In OCCA case No. F-2002-24, Tomas Mendiola Bernal appealed his conviction for maintaining a place for keeping or selling drugs and three counts of delivering and distributing cocaine. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction for maintaining a place for selling drugs and ordered a new trial for that charge, but affirmed the convictions and sentences for delivering and distributing cocaine. One member of the court disagreed with some parts of the decision.
In OCCA case No. F-2002-323, David Dean Wichita appealed his conviction for Lewd Molestation and Forcible Oral Sodomy. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction. One judge dissented. The case focused on whether Wichita had properly waived his right to a jury trial. The court found that there was not enough evidence in the record to show that he understood and agreed to give up this important right. The State agreed that this was a mistake and that the case needed to be looked at again. The judges explained that a person must clearly show they are giving up their right to a jury trial. There was no proof in the record that Wichita made this choice himself or that he did it knowingly and wisely. Because of this error, the judges decided that Wichita should have a new trial.
In OCCA case No. F 2002-157, Kenneth Lee Dueitt appealed his conviction for Manufacturing a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Methamphetamine), Possession of a Precursor Substance (Red Phosphorus), Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Methamphetamine), and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions for Manufacturing Methamphetamine, Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia while reversing the conviction for Possession of a Precursor Substance and remanding it for a new trial. One judge dissented on the decision regarding the reversal of Count 2.
In OCCA case No. C-2003-356, Feaster appealed his conviction for robbery and related charges. In a published decision, the court decided that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and granted his writ for a proper hearing on the motion to withdraw guilty pleas. One judge dissented, arguing that the motion to withdraw was filed too late and should be dismissed.
In OCCA case No. F-2001-1444, the appellant appealed his conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (2nd offense) and Driving While Privilege Suspended. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction for Driving Under the Influence and ordered a new trial with proper instructions. The judgment for Driving While Privilege Suspended was affirmed. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2002-201, Robert Mark Stephens appealed his conviction for First Degree Robbery and Attempted Kidnapping. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions but modified his sentences to run concurrently. One judge dissented. Stephens was found guilty by a jury in Tulsa County and was sentenced to fifteen years for robbery and one year for attempted kidnapping, with the sentences to run one after the other. He raised several issues for appeal. First, he argued that his right to due process was violated because the court did not order a professional examination to check if he was competent to stand trial. However, the court concluded that there were not enough facts to raise a doubt about his competency. Second, Stephens claimed the trial court abused its power by not allowing him to use a mental illness defense. The court found no error in this as Oklahoma law does not allow for a defense of diminished capacity in non-capital cases. Third, he said he did not get a fair trial because the judge did not permit jury instructions on his mental capacity, which he believed was necessary to explain his intent during the crime. The court agreed with the trial court's ruling, saying that there is no provision for mitigating evidence in such trials. Stephens also believed he had ineffective help from his lawyer, but the court found he did not prove this claim. Finally, he said the trial judge wrongly refused to consider concurrent sentences, which led to an abuse of discretion. The court acknowledged this point and modified his sentences so they would run at the same time. In summary, the court upheld the convictions but changed the way the sentences would be served, allowing Stephens to serve his time for both crimes together instead of separately.
In OCCA case No. C-2002-633, Russell Snoe appealed his conviction for lewd and indecent proposal to a child and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant Snoe's petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse the judgment and sentence of the trial court. One judge dissented. Snoe had entered a guilty plea in the District Court of Muskogee County, where he was sentenced to five years for one charge and one year for the other, with the sentences to be served at the same time if he completed a certain program. Later, Snoe wanted to take back his guilty plea and sent a letter to the court. The court held a hearing but did not allow him to withdraw his plea. Snoe argued that he did not have a fair chance because his lawyer did not help him correctly and that he was not given the right information about what the punishment could be. The court reviewed Snoe's case and agreed that he had not been clearly informed about his potential punishment. This mistake made his plea not valid. Since he had taken the plea thinking he faced a worse punishment than he actually could have, the court decided he needed another chance. As a result, the court reversed his earlier decision and allowed him to withdraw his plea.
In OCCA case No. F 2002-101, Danny Joe Boomershine appealed his conviction for Forcible Sodomy and Rape by Instrumentation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions but modified the sentences to run concurrently instead of consecutively. One judge dissented, suggesting that the sentences should be modified to life.
In OCCA case No. F-2001-1488, Robert Wesley Choate appealed his conviction for manufacturing a controlled dangerous substance, possession of a precursor, and possession of a controlled dangerous substance. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to uphold the conviction for manufacturing but reversed the conviction for possession of a precursor, which means that his punishment for that charge was dismissed. One member of the court dissented from this decision.
In OCCA case No. F-2001-1243, Michael Gerald Turner appealed his conviction for multiple crimes. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm some of Turner's convictions and dismiss others. Specifically, the court upheld his convictions for Assault and Battery Upon a Police Officer, Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle, Possession of a Controlled Substance, Driving While Impaired, and Attempted Escape, but reversed and dismissed his convictions for Personal Injury DUI and DUI due to issues with evidence and double jeopardy. One member of the court dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2003-22, Desean Terrell Poore appealed his conviction for Accessory After the Fact to First Degree Murder and Accessory After the Fact to First Degree Manslaughter. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that the conviction for Accessory After the Fact to First Degree Manslaughter should be reversed and dismissed, as it was found to be double punishment for a single action. The court also ordered corrections to the judgment's wording concerning the prior felony conviction.
In OCCA case No. F-2001-528, the appellant appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the judgment and sentence, granting a new trial. One judge dissented. The case involved the appellant, who was convicted of a serious offense and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The appellant argued that he did not receive proper help from his lawyer during the trial. He claimed three main errors: first, that his lawyer did not do enough research on the case; second, that he was not allowed to question a witness about a sexual encounter; and third, that his lawyer had a conflict of interest. Upon reviewing the case, the court found that the lawyer's help was indeed lacking. Specifically, the lawyer did not know important details about two witnesses that could have helped the appellant's defense. This failure to prepare affected the case negatively, indicating that the defense was not done well enough. The court also concluded that the trial judge made a mistake by not allowing the appellant to explore certain evidence regarding the witness. However, since the lawyer did not raise the issue correctly, it did not automatically mean there was a problem. In the end, because of the arguments about the lawyer's effectiveness and the problems with how evidence was handled, the court decided that a new trial was necessary. One judge believed that the trial judge had made the right decisions and that everything should remain as it was. The overall outcome was that the original conviction was overturned, and the case was sent back for a new trial so the appellant could have another chance to defend himself.
In OCCA case No. F 2001-1348, Holly Ann Glasgow appealed her conviction for two counts of Robbery by Force and Fear. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction on Count One and remand it to the district court to change the charge to Receiving Stolen Property with a reduced sentence. The conviction on Count Two was affirmed. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2002-106, Christian Satterfield appealed his conviction for Attempted Manufacture of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Count I), Possession of a Precursor (Count II), and Possession of a Firearm While Committing a Felony (Count III). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Counts I and III and reverse Count II with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented. Satterfield was found guilty of attempting to make a dangerous drug and also having items that could be used to make that drug. During the trial, Satterfield's jury said he should be in prison for a total of forty-two years. The court also decided he should pay a big fine. Satterfield's lawyers argued that he shouldn’t be punished for both attempting to make a drug and having items to help make that drug because it was unfair to be punished twice for similar actions. The court agreed and decided that the conviction for having those items should be reversed. They also looked at whether some rules were followed in Satterfield's trial. They decided that even though the lawyers from the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics had a big role in the case, it didn’t mean Satterfield didn’t get a fair trial. They said the jury had the right instructions about punishments, despite the defense’s claims. The court found evidence used in the trial was okay and supported Satterfield's conviction for using a gun while committing a felony. In the end, Satterfield's sentences for the first and last counts of his conviction were kept, but they reversed the second count, which meant the charges for possession of a precursor were dropped. The judges all agreed on most parts of the decision, but one judge felt that the way the jury was told about the punishment wasn’t right and thought Satterfield should have received a shorter sentence based on newer laws.
In OCCA case No. C-2001-514, the petitioner appealed her conviction for First Degree Murder (by permitting child abuse). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modify the sentence from life imprisonment without the possibility of parole to a life sentence with the possibility of parole. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. RE-2001-947, the appellant appealed his conviction for indecent exposure. In a published decision, the court decided to vacate the judgment and sentence and remand the matter to the District Court of Noble County for further proceedings. One judge dissented. The story begins when the appellant entered a guilty plea for indecent exposure in 1991 and was given a suspended sentence. This means he wouldn't serve time unless he broke the rules of his probation. However, in 1999, the State said he had committed another crime while on probation and wanted to take away his suspended sentence. During the revocation hearing, it was discovered that when the appellant was sentenced, he should not have been given a suspended sentence at all because of his prior convictions. According to Oklahoma law, if someone has three or more felony convictions, they aren't allowed to receive a suspended sentence. The court noted that both the appellant and the State were aware of his criminal history, and no evidence was presented to show that he was eligible for a suspended sentence. In fact, the plea agreement that he entered into was not legal under the law. Because of these issues, the court decided that the appellant's original judgment and sentence should be vacated, meaning it was canceled. This allows the appellant a chance to withdraw his guilty plea, which he can do if he wants to go to trial for the indecent exposure charge again. If he chooses not to withdraw his plea, he will then be sentenced again, but this time, it will be done right and in accordance with the law. Ultimately, the court took this action to ensure that everything was done fairly and legally, giving the appellant a proper opportunity to have his case heard correctly in the District Court. The ruling was important in maintaining the rules around sentencing and ensuring that people with multiple convictions are treated based on the law.
In OCCA case No. F-01-998, Brian Tyrone Scott appealed his conviction for multiple crimes, including First Degree Burglary and Forcible Sodomy. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the kidnapping conviction but affirmed the other convictions. One judge dissented. Scott was found guilty of several serious crimes after a jury trial and was sentenced to many years in prison. He raised five main points in his appeal. First, he argued that his convictions for some crimes were unfair because they punished him twice for the same act. Second, he claimed there wasn’t enough proof that he intended to kidnap the victim. Third, he said he didn’t get a fair trial because he wasn’t allowed to show evidence that the victim might have lied. Fourth, he thought his total sentence was too harsh, and fifth, he wanted his judgement and sentence to correctly show his convictions. After reviewing everything, the court agreed that Scott's kidnapping charge should be dismissed because it conflicted with his current charge of forcible sodomy. However, they found that the other convictions didn’t violate any laws about double punishment. The court also concluded that allowing Scott to introduce the dismissed evidence wouldn’t have helped his case and that it was okay for his sentences to be served one after the other instead of at the same time. In summary, the court affirmed most of Scott's convictions but decided to dismiss the kidnapping conviction. They ordered the district court to correct the records to make sure all information was accurate.
In OCCA case No. F-2001-1170, Willie West King, Jr. appealed his conviction for Lewd Molestation of a Child Under Sixteen Years Old. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for Count I but reversed the conviction for Count II with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented regarding the length of the sentence for Count I, suggesting it should be modified to 20 years. Willie West King, Jr. was found guilty by a jury of two counts of lewd molestation after a trial in Texas County. The jury gave a punishment of 65 years for each count, and these sentences were to be served one after the other. King appealed this decision, arguing several points. First, he claimed that the jury instruction on the crime had a serious mistake because it left out an important part that should have been included. However, the court found that even though this was a mistake, it didn’t change the outcome of the trial because other parts of the instructions were clear. Second, King argued that there wasn’t enough evidence to support the second count against him. The court agreed, saying that the evidence really showed an attempt rather than a completed act of lewdness. Therefore, they reversed that part of the conviction and said it should be dismissed. Third, King felt that the court should have told the jury they needed to have another witness to back up the victim's claim. The court disagreed, stating that the victim’s testimony was believable, and did not need another person to support it. Fourth, King thought that the jury should have been informed he would have to serve 85% of his sentence before being eligible for parole. The court found that this wasn’t necessary in this case because the law didn’t require it. They also decided that the prosecutor’s comments during the trial didn’t unfairly influence the jury’s decision. Fifth, King raised a concern about evidence from Texas being allowed in without proper proof. However, the court found that the evidence was correctly shown as valid. Lastly, King argued that all the mistakes in his trial together made it unfair for him. The court concluded that while there were some errors, they were not serious enough to have denied him a fair trial. In summary, the court upheld King’s conviction on Count I but found that Count II was not supported by enough evidence, so it was reversed and dismissed. One judge disagreed with the long sentence for Count I, believing it was too harsh and should be lowered to 20 years instead of 65 years.
In OCCA case No. F-2001-558, Medlin appealed her conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree by Heat of Passion. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse her judgment and dismiss the case. One judge dissented. The case began when a jury found Medlin guilty of Manslaughter for the shooting death of her husband, Jay Medlin. The jury sentenced her to four years in prison. Medlin argued that the trial court made a mistake by allowing instructions on a lesser charge of Manslaughter since she believed her actions were in self-defense due to previous abuse from her husband. Throughout their marriage, Medlin testified about the many times she and her children had been harmed by Jay. On the night of the shooting, after Jay verbally threatened the family and struck Medlin, she took a gun and shot him multiple times while he was asleep, believing she was defending herself and her children from further harm. At the appeal, the court determined that the evidence did not support a jury instruction on Manslaughter because Medlin had intended to kill her husband. The trial court's instructions to the jury were incorrect because they could only find that she had meant to cause death. Since the evidence only pointed to a conviction for murder, the court concluded that the previous conviction must be dismissed under the law. Thus, the court reversed the conviction and ordered the lower court to dismiss the case entirely, which also meant Medlin could not be tried for First Degree Murder again after the jury had found her not guilty of that charge. The dissenting opinion argued that the judge gave the jury a fair chance to decide based on the evidence presented and that the jury's actions were reasonable based on what they had seen and heard during the trial. In conclusion, the court's ruling in this case emphasized that if there is no substantial evidence showing that a lesser charge could apply, then that instruction should not be presented to the jury.
In OCCA case No. F-2001-934, Guy Franklin Randell appealed his conviction for Lewd Molestation. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment but remand the matter for further proceedings regarding certain fees. One judge dissented. Randell was found guilty in a bench trial, meaning a judge, not a jury, decided his case. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison, with five years of that suspended, which means he won’t have to serve those five years if he meets certain conditions. He also had to pay a fine and other costs related to his court case. Randell raised several arguments on appeal. He claimed that the testimony of the victim was not reliable and needed more support to be believed. The court looked at the evidence and decided that while there were some inconsistencies in the victim's statements, they were still enough to uphold the conviction. He also challenged the costs that were added to his sentence, particularly the fees for his time in jail. The court concluded that even though the prosecution had requested these fees, there was not enough evidence to support how they were calculated. Therefore, the court decided to remove those specific fees and send the case back for a hearing to figure out the correct costs. In summary, the court upheld Randell’s conviction but disagreed with some financial aspects of his sentencing, which will be reassessed in the lower court.
In OCCA case No. F-2001-651, Vadell Lamont Wright appealed his conviction for Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle and Using a Vehicle to Facilitate the Intentional Discharge of a Firearm. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the convictions. One judge dissented. Wright was found guilty by a jury and received a sentence of twenty years for the unauthorized use of a vehicle and twenty-five years for using a vehicle in connection with the discharge of a firearm, with both sentences to be served one after the other. He decided to appeal his convictions. The court reviewed several claims raised by Wright regarding his trial. The main issues included: 1. Seeing the defendant in handcuffs could have influenced the jury. 2. There was not enough evidence to say that Wright used the vehicle to make the shooting easier. 3. The court did not allow the defendant to explain his belief that he was allowed to use the car, known as a defense of mistake. 4. Evidence about other crimes affected Wright's right to a fair trial. 5. Communication between the jury and the trial judge was improper. 6. The trial court made mistakes regarding immunity for a co-defendant. 7. The jury was not given the option of lesser charges. 8. Overall, multiple errors deprived Wright of a fair trial. Focusing on the second issue, the court noted that Wright used a stolen vehicle to flee from police. He was in the vehicle with another person who fired a gun at an officer during the chase. However, the court found that simply using the car did not meet the legal requirement that it had to help make the shooting occur. There wasn’t enough evidence to show that the act of using the car was linked to the shooting directly. Additionally, in regards to possible mistakes about using the vehicle, the trial court's instructions did not help the jury understand what was being asked about having permission to use the car. Wright believed he had permission from the person who was with him and thought he could use the vehicle, but the trial court did not clearly explain this possibility to the jury. As a result, the court decided to reverse Wright's conviction for shooting from a vehicle and dismissed that charge. They also decided to send the Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle charge back for a new trial, stating that the earlier jury did not get all the right information to make a fair decision. In conclusion, the court found that Wright should not have been convicted based on the evidence presented and that he deserved a chance to argue his case again in a new trial.
In OCCA case No. F-2001-785, Sammy Dewain Haas appealed his conviction for Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol and Driving Under Suspension. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction. One judge dissented. Sammy Dewain Haas faced serious charges for driving while drunk and for driving when his license was suspended. He went to trial in Beckham County, where a jury found him guilty. The punishment was set at ten years in prison and a $10,000 fine for the drunk driving charge, and one year and a $500 fine for the driving under suspension charge. The sentences were to be served at the same time. Haas raised several issues on appeal. First, he pointed out that the prosecutor wrongly argued that the jury should think about what he might do in the future instead of what he did this time. The court did not think this was a serious mistake that required a new trial. Second, he claimed that the jury should have been told about a lesser charge called Driving While Impaired, but the court found that the evidence did not support that. Haas also said the judge should have given instructions about using circumstantial evidence, which is when a conclusion is drawn based on the surrounding facts instead of direct evidence. While the court agreed that the instructions should have been given, they ruled that this mistake didn't affect the overall outcome of the trial. Finally, the court ordered that the official record be changed to correctly state that Haas's sentences were to run together, not one after the other. In the end, the court upheld the trial’s decision, meaning Haas would remain convicted and serve his sentence as planned.
In OCCA case No. F 2001-465, Tashiro Rudy Tillman appealed his conviction for Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug with Intent to Distribute and Obstructing an Officer. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction on the drug charge but vacated the sentence for that charge, requiring resentencing. The conviction for obstructing an officer was upheld. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2001-609, John Henry Harris appealed his conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction with instructions to dismiss the case. One judge dissented. John Henry Harris was found guilty in a trial without a jury. The court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison and a fine of $25,000. However, Harris appealed this decision, arguing that the police had violated his rights during the arrest. The main issue was whether the police were allowed to enter Harris's home without a warrant. The court reviewed the case law related to the Fourth Amendment, which protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, police need a warrant to enter a person's home, unless there are special circumstances. One of these situations is called hot pursuit, which means the police can follow someone closely if they believe a crime has been committed and the person might escape. In this case, the court found that Harris's arrest did not require a warrant since the police were trying to apprehend him for minor traffic violations and a misdemeanor charge. They ruled that there were no exceptional circumstances that would justify entering the home without a warrant. The court also emphasized that the police needed to show that waiting for a warrant would have resulted in the loss of evidence, which they did not prove. As a result, the court stated that the trial court had made a mistake by not agreeing to Harris's request to dismiss the evidence obtained during the illegal entry into his home. Since the evidence was critical for his conviction, the court had no choice but to reverse Harris's guilty verdict and instructed the trial court to dismiss the charges against him. The dissenting opinion believed that the police acted properly. The dissenting judge pointed out that Harris committed multiple traffic violations and tried to escape from the police by running into a house where he did not live. When the police arrived, the homeowners informed them that Harris should be chased. The dissenting judge felt that the police were justified in entering the home to make the arrest and to prevent potential harm to the homeowners. In summary, the court’s decision to reverse Harris’s conviction was based on the belief that his rights were violated through an illegal entry into his home without a warrant.
In OCCA case No. HC 2001-0440, the petitioner appealed his conviction for a sex offense. In a published decision, the court decided to grant extraordinary relief and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings. One judge dissented. The case began when the petitioner, who was in prison for serious crimes, requested that he be allowed to receive good time credits that he felt were unfairly taken away. These credits could reduce his prison sentence. The problem arose from a requirement by the Department of Corrections (DOC) that inmates convicted of sex offenses must attend a treatment program. To join this program, inmates need to admit their guilt and provide personal information which could lead to further legal trouble. The petitioner argued that forcing him to admit to crimes he disagreed with violated his constitutional rights, specifically the right not to self-incriminate. Initially, the district court rejected the petitioner’s request for relief, stating he could not prove he would be released even if the credits were restored. The court found that the requirement to participate in the program was not only mandatory but also fair considering the law at that time. Moreover, the court dismissed the petitioner’s concern that these requirements amounted to unfair punishment, calling his claims frivolous. However, the petitioner took his complaint to the appeals court, where he argued that his situation was similar to another case from Kansas, where the courts agreed that inmates should not be forced to incriminate themselves in order to receive treatment. The appeals court acknowledged the need to further investigate this claim and ordered a hearing to gather more facts. During the hearing, the judge found that the DOC policy indeed put significant pressure on inmates to admit guilt, which violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The judge noted that the program's requirement to disclose past crimes, especially with potential consequences for refusing to do so, placed the inmates in a tough spot. The treatment primarily relied on inmates being honest about their past, which was considered coercive. Ultimately, the appeals court sided with the findings of the district court judge. They stated that while the DOC has a right to rehabilitate inmates, the requirement for them to confess and disclose could not override their constitutional protections. Therefore, they ruled in favor of the petitioner, calling for necessary changes in the DOC's policy to ensure that inmates’ rights were not violated. Thus, the case highlighted a significant legal question about balancing the need for rehabilitation with protecting individual rights. The decision pointed out the necessity for the DOC to adjust its programs to eliminate any requirement that might force an inmate to self-incriminate, while still letting them work toward rehabilitation.