Judicial Ruling

C-2018-1235

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**COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **AUGUST 29, 2019** **CASE NO. C-2018-1235** **ROY DEAN HARJO,** *Petitioner,* **vs.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** *Respondent.* **SUMMARY OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Roy Dean Harjo entered a blind plea to Counts I, Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon, and Counts II-V, Assault with a Dangerous Weapon, after previous convictions for two or more felonies, in the District Court of Pottawatomie County, Case No. CF-2017-665. Following a sentencing hearing, the Honorable John Canavan sentenced Harjo to life on each Count I-V, concurrent for Counts II-V but consecutive to Count I, requiring Harjo to serve 85% before parole eligibility. Harjo filed a motion to withdraw his pleas, which was denied after a hearing on November 28, 2018. Harjo then filed a timely Petition for Writ of Certiorari, asserting four propositions of error: I. Harjo should be allowed to withdraw his pleas for Counts II-V due to lack of factual basis. II. His plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was uninformed about sentencing ranges, violating his rights under the Constitution. III. His plea was not knowing and voluntary due to misinformation regarding sentencing. IV. He was denied effective assistance of counsel. **Decision:** After comprehensive review, we find the evidence does not warrant relief. Proposition I cannot be considered as it was not presented in the motion to withdraw or the certiorari petition. In Propositions II and III, we find the pleas were knowing and voluntary. Harjo's assertion that he believed he would receive a thirty-year maximum sentence is contradicted by the record, which shows he understood the plea form stating potential life sentences. Therefore, his claims regarding plea counsel’s advice lack merit. In Proposition IV, we determine that there was no ineffective assistance from either plea or conflict counsel. Harjo's claim regarding the factual basis for his plea is unsupported, as ample facts exist to justify the plea. Any assertion that conflict counsel was ineffective for not challenging plea counsel also fails, as no substantial claims could have been made given the determination of a solid factual basis. **Conclusion:** The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is therefore **DENIED**. Upon filing this decision, the **MANDATE is ORDERED issued.** **This decision is concurred by all Justices.** --- *To view the complete decision, click [here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2018-1235_1734229271.pdf).*

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S-2013-687

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In OCCA case No. S-2013-687, the appellant appealed his conviction for DUI manslaughter. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling, stating that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the appellant's actions were the direct cause of the victim's death. Two justices dissented from the decision. The case involved an incident that took place on October 11, 2012, when the appellee was charged with first-degree manslaughter. This charge stemmed from the accidental death of his wife, Linda Vaughan, while he was driving under the influence of alcohol. During the preliminary hearing, it was revealed that Vaughan was intoxicated, with a blood alcohol level of .14, and that his wife had exited the truck he was driving. She was killed when he accidentally ran over her. Vaughan argued that the state's evidence failed to show that his driving while intoxicated was the direct cause of Linda's death. Testimony from a highway patrolman indicated that while Vaughan may have been more aware of his surroundings if he were sober, Linda's death would have occurred regardless of his intoxication. The court examined whether the state had presented enough evidence to prove that the appellee's actions directly caused the victim's death. They found that the evidence showed Linda made the choice to leave the vehicle and that her death was caused by her own actions, not by the appellee's impaired driving. Because there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of DUI manslaughter, the court upheld the decision of the lower court, which had granted Vaughan's demurrer, meaning they did not find probable cause to believe a crime had been committed. In the end, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that the evidence was not strong enough to support the charge against Vaughan. The decision did not minimize the tragedy of the accident but emphasized the importance of concrete evidence in such cases.

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S-2013-140

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In OCCA case No. S-2013-140, Haley appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of marijuana. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling that dismissed the supplemental information, which had attempted to elevate Haley's charge to a felony. One justice dissented. The State of Oklahoma had originally charged Haley with unlawful possession of marijuana as a subsequent offense, which is a felony, due to his prior felony conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The district court held that Haley's previous conviction for a different drug offense could not be used to enhance his current charge for marijuana. The case focused on the wording in the law about how to classify repeat offenders. The law specifies that someone can be charged with a felony for a second or subsequent violation of marijuana possession only if their past violations were also under the same marijuana law. Since Haley's previous conviction was for a different substance, the court ruled that it could not be used to upgrade his current marijuana charge. The majority opinion held that the statute must be read as requiring a prior violation of the specific marijuana law to qualify for felony enhancement. The dissenting opinion argued that the law should consider any prior drug conviction to establish the felony status. The dissent believed the majority misinterpreted the intent of the law and that it could lead to confusion in future cases.

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S-2009-363

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In OCCA case No. S-2009-363, Heather Renee Trask appealed her conviction for First Degree Child Abuse Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling that prevented the State from arguing alternative theories of guilt against her. One judge dissented. Heather Trask was arrested and charged with very serious crimes after her baby daughter, Mackenzie, died. The baby had injuries that suggested she had been hurt badly. Evidence from doctors showed that the baby died from head injuries caused by blunt force trauma. When the baby was found, she was not breathing and could not be revived. During the trial of Heather's husband, he testified about the night of the baby’s incident. Heather left for work after 7:00 p.m. on the night of the tragedy, and her husband was the only adult with the baby after that time. The experts in the trial said the baby must have suffered severe injuries shortly before she died, but they could not pinpoint the exact moment it happened. The district court listened to the arguments and decided that there was enough evidence to show that Heather’s husband was likely the one who caused the fatal injuries. Because of this, the court ruled that the State could not present alternative theories that might shift blame to Heather. After hearing everything, the appeals court agreed with the district court's decision. They determined that the lower court did not make a mistake by blocking the State from using other theories to argue guilt. Therefore, the ruling that prevented the State from pursuing various angles was upheld, affirming the decision made by the district court.

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