In OCCA case No. RE-2019-619, the appellant appealed his conviction for endangering others while trying to avoid the police and possession of a stolen vehicle. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of his suspended sentence but ordered the district court to give him credit for four days he had already served in jail. One judge dissented from this decision.
In OCCA case No. F-2019-417, Henry Warren Kwe Kwe appealed his conviction for Conjoint Robbery, Shooting with Intent to Kill, Possession of a Sawed-Off Shotgun, and Leaving Scene of a Collision Involving Injury. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Kwe Kwe's convictions on all counts except for the Victim Compensation Assessment for Count 4, which was vacated. Kwe Kwe dissented. Kwe Kwe was found guilty of several serious crimes stemming from an incident involving a robbery and a shooting. The trial revealed that he, along with accomplices, confronted the victim, demanding her money while one of them displayed a weapon. When the victim attempted to call for help, she was shot in the back with a shotgun. Following this, the robbers took her purse and fled. On appeal, Kwe Kwe raised numerous issues regarding his convictions. He argued that being convicted for both robbery and shooting violated laws against multiple punishments for a single act. However, the court found that the robbery and the shooting were distinct actions. The shooting was meant to prevent the victim from escaping and to eliminate her as a witness, rather than to take possession of her belongings. Kwe Kwe also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against him, claiming he wasn't the shooter. However, the jury had enough circumstantial evidence to conclude he aided in the crime, as he orchestrated the robbery and knew one accomplice was armed. Also, he was found in possession of a sawed-off shotgun shortly after the incident. The court held that the evidence supported the conclusion he was culpable for aiding and abetting the shooter. Another argument from Kwe Kwe revolved around the legality of the sawed-off shotgun itself. He claimed the prosecution didn't prove the shotgun's barrel was less than 18 inches, which would classify it as sawn-off under the law. Nevertheless, the officer testified that the weapon was a modified sawed-off shotgun and that the jury could determine this after examining it. Moreover, Kwe Kwe claimed that the court’s language when discussing the victim's injuries went against the norms of a fair trial. However, the court found this testimony relevant, as it demonstrated the severity of the attack and the intent behind the actions taken by Kwe Kwe and his accomplices. Lastly, he argued that his legal counsel did not perform adequately by failing to raise certain legal defenses and objections during the trial. Yet, the court determined that any such failures did not adversely affect his rights or the outcome of the case. In summary, Kwe Kwe's convictions remained intact, and while some procedural missteps were noted, none were sufficient to reverse the verdict aside from the correction regarding the Victim Compensation Assessment linked to his charge. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision overall, while rectifying the single financial aspect.
In OCCA case No. F-2018-894, Olubanji Milton Macaulay appealed his conviction for possession of counterfeit driver licenses. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm some counts but reverse others. One judge dissented. Summary: Olubanji Milton Macaulay was found guilty by a jury of seven counts of possessing counterfeit driver licenses after a trial in Oklahoma. The judge sentenced him to ten years in prison, with sentences running at the same time for each count. He argued that law enforcement illegally searched his rental car, that he faced double punishment for the same crime, and that the trial court wrongly refused to instruct the jury about missing video evidence. When he appealed, the court looked closely at each of his claims. About the first point, the court ruled that the police had the right to search the car because Macaulay had given up any claim of privacy when he said he walked to the bank and did not indicate he owned the vehicle. Thus, his evidence was allowed in court. Regarding the second point, Macaulay claimed he should only be charged with one count since he possessed all the fake IDs in one event. The court agreed that multiple counts for a single act were not allowed. They found he should only be guilty of two counts: one for fake ID he took into the bank and another for the ID found in his car. On the third point about the jury instruction regarding the missing bank video, the court said there was no proof that the police acted in bad faith. Therefore, the request for a jury instruction explaining this did not need to be granted. In summary, the court upheld some of his convictions while reversing others, leading the case forward to dismiss those extra counts.
In OCCA case No. C-2019-15, Nicholas Allan Daniel appealed his conviction for First Degree Felony Murder (Distribution of a Controlled Dangerous Substance) and Robbery with a Firearm. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant his request for a writ of certiorari, modifying his conviction for First Degree Felony Murder while reversing his conviction for Robbery with a Firearm. One judge dissented from this opinion. Nicholas Daniel faced serious charges after being accused of killing a man while trying to sell drugs and also robbing him. He pleaded guilty to these charges but later wanted to withdraw his plea. He felt that his lawyer did not help him enough during the process, and he raised several reasons for this claim. He argued that the lawyer had a conflict of interest, that he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea, that the plea lacked a good factual basis, and that he did not get effective help from his lawyer. The court carefully examined each of Daniel's arguments. In the first argument, the court found no real conflict of interest because Daniel’s dissatisfaction stemmed from the state’s evidence and the sentence, not from his lawyer's performance. In the second argument, it was decided that Daniel had entered the plea with a clear understanding that he would face sentencing and that it was done voluntarily. For the third argument, about the factual basis for his felony murder conviction, the court found that there were issues with how the charges were presented. It was determined that the way Daniel described the incident in his plea was inadequate to meet the legal requirements for felony murder because he was treated primarily as a buyer, not a seller of drugs. Thus, the combined crimes could not both stand. In terms of Daniel's claims against his lawyer's effectiveness, the court acknowledged that his lawyer could have done better. However, it ruled against some of Daniel's more serious arguments on the effectiveness of his lawyer, finding that he did not provide sufficient proof that his lawyer’s actions negatively affected his defense. In the final decision, the court adjusted Daniel's felony murder conviction based on the issues around how the charges were processed and reversed the robbery conviction, as it should not stand alongside the adjusted murder charge. Ultimately, the court confirmed Daniel's modified conviction for felony murder but sent the case back regarding the robbery count. One judge disagreed with parts of this conclusion, stating that the trial court had not made a mistake in the first place and therefore should not have granted the appeal. The judge argued that since Daniel's plea was expressed clearly and voluntarily, it should have been upheld without modification. The judge emphasized the importance of adhering to proper legal processes and rules when making such determinations. Thus, the outcome celebrated the importance of ensuring that legal principles and procedures are correctly applied, even as it affirmed Daniel’s conviction under modified circumstances.
In OCCA case No. F-2018-1263, Leatherwood appealed his conviction for Murder in the First Degree, Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Dangerous Substance, Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a Felony, Maintaining a Place for Keeping/Selling Controlled Substances, and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions. One judge dissented. Travis Michael Leatherwood fatally shot Aaron Smith on Halloween night in 2017. They were once friends and worked together selling marijuana, but their friendship soured when Smith stole marijuana from Leatherwood. On the night of the shooting, Smith, upset by an exchange of insults with Leatherwood, went to confront him, unarmed. Leatherwood shot Smith with a rifle before he could say a word. Smith later died from the gunshot wound. After the shooting, police found a lot of evidence connecting Leatherwood to marijuana distribution at his home, including a rifle that he had used to shoot Smith and other drug-related items. Leatherwood argued in court that he acted in self-defense, but the jury did not agree. They concluded that he was the aggressor, especially since he called Smith a coward and provoked him. The jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, along with several drug-related charges. Leatherwood raised multiple issues on appeal, including claims that the state did not prove he acted outside of self-defense, that the court gave confusing jury instructions, allowed improper amendments to the charges, and that he had ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court disagreed with all of his claims. In terms of self-defense, the court ruled that Leatherwood’s actions and words indicated he was not acting in self-defense but rather was the one who provoked the situation. He had armed himself before Smith arrived and shot him before any confrontation occurred. The court also discussed the jury instructions, concluding that the district court did not err by omitting instructions on a lesser charge of heat of passion manslaughter since there was no evidence to support that Smith's actions would provoke such a response from Leatherwood. As for the amendment of charges, the court determined that Leatherwood was sufficiently informed of the charges he faced and that he could defend against them adequately. The evidence showed that he had both the firearm and the controlled substances as part of his operations, fulfilling the requirements for his convictions. Leatherwood's claim that his lawyer was ineffective was also denied because the court found that the lawyer's strategies were reasonable given the overwhelming evidence against Leatherwood. The lawyer focused his arguments on the more serious murder charge rather than the drug offenses, which the jury could have easily decided against Leatherwood irrespective of those counts. Finally, the court ruled that Leatherwood's sentence was not excessive given the nature of the crime and his actions. The judge pointed out that the jury was aware of his age (20 at the time of the crime) and other circumstances, which did not make the sentence shockingly excessive. Ultimately, the court affirmed Leatherwood's convictions and ordered a separate hearing regarding the restitution amount, which needed to be calculated more accurately.
In OCCA case No. C-2019-489, Taheerah Ayesha Ahmad appealed her conviction for Assault and Battery by means likely to produce death, Child Neglect, and Arson in the First Degree. In a published decision, the court decided to deny her petition for a writ of certiorari and affirmed the District Court's judgment. However, the case was remanded to the District Court to correct errors in the judgment regarding the imposition of costs. One judge dissented.
This document is a summary opinion from the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma regarding the appeal of Joseph Eugene Dean. He was convicted in Muskogee County District Court for endangering others while eluding or attempting to elude a police officer after having two or more prior felonies. The jury sentenced him to twenty years in prison and a $2,500 fine. Although he was acquitted of possessing a stolen vehicle, Dean appealed the decision on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argued his attorney failed to request a cautionary instruction regarding eyewitness identification. The court considered the appeal but found Dean's argument lacked relevant authority or sufficient legal backing. As a result, they deemed the issue forfeited for appellate review in compliance with court rules. Furthermore, the court addressed the merits of the claim, applying the Strickland v. Washington standard. This requires showing both deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice to the defense. The court found the cautionary instruction unnecessary due to the reliability of the eyewitness identification in the case and determined the counsel's actions did not constitute ineffective assistance. Consequently, the court affirmed Dean's conviction and sentence.
**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JOSEPH EUGENE DEAN,** **Appellant,** **V.** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **Case No. F-2019-224** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **HUDSON, JUDGE:** Appellant, Joseph Eugene Dean, was tried and convicted by a jury in Muskogee County District Court, Case No. CF-2017-1030, of Endangering Others While Eluding or Attempting to Elude Police Officer, After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies (Count 2), in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 540(B). The jury recommended a sentence of twenty years imprisonment and a $2,500.00 fine. The Honorable Bret A. Smith, District Judge, presided at trial and sentenced Dean in accordance with the jury's verdict, including various costs and fees. The jury acquitted Appellant of Count 1 - Possession of a Stolen Vehicle. Dean appeals, raising the following proposition of error: **I. APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ART. II, §§ 7, AND 20, OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION.** After thorough consideration of the record, including transcripts and the parties' briefs, we find that no relief is warranted. **Proposition I:** Dean asserts that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction (OUJI-CR (2d) 9-19). However, Dean fails to provide relevant authority or argument supporting his claim, thus forgoing appellate review of the issue as per Rule 3.5(C)(6) of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Moreover, we alternatively reject Dean's ineffectiveness claim on its merits. To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). In this case, a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction was unwarranted as no serious question exist[ed] concerning the reliability of the [eyewitness's] identification[s] (Robinson v. State, 1995 OK CR 25, ¶ 56, 900 P.2d 389, 404). Counsel’s failure to request such instruction, therefore, was not ineffective since there was no merit to such a request (Logan v. State, 2013 OK CR 2, ¶ 11, 293 P.3d 969, 975). **DECISION** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is AFFIRMED. **MANDATE** is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision, pursuant to Rule 3.15 of the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. --- **APPEARANCES:** **AT TRIAL:** LARRY VICKERS 600 Emporia, Suite B Muskogee, OK 74401 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT **ON APPEAL:** DERECK J. HURT Oklahoma Indigent Defense System P.O. Box 926 Norman, OK 73070 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT SEAN WATERS Asst. District Attorney Muskogee District Attorney's Office 220 State Street Muskogee, OK 74401 COUNSEL FOR THE STATE **OPINION BY:** HUDSON, J. LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR KUEHN, V.P.J.: CONCUR LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR --- [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2019-224_1734779625.pdf)
**State of Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Summary Opinion** **Case Title:** M.C.T. v. The State of Oklahoma **Case Number:** J-2019-618 **Filed:** February 6, 2020 **Judges:** Kuehn, Vice Presiding Judge; Lewis, Presiding Judge (specially concurring); Lumpkin, J.; Hudson, J.; Rowland, J. **Background:** M.C.T. appeals the certification decision by Special Judge Scott Brockman in Cleveland County District Court Case No. CF-2019-470, where M.C.T. was certified for trial as an adult for crimes including Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon and Unlawful Use of a Computer. The case was expedited under the Accelerated Docket of the Court. **Legal Issues:** The core issue revolves around statutory interpretation regarding the certification of juveniles as adults under Oklahoma law, specifically focusing on 10A O.S.2018 § 2-5-204(H)(1). **Findings:** 1. **Statutory Interpretation:** The Court reviewed the statute, noting that once adjudicated as an adult, a youthful offender retains that status in subsequent criminal proceedings, as mandated by the law. M.C.T.'s prior stipulation to adult status in Oklahoma County was sufficient to affirm his status as an adult in Cleveland County. 2. **Precedent:** M.C.T. relied on D.J.B. v. Pritchett, but the Court distinguished this case based on its unique circumstances, emphasizing that M.C.T. had already been adjudicated as an adult prior to the Cleveland County proceeding. 3. **Judicial Efficiency:** Holding a certification hearing in Cleveland County after a prior adult conviction would be considered a waste of judicial resources, reinforcing the decision to affirm the district court's certification of M.C.T. as an adult. **Conclusion:** The Court affirmed the decision of the Cleveland County District Court to certify M.C.T. as an adult, highlighting that the statutory provisions were effectively applied in this case and that his prior plea as an adult eliminated the necessity for further certification hearings. **Decision:** The certification is AFFIRMED. The mandate is to be issued upon filing this decision. **Counsel:** - **For Appellant:** M. Karla Tankut, Jasmine Johnson (Indigent Defense System) - **For Appellee:** Kristi Johnson, Suanne Carlson (Assistant District Attorneys) **Special Concurrence:** Judge Lewis acknowledged the detailed writing of the opinion and expressed concern regarding the trial counsel's understanding of the consequences of simultaneous cases in different counties. Though counsel's actions were questionable, they did not alter the outcome, given M.C.T.'s unsuitability for youthful offender status. **Download PDF:** [Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/J-2019-618_1734430249.pdf)
The document is a summary opinion issued by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma in the case of D'Angelo Keiyawn Threatt. The appellant, Threatt, was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to eight years in prison. The opinion addresses three propositions of error raised by Threatt on appeal: 1. **Admission of Prior Felony Conviction**: Threatt contended that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to name his specific prior felony conviction (forcible oral sodomy) despite his offer to stipulate that he had a felony conviction. He cited the case Old Chief v. United States to support his argument. The Court ruled that Threatt did not preserve this issue adequately for appeal due to the timing and nature of his objections and ultimately found that there was no plain error affecting his substantial rights. 2. **Prosecutorial Misconduct**: Threatt claimed that the prosecutor's closing argument included highly prejudicial statements that unfairly influenced the jury. The Court examined the statements and determined they were reasonable comments based on the evidence presented at trial. Thus, they did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct that would warrant relief. 3. **Cumulative Effect of Errors**: Threatt argued that the combined effect of the alleged errors warranted a new trial. The Court disagreed, noting that the individual errors did not affect the overall outcome of the trial and therefore did not justify relief. In conclusion, the Court affirmed the judgment and sentence imposed by the District Court of Oklahoma County, finding no reversible error in the trial proceedings. The opinion underscores the importance of proper procedural objections and the evaluation of trial conduct in the context of the entire trial. For more detailed information, a PDF of the full opinion can be downloaded from the provided link.
In OCCA case No. F-2018-114, Andrew Huff appealed his conviction for four counts of Child Neglect and one count of Child Sexual Abuse. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction and sentence. One judge dissented. Andrew Huff was convicted of neglecting his children and sexually abusing a minor. He was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years for the neglect charges and thirty years for the sexual abuse, with all sentences running concurrently. He raised several arguments against his conviction, claiming his rights were violated through various means. First, Huff stated that his video-recorded statements to an investigator should not have been allowed in court because he didn't properly waive his right to counsel. The court found no error in admitting the statement, stating that Huff’s questioning did not clearly indicate he wanted a lawyer at that moment. Next, Huff argued that hearsay evidence was incorrectly allowed, which hurt his chance of a fair trial. However, the court found that any hearsay used was not harmful to the case since other clear evidence proved the charges. Huff also claimed improper admission of other crimes evidence during his police interview, but again, the court concluded there was enough evidence for a verdict regardless of those statements. Regarding jury instructions, Huff felt the jury did not receive proper guidance on the laws for child sexual abuse, which the court acknowledged but deemed harmless since overwhelming evidence supported the verdict. Huff’s claim of insufficient evidence was denied as the court found that evidence presented allowed for rational conclusions supporting the guilty verdicts on both child neglect and sexual abuse. He also brought up issues regarding prosecutorial misconduct during the trial. The court examined these claims and determined any alleged misconduct was not severe enough to warrant a reversal of the conviction. Huff argued that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the introduction of certain evidence and not properly advising him during the trial. The court disagreed, stating that the counsel's performance, while being scrutinized, did not affect the overall outcome of the trial as there was sufficient evidence against him. Lastly, Huff believed that his sentence was excessive, but the court noted that the punishment was within legal limits and that the nature of the crimes warranted the sentence imposed. The overall decision confirmed that there were no reversible errors during the trial, and the affirmance upheld Andrew Huff’s conviction and sentences.
In OCCA case No. F-2018-113, the appellant appealed her conviction for multiple counts of child neglect and enabling child sexual abuse. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions and the sentences imposed. One judge dissented. The case involved Brenda Marie Huff, who was convicted by a jury of four counts of child neglect and one count of enabling child sexual abuse. The jury sentenced her to 25 years in prison for each count, which would be served at the same time. Brenda and her husband, co-defendant Andrew Huff, were accused of allowing their children to live in very poor conditions. Evidence showed the home was filthy, lacking running water, and filled with animal waste and sexual materials. The children were also exposed to troubling behavior, including sexual messages sent by Andrew to a young girl. Brenda was aware of this behavior but did not act to protect the child. Brenda raised several arguments in her appeal, including claims that the evidence against her was not enough to support the convictions, that there were problems with jury instructions, and that her sentence was too harsh. However, the court found that the evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to conclude that she was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also noted that there were no errors in how the jury was instructed, and that the severity of her sentence was justified given the circumstances. The court upheld the jury's decision, concluding that Brenda had neglected the children and enabled her husband to harm them. Ultimately, the court affirmed the judgment and sentence, meaning Brenda would serve her time in prison as decided by the jury.
**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **DOMINICK JAVON SMITH, Appellant,** **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** **Case No. F-2018-1186** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA JAN 30 2020** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN CLERK** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Appellant, Dominick Javon Smith, was tried by jury and convicted of Child Neglect, After Former Conviction of a Felony, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5(C), in the District Court of Tulsa County Case Number CF-2017-1887. The jury recommended punishment of forty years imprisonment and payment of a $5,000.00 fine. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly; she will serve 85% of her sentence before becoming eligible for parole consideration. From this judgment and sentence, Appellant appeals, raising three propositions of error: **I.** The trial court erred in permitting the State to cross-examine Dominick Smith in the punishment stage on matters not relevant to her alleged prior felony conviction. **II.** Prosecutorial misconduct deprived Appellant of a fair trial. **III.** Appellant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. After thorough consideration of the record, including the original documents and briefs, we find that under the law and evidence, Appellant is not entitled to relief. In her first proposition, Appellant claims that the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to question her about matters irrelevant to her prior felony conviction. While defense counsel objected multiple times, only two objections referenced relevance. Therefore, the remainder is assessed under plain error review. Under the Simpson test, we assess actual error that is plain or obvious and that affects substantial rights. The trial court's limitations on cross-examination are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. During the punishment phase, Appellant testified on direct that she had a prior felony conviction for child abuse. On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Appellant about conflicting statements made to police, thereby attempting to impeach her credibility. Given that Appellant opened the door to her prior conviction and explanation, there was no error in allowing such cross-examination. Proposition I is denied. In Proposition II, Appellant contends prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing arguments when the prosecutor suggested that Santa Claus may have caused the victim's injuries and discussed how Appellant's actions deprived K.O. of life experiences. As Appellant failed to object, we review these claims for plain error. The prosecutor's remarks were within acceptable boundaries as they focused on the evidence and reasonable inferences. Appellant's claim that the argument improperly sought sympathy for K.O. does not render it improper. The remarks about the consequences of Appellant's actions are relevant and permissible. Thus, Proposition II is denied. Lastly, in Proposition III, Appellant claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutor's cross-examination and closing argument. Under the Strickland test, the claims of ineffectiveness can be dismissed due to lack of demonstrated error in the prosecutor’s conduct. Since neither allegation resulted in plain error, the claim of ineffective assistance fails. Thus, Proposition III is denied. **DECISION** The JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. --- *Counsel for Appellant: Richard Koller, Richard Couch, Rebecca Newman* *Counsel for the State: Mike Hunter, Andrea Brown, Keeley L. Miller* **OPINION BY: LUMPKIN, J.** LEWIS, P.J.: Concur KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur HUDSON, J.: Concur ROWLAND, J.: Concur [Download Opinion PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1186_1734785732.pdf)
**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **KENNETH ALLEN DAY,** Appellant, **V.** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. Case No. F-2018-1161 **SUMMARY OPINION** **HUDSON, JUDGE:** Appellant Kenneth Allen Day was tried and convicted by a jury in the District Court of Oklahoma County (Case No. CF-2017-2586) of: 1. **Count 1:** Sexual Battery (21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 1123(B)) 2. **Counts 2 and 3:** Indecent Exposure (21 O.S.2011, § 1021) The jury recommended a sentence of 30 days imprisonment on Count 1, and 1 year imprisonment each on Counts 2 and 3. The Honorable Timothy R. Henderson, District Judge, presided over the trial and executed the sentences as per the jury's recommendations, ordering them to run consecutively and consecutively to Oklahoma County Case No. CF-16-6470. Day was granted credit for 177 days served and was subject to various costs and fees. Day appeals, raising the following proposition of error: **I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED OKLA. STAT. TIT. 57, § 138(G) BY REFUSING TO GRANT MR. DAY CREDIT FOR ALL TIME SERVED WHILE AWAITING TRIAL AND SENTENCING, CLAIMING THAT THE STATUTE WAS DISCRETIONARY AND NOT MANDATORY.** Upon a thorough review of the entire record including transcripts, exhibits, and the parties' briefs, we find no legal error necessitating relief. Therefore, Day's judgments and sentences are AFFIRMED. **Proposition I:** Day's claim pertains to the nature of credit for time served—whether it is mandatory or discretionary. Citing *Loyd v. State*, 1981 OK CR 5, 624 P.2d 74, Day contends that 57 O.S.Supp.2015, § 138(G) mandates credit for all time served prior to judgment and sentence. However, as recently discussed and clarified in *Luna-Gonzales v. State*, 2019 OK CR 11, this argument has been rejected. This Court noted that *Loyd* is inconsistent with the majority of case law on this subject and that the Oklahoma Legislature has amended § 138 multiple times since 1980, which indicates a legislative intent to modify the ruling in *Loyd*. The current statute indicates that defendants automatically receive credit for jail time served only post-judgment and sentencing. Significantly, *Loyd* is overruled to the extent it conflicts with this interpretation. We also recognize that the district court exercised its discretion appropriately in awarding Day partial credit for time served, which aligns with previous ruling in *Luna-Gonzales* that grants sentencing judges discretion regarding credit for pre-sentencing incarceration. Thus, Day's argument is rejected, and his assertion is firmly denied. **DECISION** The judgments and sentences of the District Court are AFFIRMED. According to Rule 3.15 of the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the MANDATE shall be issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HENDERSON, DISTRICT JUDGE** **APPEARANCES AT TRIAL** RICHARD HULL (Counsel for Appellant) HALLIE ELIZABETH BOVOS KRISTEN MESSINA, ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER **APPEARANCES ON APPEAL** LORI MCCONNELL MIKE HUNTER RACHEL SMITH JULIE PITTMAN, ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL, (Counsel for Appellee) **OPINION BY:** HUDSON, J. **LEWIS, P.J.:** CONCUR **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** CONCUR **LUMPKIN, J.:** CONCUR **ROWLAND, J.:** CONCUR For further details and access to full judgment, [Click Here to Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1161_1734786325.pdf)
**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **MICKEY JOE EDWARD RICHARDSON,** **Appellant,** **VS.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. F-2018-975** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA JAN 30 2020** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN CLERK** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant, Mickey Joe Edward Richardson, was convicted by a jury in Haskell County District Court, Case No. CF-2016-91, of several crimes, receiving the following sentences: - **Assault and Battery on a Police Officer**, After Conviction of a Felony (Count 1) - **5 years** - **Larceny of an Automobile**, After Conviction of a Felony (Count 2) - **20 years** - **Feloniously Pointing a Firearm**, After Conviction of a Felony (Count 4) - **30 years** - **Felon in Possession of a Firearm**, After Conviction of a Felony (Count 5) - **Life** - **Escape from Detention** (Count 8) - **1 year** On September 11, 2018, the trial court, presided by the Honorable Brian C. Henderson, Associate District Judge, imposed the jury-recommended sentences to be served consecutively. This appeal followed. Appellant raises six propositions of error: 1. **Misinstruction on Sentencing Range** for Possession of a Firearm After Conviction of a Felony. 2. **Violation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process** regarding jury instructions. 3. **Improper Victim Impact Statements** affecting the fairness of the sentencing hearing. 4. **Abuse of Discretion** with respect to the policy of consecutive sentencing. 5. **Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel** violating constitutional rights. 6. **Cumulative Errors** affecting the fairness of the proceedings. After thorough consideration of the propositions, briefs, and the entire record, we affirm. Appellant was convicted after attacking a sheriff’s deputy, stealing a patrol car, and attempting to evade other officers. ### Analysis of Propositions: **Proposition I: Misinstruction on Sentencing Range** Appellant claims misinstruction regarding the sentencing range for Count 5, asserting it should be one to ten years under 21 O.S. 2011, § 1284. However, the jury was properly instructed on the sentencing range pursuant to 21 O.S.2011, §§ 51.1(A)(2) and 1284. **Proposition II: Jury Instruction on Statement Voluntariness** Appellant argues the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the voluntariness of his statement to police. As Appellant testified and did not claim the statements were involuntary, this contention lacks merit. **Proposition III: Victim Impact Statements** Appellant objected to victim impact statements, claiming they were inadmissible since the crimes were not violent. However, one conviction (Pointing a Firearm) was classified as a violent crime, making the inclusion of the statements appropriate. **Proposition IV: Consecutive Sentencing Policy** Appellant alleges the trial court enforced a policy of consecutive sentencing for defendants who exercise their right to a jury trial. The record indicates the trial court exercised discretion properly, adhering to the statutory default for consecutive sentences. **Proposition V: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel** Appellant contends his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to previous claims. As we found those claims meritless, trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise meritless objections. **Proposition VI: Cumulative Errors** No errors were identified in prior propositions, thus, there are no cumulative errors to evaluate. ### Decision The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Haskell County is **AFFIRMED**. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, the MANDATE is ordered issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. --- **Appeal from the District Court of Haskell County** **The Honorable BRIAN C. HENDERSON, Associate District Judge** **Attorneys for Appellant: ROGER HILFIGER, SARAH MACNIVEN** **Attorneys for Appellee: CHRISTINA BURNS, MIKE HUNTER, ASHLEY L. WILLIS** **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** **LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR** **LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR** **HUDSON, J.: CONCUR** **ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR** --- [**Click Here To Download PDF**](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-975_1734872271.pdf)
This document is a summary opinion from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals regarding the case of Walter Lee Roundtree, who was convicted of violations related to the Sex Offender Registration Act. The court found against him on several propositions of error, including claims of insufficient evidence, double jeopardy, improper sentencing enhancements, and ineffective assistance of counsel. **Key Points from the Opinion:** - Roundtree was convicted of two counts: Violation of the Sex Offender Registration Act and Failure to Comply with the Act, with the jury recommending sentences of four and five years, respectively, to be served consecutively. - The court addressed several legal propositions raised by Roundtree, concluding that the evidence supported the convictions, and there was no violation of double jeopardy laws. - Roundtree's assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel was also denied, as the court found that he did not demonstrate sufficient prejudice from his attorney's performance. - The court ultimately affirmed the judgment and sentences while denying a request to supplement the appeal record due to a lack of evidentiary support. **Judicial Opinions:** - Judge Lumpkin authored the opinion affirming the judgments. - Judge Lewis concurred in part but dissented on the affirmation of Count 1, arguing that Roundtree's single act of moving should not subject him to multiple punishments under the law. The court's ruling underscores the importance of establishing clear legal standards for crimes and how multiple offenses are treated under similar circumstances.
**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **CAMERON LEE SCHEMMER,** Appellant, v. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **Case No. F-2018-1023** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JAN 23 2020** **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN** **CLERK** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Appellant, Cameron Lee Schemmer, was tried by the court and convicted of Count 1, Forcible Sodomy, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 888, and Counts 2-4, Lewd Molestation, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1123, in Kingfisher County District Court, Case No. CF-2017-96. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years imprisonment with all but the last five years suspended for Count 1. For Counts 2-4, the court sentenced him to twenty-five years imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently to one another but consecutively to the sentence for Count 1. As a result, Appellant will be required to serve 85% of his sentences before becoming eligible for parole, as per 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1. From this judgment and sentence, Appellant appeals, raising the following propositions of error: **I.** The record in this case does not sufficiently demonstrate that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. **II.** Mr. Schemmer received an excessive sentence when the trial court followed the wrong sentencing statute. Upon thorough consideration of these propositions and the entire record, including the original record, transcripts, and briefs of the parties, we find no relief is warranted under the law and evidence presented. **Proposition I:** Appellant argues that the record is insufficient to support a finding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Since he did not object before the non-jury trial, we review this claim for plain error, as established in *Simpson v. State*, 1994 OK CR 40, 876 P.2d 690. Plain error requires that Appellant demonstrate an actual error that is plain or obvious and affects substantial rights. A defendant may waive their right to a jury trial, but the waiver must be knowingly, competently, and intelligently made. The record shows that prior to trial, the court engaged in a colloquy with Appellant regarding his jury trial waiver. Appellant confirmed his satisfaction with his attorney and expressly indicated his desire to waive the jury trial right. This established a knowing and intelligent waiver by Appellant. Therefore, we deny this proposition as the trial court's assessment was in compliance with the law. **Proposition II:** Appellant contends his sentence is illegal because the Information alleged that R.N. was a child under sixteen, not under twelve. Thus, Appellant argues that the sentencing range should have been from one or three years to twenty years instead of a minimum of twenty-five years, as required when the child is under the age of twelve. Since Appellant failed to object at sentencing, we again look for plain error. The Information indicated that R.N. was under the age of sixteen at the time of the offenses, and the evidence revealed she was ten years old when the abuse began and eleven when it ceased. Appellant was charged under 21 O.S.2011, § 1123(A), which necessitates a minimum of twenty-five years imprisonment when the child is under twelve years of age. A court in a non-jury trial retains the presumption of knowing the law correctly. The facts show that R.N. was indeed under twelve when the offenses occurred, and the court found this circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the claim of an illegal sentence based on an erroneous application of the statute is without merit. **DECISION:** The **JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED**. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, the **MANDATE is ORDERED issued** upon this ruling. **APPEARANCES:** **Trial Counsel:** Blayne Allsup **Appellate Counsel for Appellant:** Cindy Brown Danner **Counsel for State:** John Salmon, Assistant District Attorney, and Theodore M. Peepers, Assistant Attorney General. **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE:** CONCURS **LEWIS, P.J.:** Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** Concur in Result **HUDSON, J.:** Concur **ROWLAND, J.:** Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J., CONCURRING IN RESULT:** While I concur with the outcomes reached, I note a discrepancy in the standard of review applied to Proposition I. The burden rests with the State to prove any constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as highlighted in *Chadwell v. State* and *Chapman v. California*. The majority's application of the plain error standard does not recognize this shifting burden adequately. **[Document ends here]**
**Summary Opinion Denying Certiorari** **Case:** Spencer Joe Cuccaro v. State **Judging Authority:** Judge Hudson **Background:** Spencer Joe Cuccaro appealed from a ruling by the District Court of Kay County, where Judge David Bandy denied his application to withdraw pleas entered in three criminal cases. Cuccaro had participated in the Kay County Drug Court program and entered no contest pleas in various counts related to drug possession and other offenses, with a plea agreement tied to his performance in Drug Court. Cuccaro was allegedly coerced into his plea by a law enforcement officer and claimed to be unaware of the severe penalties he would face if he was unsuccessful in completing the Drug Court program. After being terminated from Drug Court for failing to meet its requirements and committing new crimes, Cuccaro received significant prison sentences. **Propositions of Error:** 1. Cuccaro argued that his no contest pleas were entered due to coercion and therefore were not knowing or voluntary. 2. He claimed he did not fully understand the severe consequences of failing the Drug Court program. **Court Findings:** - The Court reviews denials of motions to withdraw guilty pleas for abuse of discretion, primarily assessing if pleas were made knowingly and voluntarily. - Cuccaro's challenge regarding coercion lacked evidence, and testimony at the hearing supported the conclusion that his plea was made with an understanding of the consequences. - Regarding the claim about the punishment understanding, the court noted that fully detailed documentation outlined the potential life sentence in the event of failure in Drug Court, which Cuccaro was aware of before entering his plea. **Conclusion:** The court denied Cuccaro’s petition for a writ of certiorari, affirmed the lower court's judgment, and ruled that there was no abuse of discretion in denying the plea withdrawal. The case exemplifies the requirement for defendants to understand the implications of their plea agreements and the importance of voluntary and informed consent in legal proceedings.
**Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma** **Antonio Deondre Smith, Appellant, v. The State of Oklahoma, Appellee.** **Case No. F-2018-1082** **Summary Opinion** **Judges:** Kuehn, Vice Presiding Judge; Lewis, P.J.; Lumpkin, J.; Hudson, J.; Rowland, J. **Date Filed:** January 16, 2020 **Opinion Information:** - Appellant was convicted of Accessory to Murder, After Conviction of Two or More Felonies, related to the killing of his former step-father. - Sentenced to life imprisonment by Judge Kelly Greenough. **Propositions of Error:** 1. The trial court erred in admitting evidence of assault rifles and ammunition, impacting Appellant's right to a fair trial. 2. The sentence of life for Accessory to Murder is excessive. **Decision:** - The Court affirms the District Court’s judgment and sentence. **Details:** - Appellant was charged with First Degree Murder but was convicted of Accessory to Murder. - Evidence indicated that he was present at the murder and helped dispose of the weapon. He testified that another person was the actual killer. - The Court reviewed the admission of firearms evidence for abuse of discretion and found the introduction of the assault rifles irrelevant. - While acknowledged as an abuse, it was deemed harmless error given the trial court's jury instructions and Appellant's admissions during testimony. **On Sentencing:** - The circumstantial evidence and Appellant's criminal history made the life sentence appropriate, and it was not considered shocking. **Final Judgment:** - The District Court’s decision is upheld. - The mandate is to be issued upon filing this decision. **Dissenting Opinion:** - Judge Hudson concurs with the results but disagrees with the major opinion regarding the admissibility of firearms evidence, asserting it was relevant and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. **Download PDF:** [Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1082_1734857545.pdf)
**Summary of the Case:** In the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma, Adam Russell Hemphill, Sr. was convicted by a jury of Child Neglect. He was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. Hemphill raised two issues on appeal: (1) allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments and (2) the trial court's admission of evidence regarding his prior drug use. **Issues Presented:** 1. **Prosecutorial Misconduct:** - Hemphill argued that prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument prejudiced his right to a fair trial, primarily due to the prosecutor's references to his past marijuana use and comments regarding uncharged crimes. - The Court found that although some remarks made by the prosecutor were questionable, they did not rise to the level of affecting Hemphill's substantial rights or rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. The absence of objection to most comments and the strength of the evidence against Hemphill contributed to this conclusion. 2. **Admission of Evidence:** - Hemphill contested the introduction of evidence regarding his past marijuana use, asserting it was irrelevant and inadmissible as evidence of bad acts. - Although the Court agreed that the evidence was not relevant to the case and constituted an error in its admission, it ultimately concluded that the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Hemphill's guilt. **Decision:** The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment and sentence, determining that Hemphill was not entitled to relief on either of his claims. **Concurrences:** Judge Hudson concurred in the results but disagreed with the majority regarding the prosecutor's cross-examination about marijuana use. He believed the admission of this testimony did not constitute an abuse of discretion and was relevant to Hemphill's claims about his financial situation. --- For full details and legal citations, refer to the complete decision linked above.
In the case of Anthony Phillip Miller, Jr. v. The State of Oklahoma (Case No. F-2019-54), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Miller's conviction and sentence for child sexual abuse. The trial, held in the District Court of Tulsa County, resulted in a jury finding Miller guilty and sentencing him to twenty-five years imprisonment, with an additional ten years of post-imprisonment supervision. Miller raised several issues on appeal: 1. **Prosecutorial Misconduct**: Miller argued that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments deprived him of a fair trial. He claimed that these comments undermined his constitutional rights, including his right to a jury trial and his right to remain silent. Although the Court acknowledged that some comments were improper, they ruled that the overall evidence against Miller, which included a confession, rendered any prosecutorial error harmless. 2. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: Miller contended he was denied effective legal representation because defense counsel indicated in opening statements that he would testify but ultimately did not. However, the Court found that this was a strategic decision made after consulting with Miller and did not demonstrate ineffective assistance. 3. **Cumulative Error**: Miller claimed that, although no single error warranted reversal, the cumulative effect of errors did. The Court found that there were no combined errors affecting the trial's outcome. Ultimately, the Court upheld Miller's conviction, stating that the errors did not undermine the integrity of the trial, and affirmed the sentence imposed by the District Court. The mandate was ordered to be issued following the decision.
In this case summary, Alfonzo Lamonse Vineyard was convicted of multiple charges in the District Court of Tulsa County, including Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon, First Degree Burglary, Possession of a Firearm After Former Conviction of a Felony, and several counts of Obstructing an Officer, among others. The jury found Vineyard guilty on all counts except one (Assault and Battery), and the court subsequently sentenced him to life imprisonment on the more serious counts, with concurrent and consecutive terms for other counts. Vineyard's appeal raised five main issues: 1. **Waiver of Right to Counsel**: The court found that Vineyard’s waiver of his right to counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. He was adequately informed of the risks associated with self-representation. 2. **Right to Confrontation**: Vineyard argued that his right to confront witnesses was violated when the court allowed the reading of the victim's preliminary hearing testimony, as she did not appear at trial. The court found that the state had made sufficient efforts to locate the victim and that her unavailability was justified, thus upholding the admission of her prior testimony. 3. **Sufficiency of Evidence**: Vineyard contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon. The court determined that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 4. **Lesser Included Offense Instruction**: Vineyard argued that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of Pointing a Firearm. While the court acknowledged that the lack of instruction was error, it did not affect the trial's outcome, and therefore did not warrant reversal. 5. **Cumulative Error**: Lastly, Vineyard claimed that the cumulative effect of errors warranted a new trial. The court found no individual errors that affected the trial's fairness, thus rejecting this claim. Ultimately, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment and sentence, concluding that none of the raised issues warranted relief. The decision highlighted the adherence to established legal standards regarding self-representation, confrontation rights, evidentiary sufficiency, jury instructions, and cumulative error analysis. [Download the full opinion here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1188_1734784723.pdf).
**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **ANGEL MUNOZ,** **Appellant,** **-VS-** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. F-2018-900** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JAN - 9 2020** **SUMMARY OPINION** **LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant, Angel Munoz, appeals from the acceleration of his deferred judgment and sentencing in Case No. CF-2016-701 in the District Court of Oklahoma County, by the Honorable Glenn M. Jones, District Judge. On March 7, 2018, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to Count 1: Assault and Battery With a Dangerous Weapon, with sentencing deferred for a period of five years under probation conditions until March 6, 2023. On June 26, 2018, the State filed an application to accelerate Appellant's deferred judgment and sentencing, alleging he violated probation by committing the new crime of Possession of a Firearm after a prior felony conviction, as charged in Oklahoma County District Court Case No. CF-2018-2625. An amended application was filed on August 21, 2018. At the hearing on this application, the State called Appellant's probation officer, Tammera Saavedra. During a home visit on April 13, 2018, Officer Saavedra found a nine-millimeter semiautomatic pistol and ammunition in plain view in a garage where Appellant claimed to be staying. Additionally, personal items belonging to Appellant were found near the firearm, leading to his arrest for possessing the firearm. Appellant's brother-in-law, Arturo Plascencia, testified that Appellant did not live in the garage, stating that he had never stayed there. Appellant corroborated this, but both testimonies were contradicted by evidence showing Appellant's possession and control of the area where the gun was found. After hearing the evidence, Judge Jones found that Appellant violated his probation. Consequently, he accepted the State's recommendation and sentenced Appellant to a term of ten years. Appellant raises two propositions of error on appeal: 1. **Proposition I**: The trial court abused its discretion by accelerating Appellant's sentence when the State failed to provide sufficient competent evidence of the alleged new offense. 2. **Proposition II**: The acceleration judgment should reflect Appellant's conviction for Assault and Battery With a Dangerous Weapon, rather than Assault and Battery With a Deadly Weapon. **ANALYSIS** In **Proposition I**, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish his knowledge of the firearm's presence. The standard for reviewing such claims requires that the court finds whether a rational trier of fact could have concluded the essential elements of the probation violation were met by a preponderance of the evidence. Evidence presented indicated Appellant's admission to living in the garage at the time the firearm was discovered. Testimony from Officer Saavedra and physical evidence reinforced the conclusion that Appellant had dominion and control over the area where the firearm was located. Conflicting testimonies regarding Appellant's residence and possession were matters for the court to evaluate. Thus, Appellant failed to substantiate that Judge Jones acted irrationally in his ruling. In **Proposition II**, Appellant argues for a correction of the accelerating judgment to accurately reflect his offense. The State agrees that this matter warrants attention. Therefore, it should be remanded to the District Court for the necessary correction. **DECISION** The order of the District Court of Oklahoma County accelerating Appellant's deferred judgment and sentencing in Case No. CF-2016-701 is AFFIRMED. However, the case is REMANDED to the District Court for a correction in accordance with Appellant's request. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2020), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the filing of this decision. **APPEARANCES** **For the Appellant:** Kenneth C. Watson, Nancy Walker-Johnson Attorney at Law 119 N. Robinson, Suite 640 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 **For the State:** Tiffany Noble, Mike Hunter, Diane L. Slayton Assistant District Attorneys 505 County Office Building Oklahoma City, OK 73102 **OPINION BY:** LEWIS, P.J. KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur LUMPKIN, J.: Concur HUDSON, J.: Concur ROWLAND, J.: Concur [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-900_1735119586.pdf)
**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **ARNULFO CAMPOS GONZALES, Appellant,** **V.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** **Case No. F-2018-989** **File Date: January 2020** **OPINION BY: ROWLAND, JUDGE** Appellant Arnulfo Campos Gonzales appeals his Judgment and Sentence from the District Court of Haskell County, Case No. CF-2017-197. He was convicted for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs, Conspiracy to Traffic Methamphetamine, and Conspiracy to Distribute Methamphetamine. His sentences included twenty-five years imprisonment for Count 1 and ten years each for Counts 2 and 3, ordered to be served consecutively. Gonzales raises several issues on appeal: 1. Denial of effective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest. 2. Double punishment for Counts 2 and 3. 3. Violation of the Fourth Amendment regarding the search of his car. 4. Deficient jury instructions on conspiracy. 5. Ineffective assistance of counsel due to failure to suppress and object to instructions. 6. Abuse of discretion in consecutive sentencing. **1. Conflict of Interest** Gonzales argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel’s prior representation of a co-defendant, Samantha Johnson, who testified against him. The court examined whether an actual conflict arose during representation, determining that Gonzales failed to demonstrate that the former representation affected counsel's performance. The court found that Johnson’s testimony largely did not implicate Gonzales and that counsel's representation was sufficient. **2. Multiple Punishment** Gonzales contends that sentencing him for conspiracy to traffic and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine violates the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same act. The court found both counts stemmed from a single agreement concerning the same methamphetamine and that the convictions constituted a violation of Section 11. The court remanded the case for dismissal of Count 3. **3. Fourth Amendment** Gonzales did not properly contest the legality of the search of his car and thus the court reviewed this claim for plain error. The court concluded that Gonzales had not demonstrated that the timeline of events during the traffic stop violated his rights, as he consented to the search prior to its execution. **4. Jury Instructions** Gonzales argued that jury instructions were insufficient as they failed to name the conspirators. However, the court determined the instructions, when read as a whole, properly conveyed the necessary information. Gonzales did not establish any plain error regarding jury instructions. **5. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel** This claim was evaluated under the standard set by Strickland v. Washington. The court found no prejudice affecting the outcome as Gonzales could not demonstrate ineffective assistance. **6. Consecutive Sentences** Gonzales claims the district court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. The prosecutor’s remark about a presumed policy did not demonstrate that the district court failed to exercise discretion. The court affirmed its decision as the record supported the imposition of consecutive sentences. **DECISION** The Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED for Counts 1 and 2. Count 3 is DISMISSED. Gonzales’s Application for Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED. **APPEARANCES** *AT TRIAL* Roger Hilfiger, Counsel for Defendant *ON APPEAL* Ariel Parry, Appellate Counsel Christina Burns, Assistant District Attorney Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma **OPINION BY: ROWLAND, J.** **LEWIS, P.J., KUEHN, V.P.J., LUMPKIN, J., HUDSON, J.:** Concur. [PDF Download Link](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-989_1734871593.pdf)
In OCCA case No. F-2018-136, Michael Emmanuel Ishman appealed his conviction for Murder in the First Degree, Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon, and Possession of a Firearm After Former Felony Conviction. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Ishman's conviction and sentencing. One judge dissented. The case involved Ishman who was trialed and convicted by a jury. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for each count, with all sentences running consecutively. Ishman raised several arguments in his appeal regarding the evidence presented, jury instructions, and the conduct of his trial. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for robbery and determined that the witness's corroboration was not required as she was not considered an accomplice. The court also addressed claims of instructional errors regarding the punishment range for firearm possession, finding that the errors were harmless because the jury recommended the maximum sentence. Moreover, the court dismissed claims about the introduction of evidence of other bad acts and the failure to instruct the jury on lesser offenses. The court determined that defense counsel performed adequately, stating that there was no evidence that any of the claimed errors affected the trial's outcome. The court summarized that the jury's recommendation of life sentences was appropriate given the circumstances of the case, and affirmed all judgments made by the trial court. Overall, the court did not find sufficient grounds for relief based on Ishman's claims and decided to uphold the conviction and sentencing.