F-2018-1103

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **BERT GLEN FRANKLIN,** **Appellant,** **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **Case No. F-2018-1103** **OPINION** LUMPKIN, JUDGE: Appellant, Bert Glen Franklin, was tried by jury and convicted in a consolidated trial of Count 1, First Degree Murder (Child Abuse), and of Count 2, Solicitation of First Degree Murder. The jury recommended punishment of life imprisonment without parole on Count 1 and life imprisonment on Count 2, with the sentences running consecutively. Appellant appeals from this judgment and sentence raising two propositions of error. **PROPOSITION I: Joinder of Charges** Appellant contends that his cases should not have been joined in one trial, asserting that this improper joinder resulted in prejudice. However, as Appellant failed to object at trial, we must review this for plain error, which requires an actual error that is plain or obvious and that affects the Appellant's substantial rights. The statute governing joinder of charges, 22 O.S.2011, § 438, permits the trial of two or more offenses together if they could have been joined in a single indictment. Our analysis is guided by reconciling the factors set forth in previous case law. 1. **Same Type of Offenses:** The charges of murder and solicitation reflect a common theme of violence directed towards individuals involved with the defendant, qualifying them as the same type of offenses. 2. **Proximity in Time:** While the offenses occurred approximately seventeen months apart, the delay was due to Appellant's incarceration. They are sufficiently related given the circumstances under which Appellant acted. 3. **Proximity in Location:** Both offenses were committed within Oklahoma County, suggesting a logical relationship between the two. 4. **Overlapping Proof:** Evidence supporting each charge would have been admissible in separate trials since they are intrinsically linked to Appellant’s actions and intent. Given these observations, we find that the joinder was proper, and Appellant suffered no prejudice; therefore, no error occurred. We deny Proposition I. **PROPOSITION II: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel** Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the joinder. Under the Strickland test, Appellant must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient and that such performance prejudiced his case. Since we determined in Proposition I that the joinder was appropriate, Appellant cannot show that any failure to object prejudiced his case. As a result, we also deny Proposition II. **DECISION** The judgment and sentence are affirmed. The mandate is ordered issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. --- **APPEARANCES:** **For Appellant:** R. Scott Adams Box 926 Norman, OK 73070 **For Appellee:** Mike Hunter Attorney General of Oklahoma Theodore M. Peeper, Asst. Attorney General 320 Robert S. Kerr, #505 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 --- **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **LEWIS, P.J.:** Concur in Result **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** Recuse **HUDSON, J.:** Concur **ROWLAND, J.:** Recuse --- [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1103_1734788162.pdf) This ruling affirms the conviction and sentences of Bert Glen Franklin and addresses the legal standards regarding the joinder of offenses and ineffective assistance of counsel.

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F-2018-309

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-309, Adrian Escajeda appealed his conviction for Murder in the First Degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction and sentence. One judge dissented. Adrian Escajeda was found guilty of first-degree murder by a jury and sentenced to life in prison. He was also convicted earlier of two drug possession charges, but those were not part of his appeal. During his trial, Escajeda claimed there were several errors that negatively impacted his case. First, he argued that it was wrong to have both his murder case and a separate child neglect case tried together in front of the same jury. He believed this made it hard for the jury to be fair. However, the court found that he didn't show how this joined trial actually harmed him because the jury had acquitted him of the child neglect charge. Additionally, the evidence against him for murder was very strong and unrelated to the child neglect, making the combined trial harmless. Escajeda also said his lawyer did not do a good job by not objecting to the charges being joined for trial. However, the court decided that his lawyer's performance wasn’t ineffective because there wasn’t any real prejudice; the outcome was not affected. The next point Escajeda raised was about some statements made during the trial. He believed hearsay was wrongly admitted, which violated his right to confront witnesses. The court looked into this and concluded that the statements in question were not hearsay, as they were used to explain the detective's investigation and did not assert the truth of those statements. Finally, Escajeda claimed that the prosecutor made unfair comments during the trial that made it hard for the jury to be impartial. The court examined these comments and found they were reasonable and based on the evidence presented. Since the comments did not create an unfair trial, the court dismissed this argument as well. In conclusion, the court reviewed all of Escajeda’s claims and found none of them warranted a change to his conviction or sentence. As a result, his conviction for first-degree murder remained in place, and he will serve the majority of his sentence in prison.

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F 2002-1259

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In OCCA case No. F 2002-1259, the appellant appealed his conviction for robbery in the first degree, robbery with imitation firearm, and possession of drug paraphernalia. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions but modified the sentences to run concurrently rather than consecutively. One judge dissented, stating that eleven life sentences shocked the court's conscience but eight did not.

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