Driving While Under the Influence Archives

C-2019-227

Post author:Staff
Post published:October 31, 2019
Post category:C

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **CYNTHIA ROWSHELL GAY,** Petitioner, **V.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Respondent. **Case No. C-2019-227** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **OCT 31 2019** **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** **SUMMARY OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI** Petitioner Cynthia Rowshell Gay, represented by counsel, entered guilty pleas as part of a plea agreement with the State to the charges of Count 1, Driving While Under the Influence, a violation of 47 O.S.2011, § 11-902, and Count 2, Driving While Under Suspension, a violation of 47 O.S.2011, § 6-303(B), in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2019-369. The Honorable Kathryn R. Savage, Special Judge, accepted the pleas on February 19, 2019. The plea agreement included a five-year sentence on Count 1, with all but the first thirty days suspended, and a one-year suspended sentence on Count 2, with the sentences running concurrently. On March 1, 2019, Petitioner filed an Application to Withdraw Guilty Plea, and a hearing was held on March 21, 2019, which resulted in the denial of her application. Petitioner claims the following error: Ms. Gay did not knowingly and voluntarily enter her plea of guilty, and thus the District Court erred when it denied her Application to Withdraw her Guilty plea. Upon thorough review of the record, including original documents, transcripts, and briefs, we find no need for reversal or modification. Our evaluation of a guilty plea focuses on its voluntary and intelligent nature (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 1969; Ocampo v. State, 1989 OK CR 38, ¶ 3). We review the denial of a petitioner's motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion (Lewis v. State, 2009 OK CR 30, ¶ 5). Petitioner acknowledged signing the Plea of Guilty Summary of Facts form, which reflected her voluntary decision to plead guilty and accept a suspended sentence. With prior felony convictions, she was familiar with the process. Her motivations for signing the plea agreement, including a desire to expedite her release from jail, do not render the plea involuntary (United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400, 404 (1st Cir. 1970)). Petitioner’s change of heart after consulting relatives does not provide grounds for withdrawal, nor does disappointment with her sentence (Miles v. U.S., 385 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1967); Lozoya v. State, 1996 OK CR 55, ¶ 44). The trial court found her plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, and its findings during the hearing on the application to withdraw were credible. The record shows that Petitioner was fully informed of and understood the consequences of her plea. Her later claim regarding misunderstanding the conditions of her suspended sentence was deemed incredible by the trial court. We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Therefore, the proposition is denied. **DECISION:** The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is DENIED. The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is AFFIRMED. **Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED to be issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.** **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY** **THE HONORABLE KATHRYN R. SAVAGE, SPECIAL JUDGE** **APPEARANCES IN DISTRICT COURT:** NICOLE BURNS, ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER HALLIE E. BOVOS, ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER 320 ROBERT S. KERR, #400 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE **APPEARANCES ON APPEAL:** RICKY LUTZ, ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY 320 ROBERT S. KERR, #505 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 COUNSEL FOR THE STATE **NO RESPONSE NECESSARY** **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **LEWIS, P.J.: Concur** **KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur** **HUDSON, J.: Concur** **ROWLAND, J.: Concur** [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2019-227_1734232520.pdf)

RE 2013-0511

Post author:Staff
Post published:April 18, 2014
Post category:RE

In OCCA case No. RE 2013-0511, Carrie Denise Stumpff appealed her conviction for revocation of her suspended sentence. In a published decision, the court decided that the trial court failed to ensure that Stumpff knowingly waived her right to an attorney, which required them to reverse the decision and send the case back to the District Court for further actions. One member of the court dissented.

S-2010-540

Post author:Staff
Post published:January 20, 2011
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2010-540, Cavner appealed his conviction for Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to uphold the district court's decision to suppress the evidence. One judge dissented. The case began when the State of Oklahoma charged Cavner with Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol. He argued that the traffic stop was not justified because there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. The district court agreed to suppress the evidence but did not dismiss the case entirely. On appeal, the State argued that the district court made an error by suppressing the evidence. When reviewing these kinds of cases, the court looks at the facts presented and defers to the trial court's findings unless something is clearly wrong. It was nighttime when Deputy Yarber observed a vehicle in the parking lot of an abandoned grocery store. He noted that the car left the parking lot in a lawful manner as he and another officer approached. The deputy did not mention any specific criminal activity and had no reason to believe something illegal was happening. Another officer had previously looked into possible drug activity in the area, but that had not been reported recently. In such situations, officers are allowed to check on people they find in unusual circumstances. However, since the vehicle drove away from the parking lot before Yarber could approach, he needed to stop it on a highway, which changes the situation from a simple question into a detention, known as a traffic stop. The law requires that a traffic stop must be supported by something more than just a hunch or general suspicion. The court explained that deputies must have reasonable suspicion to make a legal traffic stop. They look for specific facts suggesting that a crime may be occurring, which was not the case here. The deputy did not have enough evidence or reasons to suspect that Cavner was committing a crime simply because he was in the parking lot of an abandoned store late at night. The court referenced a prior case to support its decision, comparing the circumstances to those in a previous ruling where a stop was also deemed unlawful due to lack of reasonable suspicion. In Cavner's case, the court ruled that the officers did not have enough evidence to justify the traffic stop. Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court's order to suppress the evidence gathered during the stop, meaning the evidence could not be used against Cavner. The decision highlighted the importance of having proper legal grounds for police actions, ensuring that citizens' rights are protected under the law.

S-2009-719

Post author:Staff
Post published:March 22, 2010
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2009-719, the appellant appealed his conviction for Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, Second and Subsequent Offense. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's decision, which had quashed the felony charge. One member of the court dissented. Leslie Doyle was charged with multiple offenses, including a second DUI, after a traffic incident on April 1, 2001. Initially, the state claimed Doyle had a prior DUI conviction from June 17, 1998, which would elevate his charge from a misdemeanor to a felony. However, Doyle's attorney argued that since more than ten years had passed since the 1998 conviction, this should not be treated as a felony charge under Oklahoma law. After entertaining arguments from both sides, the special judge ruled in favor of Doyle, stating that because of the ten-year rule, the state could not pursue a felony charge against him. The state then appealed the decision. The core of the argument revolved around the interpretation of statutes related to DUI offenses. The state believed that the existing law allowed them to enhance the charge based on the earlier conviction if the DUI was committed within ten years, regardless of the conviction date. Meanwhile, Doyle maintained that his prior conviction had to occur within ten years of the new charge in order for it to be considered a felony. The reviewing district court confirmed the special judge's ruling, concluding that the law explicitly states convicted and not merely committed, meaning that for enhancement to apply, Doyle's prior conviction must have occurred within the ten-year timeframe, which was not the case here. Ultimately, the court found in favor of Doyle, maintaining that the specific statutes dealing with DUI enhancement supported his case. The court's opinion affirmed the lower court's decision to quash the supplemental information that would have allowed for the felony charge to proceed. A member of the court disagreed with this conclusion and expressed dissent.

F-2005-700

Post author:Staff
Post published:July 14, 2006
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2005-700, Harry Oliver West appealed his conviction for Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and Driving While License is Canceled/Suspended/Revoked. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and send the case back for a new trial. One judge dissented. West was found guilty by a jury, which decided that he should serve a total of 45 years in prison for the first offense and 1 year for the second offense, with some fines included as well. However, during the trial, the jury was not given proper instructions about what driving under the influence and driving while impaired mean. Even though West did not ask for these instructions, the court agreed that this was a significant mistake that affected the case. Due to this error, the court found that West deserved another chance to have his case heard, which means a new trial will take place. As a result, the decisions made in the trial are reversed, and the case gets remanded, which means it goes back to the lower court for a fresh start.

F 2003-1401

Post author:Staff
Post published:September 7, 2004
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F 2003-1401, Toni Lisa Dixon appealed her conviction for Driving while Under the Influence of Alcohol, second offense; resisting an officer; and failure to stop at a stop sign. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify her DUI conviction to a first offense and ordered a resentencing on that charge. The conviction for resisting an officer was affirmed, but the fine was reduced to $500. The conviction for failure to stop at a stop sign was also affirmed. One judge dissented.

F 2003-1018

Post author:Staff
Post published:June 23, 2004
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F 2003-1018, Orcutt appealed his conviction for Driving While Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor, Second and Subsequent Offense. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modify the sentence. One judge dissented. Orcutt was found guilty in a jury trial of several charges linked to driving while drunk. This happened in Creek County after a trial that lasted a few days in August 2001. The jury decided that he should spend ten years in prison and pay a big fine for his most serious crime, as well as some smaller fines for the other charges. Orcutt claimed that there were mistakes made during his trial. He said that the jury was not given the right instructions about how they should decide on the punishment. He also argued that the prosecution acted unfairly and that the jury should have been kept together without being allowed to leave during the trial. After looking at all the evidence from the trial and listening to the arguments made by both sides, the court said that Orcutt's convictions would stand. However, they agreed that the sentence needed to be changed. The jury had been instructed incorrectly about the possible punishments for Orcutt's offenses. The law said that they could not set his punishment to include both treatment and prison time at the same time. While his prison time of ten years and the fine were kept in place, the part of the punishment that required treatment and use of an ignition device was removed. The court found that some of Orcutt's other arguments about unfairness during the trial did not hold up, and no changes were made based on those claims. In conclusion, the court affirmed the main conviction but modified part of the punishment, removing some of the conditions, while agreeing on the primary penalties.

RE-2002-1077

Post author:Staff
Post published:August 25, 2003
Post category:RE

In OCCA case No. RE-2002-1077, Tracy Allen Mitchon appealed his conviction for revocation of a suspended sentence. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the revocation and send the case back to the District Court to correct the written order regarding the time Mitchon had already served. One judge dissented.

F-2002-899

Post author:Staff
Post published:July 22, 2003
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2002-899, Edward John VanWoundenberg appealed his conviction for Driving While Under the Influence (DUI) after having two or more previous convictions. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction and sentence. One judge dissented. VanWoundenberg was found guilty of DUI in a trial where a jury sentenced him to twenty years in prison. He raised several arguments in his appeal. He argued there were mistakes in the jury instructions, his sentence should be changed, a clerical error needed to be fixed, and that the combined effect of all the mistakes denied him a fair trial. The court reviewed all the information from the trial. It decided that VanWoundenberg’s case did not need to be reversed or changed, but there was a clerical mistake in the court documents that had to be corrected. The court found that the evidence did not support giving the jury instructions about lesser charges, and so the trial court acted correctly by not providing those instructions. VanWoundenberg also argued that his felony DUI sentence should not have been increased under a general law since it had already been raised under a specific DUI law due to his previous offenses. The court explained that it was legal to enhance (or increase) his sentence using a general law because he had many previous different felony convictions within the required time. The court pointed out that one of VanWoundenberg's arguments was mistaken; the rules allowed for both the specific and general laws to apply in his case. Finally, the court amended the total costs listed in the original court documents to a lesser amount due to a fee that should not have been included. In the end, the court confirmed VanWoundenberg's conviction and corrected the clerical error, but found no other issues that needed to change the outcome of the case.

F-2002-653

Post author:Staff
Post published:June 2, 2003
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2002-653, Carole Jean Arnold appealed her conviction for Driving While Under the Influence and Driving While License is Suspended. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment and modify the sentence. One judge dissented. Carole Jean Arnold was found guilty by a jury in the District Court of Payne County. The jury decided she should spend five years in prison and pay a $500 fine for driving while under the influence. For driving with a suspended license, the jury decided on one year in prison and another $500 fine. The trial judge ruled that the fines would be suspended, but Carole didn't agree with the conviction. In their review, the court looked at several issues that Carole raised. First, she argued that there was not enough evidence to prove she was intoxicated when she was driving. However, the court found that the evidence was strong enough. There were officers who testified that they smelled alcohol on her breath, noticed her speech was slurred, her eyes were bloodshot, and that she was having trouble standing up. Carole admitted to drinking alcohol before driving, which supported the jury's conclusion. Second, Carole claimed the trial court made a mistake by not correctly telling the jury about possible punishments. The court agreed that this was a mistake because the jury should have been aware of more options regarding punishment. Since the defense attorney did not object during the trial, it was still considered a major error that needed to be corrected. Because of this mistake, the court changed Carole's prison sentence to two years instead of the longer one originally given. The third issue Carole had was about a test called the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, which was used to check her level of intoxication. The court agreed that there were rules about when scientific evidence can be used at trials, and those rules were not followed when this test's results were allowed. However, the court also decided that this error was not serious enough to have changed the jury's decision, so it didn’t matter much in the end. Lastly, Carole felt her overall punishment was too harsh. Because the court already changed the length of her sentence due to the earlier mistake, they found that they did not need to make any other changes. In the end, the court upheld Carole's conviction but changed her sentence to two years in prison. One judge disagreed with modifying her sentence, believing the jury's maximum sentence was appropriate and that the results of the test were acceptable in court.

F-2000-618

Post author:Staff
Post published:August 31, 2001
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2000-618, Keith Avey appealed his conviction for Driving While Under the Influence, After Former Conviction of Driving Under the Influence. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Avey's judgment and sentence of eight years imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. However, the court requested a remand for a hearing on restitution. One judge dissented. Avey was found guilty by a jury which heard evidence that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. This included observations of his strong smell of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and unstable walking after a collision. The jury decided to give him a punishment of eight years in prison and a fine, along with restitution payment. During the appeal, Avey argued that the trial court made mistakes. He believed the court should have informed the jury about a lesser charge called Driving While Impaired. However, the appellate court ruled that the evidence against him was strong enough that not giving this instruction was acceptable. Avey also contended that the trial court should have examined the specific losses experienced by the victims before setting the restitution amount. The appellate court agreed that the trial court failed to provide this hearing, stating that the law requires the court to establish the actual losses suffered by the victims. This is why they sent the case back for a restitution hearing. Avey argued that he did not get a fair defense because his attorney didn’t challenge the order of restitution effectively. However, the court disagreed, saying that the attorney did raise objections about the amount of loss and therefore did not provide ineffective assistance. Furthermore, Avey claimed that the evidence presented was not enough to prove he was guilty. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. Finally, Avey said that the eight-year sentence was too harsh. The appellate court stated that the sentence was appropriate and in line with the law. In summary, while the appellate court upheld Avey's imprisonment and fine, it required a new examination of the restitution amount due to the trial court's failure to provide proper hearings.