J-2019-2

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This document is a summary of a court case from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals involving an appeal by B.J.H., a youthful offender, contesting an order that allowed the State of Oklahoma to sentence him as an adult. The case centered around multiple charges, including Assault With a Deadly Weapon, and the court's decision on whether the public would be adequately protected if the appellant were sentenced as a youthful offender. **Key Points:** 1. **Background**: B.J.H. was charged as a youthful offender at the age of 16 for multiple violent offenses. The State filed a motion to sentence him as an adult under Oklahoma law. 2. **Court Proceedings**: Hearings were held to review the motion, where evidence included testimonies and psychological evaluations. The presiding judge, David A. Stephens, granted the State's motion based on findings that the public would not be adequately protected if B.J.H. were sentenced as a youthful offender. 3. **Appellant's Claims**: B.J.H. appealed the decision on four grounds, including claims of abuse of discretion regarding public safety findings, denial of due process, procedural issues related to preliminary hearings, and lack of service notice to his guardians. 4. **Court's Ruling**: The court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion or merit in B.J.H.'s claims. The ruling stated that the evidence supported the conclusion regarding public safety. 5. **Dissenting Opinion**: Presiding Judge Lewis dissented, arguing that the overwhelming evidence presented at the hearing indicated that the public would be adequately protected if B.J.H. were sentenced as a youthful offender. He highlighted that the majority’s ruling contradicted the facts presented during the hearings. Overall, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the decision to sentence B.J.H. as an adult despite disagreements on the interpretation of evidence and procedural fairness.

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C-2018-410

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **SEAN ALAN REYNOLDS,** Petitioner, v. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Respondent. **Case No. C-2018-410** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **APR 18 2019** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** --- ### SUMMARY OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI **ROWLAND, JUDGE:** Petitioner Sean Alan Reynolds entered a negotiated plea of guilty in the District Court of LeFlore County, Case No. CF-2016-1365, to Soliciting Sexual Conduct or Communication with a Minor by Use of Technology (Count 1), in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1040.13a, and Possession of Juvenile Pornography (Count 3), in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1021.2. On March 7, 2018, the Honorable Marion D. Fry, Associate District Judge, accepted Reynolds' guilty plea and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment on Count 1. On Count 3, Reynolds was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment with all but the first ten years suspended. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Reynolds filed a timely motion to withdraw his plea, which was denied after a hearing. He now appeals the denial of that motion and raises the following issues: 1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying his plea withdrawal on the grounds that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; 2. Whether the district court erred by failing to conduct the requested competency hearing; 3. Whether the special condition of probation restricting his internet use is overly broad and infringes upon his rights; 4. Whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel. **1. Denial of Motion to Withdraw Plea** Reynolds argues that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily, claiming the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw. The standard of review for such cases is whether there was an abuse of discretion. The district court's decision, based on testimony, demeanor, and the plea form, supports that Reynolds' plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plea withdrawal. **2. Competency Hearing** Reynolds contends that the trial court erred in not ordering a mental health evaluation before ruling on the plea withdrawal motion. However, the record reflects that the district court established Reynolds' competency when accepting his plea. There was no indication during the plea hearing of any mental incapacity, and therefore, the court acted within its discretion by not ordering further evaluation. **3. Condition of Probation** Reynolds challenges a condition of probation prohibiting internet usage for five years, arguing it's overly broad. However, this issue was not raised in his motion to withdraw the plea, leading to a waiver of appellate review on this matter. **4. Effective Assistance of Counsel** Finally, Reynolds argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. To succeed, he must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. He claims his counsel did not address his alleged mental health issues, but there was no evidence presented at the plea hearing to suggest incapacity. Additionally, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to cite non-binding cases. Therefore, Reynolds has failed to show he was denied effective assistance of counsel. ### DECISION The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is **DENIED**. The district court's denial of Petitioner's motion to withdraw plea is **AFFIRMED**. The MANDATE is ordered issued. --- **APPEARANCES IN THE DISTRICT COURT** **CYNTHIA VIOL** ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER **KIMBERLY D. HEINZE** PLEA COUNSEL **MATTHEW R. PRICE** MOTION TO WITHDRAW COUNSEL **MIKE HUNTER** ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA --- **OPINION BY: ROWLAND, J.** **LEWIS, P.J.:** Concur in Results **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** Concur **LUMPKIN, J.:** Concur **HUDSON, J.:** Concur [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2018-410_1734106115.pdf)

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F-2013-1129

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In OCCA case No. F-2013-1129, Aaron Mitchell Stigleman appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and remand the case for a new trial. One judge dissented. The case involves Aaron Stigleman, who shot and killed his mother in Elk City, Oklahoma, on February 13, 2013. At the time of the incident, he lived with his girlfriend and mother, both of whom had a history of drug use, specifically methamphetamine. Aaron was believed to be suffering from paranoia and hallucinations due to his drug use leading up to the shooting. Witnesses, including his girlfriend, testified that he accused them of trying to kill him before he shot his mother in the head. During his trial, Stigleman's attorneys failed to secure an expert witness to help argue that he was under the influence of methamphetamine and not in control of his actions at the time of the crime. They tried to get funding for an expert, but their requests were either late or not sufficiently justified. As a result, they could not present an argument related to his mental state or introduce expert testimony that could aid in the defense of insanity or diminished capacity. The court noted that Stigleman's behavior before, during, and after the incident indicated the possibility of a serious mental health issue caused by drug use, which warranted an expert’s evaluation. The silence of an expert on the mental health issues surrounding his drug use could have made a significant difference in the outcome. The court ruled that Stigleman’s attorneys did not adequately represent him by failing to present a complete defense. The decision emphasized that the right to present a complete defense is constitutionally guaranteed. Based on these findings, the court deemed it necessary to grant Stigleman a new trial to allow for proper evaluation of his mental state. While one judge expressed disagreement, arguing that the defense had not shown that the lack of expert testimony prejudiced Stigleman's case, the majority concluded that the claims and evidence presented merited a reversal and a new opportunity for a fair trial.

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C-2013-730

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In OCCA case No. C-2013-730, Mon'tre Brown appealed his conviction for First Degree Felony Murder, First Degree Burglary, and Attempted Robbery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand the case to the District Court. The dissenting opinion argued against the majority's decision. Mon'tre Brown was given several charges, including serious ones like murder and burglary. He pleaded guilty to all counts in April 2013 but later wanted to change his plea, claiming he didn’t understand what he was doing due to his mental condition. The trial court denied his request, leading to this appeal. During the initial plea hearing, there were concerns about Mon'tre's mental competency because of his low IQ, which was reported as around 65. His attorney was aware of his learning disabilities, but they appeared not to conduct a thorough investigation into his mental health before allowing him to plead guilty. Mon'tre claimed he felt pressured to plead guilty because his counsel had said he couldn’t win the case. At a later hearing, Mon'tre's family and mental health professionals testified that he struggle to understand the legal concepts involved in his case, which raised questions about his ability to make informed decisions. Some of the professionals stated he didn’t have a clear understanding of what his guilty plea meant or the consequences of waiving his right to trial. The court found that the attorney had not adequately assessed Mon'tre's competence or sought further evaluations that could have supported his claim of mental retardation. It decided that his attorney's failure to investigate his mental condition and present sufficient evidence during the plea process was ineffective assistance of counsel. Ultimately, the court believed that there’s a reasonable chance that had adequate evidence of Mon'tre's mental condition been presented early, it may have changed the outcome of his guilty plea. Thus, they ruled in favor of allowing Mon'tre to withdraw his guilty plea and directed for conflict-free counsel to represent him in further proceedings.

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J-2014-108

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In OCCA case No. J-2014-108, C.E.B. appealed his conviction for Lewd Molestation and First Degree Rape. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the lower court's sentencing order. A dissenting opinion was not noted. C.E.B. was charged as a youthful offender when he was only 15 years old for serious offenses involving a younger relative. He initially pleaded guilty to these charges and was sentenced to a rehabilitation program rather than prison. His time in the program was monitored by the Office of Juvenile Affairs, which recommended that he could successfully complete his treatment. The court emphasized that upon successful completion, charges could be dismissed. Despite showing progress and completing his treatment program, the District Court later sentenced C.E.B. to prison as an adult, which contradicted the earlier agreements regarding his rehabilitation. The State had initially indicated that his completion of the program would lead to dismissal, yet pursued a harsher sentence instead. The Appeals Court found that the lower court abused its discretion. C.E.B. had completed his rehabilitation successfully, and there was no extensive evidence to suggest he posed a threat that would require adult sentencing. The State failed to follow the proper procedures for transferring him to adult custody and should not have ignored the earlier agreements about his rehabilitation. Ultimately, the court ordered that C.E.B.'s case be dismissed, his name removed from the sex offender registry, and that his record be expunged. He was to be released from custody right away, confirming the importance of fair legal processes, especially for youthful offenders.

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RE-2009-1019

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In OCCA case No. RE-2009-1019 and RE-2009-1020, the appellant appealed his conviction for the revocation of his suspended sentences. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the full revocation of his seven-year suspended sentences to a three-year revocation with four years remaining suspended. One judge dissented. The case involved the appellant, who had previously pleaded guilty to multiple drug charges and received a suspended sentence. Later, the State accused him of violating his probation by committing new crimes. The judge found enough evidence to revoke his entire suspended sentence, which the appellant contested. The appellant argued that a small amount of marijuana found in a car he was driving was not enough to prove he controlled it because it was not his car. He also claimed that revoking his entire sentence was too harsh and should be changed. However, the court upheld the judge's finding that the appellant indeed had control over the marijuana since he was driving the car alone and had acknowledged ownership of the drug paraphernalia in the car. The court found merit in the appellant's argument about the harshness of the punishment because the reasons for revoking the full sentence were incorrect. The judge had based his decision on prior allegations that didn't hold up to factual scrutiny during the revocation hearing. The violations were also deemed minor and were not even prosecuted. In the end, the court decided to cut the original seven-year full revocation down to three years while keeping four years suspended, demonstrating that the punishment still reflected the violations but was fairer given the circumstances.

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J 2010-0788

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In OCCA case No. J-2010-0788, the appellant appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery With A Deadly Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the order that imposed an adult sentence and remand the case for sentencing as a Youthful Offender if the appellant is convicted. One judge dissented. The appellant, who was born on March 12, 1994, faced charges in the District Court of Muskogee County where he was labeled a Youthful Offender. A motion was filed by the State for an adult sentence, while the appellant sought to be treated as a juvenile. The court held a hearing, and the judge denied the appellant's request to be treated as a juvenile. The same judge also granted the State's request for an adult sentence. The appellant raised three main arguments on appeal. First, he claimed the written order for the adult sentence did not match what the judge said during the hearing. Second, he argued that the trial court did not show clear and convincing evidence to justify an adult sentence. Third, he said it was wrong for the court to deny his request to be treated as a juvenile. According to the law, to punish someone as an adult, the court must find strong evidence that the individual could not adequately be rehabilitated or that the public would be at risk. The court found that the trial judge did not make the necessary findings to support an adult sentence and actually believed the appellant could complete rehabilitation and that public safety would not be compromised. Therefore, the court agreed with the appellant that the decision to treat him as an adult was wrong, thus reversing that part of the judgment. However, regarding the second argument about treating him as a juvenile, the court disagreed. The judges felt the trial judge had enough reasons to treat the appellant as a Youthful Offender instead of a juvenile. In conclusion, while the order for an adult sentence was reversed, the court confirmed that the decision to treat the appellant as a Youthful Offender was appropriate. The case was sent back to the lower court to proceed with sentencing as a Youthful Offender if he is found guilty.

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C-2003-1247

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In OCCA case No. C-2003-1247, Robert Hershal Perkis appealed his conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon, kidnapping, and burglary in the first degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon, reverse the kidnapping conviction, and modify the burglary conviction to second-degree burglary. One judge dissented on the kidnapping aspect. Robert Hershal Perkis was charged with three serious crimes: robbery using a dangerous weapon, kidnapping, and first-degree burglary. He pleaded nolo contendere, which means he did not contest the charges. The court sentenced him to a total of 60 years in prison for these crimes, with the sentences running one after the other, and ordered him to pay fines and restitution. Later, Perkis filed an application to withdraw his guilty pleas, stating that his pleas were not supported by enough evidence, that the sentences were too harsh, and that he did not receive good help from his lawyer. The court looked into these claims and first examined if the pleas were based on sufficient evidence. For the robbery charge, the court found that the victim was threatened with a dangerous weapon and had property taken from him, which satisfied the elements of robbery. Thus, the court upheld Perkis' conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon. In looking at the kidnapping charge, the court considered the facts surrounding the incident. The victim was taken to a field and held there by Perkis and others. The central issue was whether the confinement of the victim could be considered “secret.” The court decided that because the victim was in a public area, it did not meet the legal definition of secret confinement, which led to the reversal of the kidnapping conviction. Regarding the burglary charge, the court found that while there were issues concerning the evidence for first-degree burglary, it chose to modify the conviction to second-degree burglary instead, giving Perkis a shorter sentence for that conviction. Overall, the court's opinion granted some relief to Perkis by reversing one conviction and modifying another, but kept the robbery conviction intact. The dissenting judge felt that the kidnapping conviction should stand, arguing that the facts should be considered as a case of secret confinement.

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C-2001-514

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In OCCA case No. C-2001-514, the petitioner appealed her conviction for First Degree Murder (by permitting child abuse). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modify the sentence from life imprisonment without the possibility of parole to a life sentence with the possibility of parole. One judge dissented.

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