Habeas Corpus

F-2018-120

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-120, Shelton appealed his conviction for Human Trafficking for Commercial Sex. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction and sentence. No one dissented. Shelton was found guilty of coercing a young woman to engage in prostitution. The jury sentenced him to thirty years in prison, which he must serve at least 85% of before he can be considered for parole. Shelton raised issues claiming that the trial court made several errors that affected his right to a fair trial. First, he argued that the court should have given a different definition for human trafficking. However, since he did not ask for a specific instruction during the trial, the court looked for any major mistakes. They decided that the instruction provided was accurate and that giving a different definition would have confused the jury more than it helped. Second, Shelton argued that there was not enough evidence against him to support the conviction. The victim testified that she was recruited by him, provided with clothing and drugs, and he took away the money she earned. The court found that the evidence clearly supported the jury's determination that Shelton coerced her, even though she was not physically forced to work. Third, a concern was raised about an instruction given by the trial court that explained consent was not a defense in this case. The court ruled that this instruction was correct and did not unfairly shift the burden of proof to Shelton. Finally, Shelton claimed he was unable to present a full defense because the trial court did not let him ask if the victim had engaged in prostitution before meeting him. The court decided that this question was not relevant, as the victim had already shared enough information about her background and that it did not show any reason for her to lie about Shelton. In conclusion, the court firmly upheld the conviction, showing that the trial was fair and that evidence supported the jury’s decision.

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F-2017-1301

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In OCCA case No. F-2017-1301, William Curtis Box appealed his conviction for Aggravated Domestic Assault and Battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the acceleration of his deferred judgment, which meant that his earlier decision to defer judgment was changed to a conviction. One judge dissented. The case started when Box was found guilty of a crime related to domestic violence and was given a deferred judgment, meaning he wouldn’t have a criminal record if he followed certain conditions for ten years. However, he did not follow those conditions and committed another crime called Obstructing an Officer. When the State of Oklahoma found out, they asked the court to change his deferred judgment to a conviction. Box argued that his probation should not be accelerated because the court did not have a written list of rules for his probation. He referred to previous cases from 1969 and 1970 which ruled in favor of defendants when there were no signed probation rules. However, the court explained that in later cases, they decided that a person on probation should understand they cannot commit any further crimes, even without a written agreement. Box also asked to withdraw his agreement to the State's application to change his probation status but could not find any laws that allowed him to do so. The court noted that a stipulation, or agreement, to accelerate a deferred judgment is different from things like guilty pleas, and there is no established way to take back such an agreement. Moreover, Box claimed that his sentence was too harsh. However, the court stated that during an acceleration appeal, they can only examine whether the acceleration was lawful, not whether the sentence was too long. Ultimately, the court upheld the decision to accelerate Box's judgment to a conviction based on his probation violation. They found no evidence of an abuse of discretion by the lower court in making this decision.

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C 2014-920

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In OCCA case No. C 2014-920, John Edward Oxford appealed his conviction for several serious crimes including robbery, burglary, and conspiracy. In a published decision, the court decided to deny his appeal but also ordered a hearing to review the amount of restitution he was ordered to pay. Oxford was charged with multiple counts and, on July 10, 2014, he entered a blind plea, which means he pleaded guilty without negotiating a deal, to all the charges. The court sentenced him to a total of over 70 years in prison and ordered him to pay about $67,539 in restitution to the victims. After his sentencing, Oxford tried to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming he did not understand the charges and was not fully informed about his rights. The trial court held a hearing on this and ultimately denied his request. Oxford then appealed this decision, arguing several points. First, he believed he should not have been sentenced for certain counts because it violated laws against double punishment. However, the court noted that his arguments about double jeopardy were not raised in the earlier stages and thus were not considered. Second, he argued there wasn't enough evidence to support the restitution amount, but again the court found this issue had not been raised before and rejected it. Oxford also claimed he did not receive effective legal help during his plea and the hearing to withdraw it. The court agreed that there were problems with how his attorney handled the restitution order, focusing mainly on the lack of detailed documentation justifying the restitution amount. This lack of evidence meant the restitution order was not valid. While the court found that Oxford's guilty plea was made voluntarily, it did acknowledge inadequate support for the restitution order. Therefore, it denied his appeal regarding the guilty plea but vacated the restitution order, sending the case back to the lower court for a proper review of how much compensation was truly owed to the victims. One judge dissented, noting that the case should have been looked at more closely regarding the earlier claims. So, in summary, the appeal was mainly denied except for the part about restitution, which was sent back to the lower court for further review.

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C-2010-77

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In OCCA case No. C-2010-77, Markeese Kreashawmn Ward appealed his conviction for Trafficking CDS and Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to deny his petition for a writ of certiorari and affirmed the trial court's order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. One judge dissented. Markeese Kreashawmn Ward was in court for committing serious crimes. On December 19, 2007, he said he was guilty to two charges: Trafficking in Controlled Dangerous Substances (CDS) and Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle. Because he was a young adult, the judge decided he could join a special program called the Delayed Sentencing Program for Young Adults. This program was supposed to give him a second chance, and his sentencing was scheduled for a year later, on December 19, 2008. When that day came, the judge decided that Markeese had not done well in the program, so he was punished with five months in jail. After his jail time, he was supposed to go into another program designed to help him. Later, on November 13, 2009, the judge sentenced him to 45 years in prison for Trafficking and 5 years for unauthorized vehicle use, with both sentences running at the same time. Markeese didn't like the sentences he received and wanted to change his mind about pleading guilty. He filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but the court held a hearing and decided not to allow him to withdraw his plea. Markeese believed there were two main reasons why he should be allowed to change his plea: 1. He claimed that some conditions added by the judge to his plea agreement were unfair because he didn’t agree to them. He thought this broke the rules about how judges and other branches of government should work separately. 2. He argued that the judge didn’t sentence him within the year required by law, making the sentence illegal. As the court reviewed these claims, they decided that the judge had done everything by the rules. First, they found that the judge's notes did not change the original agreement Markeese had made when he pleaded guilty, and he could have refused to accept the new conditions if he wanted. Therefore, his plea was still valid. For the second point, the court noted that even though Markeese thought the judge’s actions were a delay in sentencing, they were not. Instead, the judge was just giving him another chance to succeed in the program. The court pointed out that the judge was following the law properly by looking at Markeese's progress and determining if he deserved to have his sentence delayed further. Eventually, the court realized that the judge’s actions had led to a misunderstanding. To account for it properly, the court determined that Markeese had already been treated as if he had been given a part of his sentence when he was sanctioned to jail time and sent to the aftercare program. However, since Markeese had also been sentenced again later, it was like giving him two different sentences for the same crime, which is not allowed. In summary, the court decided to keep the original decision to deny Markeese's request to withdraw his plea but corrected what would happen next. They asked that his official record reflect that the sentence imposed during the sanction in December 2008 was what he needed to serve, and they mentioned that he should be released from custody. The result was that Markeese's case was somewhat settled, and his future would look different than it may have before, with the court noting a mistake that needed fixing without adding more time to his punishment.

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HC 2001-0440

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In OCCA case No. HC 2001-0440, the petitioner appealed his conviction for a sex offense. In a published decision, the court decided to grant extraordinary relief and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings. One judge dissented. The case began when the petitioner, who was in prison for serious crimes, requested that he be allowed to receive good time credits that he felt were unfairly taken away. These credits could reduce his prison sentence. The problem arose from a requirement by the Department of Corrections (DOC) that inmates convicted of sex offenses must attend a treatment program. To join this program, inmates need to admit their guilt and provide personal information which could lead to further legal trouble. The petitioner argued that forcing him to admit to crimes he disagreed with violated his constitutional rights, specifically the right not to self-incriminate. Initially, the district court rejected the petitioner’s request for relief, stating he could not prove he would be released even if the credits were restored. The court found that the requirement to participate in the program was not only mandatory but also fair considering the law at that time. Moreover, the court dismissed the petitioner’s concern that these requirements amounted to unfair punishment, calling his claims frivolous. However, the petitioner took his complaint to the appeals court, where he argued that his situation was similar to another case from Kansas, where the courts agreed that inmates should not be forced to incriminate themselves in order to receive treatment. The appeals court acknowledged the need to further investigate this claim and ordered a hearing to gather more facts. During the hearing, the judge found that the DOC policy indeed put significant pressure on inmates to admit guilt, which violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The judge noted that the program's requirement to disclose past crimes, especially with potential consequences for refusing to do so, placed the inmates in a tough spot. The treatment primarily relied on inmates being honest about their past, which was considered coercive. Ultimately, the appeals court sided with the findings of the district court judge. They stated that while the DOC has a right to rehabilitate inmates, the requirement for them to confess and disclose could not override their constitutional protections. Therefore, they ruled in favor of the petitioner, calling for necessary changes in the DOC's policy to ensure that inmates’ rights were not violated. Thus, the case highlighted a significant legal question about balancing the need for rehabilitation with protecting individual rights. The decision pointed out the necessity for the DOC to adjust its programs to eliminate any requirement that might force an inmate to self-incriminate, while still letting them work toward rehabilitation.

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