Due Process

C-2021-504

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In OCCA case No. C-2021-504, Starlyn Sean Hill appealed his conviction for multiple serious crimes, including aggravated possession of child pornography and multiple counts of rape and sodomy. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant his appeal, allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea. One judge dissented from the opinion. Hill had pleaded guilty to several counts, and upon sentencing, he received a lengthy prison term. After his plea, he filed a motion to withdraw it, arguing that he felt rushed into making his decision and that he was misinformed about the potential consequences. He also raised issues regarding the statute of limitations for some of the charges, claiming that ten of them should not have been prosecuted because they were filed too late. The court reviewed the case and found that the prosecution for some of the counts may indeed have been beyond the statute of limitations. They concluded there were errors in how Hill’s plea was accepted, particularly as he did not properly waive his right to challenge the statute of limitations on several counts. This led the court to determine that his guilty plea was not made voluntarily or intelligently. As a result, the court vacated Hill's judgment and sentence and instructed that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings that would not contradict this new decision.

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RE-2021-1202

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In OCCA case No. RE-2021-1202, Jimmy Dale Jackson, Jr. appealed his conviction for violating the terms of his probation. In a published decision, the court decided to modify the revocation of his suspended sentence to six months instead of a longer term. One judge dissented. Here’s a summary of the case: Jimmy Dale Jackson, Jr. had a suspended sentence from a previous conviction for Lewd Molestation, which means he was not in prison but had to follow certain rules. In 2021, the State of Oklahoma accused him of breaking those rules. They said he did many things wrong, such as driving with a gun, using drugs, not paying the fees he needed to, and talking to a girl who was a minor, which he was told not to do. When Jackson went to the court for a hearing, the judge decided that he had indeed broken the rules, and as a result, revoked his suspended sentence completely. Jackson then appealed this decision. He argued that the judge's decision was too harsh and that he should not have been punished so severely for what he called technical violations. He also claimed that the judge improperly used the results of a lie detector test (polygraph) against him during the hearing. The court had to consider whether the judge had made a real mistake. They found out that Jackson's violations were mostly technical, meaning they were not serious crimes but rather rule-breaking issues. According to Oklahoma law, if a person on probation has technical violations for the first time, the judge can only revoke their suspended sentence for up to six months. The court decided that Jackson's violations did not include breaking any serious laws because he had never been told to follow specialized rules for sex offenders, which would have been more serious. They noted he was only accused of violating standard probation rules. Since the judge revoked his sentence for a period longer than what the law allows for technical violations, the court agreed that was a mistake. Regarding the polygraph results, Jackson's team had talked about them first, so the court said that Jackson could not complain about that now. They concluded that even without the polygraph, there were enough other reasons to revoke his probation. In the end, the court said Jackson's sentenced revocation would be adjusted to six months, meaning he would have to follow the suspension rules for just that amount of time instead of facing a longer prison term. The court emphasized that everyone must understand the rules when they are on probation and that following proper legal steps is important to ensure fairness. So, in summary, the court reduced Jackson's punishment because they found he was not given proper notice about the rules he had to follow and that he should not have been penalized so harshly for technical violations alone.

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F-2021-211

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In OCCA case No. F-2021-211, Michael Ray Dawkins appealed his conviction for assault and battery with a deadly weapon, felon in possession of a firearm, and maiming. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for assault and battery with a deadly weapon and felon in possession of a firearm but reversed the conviction for maiming and instructed to dismiss it. A dissenting opinion was not noted. The case involved a jury trial where Dawkins was found guilty on all counts after shooting a woman named Krystal Traylor. He received a sentence of 45 years for the assault and battery, 25 years for the firearm possession, and another 45 years for the maiming, with some sentences running concurrently and others consecutively. Dawkins raised several claims on appeal, including that his constitutional right to an attorney of his choice was violated, that he faced double punishment for the same act, and that there were errors in admitting certain evidence during his trial. Upon review, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Dawkins's request for a new attorney, as he did not provide valid reasons for wanting to change lawyers. It was also determined that Dawkins’s convictions for assault and battery and maiming stemmed from a single act, which should not result in multiple punishments. Therefore, the court reversed the maiming conviction. Further, the court found that the identification of Dawkins by the victim was correctly admitted as evidence, dismissing the hearsay claim. Dawkins's assertions about prior bad acts being admitted were also rejected, as they were deemed relevant and essential for establishing motive and intent. The court noted that a limiting instruction had been provided to jurors, mitigating concerns over the impact of these past acts. Finally, regarding Dawkins's claim for a speedy trial violation, the court found that the delays were mainly attributable to him or his defense strategies, concluding that he was not prejudiced by the delay. Overall, most of Dawkins's claims were denied, leading to the affirmation of his main convictions and the reversal of the maiming charge.

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RE-2020-501

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In OCCA case No. RE-2020-501, Kaylen Harrison Rice appealed his conviction for the revocation of his suspended sentences. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation but vacated the portion that required him to remain under supervision. One judge dissented. Kaylen Harrison Rice had previously been given suspended sentences for his crimes. He was supposed to follow certain rules instead of serving time in jail, but the rules changed to make his crime less serious. A new law stated that if someone is being revoked for a crime that is now seen as less serious, their punishment must follow the new law's limits. Kaylen argued that his one-year revocation was too long given the new law. However, the court found that the existing rules and his situation didn’t allow for the changes he suggested. During his revocation hearing, Kaylen raised concerns about being supervised after his jail time, saying that the law did not allow for that kind of supervision for his crime. The State acknowledged this point but later dropped the argument, which meant the court didn't consider it. The court decided that since the State had waived its right to challenge this part, it could not revisit it in Kaylen's appeal. In conclusion, the court upheld the decision to revoke Kaylen's suspended sentences but overturned the requirement that he be supervised, which was not allowed under the new law.

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C-2021-218

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In OCCA case No. C-2021-218, the petitioner appealed her conviction for outraging public decency and violation of a protective order. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant the appeal. The court agreed that her due process rights were violated when the district court denied her motions to withdraw her pleas while she was absent from the hearing. No one dissented.

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RE-2020-452

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In OCCA case No. RE-2020-452, Katlin Maye Ford appealed her conviction for Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the order revoking her suspended sentence. One judge dissented. Katlin pled guilty to Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon and received a ten-year sentence that was suspended. This means she did not have to go to prison right away but had to follow certain rules. One rule was that she needed to pay restitution, which is money that goes to the victim to help with their losses. In October 2018, the State of Oklahoma asked the court to end her suspended sentence because she had not paid the restitution. In November 2018, Katlin decided to represent herself in court, meaning she did not want a lawyer. She admitted that she had not paid the restitution as ordered. The court then allowed more time for her to get back on track with her payments. However, in June 2020, the court decided to take away three years of her suspended sentence because she still had not paid the restitution. Katlin thought this was unfair and appealed the decision, making some important claims: 1. She said she was not given proper legal help when she needed it. 2. She believed the court should have helped her get a lawyer for her hearing. 3. She argued that any failure to pay the restitution was not intentional. In examining her first claim, the court noted that people have the right to have a lawyer when their suspended sentences are being revoked. For someone to give up that right, they must do it knowingly, which means they understand what they are doing. The court found that there was no clear record showing that Katlin had enough information about self-representation or that she made her decision with full understanding of the consequences. Since the court did not make sure she understood everything about waiving her right to a lawyer, the appeal was successful. The original decision to revoke her suspended sentence was reversed, meaning Katlin would get another chance to address her restitution payments and have proper legal representation. Therefore, the court instructed for the case to go back to the lower court for further actions that are consistent with its opinion. One judge disagreed with the majority's decision.

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F-2019-854

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In OCCA case No. F-2019-854, Joshua Lee Purdom appealed his conviction for several serious crimes, including assault and battery, kidnapping, and rape. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse his convictions and remand the case with instructions to dismiss it. One judge dissented. Joshua Lee Purdom was found guilty by a jury of multiple crimes and received a lengthy sentence in the District Court of Hughes County. The court took into account that Purdom committed these crimes against a victim who had Indian heritage and that the crimes occurred on land considered part of an Indian Reservation. This brought up a question about whether the state had the right to convict him. Purdom argued that because the victim was an enrolled member of an Indian tribe and the crimes happened on Indian land, the state did not have jurisdiction to prosecute him; instead, this should be handled by federal courts. The case brought attention to a ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court that said parts of Oklahoma were still considered Indian Country for legal purposes. The OCCA agreed with Purdom and found that based on the facts established in a hearing, the state did not have the authority to prosecute him. The victim’s status as an Indian and the location of the crimes played a crucial role in the decision. Therefore, the court dismissed the case, emphasizing that only federal courts have jurisdiction over crimes against Indians in Indian Country under federal law. In summary, the court reversed Purdom’s convictions and ordered the case to be dismissed, which means he will not face charges from this case.

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RE-2019-850

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In OCCA case No. RE-2019-850, Jade Christian Nichols appealed his conviction for the revocation of his suspended sentence. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the order revoking four years of Appellant's suspended judgment and sentence and remanded the case for a new hearing before a different judge. One judge dissented.

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F-2018-78

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-78, Jordan Batice Mitchell appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that the State of Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction to prosecute him. This means that the court could not judge this case because it involved issues concerning his status as an Indian and the location of the crime being within the Muscogee Creek Reservation. The finding was based on a previous case, McGirt v. Oklahoma, which affected how certain crimes involving Native Americans are prosecuted. Consequently, the court vacated Mitchell's sentence and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it. There was a dissenting opinion regarding the decision, as one judge expressed concerns about the implications of the ruling.

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F-2019-369

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In OCCA case No. F-2019-369, Collins appealed his conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction and sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment but vacated and remanded the restitution and fees due to errors in their assessment. One judge dissented. Joseph Willis Collins was found guilty by a jury for committing assault with a dangerous weapon. He faced this trial in Comanche County where he was sentenced to spend twenty-five years in prison and was ordered to pay restitution and court costs. Collins claimed that several things went wrong during his trial that justified overturning his conviction. First, Collins argued that when he asked police if he could go back downstairs, it meant he wanted to stop talking to them, and police should have immediately respected that request. He believed this request was an important part of his rights, which should not have been pushed aside during the questioning. However, the court decided that even though admitting his statements without considering his right not to speak was a mistake, it was not significant enough to change the outcome of the case because there was a lot of clear evidence proving he was guilty. Next, Collins argued that some embarrassing information from his cellphone should not have been used against him during the trial. He thought that this evidence made it hard for him to get a fair trial because it focused on his relationships in a negative way. However, the court did not find this evidence to be unfairly prejudicial, as it was used to help explain details relevant to the case. Collins also believed that his lawyer did not competently defend him, especially regarding the use of the testimony linked to the cellphone and the earlier statements made to police after he asked to stop being questioned. The court looked at all these claims and found that there were no significant mistakes made by Collins’s lawyer that affected the trial's outcome. The other issues Collins raised were about financial matters from his sentencing. Collins was ordered to pay $7,504 in restitution for the victim’s losses, but the court admitted this amount wasn't properly justified, so they decided it should be determined again. The court also acknowledged a mistake in charging Collins a $1,500 indigent defense fee instead of the maximum allowed of $1,000. There was also a dispute about the juror fees that Collins thought were incorrectly calculated, but since he did not raise this objection during the trial, the court decided not to change this part of the decision. In the end, the court upheld the conviction and the lengthy sentence Collins received. They ordered the lower court to redo the calculations for restitution and the indigent defense fee to comply with the law and ensure a fair process. The judgment of conviction and the twenty-five-year prison sentence were upheld, while the restitution and indigent fees were vacated and remanded for further action.

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RE-2019-683

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In OCCA case No. RE-2019-683, the appellant appealed his conviction for the revocation of his suspended sentence. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation but modify it to be limited to six months. One member dissented. The case involved the appellant who had earlier been sentenced for multiple crimes, including possession of a controlled substance and driving under the influence. Initially, he was given a suspended sentence where he would serve time in jail only on weekends. However, he violated the terms of his probation several times by failing to report, pay fees, and complete required programs. After a while, he faced new charges for more serious crimes, which led to the state seeking to revoke his suspended sentence altogether. During the hearing for the revocation, the judge decided to revoke all five years of his suspended sentence. However, the court found later that this action was not appropriate. The court ruled that even though the appellant had committed technical violations, he could only be punished with a maximum of six months because the alleged new crimes occurred after his probation had expired. The court concluded that the trial judge had made a mistake when revoking the whole five years instead of just six months based on the technical violations proven. Thus, the revocation punishment was modified by the court to six months instead of five years.

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F-2019-310

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In OCCA case No. F-2019-310, Kedrin Ray Dixon appealed his conviction for first-degree burglary, sexual battery, and possession of a controlled dangerous substance. In a published decision, the court decided to modify the sentence for sexual battery to ten years imprisonment, making it consecutive to the other sentence, and otherwise affirmed the convictions. One judge dissented regarding the modification of the sentence for sexual battery. Dixon was found guilty by a jury on multiple counts after a trial in the District Court of Washington County. The jury sentenced him to twenty years in prison for burglary and sexual battery, and one year for possession of a controlled substance. The trial judge ordered the sentences for burglary and sexual battery to be served back-to-back. Dixon then appealed, raising several points of error, including issues related to jury instructions and evidence. The first issue was about the trial judge not mentioning that he was presumed innocent in the instructions at the start of the trial. The court found this error was not significant since the final instructions did include the presumption of innocence. Next, Dixon claimed that the evidence was not strong enough for the first-degree burglary conviction. The court disagreed, stating that there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find him guilty. Dixon also argued that he should have been allowed to present evidence regarding his intoxication at the time of the crime. The court ruled that the trial judge had the right to refuse his request since the evidence did not clearly support intoxication as a defense. Another point of concern for Dixon was what he called evidentiary harpoons, which are when comments are made that suggest knowledge of other crimes. The court found that he did not object to these comments at the trial and they did not seriously affect the verdict. Dixon claimed that he was unfairly prevented from presenting a full defense regarding reports of his previous erratic behaviors. The court decided that these reports were not very relevant to his defense and that excluding them did not significantly harm his case. A notable issue was a mistake in how the jury was informed about the potential punishment for sexual battery. The trial judge incorrectly stated that it could be punished by twenty years, which was incorrect. The State agreed that this was an error. Instead of sending Dixon back for a new trial, the court decided to lower his sentence for sexual battery to ten years because of this error. Dixon stated that his total sentences were too harsh, but after reviewing the circumstances, the court determined that the sentences were acceptable even after the changes made to one of them. Lastly, Dixon argued that there were too many errors in the case that made it unfair for him. The court did acknowledge the instructional error but believed there were no other significant errors affecting the outcome of the trial. In summary, the court modified Dixon's sentence for sexual battery and kept the other parts of his conviction intact. The final decision still upheld his guilty verdicts on all counts.

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F-2019-149

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In OCCA case No. F-2019-149, Kimberli Sue Dunham appealed her conviction for multiple drug-related offenses. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's decision to terminate her from Drug Court and impose her sentences. One judge dissented. Dunham had been placed in the Delaware County Drug Court program after pleading guilty to several drug-related charges. The program was intended to help her recover from substance abuse. According to her agreement, if she was successful in the program, the charges would be dismissed. However, if she failed, she would face prison time. During her time in Drug Court, Dunham had several violations, including testing positive for methamphetamine. After admitting to more violations, the State sought her removal from the program. In a hearing, evidence of Dunham’s past violations was presented. The judge decided to terminate her from the program, leading to her appeal. In her appeal, Dunham claimed the termination was improper because she was sanctioned for previous violations. She also argued that the court did not follow proper procedures as required by the Oklahoma Drug Court Act, which aims to support individuals in recovery. Dunham claimed that a relapse should not automatically lead to termination and that the court should have used progressively increasing sanctions instead. The court reviewed these claims and found that Dunham had indeed admitted to new violations that justified her termination. Her request to consider her actions as mere relapses was denied, as the judge believed more severe action was necessary to maintain the integrity of the Drug Court program. Lastly, Dunham argued that she was misinformed about her rights to withdraw her guilty pleas. The court agreed that she should have been informed of her rights but ruled that her termination and conviction would still stand. The court upheld the trial court's decision but noted that it should have properly advised Dunham regarding her rights, allowing her the option to appeal her plea. Thus, while her conviction was confirmed, the case was remanded to correct the error about her rights.

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RE-2019-19

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In OCCA case No. RE-2019-19, Daniel Lee Hart appealed his conviction for revocation of a suspended sentence. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that revoking his suspended sentence without him being present was a violation of his right to due process, and therefore, the revocation was reversed. One judge dissented. Daniel Lee Hart originally pleaded guilty in 2009 to trying to manufacture a controlled substance. He was given a 20-year sentence, with 12 years of that being suspended, meaning he didn't have to serve that part of the time as long as he followed certain rules. One of those rules was that he had to stay clean from drugs and check in regularly with his probation officer. In 2017, the state said that Hart had broken the rules. They said he had used drugs, didn’t show up for meetings with his probation officer in both Oklahoma and Kansas, didn’t register as a drug offender in Kansas, didn’t pay fees for his probation, and hadn’t completed his GED as he was supposed to. Hart later agreed to these claims but was able to be released for drug treatment for a few months before being sentenced. When the time came for his sentencing, Hart did not show up. Because he was absent, the court revoked the suspended part of his sentence completely. This meant he would have to serve the full 20 years instead of just the 8 years that he had left to serve. Hart appealed this decision, saying it was unfair for the court to make such a serious decision without him being there. The court looked at whether Hart's absence affected his right to defend himself. They said that everyone has the right to be present when decisions are made about their punishment. The court noted that Hart had not willingly chosen to skip the sentencing and that his absence could have greatly impacted the outcome. Because of these reasons, the court said Hart deserved a new hearing where he could be present to possibly explain why he wasn’t there and defend himself more fully. The final decision was to send the case back for another hearing. They wanted to make sure Hart had a fair chance to be present when the consequences of his actions were discussed again. In summary, because Hart was missing during a very important hearing, the court agreed that this was a mistake. They reversed the earlier decision and ordered a new hearing where he could be present.

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F-2018-894

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-894, Olubanji Milton Macaulay appealed his conviction for possession of counterfeit driver licenses. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm some counts but reverse others. One judge dissented. Summary: Olubanji Milton Macaulay was found guilty by a jury of seven counts of possessing counterfeit driver licenses after a trial in Oklahoma. The judge sentenced him to ten years in prison, with sentences running at the same time for each count. He argued that law enforcement illegally searched his rental car, that he faced double punishment for the same crime, and that the trial court wrongly refused to instruct the jury about missing video evidence. When he appealed, the court looked closely at each of his claims. About the first point, the court ruled that the police had the right to search the car because Macaulay had given up any claim of privacy when he said he walked to the bank and did not indicate he owned the vehicle. Thus, his evidence was allowed in court. Regarding the second point, Macaulay claimed he should only be charged with one count since he possessed all the fake IDs in one event. The court agreed that multiple counts for a single act were not allowed. They found he should only be guilty of two counts: one for fake ID he took into the bank and another for the ID found in his car. On the third point about the jury instruction regarding the missing bank video, the court said there was no proof that the police acted in bad faith. Therefore, the request for a jury instruction explaining this did not need to be granted. In summary, the court upheld some of his convictions while reversing others, leading the case forward to dismiss those extra counts.

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RE-2018-1233

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In OCCA case No. RE-2018-1233, Joice appealed his conviction for obtaining cash or merchandise by bogus check/false pretenses. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to vacate the order revoking Joice's suspended sentence and remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the State's application to revoke with prejudice. One judge dissented. Joice had originally entered a guilty plea in 2013 for writing a bogus check and received a twenty-year sentence, which was all suspended, meaning he would not serve time in prison if he followed the rules of his probation. However, in 2018, the State claimed he broke the rules of his probation and sought to revoke his suspended sentence. During the hearings, Joice argued that the original sentence was too long and that the State filed their application to revoke his probation too late. He also said his lawyer did not help him properly by not questioning the judge’s decision to revoke his sentence. The court agreed there were major issues with his original sentence and that the State was too late in trying to revoke it. They found that Joice did not get good legal help at his revocation hearing. Since the court recognized that the original sentence was illegal and the State's request to change it came too late, they decided to dismiss the application to revoke Joice’s probation. This means he won't have to serve time because the conditions under which his probation could be revoked were not met correctly.

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F-2018-1267

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**Case Summary: Shelley Jo Duncan's Appeal** **Court:** Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals **Judge:** Rowland, Judge **Case Number:** CF-2017-31 **Verdict:** Affirmed **Background:** Shelley Jo Duncan, a teacher, was charged with Lewd Acts with a Child. Her trial was conducted in Cleveland County after a change of venue due to pre-trial publicity. Duncan was sentenced to six years in prison in accordance with the jury's recommendation. **Issues Raised on Appeal:** 1. The denial of a motion to strike two jurors for cause. 2. Claims of improper commentary on her right to remain silent. 3. The credibility of the alleged victim and sufficiency of evidence for conviction. 4. Admission of other crimes evidence regarding past drug use. 5. Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. 6. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. 7. Challenge to the excessive nature of her sentence. 8. Cumulative errors affecting the fairness of the trial. **Findings:** 1. **Jurors for Cause:** The court did not err in denying the motion to strike jurors S.M. and J.S. Duncan did not preserve her claim regarding J.S. since a peremptory challenge was successfully used to remove her from the jury. 2. **Right to Remain Silent:** Testimony regarding the investigation did not comment on Duncan’s post-arrest silence. Any potential error was cured by the court's action in sustaining objections. 3. **Credibility of Victim:** The court found the victim's testimony credible and sufficient, supporting the conviction based on the preponderance of evidence, even without corroboration. 4. **Other Crimes Evidence:** Duncan’s argument related to drug use was denied as she had introduced this evidence herself. Inviting error prevented relief. 5. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:** Duncan could not demonstrate that her counsel's performance was deficient or that it prejudiced her case sufficiently to impact the outcome. 6. **Prosecutorial Misconduct:** Claims of improper comments were denied, as the prosecutor’s comments did not exceed the acceptable limits of argument during closing statements. 7. **Excessive Sentence:** The six-year sentence was within statutory limits and did not shock the conscience of the court, thus it was upheld. 8. **Cumulative Effect of Errors:** The court found no cumulative errors that would necessitate a new trial or modification of the sentence, as no individual error was identified. **Conclusion:** The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court. Duncan was denied relief on all issues raised in her appeal, with the court finding no significant errors affecting her right to a fair trial. **Access the full opinion:** [Download PDF of the Opinion](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1267_1734782177.pdf)

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F-2018-114

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-114, Andrew Huff appealed his conviction for four counts of Child Neglect and one count of Child Sexual Abuse. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction and sentence. One judge dissented. Andrew Huff was convicted of neglecting his children and sexually abusing a minor. He was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years for the neglect charges and thirty years for the sexual abuse, with all sentences running concurrently. He raised several arguments against his conviction, claiming his rights were violated through various means. First, Huff stated that his video-recorded statements to an investigator should not have been allowed in court because he didn't properly waive his right to counsel. The court found no error in admitting the statement, stating that Huff’s questioning did not clearly indicate he wanted a lawyer at that moment. Next, Huff argued that hearsay evidence was incorrectly allowed, which hurt his chance of a fair trial. However, the court found that any hearsay used was not harmful to the case since other clear evidence proved the charges. Huff also claimed improper admission of other crimes evidence during his police interview, but again, the court concluded there was enough evidence for a verdict regardless of those statements. Regarding jury instructions, Huff felt the jury did not receive proper guidance on the laws for child sexual abuse, which the court acknowledged but deemed harmless since overwhelming evidence supported the verdict. Huff’s claim of insufficient evidence was denied as the court found that evidence presented allowed for rational conclusions supporting the guilty verdicts on both child neglect and sexual abuse. He also brought up issues regarding prosecutorial misconduct during the trial. The court examined these claims and determined any alleged misconduct was not severe enough to warrant a reversal of the conviction. Huff argued that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the introduction of certain evidence and not properly advising him during the trial. The court disagreed, stating that the counsel's performance, while being scrutinized, did not affect the overall outcome of the trial as there was sufficient evidence against him. Lastly, Huff believed that his sentence was excessive, but the court noted that the punishment was within legal limits and that the nature of the crimes warranted the sentence imposed. The overall decision confirmed that there were no reversible errors during the trial, and the affirmance upheld Andrew Huff’s conviction and sentences.

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C-2018-1167

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This document is a summary opinion from the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma regarding the case of Ronald Fitzgerald Williams. Williams entered a negotiated guilty plea to multiple counts related to drug offenses and other violations. After sentencing, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted a writ of certiorari (a type of court order) and remanded the case for a new hearing on Williams' motion to withdraw his plea. The court found significant errors: 1. Williams was allegedly misadvised about his appellate rights, affecting the voluntariness of his plea. 2. The evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea was held in his absence without a valid waiver of his right to be present. 3. Williams asserted he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The court emphasized that due process requires a defendant's attendance at a hearing concerning the withdrawal of a plea unless there’s evidence of a waiver, which was not present in this case. The court reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw the plea and ordered a new hearing to ensure due process is upheld. The document concludes with information about the attorneys involved in the case and instructions for further proceedings. For additional details or specific legal arguments, you can download the full opinion using the link provided.

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RE-2018-932

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **ANTHONY CURTIS CREEK,** Appellant, v. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **Case No. RE-2018-932** **SUMMARY OPINION** **Filed January 23, 2020** ROWLAND, JUDGE: Anthony Curtis Creek, Appellant, entered a guilty plea on March 16, 2015, in Garfield County District Court Case No. CF-2013-393, to Count 1 - Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance, a misdemeanor, and Count 2 - Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a misdemeanor. He received a sentence of one year in the County Jail on Count 1, with 90 days to be served and the remainder suspended; Count 2 was sentenced to one year suspended, with penalties running consecutively. He was also fined $500.00. On January 20, 2017, the State applied for the revocation of Appellant's suspended sentence on Count 2, alleging violations: (1) possession or consumption of alcohol; (2) DUI-A, a misdemeanor; and (3) Defective Equipment, a misdemeanor, in Oklahoma County Case No. CM-2016-2776. During the revocation hearing on June 2, 2017, Appellant admitted to the first allegation. The trial judge, Honorable Dennis Hladik, determined that the State proved the other allegations and revoked six months of Appellant's suspended sentence. Appellant appeals this decision, raising several propositions of error: 1. **Abuse of Discretion:** The trial court allegedly utilized a strict liability standard, resulting in a cruel and excessive sentence. 2. **Prosecutorial Misconduct:** Claiming that Appellant was deprived of a fundamentally fair proceeding due to misconduct. 3. **Plain Error:** The trial court's finding on the State's evidence and the standard of proof was erroneous. 4. **Equal Protection Violation:** Appellant asserts he was denied equal protection under the law. 5. **Cumulative Error:** The accumulation of errors deprived Appellant of due process. Upon review, the Court affirms the District Court's order revoking six months of Appellant's suspended sentence. 1. The decision to revoke a suspended sentence is within the substantial discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. The evidence supported Judge Hladik’s decision to revoke only part of the sentence after considering a stipulation and witness testimonies. 2. The Court agrees with Appellant's counsel that prosecutorial misconduct is more appropriate for post-conviction matters. The record does not support claims of misleading behavior by the prosecutors. 3. The standard of proof for such violations is a preponderance of the evidence, adequately satisfied in Appellant's case. Revocation is valid with any proven violation. 4. The trial court's exclusion of evidence does not equate to an equal protection violation. The ruling was consistent and reasonable. 5. As there were no individual errors identified, the argument for cumulative error also fails. **DECISION** The revocation of Appellant's suspended sentence in Garfield County District Court Case No. CF-2013-393 is **AFFIRMED**. The mandate is ordered to be issued upon the filing of this decision. **APPEARANCES ON APPEAL:** **David J. Batton** Counsel for Defendant **Tallena Hart** Carter Jennings Assistant District Attorney Counsel for the State **OPINION BY: ROWLAND, J:** **LEWIS, P.J.: Concur** **KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur** **LUMPKIN, J: Concur** **HUDSON, J.: Concur** [Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/RE-2018-932_1734358983.pdf)

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F-2018-1103

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **BERT GLEN FRANKLIN,** **Appellant,** **v.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **Case No. F-2018-1103** **OPINION** LUMPKIN, JUDGE: Appellant, Bert Glen Franklin, was tried by jury and convicted in a consolidated trial of Count 1, First Degree Murder (Child Abuse), and of Count 2, Solicitation of First Degree Murder. The jury recommended punishment of life imprisonment without parole on Count 1 and life imprisonment on Count 2, with the sentences running consecutively. Appellant appeals from this judgment and sentence raising two propositions of error. **PROPOSITION I: Joinder of Charges** Appellant contends that his cases should not have been joined in one trial, asserting that this improper joinder resulted in prejudice. However, as Appellant failed to object at trial, we must review this for plain error, which requires an actual error that is plain or obvious and that affects the Appellant's substantial rights. The statute governing joinder of charges, 22 O.S.2011, § 438, permits the trial of two or more offenses together if they could have been joined in a single indictment. Our analysis is guided by reconciling the factors set forth in previous case law. 1. **Same Type of Offenses:** The charges of murder and solicitation reflect a common theme of violence directed towards individuals involved with the defendant, qualifying them as the same type of offenses. 2. **Proximity in Time:** While the offenses occurred approximately seventeen months apart, the delay was due to Appellant's incarceration. They are sufficiently related given the circumstances under which Appellant acted. 3. **Proximity in Location:** Both offenses were committed within Oklahoma County, suggesting a logical relationship between the two. 4. **Overlapping Proof:** Evidence supporting each charge would have been admissible in separate trials since they are intrinsically linked to Appellant’s actions and intent. Given these observations, we find that the joinder was proper, and Appellant suffered no prejudice; therefore, no error occurred. We deny Proposition I. **PROPOSITION II: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel** Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the joinder. Under the Strickland test, Appellant must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient and that such performance prejudiced his case. Since we determined in Proposition I that the joinder was appropriate, Appellant cannot show that any failure to object prejudiced his case. As a result, we also deny Proposition II. **DECISION** The judgment and sentence are affirmed. The mandate is ordered issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. --- **APPEARANCES:** **For Appellant:** R. Scott Adams Box 926 Norman, OK 73070 **For Appellee:** Mike Hunter Attorney General of Oklahoma Theodore M. Peeper, Asst. Attorney General 320 Robert S. Kerr, #505 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 --- **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **LEWIS, P.J.:** Concur in Result **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** Recuse **HUDSON, J.:** Concur **ROWLAND, J.:** Recuse --- [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-1103_1734788162.pdf) This ruling affirms the conviction and sentences of Bert Glen Franklin and addresses the legal standards regarding the joinder of offenses and ineffective assistance of counsel.

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F-2018-835

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **ANTHONY BRUCE HENSON, SR.,** Appellant, **V.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. Case No. F-2018-835 Summary Opinion FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA JAN - 9 2020 **OPINION** *LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE:* Anthony Bruce Henson, Sr., Appellant, was tried by jury and found guilty on Counts 1 through 6 for sexual abuse of a child under twelve (12) years, violating 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5(F); and Count 7 for child abuse, violating 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5(A), in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2017-3127. The jury sentenced the Appellant to life imprisonment and a $1,000.00 fine for each of Counts 1 through 6, and six (6) years imprisonment for Count 7. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively, though the court did not impose the fines. The State dismissed Count 8, charging child abuse, prior to trial. The jury deadlocked on Counts 9 and 10, also charging sexual abuse of a child under twelve, leading the State to dismiss those counts. Mr. Henson raises the following propositions of error on appeal: 1. The District Court erred in admitting bad act evidence of pornography, violating provisions of the Oklahoma Evidence Code and denying due process and a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2. The jury instruction concerning the other crimes evidence was erroneous, as it did not limit its admission purpose. 3. The consecutive life sentences are excessive and should be modified. 4. Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel per the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. **Proposition One:** Appellant argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his possession of child pornography on a cell phone, which counsel did not object to at trial, waiving all but plain error. As established in *Simpson v. State*, Appellant must demonstrate that this plain error affected the trial's outcome. The Court finds no error in the admission of this evidence to show motive or intent for the charged crimes. **Proposition Two:** Appellant contends the trial court used an incorrect limiting instruction for the other crimes evidence of child pornography. The request for this instruction constituted a waiver of the standard error analysis. Although the court erred in using a modified instruction, it did not compromise the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings, thus, relief is unwarranted. **Proposition Three:** Appellant claims his six consecutive life sentences are excessive. The Court will not alter sentences within statutory limits unless they are so excessive that they shock the court’s conscience. The sentences here do not shock the conscience and are within legal limits. **Proposition Four:** The Appellant argues ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to inadmissible evidence and not requesting a proper limiting instruction. Following *Strickland v. Washington*, the Court finds no reasonable probability that the outcomes would have differed due to trial counsel's performance. **DECISION** The judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. --- **APPEARANCES** **AT TRIAL** Richard Koller, Attorney for Appellant Barbara Woltz **ON APPEAL** Nicole Dawn Herron, Attorneys for Defendant Katie Koljack, Mike Hunter, Mark Morgan, Asst. District Attorneys Sheri M. Johnson, Asst. Attorney General **OPINION BY:** Lewis, P.J. Kuehn, V.P.J.: Concur Lumpkin, J.: Concur in Results Hudson, J.: Concur Rowland, J.: Concur [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-835_1735212413.pdf)

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F-2018-850

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Here’s a summary of the case involving Johnny Aldric Samples, III, as presented in the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma: **Case Overview:** - **Appellant:** Johnny Aldric Samples, III - **Charges:** Four counts of Child Sexual Abuse, violating Oklahoma law (21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5(E)). - **Trial Outcome:** Convicted by jury; sentenced to life imprisonment on each count, with sentences to run consecutively. - **Appeal Filed Against:** The judgment and sentence. **Propositions of Error Raised by the Appellant:** 1. **Admission of Hearsay Statements:** Claims the trial court improperly admitted hearsay from child witnesses, arguing B.L. did not meet the disability requirement for hearsay exceptions. 2. **Admission of Irrelevant Evidence:** Contends the trial court admitted prejudicial evidence related to B.L.'s mother's suicide. 3. **Insufficient Evidence (B.L.):** Argues there was inadequate evidence of sexual abuse against B.L. 4. **Insufficient Evidence (C.L.):** Claims insufficient evidence to support convictions for sexually abusing C.L. 5. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:** Suggests his counsel failed to properly object to hearsay statements regarding B.L. 6. **Cumulative Errors:** Argues that the cumulative effect of errors denied him a fair trial. 7. **Consecutive Sentencing:** Contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering sentences to run consecutively, claiming it results in an excessive sentence. **Court's Analysis and Decisions:** - The court found no merit in the claims regarding hearsay evidence or the sufficiency of evidence relating to both B.L. and C.L. The analysis included verifying B.L.'s status as a disabled child, which justified the admission of her hearsay statements. - Though the court acknowledged an error in admitting evidence related to B.L.'s mother's suicide, it deemed the error harmless, as overwhelming evidence supported the convictions. - The court concluded that the convictions against C.L. were also adequately supported by credible testimony. - Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found no deficiency since no errors were present in the trial. - The cumulative error argument was rejected as no single error warranted reversal. - Finally, the court supported the trial court's sentencing decision, stating the consecutive sentences aligned with the nature of the offenses. **Conclusion:** The judgment and sentence against Johnny Aldric Samples, III, were affirmed, with the court finding no errors that warranted relief. **Concurrence:** Vice Presiding Judge Kuehn expressed disagreement with the constitutionality of the child sexual abuse statute but concurred in results based on existing law. He noted a significant change in the law due to a recent decision (A.O. v State) affecting jury instructions in similar cases and criticized the denial of a supplemental brief based on this change. For more detailed information, you can reference the full opinion [here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-850_1735154293.pdf).

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F-2018-738

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This document is a summary opinion from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals regarding the case of Keith Lorenzo Sumpter, who was convicted of Indecent or Lewd Acts with a Child Under Sixteen. Sumpter was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison and appealed his conviction on multiple grounds, asserting errors related to hearsay, the admission of previous testimony, prosecutorial misconduct, and the accumulation of errors leading to an unfair trial. The court addressed each of Sumpter's assertions: 1. **Hearsay and Affidavit**: The court ruled that the trial court did not err in excluding an affidavit by the victim's mother, LaLethia Frederick, which was deemed to be self-serving hearsay without sufficient corroborating evidence to establish its trustworthiness. 2. **Cross-Examination Issues**: The court found that there was no error in admitting Frederick's Preliminary Hearing testimony since defense counsel had ample opportunity to cross-examine her about the lewd conduct allegations. 3. **Reliability of Testimony**: The court determined that the Preliminary Hearing testimony was reliable as it was given under oath and was subject to thorough cross-examination, thereby satisfying legal standards for admissibility. 4. **Federal Due Process**: Sumpter's argument that federal due process mandated the admission of the affidavit was dismissed, as the affidavit did not meet the criteria for reliability or critical importance to his defense. 5. **Prosecutorial Misconduct**: Allegations regarding improper commentary by the prosecutor during closing arguments were evaluated and deemed insufficient to constitute grounds for a fair trial violation. 6. **Cumulative Errors**: The court concluded that because none of Sumpter's claims of error were sustained, the cumulative error argument lacked merit. Ultimately, the Court affirmed the judgment and sentence imposed by the lower court. This summary opinion highlights various legal principles regarding hearsay evidences, the confrontation rights of defendants, and the latitude allowed for prosecutorial arguments, culminating in the decision that Sumpter's trial was conducted fairly despite his claims.

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F-2019-16

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JOHNNY W. WARD,** Appellant, v. **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **Case No. F-2019-16** **FILED DEC 12 2019** **IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** LUMPKIN, JUDGE: Appellant Johnny W. Ward was tried by jury and found guilty of Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon (Count I) (21 O.S.2011, § 652) and Possession of a Firearm (Count II) (21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 1283), both counts After Former Conviction of A Felony, in the District Court of Muskogee County, Case No. CF-2017-1155. The jury recommended as punishment imprisonment for thirty (30) years in Count I and ten (10) years in Count II. The trial court sentenced accordingly, ordering the sentences to be served concurrently. It is from this judgment and sentence that Appellant appeals. Appellant must serve 85% of his sentence in Count I before becoming eligible for consideration for parole. 21 O.S.2011, § 13.1. **Appellant raises the following propositions of error in support of his appeal:** 1. The eyewitness identification of Appellant was based upon an overly suggestive, one-man show-up that violated Appellant's rights to due process and a fair trial. 2. The State's evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the crimes of Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon and Possession of a Firearm After Former Conviction of a Felony Conviction and his convictions must therefore be reversed with instructions to dismiss. 3. Appellant's sentence is excessive and should be modified. After thorough consideration of these propositions and the entire record, we have determined that under the law and the evidence no relief is warranted. **Proposition I:** Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress the in-court identification made by Ms. Davidson after an on-the-scene one person show-up. Appellant argues the pre-trial identification was unnecessarily suggestive and tainted the subsequent identification of Appellant at trial. A one man show-up is not necessarily unduly suggestive or improper. Young v. State, 2000 OK CR 17, ¶ 30, 12 P.3d 20, 34. Absent special elements of unfairness, prompt on-the-scene confrontations [between a victim and a suspect] do not entail due process violations.... Harrolle v. State, 1988 OK CR 223, ¶ 7, 763 P.2d 126, 128, quoting Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280, 1284 (D.C.Cir.1969). The one person show-up in this case was not unduly suggestive or so improper as to create a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress the identification. However, even if the show-up was unduly suggestive, the same would not automatically invalidate the subsequent in-court identification if that identification can be established as independently reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Young, 2000 OK CR 17, ¶ 31, 12 P.3d at 34. Under the circumstances of this case, we find the in-court identification reliable. As the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing into evidence the in-court identification of Appellant, this proposition of error is denied. **Proposition II:** Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon and Possession of a Firearm After Former Conviction of a Felony. He argues the State failed to show he had anything to do with the alleged crimes. Appellant asserts that the State's evidence showed only that he was in the wrong place at the wrong time. However, evidence showed that Appellant shot his victim in the knee and buttock as the victim begged for his life. Appellant then ran away from the scene, discarding the gun he used and a hoodie he was wearing. Reviewing Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Mitchell v. State, 2018 OK CR 24, ¶ 11, 424 P.3d 677, 682. Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is denied. **Proposition III:** Appellant argues that his sentence is excessive and should be modified. He asserts that while his sentence is technically within the range provided by law, it does not bear a direct relationship to the nature and circumstances of the offenses. However, Appellant's sentences were within the applicable statutory range (21 O.S.2011, §§ 652(A), 1284 and 51.1(C)). This Court will not modify a sentence within the statutory range unless, considering all the facts and circumstances, it shocks the conscience. Pullen v. State, 2016 OK CR 18, ¶ 16, 387 P.3d 922, 928. The evidence showed that despite having a prior robbery conviction, Appellant was in possession of a gun, which he used to shoot the victim multiple times as the victim begged for his life. Under these circumstances, the 30 year and 10 year sentences are not excessive. Therefore, modification of the sentences is not warranted and this proposition is denied. Accordingly, this appeal is denied. **DECISION** The JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE THOMAS H. ALFORD, DISTRICT JUDGE** **APPEARANCES AT TRIAL** BRIAN WATTS 222 N. 4TH ST. MUSKOGEE, OK 74401 COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE **APPEARANCES ON APPEAL** NICOLLETTE BRANDT OKLA. INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM P.O. BOX 926 NORMAN, OK 73070 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT **ORVIL LOGE** DISTRICT ATTORNEY TIM KING ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY MUSKOGEE CO. COURTHOUSE MUSKOGEE, OK 74401 COUNSEL FOR THE STATE **MIKE HUNTER** ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA CAROLINE E.J. HUNT ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL 313 N.E. 21ST ST. OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105 COUNSEL FOR THE STATE **OPINION BY: LUMPKIN, J.** LEWIS, P.J.: Concur KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur HUDSON, J.: Concur ROWLAND, J.: Concur --- [**Click Here To Download PDF**](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2019-16_1734781599.pdf)

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