**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **DOMINICK JAVON SMITH, Appellant,** **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** **Case No. F-2018-1186** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA JAN 30 2020** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN CLERK** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Appellant, Dominick Javon Smith, was tried by jury and convicted of Child Neglect, After Former Conviction of a Felony, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5(C), in the District Court of Tulsa County Case Number CF-2017-1887. The jury recommended punishment of forty years imprisonment and payment of a $5,000.00 fine. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly; she will serve 85% of her sentence before becoming eligible for parole consideration. From this judgment and sentence, Appellant appeals, raising three propositions of error: **I.** The trial court erred in permitting the State to cross-examine Dominick Smith in the punishment stage on matters not relevant to her alleged prior felony conviction. **II.** Prosecutorial misconduct deprived Appellant of a fair trial. **III.** Appellant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. After thorough consideration of the record, including the original documents and briefs, we find that under the law and evidence, Appellant is not entitled to relief. In her first proposition, Appellant claims that the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to question her about matters irrelevant to her prior felony conviction. While defense counsel objected multiple times, only two objections referenced relevance. Therefore, the remainder is assessed under plain error review. Under the Simpson test, we assess actual error that is plain or obvious and that affects substantial rights. The trial court's limitations on cross-examination are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. During the punishment phase, Appellant testified on direct that she had a prior felony conviction for child abuse. On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Appellant about conflicting statements made to police, thereby attempting to impeach her credibility. Given that Appellant opened the door to her prior conviction and explanation, there was no error in allowing such cross-examination. Proposition I is denied. In Proposition II, Appellant contends prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing arguments when the prosecutor suggested that Santa Claus may have caused the victim's injuries and discussed how Appellant's actions deprived K.O. of life experiences. As Appellant failed to object, we review these claims for plain error. The prosecutor's remarks were within acceptable boundaries as they focused on the evidence and reasonable inferences. Appellant's claim that the argument improperly sought sympathy for K.O. does not render it improper. The remarks about the consequences of Appellant's actions are relevant and permissible. Thus, Proposition II is denied. Lastly, in Proposition III, Appellant claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutor's cross-examination and closing argument. Under the Strickland test, the claims of ineffectiveness can be dismissed due to lack of demonstrated error in the prosecutor’s conduct. Since neither allegation resulted in plain error, the claim of ineffective assistance fails. Thus, Proposition III is denied. **DECISION** The JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. --- *Counsel for Appellant: Richard Koller, Richard Couch, Rebecca Newman*
*Counsel for the State: Mike Hunter, Andrea Brown, Keeley L. Miller* **OPINION BY: LUMPKIN, J.**
LEWIS, P.J.: Concur
KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur
HUDSON, J.: Concur
ROWLAND, J.: Concur [Download Opinion PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1186_1734785732.pdf)
