properly advising him during the trial. The court disagreed, stating that the counsel's performance, while being scrutinized, did not affect the overall outcome of the trial as there was sufficient evidence against him. Lastly, Huff believed that his sentence was excessive, but the court noted that the punishment was within legal limits and that the nature of the crimes warranted the sentence imposed. The overall decision confirmed that there were no reversible errors during the trial, and the affirmance upheld Andrew Huff’s conviction and sentences.

Continue ReadingF-2018-114

RE-2019-57

  • Post author:
  • Post category:RE

In the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma, Toni Lynn Cook appeals the revocation of her suspended sentence from the McIntosh County District Court. Cook had originally pled guilty to the charge of Obstructing an Officer. Following her guilty plea, the State filed a Motion to Revoke her suspended sentence, claiming she committed new crimes while on probation, which included multiple counts of Assault and Battery on a Police Officer and Indecent Exposure. The revocation hearing saw evidence presented, including testimonies from jailers detailing that Cook had exposed herself and physically resisted their attempts to move her to a solitary cell, leading to injuries to the officers involved. The trial court found that the State met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Cook had violated her probation. Cook raised several propositions on appeal: 1. **Insufficient Evidence**: Cook argued that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove the alleged probation violations. However, the court found that the evidence sufficient and credible, affirming that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. 2. **Waiver of Hearing Within Twenty Days**: Cook contended that her waiver of the right to a hearing within twenty days was not valid. The court ruled that Cook had waived this right knowingly, as she had not requested an early hearing and did not provide evidence that she was unaware of this right. 3. **Excessiveness of Revocation**: Cook argued the revocation was excessive. The court noted that revocation is a matter of grace, and since Cook committed multiple new offenses while on probation, the trial judge's decision to revoke her sentence in full was not an abuse of discretion. In conclusion, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to revoke Cook's suspended sentence, finding no merit in her claims. The mandate was ordered to be issued upon filing the decision.

Continue ReadingRE-2019-57

F-2018-1186

  • Post author:
  • Post category:F

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **DOMINICK JAVON SMITH, Appellant,** **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** **Case No. F-2018-1186** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA JAN 30 2020** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN CLERK** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Appellant, Dominick Javon Smith, was tried by jury and convicted of Child Neglect, After Former Conviction of a Felony, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5(C), in the District Court of Tulsa County Case Number CF-2017-1887. The jury recommended punishment of forty years imprisonment and payment of a $5,000.00 fine. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly; she will serve 85% of her sentence before becoming eligible for parole consideration. From this judgment and sentence, Appellant appeals, raising three propositions of error: **I.** The trial court erred in permitting the State to cross-examine Dominick Smith in the punishment stage on matters not relevant to her alleged prior felony conviction. **II.** Prosecutorial misconduct deprived Appellant of a fair trial. **III.** Appellant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. After thorough consideration of the record, including the original documents and briefs, we find that under the law and evidence, Appellant is not entitled to relief. In her first proposition, Appellant claims that the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to question her about matters irrelevant to her prior felony conviction. While defense counsel objected multiple times, only two objections referenced relevance. Therefore, the remainder is assessed under plain error review. Under the Simpson test, we assess actual error that is plain or obvious and that affects substantial rights. The trial court's limitations on cross-examination are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. During the punishment phase, Appellant testified on direct that she had a prior felony conviction for child abuse. On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Appellant about conflicting statements made to police, thereby attempting to impeach her credibility. Given that Appellant opened the door to her prior conviction and explanation, there was no error in allowing such cross-examination. Proposition I is denied. In Proposition II, Appellant contends prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing arguments when the prosecutor suggested that Santa Claus may have caused the victim's injuries and discussed how Appellant's actions deprived K.O. of life experiences. As Appellant failed to object, we review these claims for plain error. The prosecutor's remarks were within acceptable boundaries as they focused on the evidence and reasonable inferences. Appellant's claim that the argument improperly sought sympathy for K.O. does not render it improper. The remarks about the consequences of Appellant's actions are relevant and permissible. Thus, Proposition II is denied. Lastly, in Proposition III, Appellant claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutor's cross-examination and closing argument. Under the Strickland test, the claims of ineffectiveness can be dismissed due to lack of demonstrated error in the prosecutor’s conduct. Since neither allegation resulted in plain error, the claim of ineffective assistance fails. Thus, Proposition III is denied. **DECISION** The JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. --- *Counsel for Appellant: Richard Koller, Richard Couch, Rebecca Newman* *Counsel for the State: Mike Hunter, Andrea Brown, Keeley L. Miller* **OPINION BY: LUMPKIN, J.** LEWIS, P.J.: Concur KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur HUDSON, J.: Concur ROWLAND, J.: Concur [Download Opinion PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1186_1734785732.pdf)

Continue ReadingF-2018-1186

F-2018-1061

  • Post author:
  • Post category:F

**Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma** **Case Summary: Joshua Loyd Bullard v. The State of Oklahoma** **Case No.: F-2018-1061** **Date Filed:** January 30, 2020 --- **Overview:** Joshua Loyd Bullard was convicted in the District Court of Stephens County for several offenses, including Petit Larceny, Resisting a Peace Officer, and Assault and Battery on a Police Officer. The jury determined sentences for each count, ultimately resulting in consecutive sentences totaling eight years, along with fines. Bullard appealed on two grounds: ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. --- **Propositions of Error:** 1. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:** - Claim: Bullard contended that his attorney failed to request a third competency evaluation. - Analysis: The court assessed this claim based on the two-pronged test from *Strickland v. Washington*. It determined that defense counsel did not provide deficient performance, noting that two prior evaluations had confirmed Bullard's competency. There was no evidence suggesting a change in Bullard's mental state warranting further evaluation. Thus, the court ruled that there was no ineffective assistance. 2. **Prosecutorial Misconduct:** - Claim: Bullard argued that improper comments by the prosecutor regarding his prior suspended sentence during closing arguments prejudiced his trial. - Analysis: The court found that without objection from Bullard's counsel, review was limited to plain error. The court determined that the prosecutor’s references were permissible as they pertained to relevant evidence of prior convictions. Furthermore, the outcome of the sentencing showed that the jury's verdict was reasonable and not influenced by any improper statements. --- **Decision:** The appeals court affirmed the judgment and sentence imposed by the District Court, finding no merit in either of Bullard's propositions for appeal. **Judgment: AFFIRMED.** --- **Note:** The decision referenced case law and standards concerning competency evaluations and prosecutorial conduct during trials, underscoring the adherence to procedural norms. **For the Full Text Access:** [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1061_1734859049.pdf)

Continue ReadingF-2018-1061

F-2018-989

  • Post author:
  • Post category:F

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **ARNULFO CAMPOS GONZALES, Appellant,** **V.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** **Case No. F-2018-989** **File Date: January 2020** **OPINION BY: ROWLAND, JUDGE** Appellant Arnulfo Campos Gonzales appeals his Judgment and Sentence from the District Court of Haskell County, Case No. CF-2017-197. He was convicted for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs, Conspiracy to Traffic Methamphetamine, and Conspiracy to Distribute Methamphetamine. His sentences included twenty-five years imprisonment for Count 1 and ten years each for Counts 2 and 3, ordered to be served consecutively. Gonzales raises several issues on appeal: 1. Denial of effective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest. 2. Double punishment for Counts 2 and 3. 3. Violation of the Fourth Amendment regarding the search of his car. 4. Deficient jury instructions on conspiracy. 5. Ineffective assistance of counsel due to failure to suppress and object to instructions. 6. Abuse of discretion in consecutive sentencing. **1. Conflict of Interest** Gonzales argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel’s prior representation of a co-defendant, Samantha Johnson, who testified against him. The court examined whether an actual conflict arose during representation, determining that Gonzales failed to demonstrate that the former representation affected counsel's performance. The court found that Johnson’s testimony largely did not implicate Gonzales and that counsel's representation was sufficient. **2. Multiple Punishment** Gonzales contends that sentencing him for conspiracy to traffic and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine violates the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same act. The court found both counts stemmed from a single agreement concerning the same methamphetamine and that the convictions constituted a violation of Section 11. The court remanded the case for dismissal of Count 3. **3. Fourth Amendment** Gonzales did not properly contest the legality of the search of his car and thus the court reviewed this claim for plain error. The court concluded that Gonzales had not demonstrated that the timeline of events during the traffic stop violated his rights, as he consented to the search prior to its execution. **4. Jury Instructions** Gonzales argued that jury instructions were insufficient as they failed to name the conspirators. However, the court determined the instructions, when read as a whole, properly conveyed the necessary information. Gonzales did not establish any plain error regarding jury instructions. **5. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel** This claim was evaluated under the standard set by Strickland v. Washington. The court found no prejudice affecting the outcome as Gonzales could not demonstrate ineffective assistance. **6. Consecutive Sentences** Gonzales claims the district court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. The prosecutor’s remark about a presumed policy did not demonstrate that the district court failed to exercise discretion. The court affirmed its decision as the record supported the imposition of consecutive sentences. **DECISION** The Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED for Counts 1 and 2. Count 3 is DISMISSED. Gonzales’s Application for Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED. **APPEARANCES** *AT TRIAL* Roger Hilfiger, Counsel for Defendant *ON APPEAL* Ariel Parry, Appellate Counsel Christina Burns, Assistant District Attorney Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma **OPINION BY: ROWLAND, J.** **LEWIS, P.J., KUEHN, V.P.J., LUMPKIN, J., HUDSON, J.:** Concur. [PDF Download Link](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-989_1734871593.pdf)

Continue ReadingF-2018-989

F-2018-691

  • Post author:
  • Post category:F

The document you provided outlines a legal case involving Jose Santiago Hernandez, who had his suspended sentences revoked due to alleged perjury. Here’s a summary of the key points: 1. **Background**: Hernandez entered a guilty plea to charges of robbery with a firearm and conspiracy in January 2017, resulting in a ten-year sentence with the last five years suspended. 2. **Revocation**: The State filed an application to revoke his suspended sentences on the grounds that he committed perjury by providing false statements regarding his co-defendant's involvement in the robbery during court proceedings. 3. **Hearing**: A revocation hearing took place on December 19, 2018, where the judge found that Hernandez did not provide truthful testimony. The judge ruled in favor of the State's application to revoke his suspended sentences. 4. **Appeal**: Hernandez appealed the revocation, arguing that the State did not present sufficient evidence of perjury, violating his due process rights. 5. **Court's Decision**: The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that violations of suspended sentences need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the revocation and found no abuse of discretion by the trial court. 6. **Conclusion**: The revocation of Hernandez's suspended sentences was upheld. For any further inquiries or specific details about the case, feel free to ask!

Continue ReadingF-2018-691

C-2018-1184

  • Post author:
  • Post category:C

In the case of Hipolito John Herrera v. The State of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals addressed Herrera's appeal concerning his guilty plea to Conjoint Robbery. The key issues raised by Herrera were: 1. **Plea Validity**: Herrera argued that his guilty plea was not entered freely, knowingly, and intelligently, citing misadvice from his legal counsel regarding his potential maximum sentence. The State conceded this point, acknowledging that the plea was not made with the requisite understanding. The court found that this constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Herrera's motion to withdraw his plea. 2. **Restitution Order**: Herrera's second and third propositions focused on the restitution order, arguing that the trial court did not have sufficient proof of actual losses incurred by the victim and a bail bondsman, and that the bail bondsman should not be considered a victim under Oklahoma restitution laws. However, these propositions became moot due to the decision on the plea validity. Ultimately, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Herrera's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and remanded the case for further proceedings. This ruling emphasized the importance of ensuring a defendant's plea is made with full understanding and without coercion or misinformation. The judicial decision highlighted in the summary opinion grants Herrera relief, enabling him to withdraw his plea and possibly reassess the legal consequences and restitution implications of his case.

Continue ReadingC-2018-1184

M-2017-511

  • Post author:
  • Post category:M

**Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma** **Case: William Robert Burk vs. The State of Oklahoma** **Case No: M-2017-511** #### OPINION BY: Kuehn, VPJ **Background:** William Robert Burk was convicted of Obstruction of Public Officer in the District Court of Payne County, sentenced to 30 days in jail and fined $500. The case arose from an incident on December 13, 2015, where Burk was stopped for driving with an improper license tag. He refused to provide a driver's license, proof of insurance, or identify himself. Police officers were forced to break into his vehicle after he locked himself inside, leading to his arrest. **Proposition I: Self-Representation** Burk contends the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself without ensuring he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. The court finds that Burk effectively waived his right to counsel through his actions over time, including repeatedly refusing to secure legal representation. The court cites multiple precedents establishing that a defendant may waive the right to counsel by conduct, and emphasizes the need for a clear understanding of the risks involved in self-representation. While acknowledging Burk's claims of financial capacity to hire an attorney, he nevertheless insisted he would not apply for court-appointed counsel. The court concludes Burk’s behavior—self-characterization of being forced to represent himself and refusal to accept assistance—constituted an implied waiver of his right to counsel, allowing the trial to proceed without an attorney. **Proposition II: Sufficiency of Evidence** In his second claim, Burk argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. However, the court finds that Burk's refusal to provide identification and engage with police clearly obstructed their duties. Citing relevant statutes and case law, the court asserts that any rational jury could find him guilty of obstructing a public officer based on his actions during the encounter. **Conclusion:** The court affirms the judgment and sentence from the District Court of Payne County, asserting that Burk had sufficient warnings about self-representation risks and willingly chose to proceed without counsel. ### Dissenting Opinion - Judge Lumpkin Judge Lumpkin argues against affirming the conviction, citing concerns about Burk's mental state and the trial court's failure to ensure he was adequately informed of the consequences of self-representation. He emphasizes that Burk was not given proper Fairtta warnings about the implications of his decision and suggests that mental health issues should have prompted the court to reevaluate Burk's right to counsel. ### Concurring Opinion - Judge Hudson Judge Hudson agrees with the outcome but asserts that the basis for the decision hinges not on waiver by conduct but rather on forfeiture of counsel due to Burk's dilatory misconduct. He highlights the necessity for courts to maintain order and efficiently administer justice, especially when faced with obstructionist behavior from defendants. **Decision: The Judgment is AFFIRMED.** For further details and full opinions, you may refer to [this PDF link](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/M-2017-511_1734779027.pdf).

Continue ReadingM-2017-511

C-2019-132

  • Post author:
  • Post category:C

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **Case No. C-2019-132** **Filed: October 31, 2019** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** --- **JAMES ROBERT BROWN,** **Petitioner,** **v.** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Respondent.** --- *SUMMARY OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI* **HUDSON, JUDGE:** Petitioner James Robert Brown was charged with Domestic Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon in Garfield County District Court, Case No. CF-2018-496, following prior felony convictions. On December 17, 2018, he entered a negotiated guilty plea before Judge Paul K. Woodward, who sentenced him to six years in prison, including credit for time served and ordered various fees and costs. Subsequently, Brown attempted to withdraw his guilty plea through a pro se motion filed on January 9, 2019. After a hearing on February 7, 2019, where Brown and his plea counsel testified, Judge Woodward denied the motion. Brown now seeks a writ of certiorari alleging: 1. He did not have access to discovery materials prior to his plea, thus could not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. 2. He received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon reviewing the record, transcripts, and the petition, we find that no relief is warranted. **Certiorari Review Standard:** Review is limited to whether the plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently before a competent court. Brown's letter, which was delayed in reaching the judge, was deemed timely. The denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion, defined as an arbitrary action without proper consideration of relevant facts and law. The burden lies with the petitioner to demonstrate a defect in the plea process. **Proposition I:** Brown asserts he was unaware of the State's case when pleading. The record contradicts this claim, showing he chose to proceed with the plea despite not having the requested discovery. Brown was informed of the charge involving a knife in the assault. His desire for additional information does not undermine the voluntary nature of his plea. The trial court's conclusion that Brown's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered is well-supported. Proposition I is denied. **Proposition II:** To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Brown must show both deficient performance and resultant prejudice. Brown claims his attorney's failure to provide discovery information led him to plead guilty. However, since we found the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, he cannot demonstrate Strickland prejudice—the necessary negative impact on his defense. Therefore, Proposition II is also denied. **DECISION:** The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is DENIED, and the Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall be issued upon this decision's filing. --- **APPEARANCES:** - **Counsel for Petitioner:** Timothy R. Beebe, Norman, OK - **Counsel for Defendant (Plea):** Mark P. Hoover, Enid, OK - **Counsel for Defendant (Motion to Withdraw):** Benjamin Barker, Enid, OK - **Counsel for the State:** Irene N. Asai, Assistant District Attorney, Garfield County Courthouse, Enid, OK **Opinion by:** Hudson, J. **Concurred by:** Lewis, P.J.; Kuehn, V.P.J.; Lumpkin, J.; Rowland, J. *For the complete opinion in PDF format, click [here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2019-132_1734231422.pdf).*

Continue ReadingC-2019-132

C-2019-227

  • Post author:
  • Post category:C

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **CYNTHIA ROWSHELL GAY,** Petitioner, **V.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Respondent. **Case No. C-2019-227** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **OCT 31 2019** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** **SUMMARY OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI** Petitioner Cynthia Rowshell Gay, represented by counsel, entered guilty pleas as part of a plea agreement with the State to the charges of Count 1, Driving While Under the Influence, a violation of 47 O.S.2011, § 11-902, and Count 2, Driving While Under Suspension, a violation of 47 O.S.2011, § 6-303(B), in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2019-369. The Honorable Kathryn R. Savage, Special Judge, accepted the pleas on February 19, 2019. The plea agreement included a five-year sentence on Count 1, with all but the first thirty days suspended, and a one-year suspended sentence on Count 2, with the sentences running concurrently. On March 1, 2019, Petitioner filed an Application to Withdraw Guilty Plea, and a hearing was held on March 21, 2019, which resulted in the denial of her application. Petitioner claims the following error: Ms. Gay did not knowingly and voluntarily enter her plea of guilty, and thus the District Court erred when it denied her Application to Withdraw her Guilty plea. Upon thorough review of the record, including original documents, transcripts, and briefs, we find no need for reversal or modification. Our evaluation of a guilty plea focuses on its voluntary and intelligent nature (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 1969; Ocampo v. State, 1989 OK CR 38, ¶ 3). We review the denial of a petitioner's motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion (Lewis v. State, 2009 OK CR 30, ¶ 5). Petitioner acknowledged signing the Plea of Guilty Summary of Facts form, which reflected her voluntary decision to plead guilty and accept a suspended sentence. With prior felony convictions, she was familiar with the process. Her motivations for signing the plea agreement, including a desire to expedite her release from jail, do not render the plea involuntary (United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400, 404 (1st Cir. 1970)). Petitioner’s change of heart after consulting relatives does not provide grounds for withdrawal, nor does disappointment with her sentence (Miles v. U.S., 385 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1967); Lozoya v. State, 1996 OK CR 55, ¶ 44). The trial court found her plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, and its findings during the hearing on the application to withdraw were credible. The record shows that Petitioner was fully informed of and understood the consequences of her plea. Her later claim regarding misunderstanding the conditions of her suspended sentence was deemed incredible by the trial court. We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Therefore, the proposition is denied. **DECISION:** The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is DENIED. The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is AFFIRMED. **Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED to be issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.** **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE KATHRYN R. SAVAGE, SPECIAL JUDGE** **APPEARANCES IN DISTRICT COURT:** NICOLE BURNS, ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER HALLIE E. BOVOS, ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER 320 ROBERT S. KERR, #400 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE **APPEARANCES ON APPEAL:** RICKY LUTZ, ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY 320 ROBERT S. KERR, #505 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 COUNSEL FOR THE STATE **NO RESPONSE NECESSARY** **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **LEWIS, P.J.: Concur** **KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur** **HUDSON, J.: Concur** **ROWLAND, J.: Concur** [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2019-227_1734232520.pdf)

Continue ReadingC-2019-227

F-2018-954

  • Post author:
  • Post category:F

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **Case No. F-2018-954** --- **CHRISTIAN D. MOLINA-SOLORZANO, Appellant,** **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **ROWLAND, JUDGE:** Appellant Christian D. Molina-Solorzano appeals his Judgment and Sentence from the District Court of Beckham County, Case No. CF-2017-259, for Aggravated Trafficking in Illegal Drugs, in violation of 63 O.S.Supp.2015, § 2-415. The Honorable F. Douglas Haught presided over the non-jury trial, found Molina-Solorzano guilty, and sentenced him to fifteen years imprisonment, $1,000.00 fine, and one year of post-imprisonment supervision. Molina-Solorzano raises the following issues: 1. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge the basis for the traffic stop. 2. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inform him of his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). 3. Entitlement to retroactive application of recent changes in law regarding parole eligibility for aggravated trafficking convictions. **DECISION:** After review, we find relief is not warranted and affirm the district court's Judgment and Sentence. **1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Traffic Stop Challenge** Molina-Solorzano asserts that defense counsel was ineffective by not challenging the validity of the traffic stop, which he claims was based on race discrimination and an inadequate fog light infraction. To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, Molina-Solorzano must demonstrate: - Counsel's performance was deficient. - The deficiency resulted in prejudice that affected the outcome of the trial. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and a traffic stop is valid if the officer had probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. The record, including video evidence from the traffic stop, supports that the stop was justified due to a fog light infraction. The trooper's testimony confirmed that visibility was over a mile, and thus the use of fog lights constituted a violation under Oklahoma law. Since the stop was justified, Molina-Solorzano cannot establish that counsel's failure to challenge it affected the trial's outcome, denying his ineffective assistance claim. **2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: VCCR Rights** Molina-Solorzano also contends that defense counsel failed to inform him of his rights under the VCCR, which would have allowed him to contact the Mexican consulate for assistance. To evaluate this claim, we consider: - Whether he was unaware of his right to contact his consulate. - Whether he would have utilized that right had he known. - Whether the consulate's assistance would have likely aided his defense. The record lacks evidence that Molina-Solorzano was unaware of his rights or that assistance from the consulate would have changed the trial's outcome. Appellate counsel's assertions do not suffice to demonstrate these conditions. Therefore, this claim is also denied. **3. Retroactive Application of Parole Changes** Molina-Solorzano argues that he should benefit from recent legislative proposals reducing parole eligibility terms for aggravated trafficking convictions. However, as legislation is not retroactive unless explicitly stated, and the referenced Senate Bill was never enacted, his claim is moot. **CONCLUSION:** The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED. The MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon filing of this decision. **APPEARANCES** - Kenny R. Goza, Counsel for Defendant - Debra K. Hampton, Counsel for Appellant - Gina R. Webb, Counsel for State - Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma - Joshua R. Fanelli, Assistant Attorney General **OPINION BY:** ROWLAND, J. **Concur in Results:** KUEHN, V.P.J. **Concur:** LUMPKIN, J. **Concur:** HUDSON, J. --- For the full decision, click here: [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-954_1734874505.pdf)

Continue ReadingF-2018-954

D-2014-153

  • Post author:
  • Post category:D

The court's opinion in this case addresses multiple aspects of the criminal trial of Donnie L. Harris, Jr., who was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of his girlfriend Kristi Ferguson. The court's analysis spans various propositions presented by the appellant, mainly challenging the trial proceedings, including issues related to the completeness of the trial record, the admission of evidence, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the handling of victim impact statements. ### Key Points: 1. **Trial Proceedings**: The case stemmed from an incident where Harris was accused of intentionally setting his girlfriend on fire. Testimonies and evidence presented at trial indicated abusive conduct leading up to the incident. 2. **Trial Record and Appeal**: - **Incomplete Record**: Harris contended there were omissions in the trial record affecting his appeal. The court ruled that while some materials were missing, the existing record was sufficient to conduct a meaningful review, and the appeal could proceed. - **Physical Evidence**: Harris claimed vital evidence was lost or destroyed, impacting his defense. The court found no indication of bad faith by the prosecution regarding the evidence's loss. 3. **Expert Testimony**: Harris argued he was denied fair trial rights due to the absence of expert testimony regarding fire investigations because his expert was unavailable. The court noted that the defense had made strategic choices not to pursue alternative means to present this testimony, and found no abuse of discretion by the trial court. 4. **Victim Impact Statements**: The court supported the admissibility of victim impact statements from Ferguson’s family, including the argument that such testimonies provide necessary context during the sentencing phase. 5. **Aggravating Circumstances**: The court found sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s determination that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and that there was a great risk of death to more than one person during the crime. 6. **Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: Harris alleged his trial attorneys were ineffective in their representation. The court upheld the presumption that trial counsel acted within reasonable professional norms, asserting their decisions were strategic responses to the evidence and circumstances. 7. **Statutory Challenges**: Harris's challenges to the death penalty laws were rejected as the court reiterated that past precedent upholds the application of these laws. 8. **Motion for New Trial**: Harris’s motion for new trial, based on newly discovered evidence, was dismissed as untimely. 9. **Cumulative Error**: Harris claimed that errors cumulatively led to an unfair trial; however, the court found no reasonable probability that errors affected the verdict. ### Conclusion: The court affirmed the judgment and sentence from the trial court, rejecting all propositions raised by Harris. The opinion emphasizes the trial's conduct, the sufficiency of evidence supporting the verdict, and the strong standards governing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The approach to victim impact testimony and the framework of the aggravating circumstances were also upheld in this detailed analysis, asserting the integrity of the judicial process throughout the trial and its aftermath. Ultimately, Harris’s convictions and death sentence were maintained, reiterating the court's reliance on procedural appropriateness and the substantive evidence presented during the trial.

Continue ReadingD-2014-153

F-2018-341

  • Post author:
  • Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2018-341, Anthony Kejuan Day appealed his conviction for several charges. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment and sentence against him. One judge dissented. Mr. Day was convicted of assault and battery on a police officer, conspiracy to cause violence, possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, obstructing an officer, and resisting an officer. The trial court sentenced him to a total of twenty-five years for the first charge, with additional long sentences for the others. Mr. Day argued that the trial court made several mistakes. He claimed that the prosecution unfairly excluded African-American jurors, that changes to the charges against him were wrong, that he was punished too harshly for similar actions, and that his sentences should not have run one after the other but rather together. The court examined each argument. For the claim about jurors, it decided that the trial court acted properly and that there was no discrimination. Regarding the changes to the charges, the court found no clear mistakes that would have harmed Mr. Day's case. The court also rejected his argument about facing double punishment for similar offenses. Finally, it determined that the trial court was correct in allowing the sentences to be served consecutively. In conclusion, the court upheld the decision of the trial court and affirmed Mr. Day's convictions and sentences.

Continue ReadingF-2018-341

RE-2018-1039

  • Post author:
  • Post category:RE

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **FRANK REVILLA PAIZ, JR.,** Appellant, **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. --- **Case No. RE-2018-1039** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA SEP 12 2019** **SUMMARY OPINION** **ROWLAND, JUDGE:** On January 4, 2017, Appellant Frank Revilla Paiz, Jr., represented by counsel, entered guilty pleas to multiple charges including Possession of CDS - Methamphetamine (Count 2), Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (Count 4), Driving Without a Driver's License (Count 5), Failure to Maintain Insurance or Security (Count 6), and Failure to Pay Taxes Due to the State (Count 7) in Woodward County Case No. CF-2016-114. He received an eight-year sentence for Count 2 and a one-year sentence for Count 4, with all but the first year suspended, subject to probation conditions. Sentences were concurrent. On the same day, Paiz pleaded guilty in Woodward County Case No. CF-2016-117 to Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance - Methamphetamine (Count 1) and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (Count 2), receiving similar sentences. On June 2, 2017, the State filed an Application to Revoke Paiz's suspended sentences in Cases CF-2016-114 and CF-2016-117, citing new charges for Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance in Case No. CF-2017-142 and failure to pay court costs. Paiz pled guilty to the new offense, receiving a suspended sentence of ten years, contingent on completing a drug treatment program. The State filed another Application to Revoke on August 14, 2018, due to new charges of Carrying Weapons and violations of probation. Following a revocation hearing on September 28, 2018, Paiz stipulated to the allegations, leading to the revocation of approximately 2,495 days of suspended sentences by the District Court of Woodward County. Paiz appeals, arguing the revocation was excessive and constitutes an abuse of discretion. He cites that simple possession became a misdemeanor effective July 1, 2017, and criticizes the court for not exploring alternate sanctions. The scope of review in a revocation appeal focuses on the validity of the revocation order. This Court has held that even a single violation justifies revocation. Paiz admitted to multiple violations and new criminal activity, justifying the District Court's actions. **DECISION**: The revocation of Paiz's suspended sentences in Woodward County Case Nos. CF-2016-114, CF-2016-117, and CF-2017-142 is **AFFIRMED**. **Pursuant to Rule 3.15, the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.** **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF WOODWARD COUNTY, THE HONORABLE DON A. WORK, ASSOCIATE DISTRICT JUDGE** --- **APPEARANCES AT TRIAL:** **CURTIS BUSSETT, ATTORNEY AT LAW** P.O. BOX 1494 CLINTON, OK 73601 **COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT** **APPEARANCES ON APPEAL:** **CHAD JOHNSON** P.O. BOX 926 NORMAN, OK 73070 **COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT** **SUSAN K. MEINDERS** **MIKE HUNTER** ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY WOODWARD COUNTY 1600 MAIN STREET WOODWARD, OK 73801 **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** **CAROLINE E.J. HUNT** ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL 313 N.E. 21 ST STREET OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105 **COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE** **OPINION BY: ROWLAND, J.:** **LEWIS, P.J.: Concur** **KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur** **LUMPKIN, J.: Concur** **HUDSON, J.: Concur** [Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/RE-2018-1039_1734355896.pdf)

Continue ReadingRE-2018-1039

F-2017-1149

  • Post author:
  • Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2017-1149, Moore appealed his conviction for Permitting Invitees Under 21 to Possess or Consume Alcohol, Child Neglect, and Transporting a Loaded Firearm in a Motor Vehicle. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment and sentence imposed by the district court. One judge dissented. Moore was convicted for crimes related to a party where a fifteen-year-old boy named N.F. drank too much alcohol and died from alcohol poisoning. The party took place at the home of a sixteen-year-old friend, and although Moore was not there, the court had to decide if he was responsible for what happened because he was in a relationship with the boy's mother, who lived at that house. The first major point in the case was whether there was enough evidence to support Moore’s convictions. The court found that there was, especially because Moore admitted he lived with the mother and his driver's license listed that address. This was important as the law stated that he could be held responsible for underage drinking and neglect if he was living there. Moore also argued that he didn’t get a fair trial because his lawyer did not do a good job. He mentioned that his lawyer failed to object to certain testimonies from a worker in child protective services. The court looked into this claim but concluded that it didn’t affect the fairness of the trial enough to change the outcome. They thought that defense counsel did present evidence to support Moore's case, showing he may not have lived at the home when N.F. died. Another issue was about evidence presented during the trial. Moore’s lawyer did not object to the testimony from the child protective services worker, which led to the question of whether this testimony hurt his case. The court found that while this testimony might have been improper, it did not significantly affect the trial's result since the jury could have made their decision based on other evidence presented. Moore also claimed he should get credit for the time spent in jail before his sentencing. However, the court said it was up to the judge to decide about giving credit for time served, not mandatory. They believed the judge made the right choice and affirmed the decision. In conclusion, the court upheld Moore's convictions and sentences, affirming that there was enough evidence against him and that his rights to a fair trial were not violated. Moore was denied the motion to have a hearing about his lawyer's effectiveness in defending him.

Continue ReadingF-2017-1149

C-2018-861

  • Post author:
  • Post category:C

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **BOBBY RAY LEWIS,** **Petitioner,** **V.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Respondent.** **Case No. C-2018-861** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA JUN 16 2019** --- **OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI** **JOHN D. HADDEN LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Petitioner, Bobby Ray Lewis, faced charges in two separate cases in the District Court of Okfuskee County. Case No. CF-2017-17 included charges of *Driving Under the Influence*, *Leaving the Scene of an Accident with Injury*, and *Failure to Report a Personal Injury Accident*. Case No. CF-2018-21 involved charges of *Assault and Battery on a Police Officer* and *Assault and Battery on an Emergency Medical Care Provider*. **I. Procedural Status of Appeal** The Court notes that the Petitioner's Petition For Writ of Certiorari is not properly before it. According to established law, appeals from judgments following a plea must proceed via a writ of certiorari. The relevant statutes and court rules state that a defendant must file an application to withdraw the plea within ten days of the judgment's pronouncement. In this case, the District Court pronounced judgment and sentence on June 27, 2018. The Petitioner failed to file a motion to withdraw his plea within the required ten-day window. As a result, the conviction became final, and the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case. The Petitioner’s motion, filed on July 17, 2018—twenty days post-judgment—was therefore untimely, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain it. Accordingly, since the Petitioner's petition is not properly before the Court, this appeal is dismissed. **DECISION** The Petitioner's Petition For Writ of Certiorari is dismissed as it is not properly before the Court. Pursuant to Rule 3.15 of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. --- **APPEARANCES AT TRIAL** Curt Allen, Indigent Defense System, Okmulgee, OK Arlan Bullard, Attorney at Law, Pauls Valley, OK **APPEARANCES ON APPEAL** Robert W. Jackson, Indigent Defense System, Norman, OK Emily Mueller, Assistant District Attorney, Okemah, OK --- **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **LEWIS, P.J.:** Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** Concur **HUDSON, J.:** Concur **ROWLAND, J.:** Concur --- **[Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2018-861_1734181193.pdf)**

Continue ReadingC-2018-861

C-2018-685

  • Post author:
  • Post category:C

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **ORIE DANIEL HILL,** **Petitioner,** **V.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Respondent.** **Case No. C-2018-685** **SUMMARY OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI** LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE: **Background:** Orie Daniel Hill, Petitioner, entered a blind plea of nolo contendere to multiple charges including: first-degree rape (victim under age fourteen), rape by instrumentation, lewd or indecent acts to a child under sixteen, and child sexual abuse. The trial court sentenced him to thirty years imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently and mandated three years of post-imprisonment supervision. Hill later filed a motion to withdraw his plea, claiming it was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. **Issues Raised:** 1. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Hill's motion to withdraw his plea; 2. Hill was denied effective assistance of counsel. **Facts:** The case involved allegations against Hill related to inappropriate sexual behavior towards an 8-year-old girl, A.H. The investigation included statements from the victim and forensic evidence, including DNA linking Hill to the offenses. **Analysis:** The court's review is limited to whether the plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently, whether the sentence was excessive, and whether counsel was effective. The burden is on Hill to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective or that he did not fully understand the plea agreement. 1. **Proposition One:** The court concluded that Hill knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his plea. He was informed of his rights and the potential consequences. Despite Hill's claim of feeling pressure and receiving poor legal advice, the court found no evidence supporting these assertions. 2. **Proposition Two:** Hill’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not meet the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, which requires showing both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The court ruled that counsel’s advice was sound and appropriately reflected the realities of the situation, including the potential for harsher sentences if the case went to trial. **Conclusion:** The petition for a writ of certiorari is DENIED, and the judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED. **MANDATE:** Ordered issued upon delivery and filing of this decision. --- **APPEARANCES:** - **For Appellant:** David R. Slane; Nicollette Brandt - **For the State:** Chris Anderson, Assistant District Attorney **OPINION BY:** Lewis, P.J. **Concur:** Kuehn, V.P.J.; Lumpkin, J.; Hudson, J.; Rowland, J. [Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2018-685_1734175737.pdf)

Continue ReadingC-2018-685