C-2018-1119

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **AARON MARCUS SHORES,** **Petitioner,** **V.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Respondent.** **Case No. C-2018-1119** **SUMMARY OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI** **ROWLAND, JUDGE:** Petitioner Aaron Marcus Shores entered a negotiated plea of no contest in the District Court of LeFlore County to resolve his felony and misdemeanor charges in three cases. The charges included: 1. **Case No. CF-2018-239:** Failure to Notify Address Change of Sex Offender (felony). 2. **Case No. CM-2018-371:** Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (misdemeanor). 3. **Case No. CM-2018-373:** Malicious Injury to Property Under $1,000.00 (misdemeanor). Pursuant to the plea agreement, one count of Obstructing an Officer and one count of Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia were dismissed by the State. Judge Marion Fry subsequently sentenced Shores to four years of imprisonment on the felony count and one year in the county jail for each misdemeanor count, with all sentences running concurrently. He was also ordered one year of post-imprisonment supervision and awarded credit for time served. Shores filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, which was denied after a hearing. He appeals this denial, claiming: 1. The district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea as he did not receive the benefits of his plea bargain. 2. He received ineffective assistance of counsel. **1. Denial of Motion to Withdraw Plea** Shores argues he did not receive the promised benefits of his plea bargain. The court evaluated this claim against the standard set forth in *Couch v. State*, noting that promises made in plea agreements must be fulfilled. While Shores did not specifically raise his current argument in his initial motion to withdraw, it was discussed during the evidentiary hearing. The appellate court reviews the denial for abuse of discretion and affirmatively holds that Shores received the benefits of his plea agreement. The district court's order confirmed that Shores's Oklahoma sentences would run concurrently with his sentences from Arkansas, fulfilling the terms agreed upon during the plea process. **2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel** Shores claims ineffective assistance from conflict counsel, who allegedly failed to preserve his claim regarding the benefits of the plea agreement. To prevail on such a claim, Shores must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance. The court found that conflict counsel adequately raised Shores's concerns at the withdrawal hearing, effectively preserving the issue for appeal. Therefore, Shores could not establish that his counsel's performance resulted in any prejudice. **CONCLUSION** The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is DENIED. The district court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to withdraw plea is AFFIRMED. **MANDATE ordered to be issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.** **Appearances:** - Doug Schmuck, Appellate Defense Counsel, for Petitioner. - Matt McBee, Counsel for Withdraw Motion. - Kevin Merritt and Margaret Nicholson, Assistant District Attorneys for the State. --- This summary is designed for clarity and understanding without retaining excessive legal jargon, while accurately reflecting the decisions and arguments presented in the original case summary.

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F-2018-945

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **CASE SUMMARY:** **Appellant:** Carey James Buxton **Appellee:** The State of Oklahoma **Case Numbers:** CM-2014-358, CF-2014-578, CF-2017-5 **Opinion Date:** August 8, 2019 **Judge:** Lumpkin --- **BACKGROUND:** Carey James Buxton appealed the termination of his participation in the Drug Court program and the imposition of sentencing by the District Court of Kay County, presided by Judge David Bandy. Buxton had entered pleas of no contest to multiple charges, including drug possession and burglary, and was sentenced to a Drug Court program where successful completion would lead to dismissal of the charges. However, after the State filed applications for his removal from the Drug Court program due to non-compliance, a hearing was conducted on this matter. The judge ultimately decided to terminate Buxton from the program and impose the sentencing terms outlined in the plea agreement. --- **PROPOSITION OF ERROR:** Buxton asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating him from the Drug Court program. --- **ANALYSIS:** 1. **Standard of Review:** The decision to revoke or terminate a Drug Court participant lies within the trial judge's discretion. An abuse of discretion is defined as a clearly erroneous conclusion. 2. **Contentions by Appellant:** - Buxton argues that the court did not assess whether disciplinary measures short of termination would suffice. - He also claims that removal for cheating on drug tests is against Drug Court laws. 3. **Court Findings:** - The court ruled that violations needed to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Buxton repeatedly violated the terms of his Drug Court contract despite receiving multiple jail sanctions. - The appellate court noted that termination was not an automatic consequence of drug test failures; the trial court considered all relevant factors before making its decision. 4. **Conclusion:** - The appellate court determined that the trial court’s decision was supported by the evidence and was not an abuse of discretion. Buxton's proposition of error was denied. --- **DECISION:** The order terminating Buxton from the Drug Court and proceeding with sentencing as per the plea agreement is **AFFIRMED**. The mandate is to be issued immediately following the filing of this decision. **APPEARANCES:** - **For Appellant:** Jarrod Stevenson and Jeremy Stillwell (Appellate Defense Counsel) - **For Appellee:** Brian Hermanson (District Attorney), Mike Hunter (Oklahoma Attorney General), Tessa L. Henry (Assistant Attorney General) --- **OPINION BY: LUMPKIN, J.** - **Concur:** Lewis, P.J.; Kuehn, V.P.J.; Hudson, J.; Rowland, J. --- For further details, the complete opinion is available in PDF format: [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-945_1734875235.pdf).

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RE 2018-0457

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In OCCA case No. RE 2018-0457, Tommy Lee Tucker appealed his conviction for domestic assault and battery along with other charges. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of his suspended sentences but remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings to fix some inconsistencies in the records. One judge dissented.

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F-2018-375

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-375, Jones appealed his conviction for multiple offenses including possession of controlled substances and public intoxication. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the termination of Jones from Drug Court and his sentencing, while also remanding a separate charge for correction regarding sentencing length for public intoxication. One judge dissented. Jones had multiple guilty pleas and was given the chance to participate in a Drug Court program with the understanding that if he successfully completed it, his charges would be dropped. However, if he failed, he would face prison time. Although he had some chances and was sanctioned when he did not adhere to the program, he repeatedly tested positive for drugs, which caused the state to move for his termination from the program. During the hearings, witnesses from the state presented evidence that showed Jones had a new arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and had failed multiple drug tests. Jones's defense argued that he had made progress and changed for the better, but the judge decided to terminate him from the Drug Court program based on the evidence of his continued drug use and new charges. The court found that his actions justified the termination. Additionally, the court recognized an error in Jones's sentencing for public intoxication because it exceeded the maximum allowed by law. The court ordered that part of the case be sent back to correct the sentence. The final decision was to uphold the termination from Drug Court but allow a correction on the public intoxication charge's sentencing in a separate order.

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C-2011-592

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In OCCA case No. C-2011-592, Philipe Jean Pace appealed his conviction for Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property, After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the writ and allow the Petitioner to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial. One judge dissented. Philipe Jean Pace was charged with a crime and, instead of going to trial, he decided to plead nolo contendere, which means he did not contest the charges. The trial judge accepted his plea and sentenced him to twenty years in prison, but he only had to serve the first ten years. After the plea, Pace wanted to change his mind and asked to withdraw his plea, but the court said no. In his appeal, Pace argued two main points. First, he said he didn't understand what he was doing when he gave up his right to have a lawyer help him. He claimed that he didn't really know what would happen if he represented himself. Second, he believed that he was confused and didn’t make a proper decision to plead guilty. The higher court looked at all the details, including what happened in the trial court. They found that the original court did not really explain to Pace the risks of not having a lawyer. They noted that just because he had signed a form saying he wanted to waive his right to counsel, it didn't mean he actually understood what he was giving up. The judges pointed out that there was no evidence in the record that he was properly informed about the dangers of self-representation or that he clearly stated he wanted to represent himself. Because of these problems, the higher court ruled that the lower court made a mistake when it denied Pace's request to withdraw his plea. They believed it was important for a person to fully understand their rights and the consequences of their choices in court. As a result, the court decided that Pace could withdraw his plea and would be able to have a trial.

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F-2007-381

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In OCCA case No. F-2007-381, the appellant appealed his conviction for child sexual abuse, lewd or indecent proposals, and forcible oral sodomy. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and remand count two while affirming the remaining counts. One judge dissented. Brandon Donell Harris was found guilty of the three offenses in the District Court of Oklahoma County and was given a total of 21 years in prison to serve consecutively. He argued that the state did not provide enough evidence to prove he committed the sexual abuse of a child, that he was wrongfully convicted of lewd acts, that there were issues with the prosecutors' conduct, and that improper comments were made by the trial court during jury selection. The court looked at the evidence and felt that enough was presented to support the sexual abuse conviction, so they upheld that verdict. However, they found that the second count concerning lewd acts required that the child witness the acts, which did not happen in this case. Therefore, they reversed that conviction and instructed for it to be dismissed, while keeping the other convictions intact. For the claims of prosecutorial misconduct and improper trial comments, the court noted that there were no objections made during the trial, so they reviewed these for plain error. They determined that the prosecutor's comments did not significantly impact Harris's right to a fair trial, nor did the trial court's remarks affect the jury's decision. In conclusion, the court reversed the conviction for the lewd acts while affirming the other two convictions and decided that Harris should not be retried on the lewd acts charge. One judge disagreed with the decision to reverse count two, believing the evidence was sufficient to support all charges.

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