In OCCA case No. N 2019-125, Blessing appealed his conviction for child abuse. In a published decision, the court upheld the denial of his motion to withdraw his no contest plea, stating the plea was entered properly and there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. One judge dissented. [occa_caption]
In OCCA case No. PC 2017-755, the petitioner appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In a published decision, the court decided to vacate the previous sentence and allow for resentencing with a jury. The dissenting opinions argued against the majority decision, indicating that the judge had the discretion to deny jury resentencing based on prior waivers. The case started when the petitioner was just seventeen years old and pleaded guilty to First Degree Murder in 2006. Originally, he was sentenced to life in prison without the chance for parole. After some time, he claimed that this sentence was unfair because he was a minor when he was sentenced. The court agreed and decided to let him be resentenced but had to deal with the issue of whether his resentencing should involve a jury. The petitioner argued that since he was seeking resentencing, he should be allowed a jury trial. However, the state disagreed, pointing out that he had waived his right to a jury trial when he originally pleaded guilty. The judge decided that because of this waiver, he didn’t have to give the petitioner a jury for resentencing. In this case, the court looked at previous decisions that said when a juvenile is sentenced to life without parole, they should have a jury trial unless they give up that right. The majority of the court found that the petitioner did not truly waive his right to a jury for the resentencing, as he was relying on new rules from recent important cases. Ultimately, the court decided that it was wrong for the judge to deny the jury resentencing. They chose to vacate that decision and said the case should go back to the lower court to figure out the right way to do the resentencing, with the ability to include a jury if the petitioner asked. The dissenting opinions argued that the judge had actually acted correctly by denying the request for a jury because the petitioner had already waived that right back when he pleaded guilty. They believed that the rules shouldn’t allow a person to change their mind long after the original decision. The court ordered that the petitioner’s guilty plea and conviction were still valid, but they needed to follow the correct process under the law for the new sentencing.
In OCCA case No. MA-2018-987, Cox appealed his conviction for a criminal case that led to an accelerated sentence. In a published decision, the court decided that the District Court must prepare the appeal record and transcripts at public expense. The court noted that Cox was deemed indigent for the purpose of having an attorney appointed, but the District Court initially ruled that he had enough assets to pay for his transcripts. This created a problem because it delayed his appeal process. The court ultimately granted Cox's request for a writ of mandamus, which allowed him to move forward with his appeal without having to pay upfront for the transcripts. The decision was not unanimous, with some judges disagreeing.
In OCCA case No. MA 2018-0296, J.M.F. appealed his conviction for Lewd Acts with a Child. In a published decision, the court decided to grant his application for a writ of mandamus and remand the matter to the District Court. The court found that J.M.F. was personally indigent and entitled to receive transcripts at public expense for his appeal, despite the trial court's earlier ruling about his parents' ability to pay. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. RE-2015-844, Cully appealed his conviction for Larceny of an Automobile, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, and Driving Without A License. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of Cully's suspended sentences. One judge dissented. Cully had entered a guilty plea in 2008 and was given suspended sentences in 2010. Later, he faced allegations of violating his probation, which led to a hearing and the eventual revocation of his suspended sentences in 2015. Cully claimed that the court should have specified that his sentences were to be served concurrently, and that the addition of post-imprisonment supervision was not allowed for him. The court concluded that while it could not add post-imprisonment supervision to his sentence due to the timing of the laws, the decision to revoke his suspended sentences was valid. Cully's request for a change to the order to show that his sentences were to be served concurrently was denied, and the case was sent back to the District Court to correct the judgment as per the court's rules.
In OCCA case No. RE-2014-96, Blackwell appealed his conviction for Child Abuse. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of Blackwell's suspended sentence but remanded the case to determine whether Blackwell is entitled to credit for time served as a Youthful Offender. One member of the court dissented. Blackwell was charged with First Degree Rape but later pleaded guilty to Child Abuse, and his sentence was delayed for five years on probation. After violating several terms of his probation, the state requested to revoke his suspended sentence. Blackwell claimed that the court did not have the right to revoke his sentence because he argued he was a youthful offender and that his adult conviction was improper. The court explained that the appeal focused on if the revocation was valid rather than the underlying conviction's correctness. Blackwell’s claims related to his conviction need to be addressed through a different legal process, not this appeal. The court also pointed out that issues about the correctness of laws mentioned in the documents were not within their authority to correct in this appeal. Additionally, Blackwell argued that his entire sentence revocation was too harsh. However, the court mentioned that breaking even a single probation rule is enough to revoke the suspended sentence. Finally, Blackwell maintained he should get credit for the days he spent under juvenile custody, and the court agreed to look into this matter further, sending the case back for clarification on this issue. They affirmed the revocation overall but allowed for the investigation into how much credit Blackwell should receive.
In OCCA case No. HC 2001-0440, the petitioner appealed his conviction for a sex offense. In a published decision, the court decided to grant extraordinary relief and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings. One judge dissented. The case began when the petitioner, who was in prison for serious crimes, requested that he be allowed to receive good time credits that he felt were unfairly taken away. These credits could reduce his prison sentence. The problem arose from a requirement by the Department of Corrections (DOC) that inmates convicted of sex offenses must attend a treatment program. To join this program, inmates need to admit their guilt and provide personal information which could lead to further legal trouble. The petitioner argued that forcing him to admit to crimes he disagreed with violated his constitutional rights, specifically the right not to self-incriminate. Initially, the district court rejected the petitioner’s request for relief, stating he could not prove he would be released even if the credits were restored. The court found that the requirement to participate in the program was not only mandatory but also fair considering the law at that time. Moreover, the court dismissed the petitioner’s concern that these requirements amounted to unfair punishment, calling his claims frivolous. However, the petitioner took his complaint to the appeals court, where he argued that his situation was similar to another case from Kansas, where the courts agreed that inmates should not be forced to incriminate themselves in order to receive treatment. The appeals court acknowledged the need to further investigate this claim and ordered a hearing to gather more facts. During the hearing, the judge found that the DOC policy indeed put significant pressure on inmates to admit guilt, which violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The judge noted that the program's requirement to disclose past crimes, especially with potential consequences for refusing to do so, placed the inmates in a tough spot. The treatment primarily relied on inmates being honest about their past, which was considered coercive. Ultimately, the appeals court sided with the findings of the district court judge. They stated that while the DOC has a right to rehabilitate inmates, the requirement for them to confess and disclose could not override their constitutional protections. Therefore, they ruled in favor of the petitioner, calling for necessary changes in the DOC's policy to ensure that inmates’ rights were not violated. Thus, the case highlighted a significant legal question about balancing the need for rehabilitation with protecting individual rights. The decision pointed out the necessity for the DOC to adjust its programs to eliminate any requirement that might force an inmate to self-incriminate, while still letting them work toward rehabilitation.