Judicial Review

F-2004-433

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-433, the appellant appealed his conviction for Conjoint Robbery and Possession of a Stolen Vehicle. In a published decision, the court decided to modify the sentence for the robbery charge but affirmed the sentence for the stolen vehicle charge. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant was charged with possessing a stolen vehicle and leaving an accident scene in 2001. Later, he faced a charge for Conjoint Robbery. He initially pleaded no contest to the stolen vehicle charges, which led to a delayed sentencing while he was to complete a rehabilitation program. However, he could not participate in this program due to the new robbery charge. The appellant pleaded no contest to the robbery charge, resulting in concurrent five-year deferred sentences. In 2004, he was accused of a new crime involving a firearm, leading the state to file an application to accelerate his sentences from the previous cases. After entering a stipulation to the violations, he received a five-year sentence for the firearm charge and additional sentences for the previous offenses. On appeal, the appellant argued that his sentences were excessive. While the court upheld the sentences for the stolen vehicle charge, it acknowledged that the sentence for the robbery was too harsh given the circumstances. Therefore, the sentence for the robbery was modified to ten years with five years suspended. The court found that, overall, the sentences were within the legal limits but decided the particular facts called for a reduction in the robbery sentence.

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C-2003-1247

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In OCCA case No. C-2003-1247, Robert Hershal Perkis appealed his conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon, kidnapping, and burglary in the first degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon, reverse the kidnapping conviction, and modify the burglary conviction to second-degree burglary. One judge dissented on the kidnapping aspect. Robert Hershal Perkis was charged with three serious crimes: robbery using a dangerous weapon, kidnapping, and first-degree burglary. He pleaded nolo contendere, which means he did not contest the charges. The court sentenced him to a total of 60 years in prison for these crimes, with the sentences running one after the other, and ordered him to pay fines and restitution. Later, Perkis filed an application to withdraw his guilty pleas, stating that his pleas were not supported by enough evidence, that the sentences were too harsh, and that he did not receive good help from his lawyer. The court looked into these claims and first examined if the pleas were based on sufficient evidence. For the robbery charge, the court found that the victim was threatened with a dangerous weapon and had property taken from him, which satisfied the elements of robbery. Thus, the court upheld Perkis' conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon. In looking at the kidnapping charge, the court considered the facts surrounding the incident. The victim was taken to a field and held there by Perkis and others. The central issue was whether the confinement of the victim could be considered “secret.” The court decided that because the victim was in a public area, it did not meet the legal definition of secret confinement, which led to the reversal of the kidnapping conviction. Regarding the burglary charge, the court found that while there were issues concerning the evidence for first-degree burglary, it chose to modify the conviction to second-degree burglary instead, giving Perkis a shorter sentence for that conviction. Overall, the court's opinion granted some relief to Perkis by reversing one conviction and modifying another, but kept the robbery conviction intact. The dissenting judge felt that the kidnapping conviction should stand, arguing that the facts should be considered as a case of secret confinement.

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C-2003-136

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In OCCA case No. C-2003-136, Justin Lyle Thomas appealed his conviction for Unlawful Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug, and Operating a Motor Vehicle Under Suspension. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the district court's decision regarding his ability to withdraw certain guilty pleas. One judge dissented. Thomas had pleaded guilty to several charges and was supposed to complete a drug court program to avoid sentencing. However, after not doing well in the program, the state wanted to sentence him. He asked to withdraw his guilty pleas for some of the counts, and the court agreed to let him withdraw his pleas for two of the charges but denied his request for the other two. Thomas argued that he had not been properly informed about the possible sentences for the charges. The court found that there was a mistake about the punishment ranges, specifically for the drug charges. They ruled that this mistake affected his decision to plead guilty, and because of this, he should have been allowed to withdraw his pleas for all counts. The court decided in favor of Thomas and said the lower court had made a mistake when it denied his request. However, one judge disagreed and believed that the incorrect information did not really influence Thomas’s decision to plead guilty to the other charges.

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RE 2002-1245

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In OCCA case No. RE 2002-1245, the appellant appealed his conviction for robbery with a weapon and conspiracy. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of the appellant's suspended sentence but modify the sentence for conspiracy to ten years. One judge dissented.

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C-2003-858

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In OCCA case No. C-2003-858, Esther Servin appealed her conviction for Child Neglect. In a published decision, the court decided to grant her petition to withdraw her guilty plea based on the interests of justice. One judge dissented. Servin had pled guilty to two counts of Child Neglect, which means she was charged with not taking care of her child. A judge sentenced her to a long time in prison—37 years for one count and 10 years for the other. This punishment would mean she had to serve those two sentences one after the other, making a total of 47 years. After the sentencing, Servin tried to take back her guilty plea because she thought she didn’t understand what was happening during her trial. Her request was denied at first, but later, the court allowed her to appeal. In her appeal, Servin said two main things: First, she believed she didn’t enter her guilty plea in a way that was fair and understood. Second, she thought her lawyer did not help her well enough. The court looked at all the information, including the questions asked in court and the answers Servin gave. They concluded that it was right to let her withdraw her plea because it would be fair to do so. The dissenting judge disagreed. This judge believed that Servin’s plea was valid and that everything in court was handled well. The dissenting judge thought the sentence, even though it was long, should be kept as is because Servin had made her choices and understood her situation at the time. In summary, the court allowed Servin to withdraw her guilty plea based on fairness, while one judge felt the original plea should stand.

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F-2001-609

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In OCCA case No. F-2001-609, John Henry Harris appealed his conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction with instructions to dismiss the case. One judge dissented. John Henry Harris was found guilty in a trial without a jury. The court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison and a fine of $25,000. However, Harris appealed this decision, arguing that the police had violated his rights during the arrest. The main issue was whether the police were allowed to enter Harris's home without a warrant. The court reviewed the case law related to the Fourth Amendment, which protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, police need a warrant to enter a person's home, unless there are special circumstances. One of these situations is called hot pursuit, which means the police can follow someone closely if they believe a crime has been committed and the person might escape. In this case, the court found that Harris's arrest did not require a warrant since the police were trying to apprehend him for minor traffic violations and a misdemeanor charge. They ruled that there were no exceptional circumstances that would justify entering the home without a warrant. The court also emphasized that the police needed to show that waiting for a warrant would have resulted in the loss of evidence, which they did not prove. As a result, the court stated that the trial court had made a mistake by not agreeing to Harris's request to dismiss the evidence obtained during the illegal entry into his home. Since the evidence was critical for his conviction, the court had no choice but to reverse Harris's guilty verdict and instructed the trial court to dismiss the charges against him. The dissenting opinion believed that the police acted properly. The dissenting judge pointed out that Harris committed multiple traffic violations and tried to escape from the police by running into a house where he did not live. When the police arrived, the homeowners informed them that Harris should be chased. The dissenting judge felt that the police were justified in entering the home to make the arrest and to prevent potential harm to the homeowners. In summary, the court’s decision to reverse Harris’s conviction was based on the belief that his rights were violated through an illegal entry into his home without a warrant.

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HC 2001-0440

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In OCCA case No. HC 2001-0440, the petitioner appealed his conviction for a sex offense. In a published decision, the court decided to grant extraordinary relief and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings. One judge dissented. The case began when the petitioner, who was in prison for serious crimes, requested that he be allowed to receive good time credits that he felt were unfairly taken away. These credits could reduce his prison sentence. The problem arose from a requirement by the Department of Corrections (DOC) that inmates convicted of sex offenses must attend a treatment program. To join this program, inmates need to admit their guilt and provide personal information which could lead to further legal trouble. The petitioner argued that forcing him to admit to crimes he disagreed with violated his constitutional rights, specifically the right not to self-incriminate. Initially, the district court rejected the petitioner’s request for relief, stating he could not prove he would be released even if the credits were restored. The court found that the requirement to participate in the program was not only mandatory but also fair considering the law at that time. Moreover, the court dismissed the petitioner’s concern that these requirements amounted to unfair punishment, calling his claims frivolous. However, the petitioner took his complaint to the appeals court, where he argued that his situation was similar to another case from Kansas, where the courts agreed that inmates should not be forced to incriminate themselves in order to receive treatment. The appeals court acknowledged the need to further investigate this claim and ordered a hearing to gather more facts. During the hearing, the judge found that the DOC policy indeed put significant pressure on inmates to admit guilt, which violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The judge noted that the program's requirement to disclose past crimes, especially with potential consequences for refusing to do so, placed the inmates in a tough spot. The treatment primarily relied on inmates being honest about their past, which was considered coercive. Ultimately, the appeals court sided with the findings of the district court judge. They stated that while the DOC has a right to rehabilitate inmates, the requirement for them to confess and disclose could not override their constitutional protections. Therefore, they ruled in favor of the petitioner, calling for necessary changes in the DOC's policy to ensure that inmates’ rights were not violated. Thus, the case highlighted a significant legal question about balancing the need for rehabilitation with protecting individual rights. The decision pointed out the necessity for the DOC to adjust its programs to eliminate any requirement that might force an inmate to self-incriminate, while still letting them work toward rehabilitation.

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F-2001-985

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In OCCA case No. F-2001-985, Karyn Jo Webb appealed her conviction for Injury to a Minor Child. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Karyn Jo Webb was found guilty by a jury for hurting a child and was sentenced to fourteen years in prison. She believed her lawyer did not help her properly during the trial. Karyn said her lawyer did not look into important medical evidence that might show she was innocent. She also thought her lawyer did not question the state’s medical experts well and missed gathering good character references that could help her side of the case. The court looked carefully at all the information from the trial and decided that Karyn’s lawyer did not perform well. They concluded that he was not able to act as a good defense lawyer, which is why Karyn should get a new trial. The main issue was that without a medical expert, her lawyer could not effectively fight against the accusations that she harmed the child. Therefore, the court said Karyn deserved another chance to prove her case.

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F-2005-392

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In OCCA case No. F-2000-638, Ray Lamont Hubbard appealed his conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree. In a published decision, the court decided that the assessment of incarceration costs against him needed further review because the process used to determine those costs was not followed properly. The opinion noted that Hubbard's ability to pay was considered, but remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to correctly calculate the incarceration costs. In OCCA case No. F-2000-194, Troy Don Cape also appealed the assessment of incarceration costs after pleading guilty to Driving While Intoxicated. The court similarly decided to vacate the amount of costs assessed against him because the required procedure for determining the costs was not adequately followed. Both cases were sent back for hearings to determine appropriate incarceration costs. One judge dissented on the decision to vacate and remand, believing that the assessments were already supported by sufficient evidence and that the trial courts had acted within their discretion.

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F-2000-386

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In OCCA case No. F-2000-386, Rodney Eugene Cheadle appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder and several other charges. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify his conviction from First Degree Murder to Solicitation for Murder in the First Degree and changed his sentence from life without parole to life imprisonment. One judge dissented. Rodney Eugene Cheadle was charged with many serious crimes, including selling drugs and murder. The case started when a woman named Donna Phillips was working with the police while she was arrested. She bought drugs from Cheadle, and police later got a search warrant for his house. When they searched it, they found drugs and guns. Cheadle was in jail when he told other inmates that he wanted to prevent Phillips from testifying against him. He even tried to get someone to kill her. Eventually, another inmate, Vance Foust, did kill Phillips. After the murder, a jail inmate told the police about Cheadle's plans. During the trial, the jury found Cheadle guilty on multiple counts, and he received heavy sentences. However, Cheadle appealed, claiming there wasn't enough evidence for some of the charges against him, especially for First Degree Murder. The court agreed with him, stating that while he did solicit someone to kill Phillips, the evidence did not show that it was in furtherance of his drug activities as required by law. Ultimately, the court agreed to change his First Degree Murder conviction to a lesser charge of Solicitation for Murder and reduced his sentence. It also reversed some of his other convictions due to double jeopardy issues. Therefore, while he was found guilty of many crimes, the court decided to modify his most serious conviction and sentence.

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C-2000-750

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In OCCA case No. C-2000-750, Nikisha Lynn Farris appealed her conviction for robbery in the first degree and concealing stolen property. In a published decision, the court decided to modify her sentence. One judge dissented. Farris pleaded guilty to robbery and concealing stolen property. She did not have a deal with the District Attorney about her sentence. The judge sentenced her to 100 years for robbery and 5 years for concealing stolen property, and both sentences would be served at the same time. After her sentence, Farris wanted to take back her guilty plea. However, the trial court said no when she asked to withdraw her plea. Farris then appealed the trial court's decision, and the court looked at everything in the case including records and Farris's arguments. The court found that Farris's plea was knowing and voluntary, meaning she understood what she was doing when she pleaded guilty. The court also determined that her lawyer did not make mistakes that harmed her case. However, the court thought the 100-year sentence for robbery was too harsh. They decided to change her sentence to 30 years instead. So while Farris would still have to spend time in prison, it would be less time than what she was originally given. The court agreed to modify the sentence while keeping the other parts of the original decision.

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