J-2019-618

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**State of Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Summary Opinion** **Case Title:** M.C.T. v. The State of Oklahoma **Case Number:** J-2019-618 **Filed:** February 6, 2020 **Judges:** Kuehn, Vice Presiding Judge; Lewis, Presiding Judge (specially concurring); Lumpkin, J.; Hudson, J.; Rowland, J. **Background:** M.C.T. appeals the certification decision by Special Judge Scott Brockman in Cleveland County District Court Case No. CF-2019-470, where M.C.T. was certified for trial as an adult for crimes including Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon and Unlawful Use of a Computer. The case was expedited under the Accelerated Docket of the Court. **Legal Issues:** The core issue revolves around statutory interpretation regarding the certification of juveniles as adults under Oklahoma law, specifically focusing on 10A O.S.2018 § 2-5-204(H)(1). **Findings:** 1. **Statutory Interpretation:** The Court reviewed the statute, noting that once adjudicated as an adult, a youthful offender retains that status in subsequent criminal proceedings, as mandated by the law. M.C.T.'s prior stipulation to adult status in Oklahoma County was sufficient to affirm his status as an adult in Cleveland County. 2. **Precedent:** M.C.T. relied on D.J.B. v. Pritchett, but the Court distinguished this case based on its unique circumstances, emphasizing that M.C.T. had already been adjudicated as an adult prior to the Cleveland County proceeding. 3. **Judicial Efficiency:** Holding a certification hearing in Cleveland County after a prior adult conviction would be considered a waste of judicial resources, reinforcing the decision to affirm the district court's certification of M.C.T. as an adult. **Conclusion:** The Court affirmed the decision of the Cleveland County District Court to certify M.C.T. as an adult, highlighting that the statutory provisions were effectively applied in this case and that his prior plea as an adult eliminated the necessity for further certification hearings. **Decision:** The certification is AFFIRMED. The mandate is to be issued upon filing this decision. **Counsel:** - **For Appellant:** M. Karla Tankut, Jasmine Johnson (Indigent Defense System) - **For Appellee:** Kristi Johnson, Suanne Carlson (Assistant District Attorneys) **Special Concurrence:** Judge Lewis acknowledged the detailed writing of the opinion and expressed concern regarding the trial counsel's understanding of the consequences of simultaneous cases in different counties. Though counsel's actions were questionable, they did not alter the outcome, given M.C.T.'s unsuitability for youthful offender status. **Download PDF:** [Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/J-2019-618_1734430249.pdf)

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F-2018-1161

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **KENNETH ALLEN DAY,** Appellant, **V.** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. Case No. F-2018-1161 **SUMMARY OPINION** **HUDSON, JUDGE:** Appellant Kenneth Allen Day was tried and convicted by a jury in the District Court of Oklahoma County (Case No. CF-2017-2586) of: 1. **Count 1:** Sexual Battery (21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 1123(B)) 2. **Counts 2 and 3:** Indecent Exposure (21 O.S.2011, § 1021) The jury recommended a sentence of 30 days imprisonment on Count 1, and 1 year imprisonment each on Counts 2 and 3. The Honorable Timothy R. Henderson, District Judge, presided over the trial and executed the sentences as per the jury's recommendations, ordering them to run consecutively and consecutively to Oklahoma County Case No. CF-16-6470. Day was granted credit for 177 days served and was subject to various costs and fees. Day appeals, raising the following proposition of error: **I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED OKLA. STAT. TIT. 57, § 138(G) BY REFUSING TO GRANT MR. DAY CREDIT FOR ALL TIME SERVED WHILE AWAITING TRIAL AND SENTENCING, CLAIMING THAT THE STATUTE WAS DISCRETIONARY AND NOT MANDATORY.** Upon a thorough review of the entire record including transcripts, exhibits, and the parties' briefs, we find no legal error necessitating relief. Therefore, Day's judgments and sentences are AFFIRMED. **Proposition I:** Day's claim pertains to the nature of credit for time served—whether it is mandatory or discretionary. Citing *Loyd v. State*, 1981 OK CR 5, 624 P.2d 74, Day contends that 57 O.S.Supp.2015, § 138(G) mandates credit for all time served prior to judgment and sentence. However, as recently discussed and clarified in *Luna-Gonzales v. State*, 2019 OK CR 11, this argument has been rejected. This Court noted that *Loyd* is inconsistent with the majority of case law on this subject and that the Oklahoma Legislature has amended § 138 multiple times since 1980, which indicates a legislative intent to modify the ruling in *Loyd*. The current statute indicates that defendants automatically receive credit for jail time served only post-judgment and sentencing. Significantly, *Loyd* is overruled to the extent it conflicts with this interpretation. We also recognize that the district court exercised its discretion appropriately in awarding Day partial credit for time served, which aligns with previous ruling in *Luna-Gonzales* that grants sentencing judges discretion regarding credit for pre-sentencing incarceration. Thus, Day's argument is rejected, and his assertion is firmly denied. **DECISION** The judgments and sentences of the District Court are AFFIRMED. According to Rule 3.15 of the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the MANDATE shall be issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HENDERSON, DISTRICT JUDGE** **APPEARANCES AT TRIAL** RICHARD HULL (Counsel for Appellant) HALLIE ELIZABETH BOVOS KRISTEN MESSINA, ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER **APPEARANCES ON APPEAL** LORI MCCONNELL MIKE HUNTER RACHEL SMITH JULIE PITTMAN, ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL, (Counsel for Appellee) **OPINION BY:** HUDSON, J. **LEWIS, P.J.:** CONCUR **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** CONCUR **LUMPKIN, J.:** CONCUR **ROWLAND, J.:** CONCUR For further details and access to full judgment, [Click Here to Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1161_1734786325.pdf)

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C-2018-1167

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This document is a summary opinion from the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma regarding the case of Ronald Fitzgerald Williams. Williams entered a negotiated guilty plea to multiple counts related to drug offenses and other violations. After sentencing, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted a writ of certiorari (a type of court order) and remanded the case for a new hearing on Williams' motion to withdraw his plea. The court found significant errors: 1. Williams was allegedly misadvised about his appellate rights, affecting the voluntariness of his plea. 2. The evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea was held in his absence without a valid waiver of his right to be present. 3. Williams asserted he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The court emphasized that due process requires a defendant's attendance at a hearing concerning the withdrawal of a plea unless there’s evidence of a waiver, which was not present in this case. The court reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw the plea and ordered a new hearing to ensure due process is upheld. The document concludes with information about the attorneys involved in the case and instructions for further proceedings. For additional details or specific legal arguments, you can download the full opinion using the link provided.

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F-2018-1144

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In the case of William G. Epperly v. The State of Oklahoma (Case No. F-2018-1144), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the judgment and sentence imposed by the District Court of Oklahoma County. The court found that the evidence presented during Epperly's trial was admissible, and his claims of error, including issues related to hearsay, relevance, and jury instructions, did not warrant reversal of his conviction for Sexual Abuse of a Child. ### Key Points from the Court's Decision: 1. **Admission of Excited Utterance Evidence**: The court found that statements made by Tiffany Epperly (Epperly's spouse) to two witnesses fell under the excited utterance exception to hearsay, as she was under emotional stress when she reported witnessing the alleged abuse. 2. **Text Messages and Witness Testimony**: The court ruled that reading text messages sent by Sutphen to Tiffany Epperly was not hearsay because they were used to challenge Tiffany's credibility rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Additionally, the testimony about Tiffany's changing demeanor was deemed relevant to the case. 3. **Witness Reading from Police Report**: Former Officer Richardson's reading from his police report, which included Tiffany Epperly's statements, was allowed because it served to impeach her trial testimony, not as hearsay. 4. **Internet Search Evidence**: The court deemed the evidence concerning Epperly's internet search about Oklahoma sex laws to be relevant, as it could suggest a consciousness of guilt. 5. **Judgment and Sentence Corrections**: The court noted that the issues regarding credit for time served and the $100 fine were resolved with an amended judgment, making that claim moot. 6. **Jury Instruction on Sex Offender Registration**: The court did not find that the failure to instruct the jury about sex offender registration constituted an error warranting relief, consistent with prior rulings. 7. **Cumulative Error Doctrine**: The court concluded that no individual errors occurred that would justify reversal and therefore found no merit in the cumulative error claim. ### Conclusion: The court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court, concluding that all claims raised by Epperly were without merit. The decision illustrates the court's adherence to evidentiary rules and its support for the discretion exercised by the trial judge in admitting evidence. For more detailed information, the full opinion can be accessed [here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1144_1734787047.pdf).

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F-2018-850

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Here’s a summary of the case involving Johnny Aldric Samples, III, as presented in the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma: **Case Overview:** - **Appellant:** Johnny Aldric Samples, III - **Charges:** Four counts of Child Sexual Abuse, violating Oklahoma law (21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5(E)). - **Trial Outcome:** Convicted by jury; sentenced to life imprisonment on each count, with sentences to run consecutively. - **Appeal Filed Against:** The judgment and sentence. **Propositions of Error Raised by the Appellant:** 1. **Admission of Hearsay Statements:** Claims the trial court improperly admitted hearsay from child witnesses, arguing B.L. did not meet the disability requirement for hearsay exceptions. 2. **Admission of Irrelevant Evidence:** Contends the trial court admitted prejudicial evidence related to B.L.'s mother's suicide. 3. **Insufficient Evidence (B.L.):** Argues there was inadequate evidence of sexual abuse against B.L. 4. **Insufficient Evidence (C.L.):** Claims insufficient evidence to support convictions for sexually abusing C.L. 5. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:** Suggests his counsel failed to properly object to hearsay statements regarding B.L. 6. **Cumulative Errors:** Argues that the cumulative effect of errors denied him a fair trial. 7. **Consecutive Sentencing:** Contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering sentences to run consecutively, claiming it results in an excessive sentence. **Court's Analysis and Decisions:** - The court found no merit in the claims regarding hearsay evidence or the sufficiency of evidence relating to both B.L. and C.L. The analysis included verifying B.L.'s status as a disabled child, which justified the admission of her hearsay statements. - Though the court acknowledged an error in admitting evidence related to B.L.'s mother's suicide, it deemed the error harmless, as overwhelming evidence supported the convictions. - The court concluded that the convictions against C.L. were also adequately supported by credible testimony. - Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found no deficiency since no errors were present in the trial. - The cumulative error argument was rejected as no single error warranted reversal. - Finally, the court supported the trial court's sentencing decision, stating the consecutive sentences aligned with the nature of the offenses. **Conclusion:** The judgment and sentence against Johnny Aldric Samples, III, were affirmed, with the court finding no errors that warranted relief. **Concurrence:** Vice Presiding Judge Kuehn expressed disagreement with the constitutionality of the child sexual abuse statute but concurred in results based on existing law. He noted a significant change in the law due to a recent decision (A.O. v State) affecting jury instructions in similar cases and criticized the denial of a supplemental brief based on this change. For more detailed information, you can reference the full opinion [here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-850_1735154293.pdf).

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RE-2018-1006

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**Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma** **Case No. RE-2018-1006** **Jose Adolfo Rios, Appellant,** **vs.** **The State of Oklahoma, Appellee.** **Summary Opinion** **Judge Lumpkin:** Appellant, Jose Adolfo Rios, appeals from the revocation in full of his concurrent ten-year suspended sentences in Case No. CF-2006-6132. The Honorable Ray C. Elliott, District Judge, ruled on this matter. On April 4, 2008, Appellant entered a guilty plea to two counts of Rape in the First Degree and two counts of Indecent or Lewd Acts With a Child Under Sixteen, resulting in sentences of twenty-two years for the rape counts (with the first twelve years suspended) and twenty years for the lewd acts counts (with the first ten years suspended), all to run concurrently. On July 25, 2018, the State filed an Application to Revoke Suspended Sentence, asserting multiple violations of probation, including failing to report, change of address, pay supervision fees, attend mandated treatment, and committing a new crime—Domestic Assault and Battery With a Dangerous Weapon. During the revocation hearing before Judge Elliott, substantial evidence was presented regarding Appellant's violation of probation terms, including testimonies from Appellant’s probation officer and other evidence illustrating Appellant's failure to comply with treatment and reporting requirements. Appellant testified about personal struggles following a crime in which he was a victim, stating he had fallen victim to substance abuse and homelessness. After reviewing the evidence, Judge Elliott found sufficient basis to revoke the suspended sentences, having established by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant had committed multiple violations, including failing to report and failing to attend treatment. **Proposition of Error:** Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in fully revoking his sentence, asserting that Judge Elliott did not adequately consider alternatives to full revocation. **Analysis:** The decision to revoke a suspended sentence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned without evidence of abuse of that discretion. Here, Judge Elliott had unrefuted evidence of Appellant's violations. The record demonstrates that Appellant acknowledged his failures and did not meet the terms of probation. While Appellant claimed that less severe measures should have been considered, the applicable statutes do not mandate such considerations during revocation proceedings. As such, Appellant has not demonstrated that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in revoking the sentences in full. **Decision:** The order of the District Court of Oklahoma County revoking Appellant's concurrent ten-year suspended sentences is AFFIRMED. **Appearances:** **For Appellant:** Ben Munda, Assistant Public Defender Hallie Elizabeth Bovos, Assistant Public Defender 320 Robert S. Kerr, Suite 400 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 **For the State:** Suzanne Lavenue, Assistant District Attorney Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma Tessa L. Henry, Assistant Attorney General 320 Robert S. Kerr, Suite 505 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 **Opinion By:** Lumpkin, J. **Concurred by:** Lewis, P.J.; Kuehn, V.P.J.; Hudson, J.; Rowland, J. MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the filing of this decision. [Download Full Opinion PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/RE-2018-1006_1734358375.pdf)

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M-2017-511

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**Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma** **Case: William Robert Burk vs. The State of Oklahoma** **Case No: M-2017-511** #### OPINION BY: Kuehn, VPJ **Background:** William Robert Burk was convicted of Obstruction of Public Officer in the District Court of Payne County, sentenced to 30 days in jail and fined $500. The case arose from an incident on December 13, 2015, where Burk was stopped for driving with an improper license tag. He refused to provide a driver's license, proof of insurance, or identify himself. Police officers were forced to break into his vehicle after he locked himself inside, leading to his arrest. **Proposition I: Self-Representation** Burk contends the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself without ensuring he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. The court finds that Burk effectively waived his right to counsel through his actions over time, including repeatedly refusing to secure legal representation. The court cites multiple precedents establishing that a defendant may waive the right to counsel by conduct, and emphasizes the need for a clear understanding of the risks involved in self-representation. While acknowledging Burk's claims of financial capacity to hire an attorney, he nevertheless insisted he would not apply for court-appointed counsel. The court concludes Burk’s behavior—self-characterization of being forced to represent himself and refusal to accept assistance—constituted an implied waiver of his right to counsel, allowing the trial to proceed without an attorney. **Proposition II: Sufficiency of Evidence** In his second claim, Burk argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. However, the court finds that Burk's refusal to provide identification and engage with police clearly obstructed their duties. Citing relevant statutes and case law, the court asserts that any rational jury could find him guilty of obstructing a public officer based on his actions during the encounter. **Conclusion:** The court affirms the judgment and sentence from the District Court of Payne County, asserting that Burk had sufficient warnings about self-representation risks and willingly chose to proceed without counsel. ### Dissenting Opinion - Judge Lumpkin Judge Lumpkin argues against affirming the conviction, citing concerns about Burk's mental state and the trial court's failure to ensure he was adequately informed of the consequences of self-representation. He emphasizes that Burk was not given proper Fairtta warnings about the implications of his decision and suggests that mental health issues should have prompted the court to reevaluate Burk's right to counsel. ### Concurring Opinion - Judge Hudson Judge Hudson agrees with the outcome but asserts that the basis for the decision hinges not on waiver by conduct but rather on forfeiture of counsel due to Burk's dilatory misconduct. He highlights the necessity for courts to maintain order and efficiently administer justice, especially when faced with obstructionist behavior from defendants. **Decision: The Judgment is AFFIRMED.** For further details and full opinions, you may refer to [this PDF link](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/M-2017-511_1734779027.pdf).

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RE-2018-604

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **LEROY ALEXANDER, JR.,** **Appellant,** **-VS-** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. RE-2018-604** **FILED** **IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **OCT 10 2019** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant Leroy Alexander, Jr., was sentenced to a total of fifteen years for the crime of Rape in the Second Degree, with all but the first year suspended. This appeal arises from the revocation of the remainder of his suspended sentence by the Honorable George W. Butner, District Judge of Seminole County. **Facts:** On April 5, 2018, the State of Oklahoma filed a motion to revoke Appellant's suspended sentence, alleging violations related to failure to attend sex offender treatment and failure to submit to required polygraph examinations. An amended motion on June 1, 2018, added allegations of inappropriate employment at a children's carnival ride during a festival. During the revocation hearing, the State's probation officer testified that Appellant had initially attended treatment sessions but was terminated for non-attendance. Appellant claimed his violations stemmed from financial hardship and lack of transportation. The Court ultimately found that Appellant had not made genuine efforts to comply with the terms of his probation. **Points of Error:** 1. **Proposition I:** Appellant argues that the trial court lacked authority to revoke more than the actual suspended portion of his sentence. He claims the written order incorrectly states that all of the fifteen years was revoked. However, the oral pronouncement during the hearing indicated the revocation was for the remainder of the suspended sentence. The court later issued an amendment to clarify the written judgment, aligning it with the oral ruling. 2. **Proposition II:** Appellant contends the full revocation of his suspended sentence was excessive, arguing that his violations were a result of indigence and lack of resources. The court's discretion in revoking a suspended sentence is established unless there is an abuse of discretion. Judge Butner found the violations were due to Appellant's lack of effort rather than financial difficulties, which was supported by evidence in the record. **Decision:** The order of the District Court of Seminole County revoking the remainder of Appellant's fifteen-year suspended sentence is AFFIRMED. The Mandate is ordered issued upon the filing of this decision. --- **ATTORNEYS:** - **ZACHARY L. PYRON** - **CHAD JOHNSON** (Appellate Defense Counsel) - **CHRISTOPHER G. ANDERSON** - **MIKE HUNTER** - **THEODORE M. PEEPER** (Assistant District Attorney / Attorney General of Oklahoma) **OPINION BY:** **KUEHN, V.P.J.** **LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR** **LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR** **HUDSON, J.: CONCUR** **ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR** --- [**Click Here To Download PDF**](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/RE-2018-604_1734429602.pdf)

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F-2018-690

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **DANIEL ROSS DAGE,** **Appellant,** **vs.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. F-2018-690** **SUMMARY OPINION** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Daniel Ross Dage was convicted of Possession of Juvenile Pornography in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1021.2, in the District Court of Comanche County, under the Honorable Gerald Neuwirth. He was sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment, with eight (8) years suspended, and a fine of $5,000.00. Additionally, he is subject to sex offender registration and two years of post-imprisonment supervision during his suspended sentence. Dage appeals his conviction and sentence, raising three propositions of error. I. The record does not sufficiently demonstrate that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. II. The State's evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dage knowingly possessed videos of juvenile pornography. III. A sentence of 20 years is excessive under the circumstances, violating the United States and Oklahoma constitutions. After thorough review of the record, including transcripts and briefs, we find that the case must be reversed and remanded for a jury trial. Proposition I is granted. The State concedes this issue. While defendants can waive their constitutional right to a jury trial, such a waiver must be competent, knowing, intelligent, and on the record, as established in *Hinsley v. State*, 2012 OK CR 11; *Valega v. City of Oklahoma City*, 1988 OK CR 101. Record evidence must show that both the State and the court consented to the waiver. The requirements for a valid waiver include an advisement of rights and a court minute reflecting the waiver, with signatures from the defendant and counsel. The record does not provide evidence of a waiver or party consent; there are no advisements regarding jury trial rights, nor discussions recorded in the trial transcript concerning the waiver. Thus, we conclude that the record fails to show Appellant validly waived his right to a jury trial. Proposition II, concerning the sufficiency of evidence, is briefly addressed. The State needed to demonstrate Dage knowingly possessed child pornography according to 21 O.S.2011, § 1021.2. Although Dage argues against the sufficiency of evidence, we find that the evidence reasonably infers Dage was aware of the prohibited nature of the material, and no other individual had reasonable access to the USB drives. Therefore, this proposition is denied. Given our decision regarding Proposition I, Proposition III concerning sentencing is rendered moot. **DECISION** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Comanche County is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for a jury trial. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COMANCHE COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE GERALD NEUWIRTH, DISTRICT JUDGE** **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** LARRY CORRALES P.O. BOX 2095 LAWTON, OK 73502 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** NANCY WALKER-JOHNSON P.O. BOX 926 NORMAN, OK 73070 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** CHRISTINE GALBRAITH ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY COMANCHE CO. COURTHOUSE 315 SW 5TH ST., RM 502 LAWTON, OK 73501-4360 **MIKE HUNTER** ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLA. DIANE L. SLAYTON ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL 313 NE 21 ST STREET OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR HUDSON, J.: CONCUR ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-690_1735220870.pdf)

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F-2018-565

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** KIMBERLY ANN SMITH-GENTILE, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee. **No. F-2018-565** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA SEP 12 2019** **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN CLERK** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant, Kimberly Ann Smith-Gentile, was convicted by a jury in Pottawatomie County District Court, Case No. CF-2017-342, of ten counts of Possessing Child Pornography. On May 31, 2018, the Honorable Dawson Engle, Associate District Judge, sentenced her in accordance with the jury's recommendation to ten years imprisonment on Counts 1-8 and twenty years imprisonment on Count 9, with all sentences to be served concurrently. Appellant must serve 85% of her sentences before parole consideration. 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1(16). Appellant raises two propositions of error in support of her appeal: **PROPOSITION I.** THE STATE'S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT Ms. GENTILE KNOWINGLY POSSESSED 10 IMAGES OR VIDEOS OF JUVENILE PORNOGRAPHY. **PROPOSITION II.** UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, A SENTENCE OF 20 YEARS IS EXCESSIVE IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTIONS. After thorough consideration of these propositions, the briefs of the parties, and the record on appeal, we affirm. Appellant was convicted of finding child pornography on a smartphone belonging to her boyfriend, Jaymes Dean, but failing to notify authorities, and instead keeping the phone in her possession for several weeks after Dean left town. The fact that the phone contained multiple files of child pornography was not disputed. In Proposition I, Appellant claims the evidence was insufficient to show that she knowingly possessed the child pornography, particularly ten different items of pornography. Once Dean left the phone behind and traveled out of state, Appellant, with knowledge that the phone contained pornographic material, had the authority to control its disposition. At trial, Appellant claimed she was simply unsure of what to do with the phone. The fact remains, however, that she knew it contained child pornography, viewed a number of the images, and even recognized the daughter of a friend in one of the images. Yet at no time did she attempt to notify authorities, even after a social worker informed her that Dean was a convicted sex offender. Instead, Appellant's conduct suggested that she wanted to use the evidence on her own schedule and for her own purposes. Furthermore, Appellant's claim that she only viewed one video file was convincingly contradicted at trial. A rational juror could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant knowingly possessed ten items of child pornography. **Jackson v. Virginia**, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); **Hamilton v. State**, 2016 OK CR 13, ¶ 4, 387 P.3d 903, 905. Proposition I is therefore denied. In Proposition II, Appellant claims her sentences are shockingly excessive. While the jury recommended the maximum term on one count, the prosecutor never requested a specific punishment, but expressly left that to the jurors' discretion. The trial court ordered concurrent service of all sentences. Finally, we note that the images in question were not simply collected from the internet or some other source; they were direct evidence of child rapes and other sex crimes that Dean himself had committed. Appellant recognized Dean as the adult perpetrator in some of the images. Considering all these circumstances, the cumulative sentences imposed are not shocking to the conscience. **Rea v. State**, 2001 OK CR 28, ¶ 5, 34 P.3d 148, 149. Proposition II is denied. **DECISION** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Pottawatomie County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF POTTAWATOMIE COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE DAWSON ENGLE, ASSOCIATE DISTRICT JUDGE** **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** SHELLEY LEVISAY 318 NORTH BROADWAY SHAWNEE, OK 74801 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** NANCY WALKER-JOHNSON INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM P.O. BOX 926 NORMAN, OK 73070 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT **APPELLEE** ABBY NATHAN DAVID HAMMER MIKE HUNTER ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS 331 NORTH BROADWAY SHAWNEE, OK 74801 JOSHUA R. FANELLI ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL COUNSEL FOR THE STATE 313 NE 21 ST STREET OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105 **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR HUDSON, J.: CONCUR ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR --- [Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-565_1735315294.pdf)

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C-2018-1024

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It appears that you have provided a court document from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals relating to the case of Larado James Smith, who entered a guilty plea to multiple counts of rape and sodomy. The document outlines the background of the case, the procedural history, and the court's decision to deny Smith's petition for a writ of certiorari. To summarize the key points: 1. **Background of the Case**: Larado James Smith entered a negotiated guilty plea to six counts of Second Degree Rape and three counts of Forcible Sodomy, resulting in a 15-year prison sentence. 2. **Motion to Withdraw Plea**: Smith later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming he had valid reasons for doing so, including alleged pressure from his counsel and stress from his incarceration. 3. **Court's Findings**: The trial court conducted a hearing on this motion and ultimately denied it, finding that Smith had entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily. This decision was based on the court's assessment of the circumstances and Smith's understanding of the plea. 4. **Appeal**: Smith appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw the plea. The appellate court reviewed the record and determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. It was concluded that Smith’s plea was made voluntarily, after a thorough understanding of the implications. 5. **Final Decision**: The Court of Criminal Appeals denied Smith's petition for certiorari, affirming the lower court's judgment and sentence. If you have specific questions about the case or need information on a particular aspect of the document, please let me know!

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F-2018-513

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-513, Bobby Lee Ruppel, Jr. appealed his conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon and robbery with a weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Ruppel's conviction but vacated the restitution order, meaning a proper determination of the victim's economic loss must take place. One judge dissented.

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F-2017-1118

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In OCCA case No. RE 2018-0397, Wesley Scot Kilpatrick appealed his conviction for robbery in the second degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of his suspended sentence. One judge dissented. Wesley Scot Kilpatrick had pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree, and a more serious charge of burglary in the first degree was dropped. He received a seven-year suspended sentence, which means he would not go to prison right away if he followed certain rules. He also had to pay a fine and court costs. Later, the state said Kilpatrick did not follow the rules of his suspended sentence. They claimed he failed to pay his costs and restitution, got into trouble with the police, and committed another crime. Because of this, a court hearing was held to decide if his suspended sentence should be revoked. At the hearing, the judge decided to revoke his sentence completely, meaning Kilpatrick would have to serve the full seven years in prison. Kilpatrick disagreed with this decision and appealed, arguing that the judge made a mistake in revoking his sentence. However, the court found that the judge did not make an error. They believed the judge had the right to make that decision based on the facts presented. The court defined an abuse of discretion as a decision that is clearly wrong and not based on logic or evidence. Since Kilpatrick did not show that the judge was wrong, the court affirmed the decision to revoke his suspended sentence. In the end, Kilpatrick would have to serve the full time in prison for his robbery conviction.

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RE-2018-425

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **ROBERT JOSEPH CLARK, JR.,** **Appellant,** **v.** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. RE-2018-425** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE:** On April 9, 2015, Appellant Clark, represented by counsel, entered a guilty plea to Count 1, Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (CDS) (Methamphetamine), and Count 2, Possession of a CDS (Psilocybin) in Oklahoma County Case No. CF-2014-8289. Sentencing was deferred for five (5) years, subject to terms and conditions of probation. On September 9, 2015, Clark's sentence in Case No. CF-2014-8289 was accelerated, and he was sentenced to eight (8) years each for Counts 1 and 2, all suspended, with terms and conditions of probation. That same date, Clark entered a guilty plea to Count 1, Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon, and Count 2, Possession of a CDS in Oklahoma County Case No. CF-2015-3126. He was sentenced to eight (8) years for each count, all suspended, also subject to terms and conditions of probation. Clark's sentences in Case No. CF-2015-3126 were ordered to run concurrently with his sentences in Case No. CF-2014-8289. Additionally, Clark entered a guilty plea in Oklahoma County Case No. CF-2015-3693 for Possession of a CDS, receiving a sentence of three (3) years, all suspended, which was ordered to be served consecutively to his sentence in Case No. CF-2015-3126. On March 24, 2017, the State filed an Application to Revoke Clark's suspended sentences in all three referenced cases, alleging the commission of new offenses in Oklahoma County Case Nos. CF-2016-7039 (possession of stolen property and possession of drug paraphernalia) and CM-2016-2833 (obstructing an officer and failing to wear a safety belt). Following a revocation hearing on April 17, 2018, the District Court of Oklahoma County, presided over by the Honorable Ray C. Elliott, revoked Clark's suspended sentences in full. Clark's sole proposition of error on appeal alleges an abuse of discretion in revoking his suspended sentences, claiming that the sentence is excessive. The revocation of Clark's suspended sentences is AFFIRMED. The scope of review in a revocation appeal is limited to the validity of the revocation order executing the previously imposed sentence. We examine the basis for the factual determination and assess whether there was an abuse of discretion. It is established that violation of even one condition of probation is sufficient to justify the revocation of a suspended sentence. Based on the appeal record, there appears to be no merit in Clark's contention that the full revocation of his suspended sentences is excessive, nor do we find an abuse of discretion in Judge Elliott's decision. **DECISION** The order of the District Court of Oklahoma County revoking Appellant's suspended sentences in Case Nos. CF-2014-8289, CF-2015-3126, and CF-2015-3693 is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. --- **APPEARANCES AT TRIAL** **THOMAS HURLEY** **ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER** **OKLAHOMA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE** **611 COUNTY OFFICE BLDG.** **320 ROBERT S. KERR AVE.** **OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102** **COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT** **KIRK MARTIN** **ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY** **OKLAHOMA COUNTY** **320 ROBERT S. KERR SUITE 505** **OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102** **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** **OPINION BY:** LEWIS, P.J. **KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur** **LUMPKIN, J.: Concur** **HUDSON, J.: Concur** **ROWLAND, J.: Concur** --- [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/RE-2018-425_1734692953.pdf)

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F-2017-68

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This text appears to be a legal opinion from the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma regarding the case of Jonathan D. McKee, who was convicted of Child Abuse. The judgment affirms the conviction and address various propositions raised by the appellant concerning the conviction and the trial process. The summary of the opinion includes analysis of the following propositions: 1. **Sufficiency of Evidence**: The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to convict McKee of child abuse based on medical expert testimony. 2. **Evidentiary Rulings**: The court reviewed multiple evidentiary rulings that McKee argued were erroneous. They concluded that while McKee's refusal to speak with authorities could raise Fifth Amendment concerns, it did not constitute plain error affecting the trial’s outcome. Additionally, evidence concerning drug paraphernalia was found relevant to the case. 3. **Judicial Bias**: Appellant’s claim of judicial bias was rejected as the court found no evidence of actual bias or any violations affecting due process. 4. **Cumulative Error**: The court stated that because none of the individual propositions were sustained, the cumulative error argument had no merit. The opinion also includes concurring opinions from Judges Kuehn and Rowland. Judge Kuehn expressed some reservations about the relevance of mentions of a request for legal counsel, while Judge Rowland emphasized that McKee's conduct and refusal to speak were relevant in assessing guilty knowledge, even though they did not implicate any constitutional violations. The final decision affirmed the judgment and sentence, with the court ordering the mandate issued upon delivery and filing of this decision. For further details, one may refer to the full opinion [here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2017-68_1734271673.pdf).

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MA 2018-0296

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In OCCA case No. MA 2018-0296, J.M.F. appealed his conviction for Lewd Acts with a Child. In a published decision, the court decided to grant his application for a writ of mandamus and remand the matter to the District Court. The court found that J.M.F. was personally indigent and entitled to receive transcripts at public expense for his appeal, despite the trial court's earlier ruling about his parents' ability to pay. One judge dissented.

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RE 2016-1019

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In OCCA case No. RE 2016-1019, Jerry Lynn Clemons appealed his conviction for Home Repair Fraud and other charges. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of his suspended sentences but directed the District Court to modify the orders so that the sentences would run concurrently. The dissenting opinion was not specified. Here's a simplified summary of what happened: Jerry Clemons was found guilty in two cases. He pleaded guilty to Home Repair Fraud in one case and robbery and property damage in another. He was given suspended sentences, meaning he would not go to prison if he followed rules and conditions of probation, like reporting to a probation officer and not changing his address without informing them. However, he did not follow these rules, which led the State to ask to revoke his suspended sentences. During a hearing, the judge decided to revoke Clemons' suspended sentences because he had failed to report as required and changed his address without telling his probation officer. Clemons argued that the State didn’t properly inform him about the reasons for the revocation and that they didn’t provide enough evidence to support their claims. He also said that the judge should not have revoked his sentence because the punishment was longer than what the law allowed for one of his charges. The court agreed with some of Clemons' points but stated that there was enough evidence to support the decision to revoke his suspended sentences. They found that he didn’t show how the judge made a wrong choice. However, they also recognized a mistake in how the sentences should be served. They ordered that all his sentences should run concurrently, meaning they would be served at the same time, rather than one after the other. In conclusion, Clemons' appeal was mostly not successful, but the court made important changes to ensure he would serve his time in a fair way according to the law.

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F-2016-902

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The Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case of K.G.O., charged as an adult with Murder in the First Degree, who sought to be certified as a Youthful Offender. The trial court granted this certification, which the State appealed, arguing that the decision was erroneous due to insufficient evidence supporting K.G.O.'s claim for Youthful Offender status. The appeal highlighted that, at the time of the alleged offense, K.G.O. was presumed to be an adult based on Oklahoma law, which allows for certification as a Youthful Offender but places the burden of proof on the accused to overcome this presumption. The court evaluated several guidelines specified in Oklahoma statute regarding certification, giving the most weight to the first three, which focus on the nature of the offense and the offender's history. After a thorough review, the appellate court concluded that the trial judge had abused her discretion by not adhering appropriately to these guidelines. They found a lack of evidence suggesting that K.G.O. met the necessary criteria to warrant status as a Youthful Offender and that the judge's decision did not support the conclusion reached. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court's order and directed that the case proceed with K.G.O. being treated as an adult. A dissenting opinion from Judge Lewis expressed a belief that the trial court's certification should be upheld, indicating a difference in interpretation of the evidence and the application of the guidelines. Overall, the decision illustrates the court's stringent standards for certifying youthful offenders, emphasizing the necessity of a robust evidentiary basis to override the presumption of adult status in serious criminal cases.

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C-2015-856

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In OCCA case No. C-2015-856, Misty Dawn Smith appealed her conviction for Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance (Methamphetamine). In a published decision, the court decided to deny Smith's petition for a writ of certiorari but modified her post-imprisonment supervision from two years to one year. One judge dissented. Smith was charged with having methamphetamine and entered a guilty plea in December 2012. She was supposed to complete a drug court program which could lead to a lighter sentence. If she did well, her sentence would be a five-year suspended sentence and a fine. If she didn't, she could face ten years in prison and a larger fine. She was taken to a treatment facility and started the drug court program in May 2013. However, in July 2015, the state asked to remove her from this program because she was not following the rules. A judge agreed, and Smith was sentenced to ten years in prison and a fine. Smith wanted to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that she didn’t understand everything about her plea and the consequences of the drug court program. She also argued that her sentence was too harsh. The court looked at these claims but determined that there was no reason to allow her to change her plea. Her initial plea was considered to be made knowingly and voluntarily. The court found that Smith knew about the difficult nature of the drug court program and that she had many chances to follow the rules. They also stated that she didn’t raise her claim about the excessive sentence in the correct way, and therefore, it could not be considered. The court agreed that the two years of post-imprisonment supervision given to her was incorrect and lowered it to one year, which is what the law allows. The decision was made after reviewing all details and records of the case.

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F-2015-933

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In OCCA case No. F-2015-933, Thompson appealed his conviction for Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle and Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment on Counts 1 and 2 but reversed the judgment on Count 3 with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented. Thompson was found guilty of three crimes related to stolen property after a jury trial. He was sentenced to six years in prison for unauthorized use of a vehicle and eight years for each count of concealing stolen property. The sentences were arranged so that the two eight-year sentences would run together, while the six-year sentence would be added afterward. He was also fined $100 for each offense. Thompson raised several issues in his appeal. First, he argued that he should not have been convicted twice for concealing stolen property. He believed that since he acted only once when hiding the stolen items, charging him with two counts was unfair. The court agreed with him on this point and found that it was a mistake to have separate charges for items taken from different people. Next, Thompson questioned whether there was enough proof to find him guilty of unauthorized vehicle use and concealing stolen property. The court looked at all the evidence and decided there was enough to support his guilty verdict for unauthorized use of a vehicle, so that part of his conviction was upheld. Thompson also claimed that the prosecution made mistakes during the trial that harmed his chance for a fair judgment. However, the court did not find these errors serious enough to change the outcome of the trial. On the fines imposed by the trial court, Thompson argued that judges can't add fines unless the jury decides to. The court determined that the fines were allowed since the law permitted judges to impose them, even if the jury did not. Thompson felt that the judge shouldn't have made him serve the sentences for Counts 2 and 3 back-to-back after the first sentence. However, the court found that the judge's decision was within his rights and not an abuse of discretion. Overall, the court decided that none of the claimed errors were significant enough to change Thompson’s convictions except for the second count of concealing stolen property, which was dismissed. They confirmed that the remaining counts were properly upheld, leading to affirmation of most of Thompson's convictions.

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F 2015-121

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In OCCA case No. F 2015-121, the appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree manslaughter. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment of the district court, but vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. One judge dissented. The case involved Erica Lashon Harrison, who was accused of murder but was convicted of the lesser charge of first-degree manslaughter. The jury sentenced her to 25 years in prison and a fine of $10,000. Harrison raised multiple issues on appeal. She argued that the state did not prove she was not acting in self-defense, that improper evidence was allowed, and that she did not have proper legal representation. The court reviewed the case and found that the evidence supported the jury's verdict. They determined Harrison's claim of self-defense could not stand as there was not enough evidence to show she was in danger. The court noted that while some incorrect evidence was introduced, it did not affect the conviction. However, they decided that the sentence should be vacated and the case sent back for resentencing due to the improper character evidence brought up during the trial. The judges concluded that this error needed to be addressed, even if the earlier convictions were proper. The opinion recognized that although some arguments made by Harrison were valid, overall, the court found her conviction was supported by overwhelming evidence. The dissenting judges believed the error did not have a significant impact on the jury's decision. They argued that the sentence should not be changed since the evidence clearly proved guilt, even if procedural mistakes were made during the trial. Overall, the court upholds the conviction but sends the case back for a new decision on sentencing. The judges agreed on the main decision, while differing on whether the sentence change was necessary.

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RE-2014-575

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In OCCA case No. RE-2014-575, Jason Duane Barnes appealed his conviction for violating his probation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the decision to revoke his suspended sentences. The judges noted that the evidence was not enough to support the revocation because the prosecution failed to show that the judgment related to his new crime was final. One judge dissented.

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RE-2013-1027

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In OCCA case No. RE-2013-1027, Justin Michael Jay appealed his conviction for Forgery in the Second Degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and remand the case for corrections. One judge dissented. Justin Michael Jay was in trouble with the law and had a suspended sentence, which means he wouldn’t have to serve time in jail if he followed the rules. He had pleaded guilty to forgery and was given a suspended sentence of five years, but he had to spend the first 30 days in jail. However, things changed when he was accused of breaking the rules of his probation. The State, which is the side that brings charges, said that Jay did not pay the money he owed for supervision, restitution (the money owed to victims), and court costs. They also noted that Jay was charged with more crimes: Domestic Abuse and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Because of these new charges and failures to pay, the State asked the court to revoke Jay's suspended sentence. The court held a hearing to discuss Jay's situation. After listening to the evidence and arguments, the judge decided to revoke the rest of Jay's suspended sentence. This meant that Jay would have to serve the time he had left, which was almost five years. Later, the court filed a document that said Jay was revoked for 4 years and 335 days, and that he would have to be supervised after getting out of jail. Jay appealed this decision, arguing two main points. First, he claimed that the amount of time the judge revoked was wrong because he should have received credit for more days served when he was part of a special program for youthful offenders. Both Jay and the State agreed on this point, saying he should have been credited for 183 days instead of just 30. Therefore, they asked to change the revocation time to 4 years and 182 days. The second point Jay argued was that the court did not have the authority to order him to be under supervision after finishing his time in jail because the law about that only applies to those who were sentenced after November 1, 2012. Since Jay's original guilty plea and sentencing were before that date, the judge should not have included that supervision requirement. In the end, the court agreed with Jay on both points. They reversed the judgment that included the incorrect time and the unnecessary supervision requirement. They ordered the lower court to make the corrections and update the documents accordingly.

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RE 2013-0885

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In OCCA case No. RE 2013-0885, Lela Mae Goodwin appealed her conviction for violation of her probation due to several reasons, including drug use and not attending treatment. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to uphold the revocation of her suspended sentences but ordered the district court to remove a part that imposed post-imprisonment supervision. One judge dissented.

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RE-2013-635

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In OCCA case No. RE-2013-635, Bradberry appealed his conviction for the revocation of his suspended life sentences. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the full revocation and modify it to a ten-year revocation instead. One judge dissented. Bradberry was given suspended life sentences for failing to register as a sex offender and living near a school. He was on probation for less than two weeks when the state accused him of not reporting to his probation officer and not providing proof of employment or treatment. The trial judge decided to revoke his sentences completely due to these violations. Bradberry argued that the judge made a mistake by revoking his sentences in full, claiming it was excessive. The appeals court agreed that the judge abused his discretion, especially since many of Bradberry’s previous issues happened before his new sentencing. They found that the most significant reason for the revocation was his failure to report, which they believed did not warrant a full revocation. In the end, the appeal court decided that Bradberry’s suspended sentences should be modified. Instead of serving a life sentence, he would have to serve ten years of his suspended time. One judge disagreed with this decision and believed the full revocation was justified because Bradberry had not met his probation requirements.

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