Jury Conviction

F-2018-1103

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **BERT GLEN FRANKLIN,** **Appellant,** **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **Case No. F-2018-1103** **OPINION** LUMPKIN, JUDGE: Appellant, Bert Glen Franklin, was tried by jury and convicted in a consolidated trial of Count 1, First Degree Murder (Child Abuse), and of Count 2, Solicitation of First Degree Murder. The jury recommended punishment of life imprisonment without parole on Count 1 and life imprisonment on Count 2, with the sentences running consecutively. Appellant appeals from this judgment and sentence raising two propositions of error. **PROPOSITION I: Joinder of Charges** Appellant contends that his cases should not have been joined in one trial, asserting that this improper joinder resulted in prejudice. However, as Appellant failed to object at trial, we must review this for plain error, which requires an actual error that is plain or obvious and that affects the Appellant's substantial rights. The statute governing joinder of charges, 22 O.S.2011, § 438, permits the trial of two or more offenses together if they could have been joined in a single indictment. Our analysis is guided by reconciling the factors set forth in previous case law. 1. **Same Type of Offenses:** The charges of murder and solicitation reflect a common theme of violence directed towards individuals involved with the defendant, qualifying them as the same type of offenses. 2. **Proximity in Time:** While the offenses occurred approximately seventeen months apart, the delay was due to Appellant's incarceration. They are sufficiently related given the circumstances under which Appellant acted. 3. **Proximity in Location:** Both offenses were committed within Oklahoma County, suggesting a logical relationship between the two. 4. **Overlapping Proof:** Evidence supporting each charge would have been admissible in separate trials since they are intrinsically linked to Appellant’s actions and intent. Given these observations, we find that the joinder was proper, and Appellant suffered no prejudice; therefore, no error occurred. We deny Proposition I. **PROPOSITION II: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel** Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the joinder. Under the Strickland test, Appellant must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient and that such performance prejudiced his case. Since we determined in Proposition I that the joinder was appropriate, Appellant cannot show that any failure to object prejudiced his case. As a result, we also deny Proposition II. **DECISION** The judgment and sentence are affirmed. The mandate is ordered issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. --- **APPEARANCES:** **For Appellant:** R. Scott Adams Box 926 Norman, OK 73070 **For Appellee:** Mike Hunter Attorney General of Oklahoma Theodore M. Peeper, Asst. Attorney General 320 Robert S. Kerr, #505 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 --- **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **LEWIS, P.J.:** Concur in Result **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** Recuse **HUDSON, J.:** Concur **ROWLAND, J.:** Recuse --- [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1103_1734788162.pdf) This ruling affirms the conviction and sentences of Bert Glen Franklin and addresses the legal standards regarding the joinder of offenses and ineffective assistance of counsel.

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F-2018-664

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **KEYUNA CRYSTAL MOSLEY,** Appellant, vs. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **No. F-2018-664** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA SEP 19 2019** **SUMMARY OPINION** JOHN D. HADDEN CLERK **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Keyuna Crystal Mosley was tried by jury and convicted of Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 801, after being previously convicted of two or more felonies, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2017-1853. Following the jury's recommendation, the Honorable Ray C. Elliott sentenced Appellant to twenty (20) years imprisonment, requiring her to serve 85% of her sentence before becoming eligible for parole consideration per 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1. Appellant appeals this conviction and sentence. **Proposition of Error:** Appellant raises one proposition of error: that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt of conjointly committing robbery with a dangerous weapon beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus due process mandates her case be reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss. **Decision:** After thorough consideration of the complete record, including original records, transcripts, exhibits, and briefs, we find the law and evidence do not necessitate relief. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed robbery with a dangerous weapon (Easlick v. State, 2004 OK CR 21, ¶ 15, 90 P.3d 556, 559). To establish robbery with a dangerous weapon, the State must demonstrate that the wrongful taking and carrying away of personal property from another's person or immediate presence occurred by force or fear, specifically involving a knife (21 O.S.2011, § 801; OUJI-CR 2d 4-144). The term “principal” in a crime includes anyone who either directly and actively commits the acts constituting the offense or knowingly and with intent aids and abets in its commission (Hackney v. State, 1994 OK CR 29, ¶ 9, 874 P.2d 810, 814; OUJI-CR 2d 2-5, 2-6). Appellant contends the State failed to prove that she acted conjointly with her boyfriend in committing the robbery. She argues that the victim Seale's testimony was incredible and contradicted by her own statement, and that the State should have corroborated Seale's testimony with additional evidence such as forensic evidence, text records, or records of their online communications. This assertion is incorrect. While the State could have provided such corroborative evidence, it was not required to do so. Seale was both an eyewitness and the victim, and the jury determines the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony (Mason v. State, 2018 OK CR 37, ¶ 13, 433 P.3d 1264, 1269). The jury is entitled to make reasonable inferences supporting their verdict. Even in cases of sharply conflicting evidence, we will not disturb a properly supported verdict (Robinson v. State, 2011 OK CR 15, ¶ 17, 255 P.3d 425, 432). The evidence established that Appellant lured victim Seale to the crime scene, called her accomplice, and directly took and carried away Seale’s property while her accomplice threatened the victim with a knife. We will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the jury (White v. State, 2019 OK CR 2, ¶ 9, 437 P.3d 1061, 1065). Thus, this proposition is denied. **Conclusion:** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Oklahoma County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY** THE HONORABLE RAY C. ELLIOTT, DISTRICT JUDGE **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** TIMOTHY M. WILSON ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY 320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 611 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** ANDREA DIGILIO MILLER PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE 611 COUNTY OFFICE BLDG. 320 ROBERT S. KERR AVE. OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 **COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT** DAN POND KATHERINE BRANDON ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLA. ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS TESSA L. HENRY 320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 505 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR HUDSON, J.: CONCUR ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR **[Download PDF Version Here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-664_1735223763.pdf)**

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F-2018-565

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** KIMBERLY ANN SMITH-GENTILE, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee. **No. F-2018-565** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA SEP 12 2019** **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN CLERK** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant, Kimberly Ann Smith-Gentile, was convicted by a jury in Pottawatomie County District Court, Case No. CF-2017-342, of ten counts of Possessing Child Pornography. On May 31, 2018, the Honorable Dawson Engle, Associate District Judge, sentenced her in accordance with the jury's recommendation to ten years imprisonment on Counts 1-8 and twenty years imprisonment on Count 9, with all sentences to be served concurrently. Appellant must serve 85% of her sentences before parole consideration. 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1(16). Appellant raises two propositions of error in support of her appeal: **PROPOSITION I.** THE STATE'S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT Ms. GENTILE KNOWINGLY POSSESSED 10 IMAGES OR VIDEOS OF JUVENILE PORNOGRAPHY. **PROPOSITION II.** UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, A SENTENCE OF 20 YEARS IS EXCESSIVE IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTIONS. After thorough consideration of these propositions, the briefs of the parties, and the record on appeal, we affirm. Appellant was convicted of finding child pornography on a smartphone belonging to her boyfriend, Jaymes Dean, but failing to notify authorities, and instead keeping the phone in her possession for several weeks after Dean left town. The fact that the phone contained multiple files of child pornography was not disputed. In Proposition I, Appellant claims the evidence was insufficient to show that she knowingly possessed the child pornography, particularly ten different items of pornography. Once Dean left the phone behind and traveled out of state, Appellant, with knowledge that the phone contained pornographic material, had the authority to control its disposition. At trial, Appellant claimed she was simply unsure of what to do with the phone. The fact remains, however, that she knew it contained child pornography, viewed a number of the images, and even recognized the daughter of a friend in one of the images. Yet at no time did she attempt to notify authorities, even after a social worker informed her that Dean was a convicted sex offender. Instead, Appellant's conduct suggested that she wanted to use the evidence on her own schedule and for her own purposes. Furthermore, Appellant's claim that she only viewed one video file was convincingly contradicted at trial. A rational juror could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant knowingly possessed ten items of child pornography. **Jackson v. Virginia**, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); **Hamilton v. State**, 2016 OK CR 13, ¶ 4, 387 P.3d 903, 905. Proposition I is therefore denied. In Proposition II, Appellant claims her sentences are shockingly excessive. While the jury recommended the maximum term on one count, the prosecutor never requested a specific punishment, but expressly left that to the jurors' discretion. The trial court ordered concurrent service of all sentences. Finally, we note that the images in question were not simply collected from the internet or some other source; they were direct evidence of child rapes and other sex crimes that Dean himself had committed. Appellant recognized Dean as the adult perpetrator in some of the images. Considering all these circumstances, the cumulative sentences imposed are not shocking to the conscience. **Rea v. State**, 2001 OK CR 28, ¶ 5, 34 P.3d 148, 149. Proposition II is denied. **DECISION** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Pottawatomie County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF POTTAWATOMIE COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE DAWSON ENGLE, ASSOCIATE DISTRICT JUDGE** **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** SHELLEY LEVISAY 318 NORTH BROADWAY SHAWNEE, OK 74801 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** NANCY WALKER-JOHNSON INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM P.O. BOX 926 NORMAN, OK 73070 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT **APPELLEE** ABBY NATHAN DAVID HAMMER MIKE HUNTER ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS 331 NORTH BROADWAY SHAWNEE, OK 74801 JOSHUA R. FANELLI ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL COUNSEL FOR THE STATE 313 NE 21 ST STREET OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105 **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR HUDSON, J.: CONCUR ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR --- [Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-565_1735315294.pdf)

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F-2017-1042

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In OCCA case No. F-2017-1042, Vincent Ray Perosi appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder and Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction. One judge dissented. The case began when Perosi, who had recently divorced, was ordered to leave the house he had been living in by January 1, 2016. After that date, his ex-wife, Pamela Perosi, returned to the house with two friends to change the locks because he had not moved out. This led to a confrontation. Perosi shot and killed Pamela and another friend, Buddy Weber, while wounding Karen Priest, who was also present. Perosi claimed he shot in self-defense, saying he was scared of Weber. However, evidence showed that he had a history of threats against his ex-wife and evidence contradicted his version of events. The court ruled that he did not qualify for immunity under the Stand Your Ground law and denied his request for related jury instructions. In reviewing the evidence, the court found sufficient proof to support the convictions, rejecting Perosi's claims of self-defense and that shooting Pamela was accidental. Further, his videotaped confession was admitted as evidence, despite defense claims it was coerced; the court found it was voluntary. In addition, the court allowed testimony about Perosi's bad character and a victim impact statement from Pamela’s family. Ultimately, the court upheld the trial’s decisions and affirmed the conviction, denying any errors raised in the appeal.

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F-2015-457

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In OCCA case No. F-2015-457, Christopher Wayne Goldman appealed his conviction for First Degree Rape, Rape by Instrumentation, Forcible Sodomy, and Incest. In a published decision, the court affirmed the convictions for the first three counts but reversed and dismissed the conviction for Incest. One member of the court dissented. Goldman was found guilty of serious crimes related to sexual offenses against his niece. The jury recommended prison sentences that ran together for counts related to rape, sodomy, and separately for the count of incest. Goldman raised several issues in his appeal. He argued that there wasn’t enough evidence to prove his guilt for some charges, that unfair evidence was presented, that the prosecutor acted improperly, and that he did not receive adequate help from his attorney during the trial. The court agreed that the incest conviction should be reversed because it was based on the same act as the rape, which is not allowed by law. This meant Goldman was improperly punished for two things for doing one act, which is unfair. However, the court found sufficient evidence to support the convictions for First Degree Rape and Forcible Sodomy, stating that a jury could reasonably decide he was guilty based on the evidence presented. Goldman's claims about the prosecution and defense lawyer's conduct were reviewed, but the court found that the lawyers acted within their rights. The evidence of Goldman’s behavior after he was accused, which included uncomfortable actions in a police room, was allowed in the trial since it showed his possible guilt. In conclusion, while Goldman did not get relief for all his claims, the court recognized an important mistake about the incest charge and fixed it by not allowing that conviction to stand.

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F-2010-99

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In OCCA case No. F-2010-99, Sheila Diane Royal appealed her conviction for multiple drug-related offenses. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm all of Royal's convictions but to modify her sentence for one of the misdemeanor charges due to a procedural error during her trial. One judge dissented. Royal was found guilty by a jury of trafficking in illegal drugs, possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, unlawful possession of marijuana (second offense), failure to obtain a drug tax stamp, and possession of paraphernalia. The jury determined that Royal had prior felony convictions, which enhanced her sentence. Royal received a life sentence without parole for the drug trafficking charge, among other sentences for the remaining charges. The case began when police officers went to Royal's house to look for a man with a warrant. Royal and her boyfriend denied knowing him and gave consent for the officers to search. During the search, officers found scales, crack cocaine, marijuana, a firearm, and a large amount of cash, leading to Royal's arrest. Royal raised several issues on appeal, including claims of multiple punishments for the trafficking and tax stamp offenses, the proper handling of her prior convictions during the trial, and the way the trial court conducted jury selection. The court found that the convictions for trafficking and failing to obtain a tax stamp did not violate double jeopardy rules because the laws intended for separate punishments. It also concluded that Royal did not make a sufficient objection to how her prior convictions were handled, thus denying her request for relief. Regarding the claim about possession of paraphernalia, the court agreed that the trial court made a mistake by improperly separating the trial stages, which influenced the jury's punishment decision. The court modified her sentence for this charge accordingly. The jury selection process was also scrutinized, but the court upheld the removal of certain jurors who may not have been impartial due to their own legal issues. Lastly, the court noted that Royal was required to wear a shock device during trial, which raised concerns under legal rules governing restraints on defendants. The court agreed that there wasn't enough evidence justifying the need for such restraint, but because it was not visible to the jury, it did not affect the trial's outcome. In summary, while Royal's convictions were largely upheld, the court made adjustments based on procedural concerns during her trial.

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F-2004-691

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-691, Cleon Christopher Johnson appealed his conviction for multiple crimes including third-degree arson, robbery with a firearm, accessory after the fact to shooting with intent to kill, and possession of a stolen vehicle. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction for third-degree arson, but affirmed the convictions for the other charges. One judge dissented regarding the reversal of the arson conviction. Johnson was charged with serious crimes in Tulsa County and was found guilty by a jury. They gave him a total of 89 years in prison for his actions. On appeal, Johnson argued that there was not enough evidence for the arson conviction, that the robbery charge was not proven, and that there was misconduct during the trial. The court agreed with Johnson that there wasn't enough evidence to prove he committed arson, as the value of the property burned was not established. They stated that to prove third-degree arson, it's necessary to show the value of the property was at least $50. Since there was no proof of this value, that specific conviction was overturned. However, they found that there was enough evidence to support the robbery conviction. The jury was able to conclude that Johnson played an important role in that crime. On the point of prosecutorial misconduct, the court mentioned that Johnson's attorney did not object at trial, which limited their review. The comments made during the trial were not serious enough to be considered a significant error. So, the final decision was to reverse the third-degree arson conviction and send it back for dismissal, while upholding the other convictions against Johnson. One judge thought that the evidence was strong enough to support the arson conviction and disagreed with the reversal.

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F-2004-643

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-643, Earnest Alphonzo Lee appealed his conviction for Attempted First Degree Burglary. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment but modify the sentence to fifteen years. One judge dissented. Earnest Alphonzo Lee was found guilty by a jury of Attempted First Degree Burglary. The jury believed he deserved to go to prison for twenty years, and the trial court agreed with their decision. Earnest felt this was unfair, so he appealed his case. In his appeal, Earnest raised several issues he thought were wrong during his trial. The first issue was about something called an “evidentiary harpoon.” This means that he thought the arresting officer made a comment that brought up Earnest’s right to stay silent after he was arrested. The court looked closely at this and decided it was not a big deal because there was a lot of strong evidence proving he was guilty, which made the officer’s comment not harmful. The second issue was about a juror named Barker that Earnest wanted removed from the jury, but the judge did not agree. The court said this did not cause any problems since Earnest’s lawyer could have removed the juror another way. For the third issue, Earnest believed that the judge did not explain the punishment ranges to the jury correctly. The court agreed and said the law was not followed properly when the jury decided on the punishment. So, they changed Earnest’s sentence to fifteen years. The fourth issue claimed the prosecutor did something wrong during the trial, but the court found that this did not affect the outcome of the trial since there was still a lot of strong evidence against Earnest. In the fifth issue, the court believed there was enough evidence for the jury to find Earnest guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the sixth issue was about whether all the errors together were so bad that Earnest did not get a fair trial. The court decided that the problems were not serious enough to change the outcome of the trial. Overall, the court agreed that the trial had some mistakes but decided that the most important issue was the incorrect instructions about the punishment. They changed Earnest’s sentence to 15 years but said the rest of the trial was fair.

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