C-2021-504

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In OCCA case No. C-2021-504, Starlyn Sean Hill appealed his conviction for multiple serious crimes, including aggravated possession of child pornography and multiple counts of rape and sodomy. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant his appeal, allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea. One judge dissented from the opinion. Hill had pleaded guilty to several counts, and upon sentencing, he received a lengthy prison term. After his plea, he filed a motion to withdraw it, arguing that he felt rushed into making his decision and that he was misinformed about the potential consequences. He also raised issues regarding the statute of limitations for some of the charges, claiming that ten of them should not have been prosecuted because they were filed too late. The court reviewed the case and found that the prosecution for some of the counts may indeed have been beyond the statute of limitations. They concluded there were errors in how Hill’s plea was accepted, particularly as he did not properly waive his right to challenge the statute of limitations on several counts. This led the court to determine that his guilty plea was not made voluntarily or intelligently. As a result, the court vacated Hill's judgment and sentence and instructed that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings that would not contradict this new decision.

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F-2019-68

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In OCCA case No. F-2019-68, Johnny Edward Mize, II appealed his conviction for First Degree Manslaughter (Heat of Passion). In a published decision, the court decided that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to prosecute Mize. Mize had claimed that the State of Oklahoma did not have the authority to prosecute him because the victim was part of a federally recognized tribe and the crime occurred within a reservation. The court supported this claim after an evidentiary hearing, confirming that the victim had Indian status and that the crime happened in the boundaries of the Muscogee Creek Reservation. As a result, the original judgment and sentence were vacated, and the matter was sent back to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case. The decision relied on previous case law stating that Oklahoma does not have jurisdiction over crimes involving Indian victims that take place on tribal land.

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C-2018-640

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In OCCA case No. C-2018-640, Jimmie Dewayne Starr appealed his conviction for multiple crimes. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to vacate his convictions and remand the case for dismissal. One judge dissented. Starr had entered a guilty plea for crimes in three different cases, including endangering others while trying to escape from police, failure to wear a seatbelt, possession of a controlled substance, resisting an officer, and bail jumping. He received several sentences that were ordered to be served concurrently, meaning he would serve them at the same time, rather than one after the other. After his sentencing, Starr wanted to withdraw his guilty plea, so he asked the court to allow it. The court held a hearing on Starr's request but ultimately denied it. This led to Starr appealing the decision, raising several issues including whether the court had the right to sentence him, whether he had good legal help, whether improper evidence led to an unfair sentence, and whether the state had jurisdiction in his case. The court looked closely at one of Starr's arguments about jurisdiction. He claimed that the State of Oklahoma didn't have the right to prosecute him based on a previous Supreme Court decision known as McGirt v. Oklahoma. This case said that certain crimes committed by Native Americans on tribal land must be handled in federal court, not state court. To investigate his claims, the court sent the case back to the lower district court to gather facts, specifically focusing on Starr's status as an Indian and whether the crime happened within the boundaries of the Muscogee Creek Reservation. Both sides agreed on several important facts about Starr's Indian blood, his membership in the Creek Nation, and that the crime occurred on Creek land. The district court accepted these facts and concluded that under federal law, Starr was indeed considered an Indian, and the crime took place on the reservation. Because of the ruling in the McGirt case, the appellate court decided that the state court did not have the authority to prosecute Starr. As a result, the appellate court vacated all of Starr's convictions, which means they were canceled, and they instructed the lower court to dismiss the case. This decision emphasized that Starr should be prosecuted in federal court instead of state court.

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C-2017-998

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In OCCA case No. C-2017-998, Arnold Dean Howell appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder and First Degree Robbery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to vacate Howell's convictions and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it. One judge dissented. Howell had pleaded guilty to the charges in the District Court of Creek County and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and twenty-five years for the robbery conviction, with both sentences served one after the other. After the guilty plea, Howell filed a motion to withdraw it, which the district court denied. Howell then raised several issues in his appeal, questioning the state's authority to prosecute him, his competency to plead guilty, if his plea was made knowingly and voluntarily, whether he received good legal help, and if his sentence was too harsh. The important part of the appeal was Howell's claim regarding jurisdiction. He argued that the state did not have the right to prosecute him because he is considered an Indian under federal laws and the crimes happened within the Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation. This argument was based on a specific legal case called McGirt v. Oklahoma, which changed how certain cases with Indian individuals should be treated. In response to Howell's appeal, the court ordered a review of his case to determine if he was an Indian and if the crimes occurred on the reservation. During this review, both sides agreed on a few facts: Howell has Indian blood, is a registered citizen of the Muscogee Creek Nation, and the crimes did occur within the reservation. The district court accepted these facts. Following this information, the court concluded that Howell is legally an Indian and that the state did not have authority over the case. As a result, the court decided Howell's conviction could not stand, and they vacated the lower court's judgment and ordered the case to be dismissed. In conclusion, Howell's legal challenges about how his case was handled were significant enough to require a reversal of his convictions based on the jurisdictional issues brought up by the McGirt decision. This decision demonstrates how important it is to understand the laws regarding tribal lands and individual rights within the legal system.

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F-2018-1263

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-1263, Leatherwood appealed his conviction for Murder in the First Degree, Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Dangerous Substance, Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a Felony, Maintaining a Place for Keeping/Selling Controlled Substances, and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions. One judge dissented. Travis Michael Leatherwood fatally shot Aaron Smith on Halloween night in 2017. They were once friends and worked together selling marijuana, but their friendship soured when Smith stole marijuana from Leatherwood. On the night of the shooting, Smith, upset by an exchange of insults with Leatherwood, went to confront him, unarmed. Leatherwood shot Smith with a rifle before he could say a word. Smith later died from the gunshot wound. After the shooting, police found a lot of evidence connecting Leatherwood to marijuana distribution at his home, including a rifle that he had used to shoot Smith and other drug-related items. Leatherwood argued in court that he acted in self-defense, but the jury did not agree. They concluded that he was the aggressor, especially since he called Smith a coward and provoked him. The jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, along with several drug-related charges. Leatherwood raised multiple issues on appeal, including claims that the state did not prove he acted outside of self-defense, that the court gave confusing jury instructions, allowed improper amendments to the charges, and that he had ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court disagreed with all of his claims. In terms of self-defense, the court ruled that Leatherwood’s actions and words indicated he was not acting in self-defense but rather was the one who provoked the situation. He had armed himself before Smith arrived and shot him before any confrontation occurred. The court also discussed the jury instructions, concluding that the district court did not err by omitting instructions on a lesser charge of heat of passion manslaughter since there was no evidence to support that Smith's actions would provoke such a response from Leatherwood. As for the amendment of charges, the court determined that Leatherwood was sufficiently informed of the charges he faced and that he could defend against them adequately. The evidence showed that he had both the firearm and the controlled substances as part of his operations, fulfilling the requirements for his convictions. Leatherwood's claim that his lawyer was ineffective was also denied because the court found that the lawyer's strategies were reasonable given the overwhelming evidence against Leatherwood. The lawyer focused his arguments on the more serious murder charge rather than the drug offenses, which the jury could have easily decided against Leatherwood irrespective of those counts. Finally, the court ruled that Leatherwood's sentence was not excessive given the nature of the crime and his actions. The judge pointed out that the jury was aware of his age (20 at the time of the crime) and other circumstances, which did not make the sentence shockingly excessive. Ultimately, the court affirmed Leatherwood's convictions and ordered a separate hearing regarding the restitution amount, which needed to be calculated more accurately.

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F-2018-1267

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**Case Summary: Shelley Jo Duncan's Appeal** **Court:** Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals **Judge:** Rowland, Judge **Case Number:** CF-2017-31 **Verdict:** Affirmed **Background:** Shelley Jo Duncan, a teacher, was charged with Lewd Acts with a Child. Her trial was conducted in Cleveland County after a change of venue due to pre-trial publicity. Duncan was sentenced to six years in prison in accordance with the jury's recommendation. **Issues Raised on Appeal:** 1. The denial of a motion to strike two jurors for cause. 2. Claims of improper commentary on her right to remain silent. 3. The credibility of the alleged victim and sufficiency of evidence for conviction. 4. Admission of other crimes evidence regarding past drug use. 5. Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. 6. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. 7. Challenge to the excessive nature of her sentence. 8. Cumulative errors affecting the fairness of the trial. **Findings:** 1. **Jurors for Cause:** The court did not err in denying the motion to strike jurors S.M. and J.S. Duncan did not preserve her claim regarding J.S. since a peremptory challenge was successfully used to remove her from the jury. 2. **Right to Remain Silent:** Testimony regarding the investigation did not comment on Duncan’s post-arrest silence. Any potential error was cured by the court's action in sustaining objections. 3. **Credibility of Victim:** The court found the victim's testimony credible and sufficient, supporting the conviction based on the preponderance of evidence, even without corroboration. 4. **Other Crimes Evidence:** Duncan’s argument related to drug use was denied as she had introduced this evidence herself. Inviting error prevented relief. 5. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:** Duncan could not demonstrate that her counsel's performance was deficient or that it prejudiced her case sufficiently to impact the outcome. 6. **Prosecutorial Misconduct:** Claims of improper comments were denied, as the prosecutor’s comments did not exceed the acceptable limits of argument during closing statements. 7. **Excessive Sentence:** The six-year sentence was within statutory limits and did not shock the conscience of the court, thus it was upheld. 8. **Cumulative Effect of Errors:** The court found no cumulative errors that would necessitate a new trial or modification of the sentence, as no individual error was identified. **Conclusion:** The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court. Duncan was denied relief on all issues raised in her appeal, with the court finding no significant errors affecting her right to a fair trial. **Access the full opinion:** [Download PDF of the Opinion](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1267_1734782177.pdf)

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F-2018-888

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This document is a summary opinion from the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma regarding the appeal of Justin William Dunlap, who was convicted of First Degree Rape by Instrumentation of a Victim under the Age of Fourteen and sentenced to ten years in prison. Dunlap raised multiple propositions of error in his appeal, including claims of insufficient waiver of a jury trial, challenges to the credibility of the victim's testimony, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, excessive sentencing, and inadequate defense representation, among others. The court considered each proposition in detail: 1. **Waiver of Jury Trial**: The court found that Dunlap's waiver was knowing and voluntary, supported by a written waiver signed by all necessary parties. 2. **Sufficiency of Evidence**: The court analyzed the testimony of the victim (D.H.) and found it sufficient to support the conviction, affirming that the evidence met the necessary legal standard. 3. **Prosecutorial Misconduct**: The court concluded there was no misconduct that affected the trial's fairness, finding that the prosecutor's comments did not misstate the evidence or improperly comment on Dunlap's failure to testify. 4. **Excessive Sentencing**: The court determined that the sentence was within statutory guidelines and did not shock the conscience given the serious nature of the crime. 5. **Right to Present a Defense**: The court upheld the trial court's decision to exclude certain evidence, finding no abuse of discretion in limiting what could be presented as a defense. 6. **Speedy Trial**: The court found no violation of Dunlap's right to a speedy trial, noting delays were justified and not solely attributable to the prosecution. 7. **Competency Evaluation**: The court ruled that since Dunlap did not request an evaluation and provided no evidence to support his claims, this argument was unmeritorious. 8. **Conflict of Interest**: The argument regarding conflicting interests between attorneys was found to lack merit as Dunlap did not demonstrate how this negatively impacted his defense. 9. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: The court scrutinized claims of ineffective assistance, applying the Strickland standard, and found that Dunlap did not demonstrate that any alleged deficiencies affected the trial's outcome. 10. **Cumulative Error**: The court dismissed this claim as there were no individual errors that would warrant a new trial. The court affirmed the judgment and sentence, upholding the findings of the lower court and denying Dunlap's requested evidentiary hearing related to ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, a concurring opinion emphasized the handling of extra-record materials submitted by Dunlap, noting the importance of adhering to established procedural rules and advocating for more careful consideration of supplementary materials going forward. In summary, the appeal was denied, and the conviction stands as affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

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F-2018-113

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-113, the appellant appealed her conviction for multiple counts of child neglect and enabling child sexual abuse. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions and the sentences imposed. One judge dissented. The case involved Brenda Marie Huff, who was convicted by a jury of four counts of child neglect and one count of enabling child sexual abuse. The jury sentenced her to 25 years in prison for each count, which would be served at the same time. Brenda and her husband, co-defendant Andrew Huff, were accused of allowing their children to live in very poor conditions. Evidence showed the home was filthy, lacking running water, and filled with animal waste and sexual materials. The children were also exposed to troubling behavior, including sexual messages sent by Andrew to a young girl. Brenda was aware of this behavior but did not act to protect the child. Brenda raised several arguments in her appeal, including claims that the evidence against her was not enough to support the convictions, that there were problems with jury instructions, and that her sentence was too harsh. However, the court found that the evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to conclude that she was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also noted that there were no errors in how the jury was instructed, and that the severity of her sentence was justified given the circumstances. The court upheld the jury's decision, concluding that Brenda had neglected the children and enabled her husband to harm them. Ultimately, the court affirmed the judgment and sentence, meaning Brenda would serve her time in prison as decided by the jury.

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F-2018-1023

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **CAMERON LEE SCHEMMER,** Appellant, v. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **Case No. F-2018-1023** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JAN 23 2020** **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN** **CLERK** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Appellant, Cameron Lee Schemmer, was tried by the court and convicted of Count 1, Forcible Sodomy, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 888, and Counts 2-4, Lewd Molestation, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1123, in Kingfisher County District Court, Case No. CF-2017-96. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years imprisonment with all but the last five years suspended for Count 1. For Counts 2-4, the court sentenced him to twenty-five years imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently to one another but consecutively to the sentence for Count 1. As a result, Appellant will be required to serve 85% of his sentences before becoming eligible for parole, as per 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1. From this judgment and sentence, Appellant appeals, raising the following propositions of error: **I.** The record in this case does not sufficiently demonstrate that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. **II.** Mr. Schemmer received an excessive sentence when the trial court followed the wrong sentencing statute. Upon thorough consideration of these propositions and the entire record, including the original record, transcripts, and briefs of the parties, we find no relief is warranted under the law and evidence presented. **Proposition I:** Appellant argues that the record is insufficient to support a finding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Since he did not object before the non-jury trial, we review this claim for plain error, as established in *Simpson v. State*, 1994 OK CR 40, 876 P.2d 690. Plain error requires that Appellant demonstrate an actual error that is plain or obvious and affects substantial rights. A defendant may waive their right to a jury trial, but the waiver must be knowingly, competently, and intelligently made. The record shows that prior to trial, the court engaged in a colloquy with Appellant regarding his jury trial waiver. Appellant confirmed his satisfaction with his attorney and expressly indicated his desire to waive the jury trial right. This established a knowing and intelligent waiver by Appellant. Therefore, we deny this proposition as the trial court's assessment was in compliance with the law. **Proposition II:** Appellant contends his sentence is illegal because the Information alleged that R.N. was a child under sixteen, not under twelve. Thus, Appellant argues that the sentencing range should have been from one or three years to twenty years instead of a minimum of twenty-five years, as required when the child is under the age of twelve. Since Appellant failed to object at sentencing, we again look for plain error. The Information indicated that R.N. was under the age of sixteen at the time of the offenses, and the evidence revealed she was ten years old when the abuse began and eleven when it ceased. Appellant was charged under 21 O.S.2011, § 1123(A), which necessitates a minimum of twenty-five years imprisonment when the child is under twelve years of age. A court in a non-jury trial retains the presumption of knowing the law correctly. The facts show that R.N. was indeed under twelve when the offenses occurred, and the court found this circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the claim of an illegal sentence based on an erroneous application of the statute is without merit. **DECISION:** The **JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED**. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, the **MANDATE is ORDERED issued** upon this ruling. **APPEARANCES:** **Trial Counsel:** Blayne Allsup **Appellate Counsel for Appellant:** Cindy Brown Danner **Counsel for State:** John Salmon, Assistant District Attorney, and Theodore M. Peepers, Assistant Attorney General. **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE:** CONCURS **LEWIS, P.J.:** Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** Concur in Result **HUDSON, J.:** Concur **ROWLAND, J.:** Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J., CONCURRING IN RESULT:** While I concur with the outcomes reached, I note a discrepancy in the standard of review applied to Proposition I. The burden rests with the State to prove any constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as highlighted in *Chadwell v. State* and *Chapman v. California*. The majority's application of the plain error standard does not recognize this shifting burden adequately. **[Document ends here]**

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C-2019-329

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In OCCA case No. C 2019 329, Feeling appealed her conviction for Aggravated Assault and Battery and Assaulting a Police Officer. In a published decision, the court decided to deny her appeal and affirm the lower court's decision. One judge dissented. [occa_caption]

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F-2018-136

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-136, Michael Emmanuel Ishman appealed his conviction for Murder in the First Degree, Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon, and Possession of a Firearm After Former Felony Conviction. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Ishman's conviction and sentencing. One judge dissented. The case involved Ishman who was trialed and convicted by a jury. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for each count, with all sentences running consecutively. Ishman raised several arguments in his appeal regarding the evidence presented, jury instructions, and the conduct of his trial. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for robbery and determined that the witness's corroboration was not required as she was not considered an accomplice. The court also addressed claims of instructional errors regarding the punishment range for firearm possession, finding that the errors were harmless because the jury recommended the maximum sentence. Moreover, the court dismissed claims about the introduction of evidence of other bad acts and the failure to instruct the jury on lesser offenses. The court determined that defense counsel performed adequately, stating that there was no evidence that any of the claimed errors affected the trial's outcome. The court summarized that the jury's recommendation of life sentences was appropriate given the circumstances of the case, and affirmed all judgments made by the trial court. Overall, the court did not find sufficient grounds for relief based on Ishman's claims and decided to uphold the conviction and sentencing.

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F-2018-1087

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This document is a summary opinion from the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma, addressing the appeal of Spencer Joe Cuccaro regarding his termination from the Kay County Drug Court and subsequent sentencing. ### Key Points: 1. **Case Background**: - Appellant Spencer Joe Cuccaro was placed in the Kay County Drug Court program on June 22, 2017, following a plea agreement that stipulated the conditions of his sentencing based on his performance in the program. - Cuccaro was involved in multiple cases (CF-2016-561, CF-2011-74, CF-2008-353) linked to drug offenses and was under specific probationary requirements. 2. **Allegations Against Cuccaro**: - The State filed a petition to remove Cuccaro from Drug Court, citing new criminal charges (including trafficking in illegal drugs), non-compliance with counseling requirements, and outstanding fees. - Evidence presented included testimonies from law enforcement regarding drug possession during a traffic stop and at the jail. 3. **Termination Hearing**: - At the termination hearing, evidence presented indicated that Cuccaro had violated the terms of his drug court agreement by committing new offenses and failing to meet his counseling and payment obligations. - The trial judge, David R. Bandy, found sufficient evidence to terminate Cuccaro from the Drug Court program. 4. **Appeal Propositions**: - **Proposition I**: Cuccaro claimed his no contest pleas were coerced. - **Proposition II**: He alleged the trial court failed to follow mandatory Drug Court procedures. - **Proposition III**: He contended the trial judge abused discretion in terminating him. - **Proposition IV**: He argued that the sentencing was excessive. 5. **Court's Analysis**: - The court found that Proposition I was not a suitable subject for this appeal and should be addressed in a separate certiorari appeal regarding the plea. - Proposition II also fell outside the scope of the termination appeal, which is to assess the validity of the termination order. - For Proposition III, the court upheld that the decision to terminate Cuccaro was within the judge’s discretion, consistent with the evidence of non-compliance and new criminal activity. - Proposition IV regarding sentencing was similarly ruled to be outside the appeal context, advising Cuccaro to raise such claims in the separate certiorari appeal. 6. **Decision**: - The court affirmed the termination order, emphasizing the trial judge's proper authority and the sufficiency of the evidence for termination from Drug Court. ### Conclusion: The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the District Court's order to terminate Spencer Joe Cuccaro from Drug Court and advised him to pursue any excessive sentence claims separately. The decision reflects adherence to legal standards concerning plea agreements, drug court compliance, and the discretion exercised by trial judges in such matters. For more details, you can access the full opinion [here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1087_1734789881.pdf).

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C-2019-25

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This decision from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals pertains to Conner E. Dover's petition for writ of certiorari, which was denied. Dover had pled guilty to unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and aggravated attempting to elude a police officer. His sentencing followed the completion of a regimented inmate discipline program, resulting in five years of imprisonment for each count, to be served consecutively. Dover sought to withdraw his plea based on an argument that the court did not sentence him according to his plea agreement. However, the court found that his plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently, and dissatisfaction with the sentence is not a valid reason for withdrawal. The court confirmed that the plea met the necessary legal standards and was not abusive, hence no relief was granted. The denial of the writ indicates the court's decision to affirm the original judgment and sentence. The legal principles applied include reviewing whether a plea was voluntarily and intelligently made, whether the sentence is excessive, the effectiveness of counsel, and the state's power to prosecute. Overall, the court held that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Dover's motion to withdraw the plea, supporting the conclusion that his plea agreement was validly applied.

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RE-2018-1006

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**Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma** **Case No. RE-2018-1006** **Jose Adolfo Rios, Appellant,** **vs.** **The State of Oklahoma, Appellee.** **Summary Opinion** **Judge Lumpkin:** Appellant, Jose Adolfo Rios, appeals from the revocation in full of his concurrent ten-year suspended sentences in Case No. CF-2006-6132. The Honorable Ray C. Elliott, District Judge, ruled on this matter. On April 4, 2008, Appellant entered a guilty plea to two counts of Rape in the First Degree and two counts of Indecent or Lewd Acts With a Child Under Sixteen, resulting in sentences of twenty-two years for the rape counts (with the first twelve years suspended) and twenty years for the lewd acts counts (with the first ten years suspended), all to run concurrently. On July 25, 2018, the State filed an Application to Revoke Suspended Sentence, asserting multiple violations of probation, including failing to report, change of address, pay supervision fees, attend mandated treatment, and committing a new crime—Domestic Assault and Battery With a Dangerous Weapon. During the revocation hearing before Judge Elliott, substantial evidence was presented regarding Appellant's violation of probation terms, including testimonies from Appellant’s probation officer and other evidence illustrating Appellant's failure to comply with treatment and reporting requirements. Appellant testified about personal struggles following a crime in which he was a victim, stating he had fallen victim to substance abuse and homelessness. After reviewing the evidence, Judge Elliott found sufficient basis to revoke the suspended sentences, having established by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant had committed multiple violations, including failing to report and failing to attend treatment. **Proposition of Error:** Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in fully revoking his sentence, asserting that Judge Elliott did not adequately consider alternatives to full revocation. **Analysis:** The decision to revoke a suspended sentence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned without evidence of abuse of that discretion. Here, Judge Elliott had unrefuted evidence of Appellant's violations. The record demonstrates that Appellant acknowledged his failures and did not meet the terms of probation. While Appellant claimed that less severe measures should have been considered, the applicable statutes do not mandate such considerations during revocation proceedings. As such, Appellant has not demonstrated that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in revoking the sentences in full. **Decision:** The order of the District Court of Oklahoma County revoking Appellant's concurrent ten-year suspended sentences is AFFIRMED. **Appearances:** **For Appellant:** Ben Munda, Assistant Public Defender Hallie Elizabeth Bovos, Assistant Public Defender 320 Robert S. Kerr, Suite 400 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 **For the State:** Suzanne Lavenue, Assistant District Attorney Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma Tessa L. Henry, Assistant Attorney General 320 Robert S. Kerr, Suite 505 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 **Opinion By:** Lumpkin, J. **Concurred by:** Lewis, P.J.; Kuehn, V.P.J.; Hudson, J.; Rowland, J. MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the filing of this decision. [Download Full Opinion PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/RE-2018-1006_1734358375.pdf)

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F-2019-16

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JOHNNY W. WARD,** Appellant, v. **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **Case No. F-2019-16** **FILED DEC 12 2019** **IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** LUMPKIN, JUDGE: Appellant Johnny W. Ward was tried by jury and found guilty of Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon (Count I) (21 O.S.2011, § 652) and Possession of a Firearm (Count II) (21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 1283), both counts After Former Conviction of A Felony, in the District Court of Muskogee County, Case No. CF-2017-1155. The jury recommended as punishment imprisonment for thirty (30) years in Count I and ten (10) years in Count II. The trial court sentenced accordingly, ordering the sentences to be served concurrently. It is from this judgment and sentence that Appellant appeals. Appellant must serve 85% of his sentence in Count I before becoming eligible for consideration for parole. 21 O.S.2011, § 13.1. **Appellant raises the following propositions of error in support of his appeal:** 1. The eyewitness identification of Appellant was based upon an overly suggestive, one-man show-up that violated Appellant's rights to due process and a fair trial. 2. The State's evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the crimes of Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon and Possession of a Firearm After Former Conviction of a Felony Conviction and his convictions must therefore be reversed with instructions to dismiss. 3. Appellant's sentence is excessive and should be modified. After thorough consideration of these propositions and the entire record, we have determined that under the law and the evidence no relief is warranted. **Proposition I:** Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress the in-court identification made by Ms. Davidson after an on-the-scene one person show-up. Appellant argues the pre-trial identification was unnecessarily suggestive and tainted the subsequent identification of Appellant at trial. A one man show-up is not necessarily unduly suggestive or improper. Young v. State, 2000 OK CR 17, ¶ 30, 12 P.3d 20, 34. Absent special elements of unfairness, prompt on-the-scene confrontations [between a victim and a suspect] do not entail due process violations.... Harrolle v. State, 1988 OK CR 223, ¶ 7, 763 P.2d 126, 128, quoting Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280, 1284 (D.C.Cir.1969). The one person show-up in this case was not unduly suggestive or so improper as to create a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress the identification. However, even if the show-up was unduly suggestive, the same would not automatically invalidate the subsequent in-court identification if that identification can be established as independently reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Young, 2000 OK CR 17, ¶ 31, 12 P.3d at 34. Under the circumstances of this case, we find the in-court identification reliable. As the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing into evidence the in-court identification of Appellant, this proposition of error is denied. **Proposition II:** Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon and Possession of a Firearm After Former Conviction of a Felony. He argues the State failed to show he had anything to do with the alleged crimes. Appellant asserts that the State's evidence showed only that he was in the wrong place at the wrong time. However, evidence showed that Appellant shot his victim in the knee and buttock as the victim begged for his life. Appellant then ran away from the scene, discarding the gun he used and a hoodie he was wearing. Reviewing Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Mitchell v. State, 2018 OK CR 24, ¶ 11, 424 P.3d 677, 682. Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is denied. **Proposition III:** Appellant argues that his sentence is excessive and should be modified. He asserts that while his sentence is technically within the range provided by law, it does not bear a direct relationship to the nature and circumstances of the offenses. However, Appellant's sentences were within the applicable statutory range (21 O.S.2011, §§ 652(A), 1284 and 51.1(C)). This Court will not modify a sentence within the statutory range unless, considering all the facts and circumstances, it shocks the conscience. Pullen v. State, 2016 OK CR 18, ¶ 16, 387 P.3d 922, 928. The evidence showed that despite having a prior robbery conviction, Appellant was in possession of a gun, which he used to shoot the victim multiple times as the victim begged for his life. Under these circumstances, the 30 year and 10 year sentences are not excessive. Therefore, modification of the sentences is not warranted and this proposition is denied. Accordingly, this appeal is denied. **DECISION** The JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE THOMAS H. ALFORD, DISTRICT JUDGE** **APPEARANCES AT TRIAL** BRIAN WATTS 222 N. 4TH ST. MUSKOGEE, OK 74401 COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE **APPEARANCES ON APPEAL** NICOLLETTE BRANDT OKLA. INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM P.O. BOX 926 NORMAN, OK 73070 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT **ORVIL LOGE** DISTRICT ATTORNEY TIM KING ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY MUSKOGEE CO. COURTHOUSE MUSKOGEE, OK 74401 COUNSEL FOR THE STATE **MIKE HUNTER** ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA CAROLINE E.J. HUNT ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL 313 N.E. 21ST ST. OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105 COUNSEL FOR THE STATE **OPINION BY: LUMPKIN, J.** LEWIS, P.J.: Concur KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur HUDSON, J.: Concur ROWLAND, J.: Concur --- [**Click Here To Download PDF**](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2019-16_1734781599.pdf)

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F-2018-1137

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This document is a summary opinion from the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma regarding the appeal of Parron Lavon Burrus. Burrus was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, after being found guilty by a jury in the District Court of Caddo County. The court sentenced him to 30 years in prison for the first count and 25 years for the second, running consecutively. In the appeal, Burrus contended that the sentences were excessive and should be modified. He argued that the offenses were interconnected and that the trial court exhibited prejudice against him during sentencing, referencing the requirement for his testimony to be under oath and the judge's prior role in prosecuting him. However, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment and sentence. The court noted that the sentences fell within the statutory range, that there is no constitutional right to concurrent sentences, and that Burrus did not demonstrate that the trial judge's actions or previous involvement in prior prosecutions caused an unfair sentencing outcome. The court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in sentencing, emphasizing the separate nature of the offenses committed by Burrus. In essence, the appeal was denied, and the court's decision was upheld, confirming the sentences imposed on Burrus.

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C-2013-254

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In OCCA case No. C-2013-254, Gina Diane Eslick appealed her conviction for multiple drug-related charges. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant her petition for certiorari, meaning they agreed to look at her case closely. The court found that she did not have effective help from her lawyer when she tried to change her guilty plea, as her lawyer had a conflict of interest. The court ordered that her case be sent back to the District Court so she could have a new hearing with a lawyer who did not have a conflict. No one dissented in this decision.

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C-2018-1040

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** *Case No. C-2018-1040* **ROLLO ROY WERLINE, IV,** *Petitioner,* *vs.* **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** *Respondent.* **FILED** *IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS* *OCT 31 2019* *JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK* **SUMMARY OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Petitioner Rolla Roy Werline, IV, represented by counsel, entered pleas of guilty to First Degree Manslaughter (Count I), Leaving the Scene of a Fatality Accident (Count II), and Failure to Maintain Insurance (Count III) in the District Court of Ottawa County, Case No. CF-2017-164. The pleas were accepted by the Honorable Robert G. Haney on April 19, 2018. On June 12, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment for Count I, five (5) years imprisonment in Count II (suspended), and a $250.00 fine for Count III. On June 15, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, which was denied at a hearing on June 26, 2018. Petitioner appeals this denial, raising two propositions of error: 1. Petitioner should be allowed to withdraw his plea as it was not entered knowingly and intelligently, given he did not understand the consequences of entering a blind plea. 2. The imposed fines and costs were excessive. **Proposition I:** Petitioner contends that his plea was not entered voluntarily and was the result of being misadvised regarding the plea process. The trial court reviewed this issue during the motion to withdraw hearing. Assessing whether the plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently is key. The record indicates the plea was knowing and voluntary, highlighting that the petitioner understood the court would determine punishment and could impose a sentence within statutory limits. The trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw is upheld. **Proposition II:** Petitioner claims his sentence is excessive, particularly citing a victim impact statement that contained a sentence recommendation, which he argues improperly influenced the court's decision. While acknowledging that victim impact statements may be considered during sentencing, those statements should not contain sentence recommendations. Any potential error here was harmless, as the overall sentence is seen as reasonable and within statutory limits. It was also noted that the issue of a $250.00 Victim Compensation Assessment in Count III was not raised previously and is thus waived for appeal. **DECISION:** The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is DENIED. The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is AFFIRMED. **OPINION BY:** **LUMPKIN, J.** *LEWIS, P.J.: Concur* *KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur* *HUDSON, J.: Concur* *ROWLAND, J.: Concur* **Click Here To Download PDF** [Link to PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2018-1040_1734225145.pdf)

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F-2018-175

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-175, Charles Randall Hayes appealed his conviction for first-degree manslaughter while driving under the influence of drugs. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction for the misdemeanor driving under the influence charge but affirmed the convictions for first-degree manslaughter and driving left of center. One judge dissented. Mr. Hayes was found guilty of serious charges, including manslaughter, because he caused an accident while driving under the influence. The jury gave him a life sentence for this, along with fines for the other charges. He had multiple reasons for appealing his case, claiming that he didn’t get a fair trial, that his sentence was too harsh, that his lawyer didn’t help him enough, and that mistakes happened during the trial that made it unfair. The court looked at whether the charges against him were correct. They agreed that he couldn't be sentenced for both manslaughter and for the misdemeanor of driving under the influence at the same time because that would be unfair punishment for the same action. Mr. Hayes argued that the prosecution behaved badly during the trial, but the court found that there were no serious mistakes that changed the outcome. They believed that the prosecutor's actions did not make the trial unfair enough to change the results. When Mr. Hayes said his sentence was too harsh, the court decided that it was still within the legal limits. They only change sentences if they are shockingly unfair, which they did not find here. Mr. Hayes also claimed that his lawyer did not defend him well enough. However, since the court did not find that the prosecutor made major mistakes, they thought there was no reason to think that a different lawyer would have helped him more. Finally, Mr. Hayes felt that too many errors had happened to make the trial fair at all. The court disagreed and said that since they found none of the individual mistakes were harmful, they couldn’t consider them as a group. In conclusion, the appeal changed one of the misdemeanor charges but largely supported the main conviction.

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F-2018-915

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**Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma** **Case Summary: Trever Wayne Ford v. The State of Oklahoma** **Case No:** F-2018-915 **Filed:** October 13, 2019 **Summary:** Trever Wayne Ford was convicted of Assault and Battery by Means and Force Likely to Produce Death under 21 O.S.2011, § 652(C) in the District Court of Pontotoc County, Case No. CF-2017-20. Judge C. Steven Kessinger sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Ford appealed, arguing that his sentence was excessive. **Key Points:** 1. **Appellant's Argument**: Ford contends that his sentence is too harsh given the conflicting evidence about the incident, his injuries (possibly a concussion), lack of prior convictions, employment status, family responsibilities, and character in relation to this crime. 2. **Court’s Response**: The court reviewed the case and noted that the trial court had considered all the relevant information when imposing the sentence. The evidence indicated that Ford engaged in violent actions that caused severe injury to the victim. 3. **Conclusion**: The appellate court found that Ford's twenty-five-year sentence was within the statutory range and not excessive given the circumstances described. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment and sentence. **Decision**: The judgment and sentence from the District Court of Pontotoc County are upheld. **Counsel Information**: - **For Appellant**: Shelley Levisay, Ricki J. Walterscheid, Carlos Henry. - **For Appellee**: Mike Hunter (Attorney General), Keeley L. Miller (Assistant Attorney General), Tara Portillo (Assistant District Attorney). **Judges**: Opinion delivered by Vice Presiding Judge Kuehn; Judges Lewis, Lumpkin, Hudson, and Rowland concurred. For the full decision, please refer to the provided [PDF link](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-915_1735118232.pdf).

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F-2018-690

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **DANIEL ROSS DAGE,** **Appellant,** **vs.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. F-2018-690** **SUMMARY OPINION** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Daniel Ross Dage was convicted of Possession of Juvenile Pornography in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1021.2, in the District Court of Comanche County, under the Honorable Gerald Neuwirth. He was sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment, with eight (8) years suspended, and a fine of $5,000.00. Additionally, he is subject to sex offender registration and two years of post-imprisonment supervision during his suspended sentence. Dage appeals his conviction and sentence, raising three propositions of error. I. The record does not sufficiently demonstrate that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. II. The State's evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dage knowingly possessed videos of juvenile pornography. III. A sentence of 20 years is excessive under the circumstances, violating the United States and Oklahoma constitutions. After thorough review of the record, including transcripts and briefs, we find that the case must be reversed and remanded for a jury trial. Proposition I is granted. The State concedes this issue. While defendants can waive their constitutional right to a jury trial, such a waiver must be competent, knowing, intelligent, and on the record, as established in *Hinsley v. State*, 2012 OK CR 11; *Valega v. City of Oklahoma City*, 1988 OK CR 101. Record evidence must show that both the State and the court consented to the waiver. The requirements for a valid waiver include an advisement of rights and a court minute reflecting the waiver, with signatures from the defendant and counsel. The record does not provide evidence of a waiver or party consent; there are no advisements regarding jury trial rights, nor discussions recorded in the trial transcript concerning the waiver. Thus, we conclude that the record fails to show Appellant validly waived his right to a jury trial. Proposition II, concerning the sufficiency of evidence, is briefly addressed. The State needed to demonstrate Dage knowingly possessed child pornography according to 21 O.S.2011, § 1021.2. Although Dage argues against the sufficiency of evidence, we find that the evidence reasonably infers Dage was aware of the prohibited nature of the material, and no other individual had reasonable access to the USB drives. Therefore, this proposition is denied. Given our decision regarding Proposition I, Proposition III concerning sentencing is rendered moot. **DECISION** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Comanche County is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for a jury trial. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COMANCHE COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE GERALD NEUWIRTH, DISTRICT JUDGE** **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** LARRY CORRALES P.O. BOX 2095 LAWTON, OK 73502 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** NANCY WALKER-JOHNSON P.O. BOX 926 NORMAN, OK 73070 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** CHRISTINE GALBRAITH ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY COMANCHE CO. COURTHOUSE 315 SW 5TH ST., RM 502 LAWTON, OK 73501-4360 **MIKE HUNTER** ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLA. DIANE L. SLAYTON ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL 313 NE 21 ST STREET OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR HUDSON, J.: CONCUR ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-690_1735220870.pdf)

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F-2018-12

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-12, the appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree rape by instrumentation and misdemeanor assault and battery. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction and sentence of life imprisonment for the rape conviction. One judge dissented. The case involved Daniel Bryan Kelley, who was initially sentenced to twenty years for rape following a jury trial. He appealed that decision, and the Court agreed that there had been a mistake involving the use of a past out-of-state conviction for sentence enhancement. They sent the case back for a new sentencing trial. The second trial resulted in a life sentence. Kelley argued that he had ineffective assistance from his appellate lawyer because he was not informed about the risks of a longer sentence should he win the appeal. However, the court found no clear evidence that he would have chosen to do anything differently had he been fully informed beforehand. Kelley also wanted the court to limit his new sentence to twenty years, but the court explained that upon retrial or resentencing, the complete range of punishment is available. Therefore, they refused his request to cap the current sentence. Finally, Kelley claimed that the life sentence was excessive. The court considered the nature of his crime and his history, stating that the sentence was within the legal limit and justified based on the circumstances of the case. As a result, the court concluded that his life sentence did not shock the conscience and upheld the previous decisions regarding his case.

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F-2018-616

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **HEATHER SUZANNE BARBEE, Appellant,** **vs.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** **No. F-2018-616** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA SEP 26, 2019** SUMMARY OPINION **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant, Heather Suzanne Barbee, was convicted by a jury in Muskogee County District Court, Case No. F-2017-190, of Sexual Exploitation of a Child. On June 14, 2018, the Honorable Michael Norman, District Judge, sentenced her to thirty-three years imprisonment, in accordance with the jury's recommendation. She must serve 85% of her sentence before parole consideration. Appellant raises six propositions of error in support of her appeal: **PROPOSITION I:** THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED BY HOLDING A TWO-STAGE TRIAL INSTEAD OF A ONE-STAGE TRIAL. **PROPOSITION II:** THE STATE'S DECISION TO PROCEED WITH A TWO-STAGE TRIAL WITHOUT ANY PROOF OF FORMER FELONIES CAUSED HARM TO Ms. BARBEE. **PROPOSITION III:** PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF A FAIR TRIAL. **PROPOSITION IV:** INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF A FAIR TRIAL. **PROPOSITION V:** THE SENTENCE WAS EXCESSIVE. **PROPOSITION VI:** CUMULATIVE ERROR DEPRIVED Ms. BARBEE OF A FAIR TRIAL. After thorough consideration of these propositions, the briefs of the parties, and the record on appeal, we affirm. Appellant was charged with sexually exploiting her minor sister for financial gain. The State charged two counts, but the jury found her guilty of only one. As to Propositions I and II, the record indicates that (1) Appellant had prior convictions used to enhance the sentence on one of the two charges she faced; (2) the trial was bifurcated as to both charges; but (3) the jury acquitted Appellant of the enhanced count. Thus, the jury sentenced Appellant as a first offender on the remaining charge, and never heard about the prior convictions. The procedure used was entirely proper, and Appellant fails to show any prejudice from it. *Wisdom v. State*, 1996 OK CR 22, 99 17-20, 918 P.2d 384, 390; *Marshall v. State*, 2010 OK CR 8, I 58, 232 P.3d 467, 481. Propositions I and II are denied. In Proposition III, Appellant alleges six instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Because she did not object to these comments below, we review them only for plain error - an actual error, that is plain or obvious, and that affects a defendant's substantial rights and the outcome of the trial. *Bosse v. State*, 2017 OK CR 10, 9 82, 400 P.3d 834, 863. We find no error. First, the prosecutor did not impermissibly comment on Appellant's failure to testify simply by arguing that the jury had received absolutely nothing to contradict the testimony of the State's primary witnesses. Such general comments about the totality of the evidence (and lack of controverting evidence) differ from directly suggesting that the defendant must be guilty because she did not take the stand. *Id.*, 2017 OK CR 10, I 85, 400 P.3d at 863. The prosecutor never shirked her burden to prove all elements of the crime. Second, the prosecutor did not vouch for the credibility of complaining witnesses by pointing to their demeanor and the consistency in their accounts; these comments were properly based on evidence presented to the jury. *Taylor v. State*, 2011 OK CR 8, I 57, 248 P.3d 362, 379; *Bland v. State*, 2000 OK CR 11, I 97, 4 P.3d 702, 728. Third, the prosecutor's assessment of the defense strategy as smoke and mirrors and intellectually disingenuous, and her statement, Ladies and gentlemen, she is guilty, were also fair inferences from the evidence presented. *Harris v. State*, 2000 OK CR 20, I 35, 13 P.3d 489, 498. Fourth, assertions of the defendant's guilt are not improper if they are made with reference to the evidence presented. *Williams v. State*, 2008 OK CR 19, I 107, 188 P.3d 208, 228. Fifth, asking the jury to consider the long-term effects of the defendant's conduct on the victim when assessing the sentence was not plainly erroneous. *Carol v. State*, 1988 OK CR 114, I 10, 756 P.2d 614, 617. We note that the jury recommended a sentence less than the 40-year sentence requested by the prosecutor. Finally, the prosecutor's reference in the punishment stage to acquitted conduct (Count 2, the charge on which the jury found Appellant not guilty in the first stage of the trial) was not improper. The jury was still free to consider that conduct, because it was not an element the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to sentencing on Count 1. *See Dowling v. United States*, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990). We find no error in the prosecutor's comments such as would warrant any relief. Proposition III is denied. In Proposition IV, Appellant faults trial counsel for not making objections to the issues raised in Propositions I, II, and III. To show trial counsel was ineffective, she must show both deficient performance and prejudice. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); *White v. State*, 2019 OK CR 2, I 23, 437 P.3d 1061, 1070. Because we found no merit to these substantive complaints, trial counsel was not ineffective. *Jackson v. State*, 2016 OK CR 5, I 13, 371 P.3d 1120, 1123. Proposition IV is denied. As to Proposition V, given Appellant's conduct in this case, the sentence recommended by the jury (less than what the prosecutor requested) was not shocking to the conscience, and the trial court's order that the sentence be served consecutively to Appellant's sentence in an unrelated case was not an abuse of discretion. *White*, 2019 OK CR 2, I 29, 437 P.3d at 1072. As to Proposition VI, because no error has been identified above, there can be no relief for cumulative error. *Engles v. State*, 2015 OK CR 17, I 13, 366 P.3d 311, 315. Proposition VI is denied. **DECISION** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Muskogee County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY THE HONORABLE MICHAEL NORMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** DAN MEDLOCK MEDLOCK LAW 620 WEST BROADWAY MUSKOGEE, OK 74401 **COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT** **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** LISBETH L. MCCARTY INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM P.O. BOX 926 NORMAN, OK 73070 **COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT** NALANI CHING ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE KEELEY L. MILLER ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL 220 STATE STREET MUSKOGEE, OK 74401 **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** **LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR** **LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR** **HUDSON, J.: CONCUR** **ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR** [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-616_1735230080.pdf)

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RE-2018-426

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **CALVIN TAYLOR HERRIEN,** **Appellant,** **-VS-** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. RE-2018-426** **FILED** **IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **SEP 19 2019** **JOHN D. HADDEN** **CLERK** **SUMMARY OPINION** **LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant, Calvin Taylor Herrien, appeals from the revocation of four years of his twenty-five year suspended sentences in Case No. CF-2011-4693 in the District Court of Oklahoma County, presided over by the Honorable Cindy H. Truong. **Background:** On November 2, 2012, Appellant entered a guilty plea to two counts of Lewd Acts With a Child Under Sixteen, resulting in a twenty-five year sentence for each count, both suspended under specific probation conditions. The State filed an Application to Revoke Suspended Sentence on November 1, 2017, alleging Appellant violated probation by failing to reside in a lawfully approved residence and not truthfully answering inquiries from the DOC and law enforcement. A hearing commenced on November 21, 2017, where evidence was presented, including testimony from police chief Allen Lane, who testified regarding Appellant's residence proximity to a park and his notification to Appellant to relocate. Further testimony came from probation officer Daniel Straka, who reported Appellant's admission about the residence, discrepancies about probation requirements, and additional violations not included in the revocation application. Appellant testified on his own behalf, offering explanations but ultimately, after considering arguments, Judge Truong found that Appellant had committed the two breaches alleged in the application. Following a continuance, on December 1, 2017, Judge Truong revoked four years of the suspended sentence. **Propositions of Error:** 1. **Inadequate Notice:** Appellant contends that the consideration of testimony regarding uncharged violations denied him adequate notice, which impeded his ability to prepare a defense. 2. **Right to Confront:** Appellant alleges deprivation of his right to confront witnesses and due process during the hearing. 3. **Excessive Sentence:** Appellant argues that the four-year revocation of his suspended sentence is excessive. **Analysis:** The evidence presented at the revocation proceedings clearly showed that Appellant violated the terms of his probation. Appellant does not contest the findings concerning the recognized violations. He does not argue that he was unaware of the specifics related to the alleged probation violations or that he lacked the opportunity to defend himself against those violations. In regards to Propositions I and II, while Appellant claims other violations were improperly admitted, the court's finding that he committed the alleged violations outlined in the application suffices to validate the revocation. Furthermore, due process entitles Appellant to argue mitigating circumstances, which was provided by Judge Truong. Concerning Proposition III, revocation decisions are primarily at the discretion of the trial court and will only be overturned in cases of demonstrable abuse of that discretion. Appellant has not shown that the four-year revocation was disproportionate relative to the violations committed. **Decision:** The order of the District Court of Oklahoma County revoking four years of Appellant's twenty-five year suspended sentences in Case No. CF-2011-4693 is **AFFIRMED**. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the **MANDATE is ORDERED** to be issued upon the filing of this decision. --- **Appearances:** **For Appellant:** Joshua C. Smith Attorney at Law 217 N. Harvey, Ste. 108 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 **For Appellee:** Ryan P. Stephenson Assistant District Attorney Oklahoma County 320 Robert S. Kerr, Ste. 505 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 **OPINION BY:** LEWIS, P.J. **CONCUR IN RESULTS:** KUEHN, V.P.J.; LUMPKIN, J.; HUDSON, J.; ROWLAND, J. *Click Here To Download PDF*

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F-2018-446

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-446, Byron Craig Herd appealed his conviction for First Degree Burglary. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction. One judge dissented. Byron Craig Herd was found guilty by a jury for breaking into someone's home. The court sentenced him to life in prison because he had a history of other convictions. During the trial, Herd's defense claimed that the prosecutor acted unfairly, which made it hard for him to get a fair trial. Herd argued two main points in his appeal. First, he said the prosecutor made the trial unfair by trying to make the jury feel sorry for the victims. The prosecutor did this by asking the jury about their feelings as potential victims of a burglary, which led to emotional comments during the trial. Secondly, Herd believed his life sentence was too harsh. The court looked carefully at the trial and the evidence. They noted that while some of the prosecutor's comments may have been too emotional, the evidence against Herd was very strong. There were recordings of him inside the victims' house, and he was caught shortly after the crime. The court concluded that, despite some mistakes made by the prosecutor, these did not significantly affect the fairness of the trial because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. They also determined that Herd's sentence was appropriate given his past crimes and the seriousness of his current crime. In the end, the court denied Herd’s appeal, meaning he would stay in prison for life.

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